

Intellect, Will, and Freedom: Leibniz and His Precursors

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Among the many puzzling features of Leibniz's philosophy, none has received more attention in the recent literature than his position on freedom. Leibniz makes his views on freedom a central theme in his philosophical writings from early in his career until its close. And yet while significant efforts have been concentrated on decoding his views on this issue, much of the discussion has focused on only one facet of Leibniz's treatment of it. I have argued elsewhere that there are at least three distinct avenues by which Leibniz approaches the issue of freedom and consequently three avenues we can follow in an attempt to understand his view. I call these the three axes of the problem of freedom.

The first axis is the one which has received the most attention in the literature and it is the axis of contingency. Leibniz is clear about the fact that free actions must be contingent. But nobody, least of all Leibniz, is unaware of the fact that many of his other philosophical commitments put this claim in jeopardy. As a result Leibniz spends a great deal of time talking about how he can preserve contingency and, thereby, freedom, in his program.

The second and third axes have received far less attention in the literature and yet together (if not severally) occupy more pages of Leibniz's writing than the first axis. The second is the divine providence axis, the third is the faculty psychology axis. Leibniz, like most of his contemporaries and predecessors, recognized that orthodoxy required that one hold that God exercises providential control over every event in nature, including free choices. The problem of course was how God could exercise such control while leaving creatures free. Leibniz had much to say about this problem and about his own view in relation to the competing positions of his day. Issues such as whether or not God could determine the creature to one particular act while still leaving the creature free were ones over which the major disputing parties disagreed, and Leibniz staked out his own position by arguing for certain theses regarding these central issues. One might think, correctly I believe, that much about Leibniz's views on freedom can be learned through texts addressing these issues. However, this axis will not be the subject of discussion here since I have treated it in some detail elsewhere.¹

The third axis also has received little attention in the recent literature, although more than has the second.² Like his predecessors and contemporaries, Leibniz cashed out the "mechanics" of free choice in terms of two faculties of the soul, the

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intellect and the will. From at least the time of St. Thomas onward, explanations of free choice were cast in terms of the operations of these faculties severally and upon one another. All of the major competing positions of the middle and late seventeenth century were cast in these terms, and as a result we can receive significant insight into Leibniz's views by looking at which views Leibniz identifies with and which he distances himself from. This will be the subject of the present essay.

In general, the problem of free choice was difficult for the orthodox Christian metaphysician because of the number of bases such an account was expected to cover for its advocate. Staking out a position on free choice meant attempting to explain how it is that intellectual beings, beings capable of deliberation about alternatives, could act in such a way that contingency was secured and further allowed the agent to retain a responsibility for actions that made them fitting subjects of praise and blame. But unlike much contemporary metaphysics aimed at the same end, the orthodox metaphysician of the seventeenth century had to explain how free choice worked not only in the human case, but in the cases of all intellectual beings in their ontology, including God, angels, demons, the blessed in heaven, the damned in hell, and so on. And, for obvious reasons, this raised not only the stakes of the discussion but the difficulty of the problem. For those bearing this burden, an account of freedom had to explain, for example, how God could have free choice despite his perfect knowledge and impeccability, how angels and the blessed (or demons and the damned) can refrain from sin without fail (or engage in it without fail), while remaining free and responsible. And such an account had to be rich enough to explain the role of passions, weakness of will, coercion, and so on, while also being able to accommodate orthodox explanations for divine providence and concurrence and the role of divine grace in choosing the good, and in salvation generally, among other requirements. And all of these requirements are exacerbated in Leibniz's case since, in addition to preserving these requirements of orthodoxy, he also had to reconcile freedom with some troubling metaphysical theses such as the principle of sufficient reason. This is no small order.

Because of the number of perils an orthodox account had to navigate around, and because such accounts were to be cast in terms of the operations of intellect and will, there were not many alternatives among which the orthodox metaphysician could choose in the mid-seventeenth century. In fact, there were, generally speaking, only three, two of which had enjoyed a long history in scholastic philosophy, the third of which was an invention of the seventeenth century. In this paper I will argue that Leibniz rejected the two older views while adopting the third with only minor alteration.

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Thus, in order to come to see how Leibniz arrives at his view, and what positions he seeks to distance himself from, it is necessary that we take a careful look at the historical development of these positions up through the middle of the seventeenth century. No one, of course, could pretend to provide a comprehensive treatment of the development of this issue from my starting point here, St. Thomas, through Leibniz in an essay such as this. Instead I propose to take a brief look at some of those significant developments along the way that are necessary for helping us understand just what it is that Leibniz accepts, and what it is that such an acceptance thereby forces him to reject. I will begin with a brief introduction to certain key facets of Aquinas' view of freedom. I will then move to the late sixteenth century where one finds two main views, both of which claim to be the rightful heirs of Thomas' position. While each of these views has interesting virtues, each view also exhibits certain serious difficulties, difficulties consistently rehearsed by advocates of the competing view. Out of this dialectic a third position, a view I will call "moral necessitarianism," emerges in the early seventeenth century, pioneered by a pair of Spanish Jesuits. These Jesuits argued that the difficulties with the other two views could be resolved by adopting this new position, one which maintained key features of the earlier views while doing away with the difficulties. In the final section I argue that Leibniz himself adopts moral necessitarianism. This is clear from the fact that he appropriates the terminology characteristic of this new school, and that he at the same time argues against the two competing positions from the sixteenth century in just the way that moral necessitarians did. As a result of seeing Leibniz situated in this historical context, we come to see just what views he tries to distance himself from and, in the process, come to have a much clearer view of just where he stands on the issues of freedom, determinism, and their compatibility.

Section I

Since all three of the competing positions I will examine claimed to find their roots in St. Thomas, I will begin with a few words on the fundamental terms and tenets of St. Thomas' position.

For Aquinas, free human action takes place through the operation of two powers of the intellectual soul, namely, the intellect and the will. The role of the intellect is to apprehend the goodness contained in the various objects available to it. The will then inclines toward these goods apprehended *sub ratione boni* and chooses among them. But when one act is chosen over another, this act must have been rationally preferable to the alternatives, otherwise the will would not be the rational appetite Aquinas claims it to be. Choosing what is apprehended as a lesser good

would indicate that the will has failed to follow the judgment of reason, something it is unable to do. Thus, for Aquinas, the will always chooses that which is judged best, at that time and in those circumstances, by the intellect. Aquinas even defends such an account in the face of the apparent counter-example of weakness of will. Since the will always chooses an object apprehended *sub ratione boni*, even the akratic is choosing something he, at that time and in those circumstances, judges to be the best and which thus appears to the will most desirable.³

But on this account, it appears as if the choice made by the will is determined by the outcome of practical deliberation. And what makes this troubling is that Aquinas argues that the intellect is not a free faculty, but a determined one. As a result, it appears that choice is subject to an intellectual determinism: the intellect, operating in a way that is itself not free, determines the choice of the will whenever it wills.

There are two ways in which Aquinas attempts to resolve this apparent difficulty. I will call these attempts at resolution the “inclination strategy” and the “psychological strategy.” To understand the inclination strategy one must first understand one further claim about the nature of the two faculties involved in choice. According to Aquinas, both the intellect and will have a certain essential orientation or tendency or inclination. For the will, it is a tendency toward goodness, and for the intellect it is a tendency toward truth. Since created goods vary in their degree of (perceived) goodness, and propositions differ in the degree of the evidentness of their truth, the inclination of the will towards perceived goods and the inclination of the intellect toward considered truths varies accordingly. These inclinings reach their upper limit when the faculties are in the presence of objects or propositions that exemplify goodness and truth in the maximal way. Objects which express goodness and truth in this way are called the *proper* or *natural* objects for the faculty. Thus, an object is *proper* or *natural* for a faculty when the faculty in question is naturally determined to choose, in the case of the will, or assent, in the case of the intellect, in the clear presence of that object. On his account, the natural object for our intellect is *Truth*, exemplified most evidently by the “first principles” such as the law of non-contradiction.⁴ It is this fundamental relationship between the intellect and its proper object which accounts for the fact that such first principles are self-evident to us. Similarly, all contingent truths are such that they cannot compel our assent in virtue of the simple fact that they do not partake in Truth in the same full-blooded fashion that necessary truths do.⁵

In the same way that the intellect is naturally determined to the truth, the will is naturally determined to the *Good*. Practically speaking, this means that if the will

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were presented with the good in its fullness, i.e., in a manner analogous to the presentation of Truth to the intellect through the first principles, it would be naturally determined to love that good.⁶ As with assent, Aquinas thinks that instances of determined willing do in fact occur, but only in the Beatific Vision. God is the only absolute good which is such that clear apprehension of Him naturally determines the love or desire of the will for that good. Yet, in our earthly life we do not know God in his fullness or “in His essence.” The only objects of will that we come across are particular goods, goods which mirror the divine goodness in so far as they instantiate the divine perfections in certain limited fashions. Because of this, the will is not naturally determined to these particular goods but is merely *inclined* towards them. It is because of this lack of determination of the will by particular goods that the will is not determined to any particular good and is thus able to act contingently and freely in choosing.⁷ Since the natural determination of the will is absent, the appetite which the will exhibits toward a particular good cannot necessitate one’s love for the object and thus one’s choice of it.

As a result, Aquinas has a wedge for preserving the freedom of choice on his account. One might say that the will chooses what the intellect presents as the best alternative for choice, but that this choice on the part of the will is not necessitated because by its very nature the will is unable to be necessitated in choosing any object other than one exhibiting perfect Goodness. Thus, while the will as matter of fact follows the judgment rendered through practical deliberation, this choice is an act that could not be necessitated given the will’s nature.

But one might argue that even this is not enough to solve the problem. If the will is bound to choose that which is apprehended to be the best by the intellect, then the will seems to be determined by the intellect, whether choice is “necessitated by the will’s nature” or not. David Gallagher has put the problem this way:

Does the agent have any control over how the options appear? This question cuts to the very heart of the matter. If we say that choice and action depend on how various goods appear to a person, and if a person does not control how those goods appear, then the person’s action will not be truly free If goods simply appear to an agent as they appear, then to characterize the will as rational appetite leads us into a form of psychological determinism, a determinism incompatible with freedom and responsibility.⁸

Such difficulties lead one to look for another (or a complementary) strategy which can resolve this difficulty. Since it seems that how the object *appears* to one fixes the way in which one chooses, Aquinas needs some account which explains how we can have some control over this process of apprehension of the objects of choice.

This leads us to what I have called the “psychological” strategy.

Since the objects available for choice in this life are limited, created goods, each one has certain aspects which are good and suitable for achieving a proposed end and certain ones which are not. Thus, I might see an act of cheating as, on the one hand, a way to achieve the good of a high grade, or, alternatively, I may view it as a sin. What determines the way in which I “see” the various alternatives available to me in a particular case? If choice is to be free, this process of coming to “see” alternatives in certain ways must be one, as noted above, over which I exercise some control, and this is just what Aquinas holds. Gallagher notes that Aquinas discusses at least three ways in which the will exercises control over the apprehensions of the intellect. First, the will can direct the intellect to ignore a certain good, i.e., one becomes willfully ignorant of that good.⁹ Second, one may voluntarily form one’s character in such a way that certain goods appear better than others. Through a process of moral habituation we train ourselves to “see” the world in a certain way, and this fixes how we apprehend the goods available for choice.¹⁰ Finally, one can willfully direct the intellect to attend to good or bad aspects of a certain alternative and thereby control the way in which it is apprehended or judged by the intellect.¹¹

Thus, the agent has control over the choice of the will because the agent has control, by means of the will, over how the intellect apprehends the various objects available for choice. So while the specification of the intellect’s act depends on the objects available to it, the *manner in which* these objects are viewed depends on direct or indirect activity of the will. The outcome of deliberation is referred to in Aquinas and later scholastics as the “last practical judgment of the intellect.” It is this judgment of reason, the end product of deliberation, that fixes the specification of the act of the will in choice.

But there are some significant difficulties for this strategy. First, as it stands, the view seems to degenerate into an infinite regress. On this view, the will chooses as it does because its choice is specified by the intellect. But this specification, if it is to be voluntary, requires that the will direct the activity of the intellect in deliberation. Yet when we consider this act of the will on the intellect, one wonders what specifies the *wills act* when it directs deliberation. Must it not be some *further* prior act of the intellect, and so on *ad infinitum*? One might try to avoid this result by simply positing that the regress ends with an act of the will to direct the intellect in the first instance. In fact, Aquinas attempts to make just this move in some places.¹² The problem for this view, however, is that for Aquinas, the will, like any other faculty, must have its powers reduced from potency to act by some entity distinct from itself, since there can be no such thing as a created self-moving

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power. But if this is the case, must not Aquinas admit that the will must be moved, even in this “first instance,” by something external to it?¹³

The account of free choice in Aquinas is as complex as it is rich. However, because of the difficulties such as those just raised, his writings on the matter lead to widely diverging traditions of interpretation. The figures I will discuss in the next two sections nonetheless agree on the broad features of the Thomistic account. They will agree that free choice is to be discussed in terms of the operation of intellect and will, that intellect and will have proper objects, Truth and the Good, respectively, which necessitate the operation of their faculty, that each choice involves deliberation and choice, that the intellect is a natural faculty, and that choice is of the last practical judgment of the intellect. What they disagree on is first, whether the last practical judgment of the intellect is last in virtue of an activity of the intellect or the will. In other words, they disagree about which faculty determines that a particular practical judgment is the one which fixes the will's choice. If the judgment which, in the end, guides the act is fixed *just in virtue of the fact that the will chooses it*, then the last practical judgment is last in virtue of an act of the will. But if the last practical judgment is fixed by the process of (the intellect's) deliberation, and the will is then bound to choose in accordance with the deliverance of this deliberation, then the last practical judgment is last in virtue of an act of intellect. Secondly, they disagree over what sense is to be given to the claim that the will can do otherwise. One side will hold that the ability to do otherwise amounts to an indifference of the will which obtains after all the necessary conditions for choice are in place, including the completion of the intellect's deliberation. The other side will hold that the ability to do otherwise means that the will could do otherwise only if deliberation had gone otherwise. On this latter account, the will has indifference only when we set aside deliberation and its deliverances. It is differing answers to these two questions that will serve to divide the later Thomistic traditions.

Section II

By the end of the sixteenth century there are two predominant views on these matters. The first is defended predominantly by Jesuits. The sixteenth century critics of this view most commonly cite Suarez and Molina as its champions. According to this view, the role of the intellect is to judge the eligibility or suitability of various means to an intended end, and the role of the will is to select among the means judged suitable. Thus, they hold that the last practical judgment of the

intellect is last in virtue of an action of the *will*, i.e., it is last because the will chooses it. Furthermore, Suarez and Molina held that freedom requires the ability to act or not act, and also to do some act or its contrary, even when all the conditions required for the agent to act are in place. Thus, they understand the ability to do otherwise much in the way contemporary libertarians do. This view is often, for better or worse, referred to as “voluntarism,” and I will stick to the convention. The competing view, held primarily amongst Dominicans and attributed by its critics to a number of sixteenth century figures, including Bañez, Bellarmine, and Cajetan, holds that the role of the intellect is to deliberate about means to an intended end and to determine the single means which is most suitable to the end. The will then chooses that means which the intellect has judged most suitable. On this view, the last practical judgment of the intellect is last in virtue of an act of the intellect. Of course, understanding the last practical judgment this way requires that one reject the voluntarist definition of freedom, at least if free choice is to be preserved. This is so because, on this second view, the will is not able to act or not act, or to do some act or its contrary, when *all* the conditions required for the agent to act are in place, since one of those “conditions” is that the intellect has settled upon a last practical judgment. As a result, freedom is consistent with determination by the intellect, since the will still has the power, albeit unexercised, to do something other than what the intellect judges to be chosen, if only the intellect had in fact proposed some other means to it. I will again abide by convention and designate this second position as “intellectualism.” In the remainder of this section I will take a brief look at how each position is defended and criticized in the period near the end of the sixteenth century.

In Disputation 19 of his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Suarez sets out the various positions that one could take on the issue of free choice when it comes to the relation of intellect and will, and then works to establish his own views against the competitors. He begins by distinguishing two types of causes: free and natural. He argues that free causes differ from natural causes in that a free cause, unlike a natural cause, is one for which, “given that all the things required for acting have been posited, [the acting faculty] is able to act and able not to act.”¹⁴ And since, he argues, there are free causes in nature, we must establish what they are and in what faculty such a power resides. Since the free act comes to be as a result of the activity of the intellect and will, freedom of choice must spring either (i) from both intellect and will, (ii) from the intellect alone, or (iii) from the will alone. The first view Suarez attributes to Durandus and will not concern us here. The second view, he says, is a position one might adopt, although he claims to know of no one who in fact holds it. Yet, he continues, the view has a certain natural affinity for another

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position that *is* endorsed by others:

[this second view] can be plausibly enough grounded in a certain position accepted by many, viz., that the will is completely determined to its choice by the judgment of the intellect in such a way that (i) in the absence of that judgment, the will cannot be determined to choose anything and (ii) once the judgment is posited, the will is unable to diverge from it or not to conform to it.¹⁵

This, of course, is the view of Suarez's main opponents in this matter, the intellectualists. Suarez argues that this view yields three consequences, all of which, he intimates, count against it since they entail that choice is not free. First, it follows that choice is not free, since once the last practical judgment is made, the will is not free to refrain from acting in those cases where the last practical judgment calls for action, or conversely is not free to act in those cases where the last practical judgment calls for one to refrain from action. Second, it follows that the will is merely a passive faculty since it is simply "acted upon" by the intellect. This entails that the will is not free since, according to Suarez, a free faculty is necessarily active and not passive. This second point is illustrated by the third: that, contrary to the intellectualists, something cannot be free simply because it has the power to act or not act. This ability can be attributed to many things, yet those things are not free. For example, he says, anything on which the will acts has such a power. My hand can move or not move but it is not free in virtue of this. Freedom requires that the power to act or refrain be an "elicited" power, i.e., one which arises from within the faculty and not from another faculty. Thus Suarez concludes that the second position and the view with which it is allied, intellectualism, ultimately fail because they entail lack of freedom.

Suarez goes on to argue against this second position (that the intellect alone is free) by claiming that since, as all admit, the intellect is naturally determined by its object, it cannot be free. Now this move seems unfair on Suarez's part because he admits with everyone else that both faculties, intellect and will, are equally determined by their proper object. So if, as St. Thomas held, the will can be free in virtue of the fact that no object is good in an unparticipated way, couldn't one make a similar argument, *mutatis mutandis*, with respect to the intellect? Suarez argues that such a move *cannot* be made in the case of the intellect for one simple reason: judgments are either determinately true or false, unlike participated goods which are truly good in some respects and not good in others.¹⁶ Thus, if there is going to be any indetermination in the intellect it would only arise because the judgment is proposed in such a way that its truth is *unclear to us*. But one wouldn't want freedom

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to hang on indetermination of this sort since, in light of the fact that God knows the truth of every proposition with perfect clarity, it would preclude divine freedom. The will, on the other hand, can be indeterminate, and thus free, even when all aspects of an object are presented to it in a perfectly clear fashion since some aspects of the object are objectively good and some objectively not so. Thus, for Suarez, divine freedom becomes a test case that works in the voluntarist's favor. Since God knows all things determinately, the indifference which grounds choice cannot be rooted in the intellect.

After establishing that freedom resides in the will alone Suarez turns to a discussion of the specific role of the intellect in choice. While he has already raised some objections against the competing intellectualist view, the attack was only indirect since it was an attack on a view to which, he says, no one was explicitly committed. As before, Suarez begins by laying out what he takes to be the only three available positions on the matter. On the first view, the role of the intellect is to form a last practical judgment which the will cannot fail to choose. Now this might not seem to be equivalent to the view criticized above, but Suarez argues here that it is. Notice that on this view, the will cannot fail to follow the last practical judgment, and this, in conjunction with the voluntarist conception of freedom, means that the will does not act freely in choosing. But if freedom is not found in the will, it must be in the intellect, and then this position actually reduces to the one criticized above. Furthermore, unlike his discussion in the previous section, Suarez can and does attribute this view to specific figures, specifically, Cajetan, Capreolus, Conrad, and, with specific textual references, to Medina, Bellarmine, and Javellus. While he says that his earlier arguments are sufficient to dispense with this view, he provides a further argument here. The argument, presented in the form of a dilemma, begins with the claim that either the judgment of the intellect proceeds necessarily given the objects available to it, or the judgment of the intellect is free. But the former is unacceptable since if the judgment of the intellect is not free, and the will is necessitated in its choice of the last practical judgment, then the act is not free in any respect and thus is not a free act.¹⁷ But if the judgment is free then it is free either as elicited by the intellect, or as commanded by the will.¹⁸ But the first answer is unacceptable since, first, all agree that the intellect is a natural and not a free faculty, and second, the arguments of the earlier section show this position to be untenable. And, as I have shown above, he argues that if one were to deny this view and hold that the intellect is free, other unacceptable consequences arise. The second answer, however, entails an infinite regress. For in this case, the intellect is determined in its judgment by an elicited free choice of the will, and this choice must in turn be

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elicited by a further free judgment by the intellect, which requires a further elicited free choice of the will, and so on. Thus, this first position ultimately ends either in determinism or an infinite regress.

The second position discussed on the relation between intellect and will in choice holds that, (i) there is some first free act of the will which occurs without a prior judgment of the intellect, and (ii) the will is never determined by the judgment of the intellect unless it wills to be so determined beforehand. This is Suarez's own position.

The third position, which he does not attribute to anyone, is a modification of the first position. As we saw, the second horn of the dilemma raised for the first position holds that the intellect is free in so far as commanded by the will, while the will is free in the elicited sense. The problem, as we saw, is that such a view results in an infinite regress. This third position accepts this view but denies that there is a regress. Instead the will and intellect "mutually cause" one another's states simultaneously and thus can act on each other without generating a regress. On this view, the will is an *efficient* cause of the judgment of the intellect, while the intellect is a *final* cause of the will's choice. Suarez describes the view this way:

Finally, some claim that (i) the practical judgment in question is free because of the will's loving the object, that (ii) the will loves the object because of such a judgment, and that (iii) these two acts are causes of one another in different genera of causality, since (a) the will determines the intellect to judge practically in such-and-such a way and (b) the intellect determines the will to such-and-such a thing. Nor is it contradictory (they claim) for these two things mutually to precede and follow one another, since this happens in different genera of causes. For the will determines the intellect as an efficient cause, whereas the intellect determines the will as a final cause.¹⁹

It is worth noting that Suarez may take this position to be St. Thomas' own.²⁰ But the position is quite puzzling. What does it mean to say that these two faculties are mutually determining but in different genera of causes? This puzzlement is shared by Suarez who begins his criticism of the view by arguing that,

(i) it is not grounded in anything and (ii) it is not necessary for anything; and from another angle (iii) one can scarcely conceive of this mutual priority and motion between the two acts in question.²¹

And from this Suarez moves straight-away into an argument that this mutual determination is simply impossible. For how can it be possible, no matter what the genera of the causes involved, that the will be determined by a judgment of the intellect when that very judgment first requires the act of will that springs from it?

Thus, once again, Suarez takes himself to have demonstrated that the intellect makes its judgment as a natural and not a free faculty, and that the role of the will is to select among the means judged by the intellect to be suitable or fitting for achieving the end. Thus, while the will requires a prior judgment on the part of the intellect, since it must have some means which have been judged eligible from which to choose, it does not require a last practical judgment which necessitates the choice of the will either as efficient or final cause.

In sum, Suarez claims that since acts are free, one of the faculties involved in choice must be free. But if we count the intellect as free, we fall into the dilemma outlined above. Furthermore, it is hard to see what the source of the indifference in the intellect would be since, unlike objects which partake of the good in limited respects, judgments are either true or false. And yet, if the intellect is not free, the will must be, and in the voluntarist's sense.

As a result, we see that Suarez has a clear line on the two questions raised at the end of the last section. With respect to the last practical judgment of the intellect, it is last not because of any determining activity of the intellect, but by virtue of the fact that it is the one chosen by the will. Second, the freedom of the will to do otherwise means that when all the requisite conditions for acting are in place ("have been posited") the will is still free to act or not act, and to do some act or its contrary.

Intellectualists of this period argued, on the contrary, that there is something metaphysically suspect about the account that the voluntarists offer on the nature of choice. They argued that unless the last practical judgment i) is last in virtue of some act of the intellect and ii) fixes the choice of the will, there is no way to make metaphysical sense of the movement of the will from being receptive to many alternatives to finally making a choice of one of them. On this view, what could move the will to make the final choice?²² Bellarmine develops this argument as follows: Either that which moves the will to the final choice is something outside of the will, i.e., the last practical judgment, or it is the will itself. But it cannot be the latter since the will is a mere "blind appetite" for things presented as good. If the intellect presents many goods, the will merely inclines towards all of them but cannot fix on or choose any of them. For if it could fix on one of them on its own, it would have the power of reducing itself from potency to act all on its own, something which is impossible in light of the general (Aristotelian) principle that whatever is reduced from potency to act, is so reduced by something already in act in the relevant respect.²³ And what else could fill this role besides the last practical judgment which judges that some particular means is to be chosen here and now?²⁴ In other words, they argued, the voluntarists appear to want to make the will a full-fledged *self-moved mover*.

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Thus since something distinct from the will is required to “reduce” the will from potency to act, it must be the last practical judgment of the intellect. But while the will is bound to the last practical judgment in this way, as it must be, still the will can be free since it has the power in itself to choose other means if the intellect were to judge them more suitable than the means in fact judged best.

At the end of the sixteenth century, then, there are two well-developed scholastic positions on freedom, intellectualism and voluntarism. While each has certain attractive features, each also was subject to certain objections. Against the intellectualists it was argued that any version of the view that made sense ran up against one of two difficulties. First it seemed that the view reduced to determinism since it appeared to make the will subject to the intellect—which is a natural, not a free, faculty. If one tried to escape this conclusion by making the operation of the intellect dependent on the operations of the will, then the view seems to land in an infinite regress, since the intellectualists required that each act of will be preceded by a judgment of the intellect to move it. Against the voluntarists it was argued that the attending conception of freedom was impossible since it required that the will be reduced from potency to act by itself, making it a self-moved mover.

Section III

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the difficulties facing the intellectualist view were clear. Any plausible defense of the view would have to show how one could avoid determinism on the one hand, and the vicious infinite regress on the other. How might this be done? One way would be to focus on what I called above Aquinas’ “inclination strategy.” Recall that Aquinas held that the proper object of the will is the Good, i.e., God seen in His essence, and that only the proper object can necessitate the will’s operation. Created or participated goods can only incline the will with a strength proportional to the degree of goodness judged to be in them. One could then argue that if a certain created good is presented by the intellect as best, that object could never necessitate the choice of the will, even though the will might find all lesser goods correspondingly less attractive, and thus would never choose these lesser goods.

But following this suggestion seems to have the result that there is a causal connection between the last practical judgment and choice of the will. If the will infallibly chooses the last practical judgment, then it is hard to see how the relation here could be anything other than causal. But this is just to fall back on one of the two horns of the dilemma proposed by the voluntarists. Might one instead i) affirm that the will does infallibly follow the last practical judgment but also ii) deny that

the last practical judgment *causally determines* the choice of the will? The two proponents of what I am calling the third main view, Diego Ruiz de Montoya and Diego Granado, argued in just this way and they proposed this development of the intellectualist position as an alternative to both the Jesuit voluntarist position and the prevailing intellectualist view. They claimed that while the choice of the will follows infallibly given the last practical judgment, this relationship fell short of causal determination. They described the modality governing the relationship between last practical judgment and choice as *necessitas moralis*, moral necessity.

Ruiz de Montoya and Granado adopted this terminology of “moral necessitation” and used it to give a general characterization of the relationship between last practical judgment and choice. Like the intellectualists, Ruiz holds that the will has a natural inclination to love the good, and thus loves objects of choice as they are presented *sub ratione boni*. As a result of the will’s nature, it is metaphysically and causally impossible for it to choose something unless it is represented as a good in some measure.²⁵ From this natural inclination to the good springs inclinations toward or motives in favor of various goods presented by the intellect, where the strength of the inclination or motive is proportional to the degree of good represented to be in the object. But while it is causally or physically impossible for the will to act contrary to its natural love for the good, it is not physically impossible for the will to choose in accordance with a weaker motive:

If one has an inclination as a result of deliberation . . . to perform a certain act, the will nonetheless retains the physical power (*physicam potestatem*) to operate against any particular inclination.²⁶

And this physical power to resist any inclination is grounded for Ruiz in the fact that the will cannot be necessitated by finite goods:

Considering the object and the cognition of it, the will is not caught up as [it would be] in a clear vision of the infinite good [i.e., God], but rather it can, if it wills, change the soul so that it considers bad facets of this object or so that it considers some good facets of omitting this object or some good facets of some contrary act.²⁷

And yet despite the fact that the will has this physical power to act contrary to any inclination or motive, there are what seem to be clear cases in which we still cannot fail to will a certain act. Ruiz and other moral necessitarians provide a steady stream of examples to emphasize this point. If a starving man is shown the finest food and there are no obstacles to eating it, he will eat.²⁸ If God were to reveal to a pious man that reciting one Ave Maria would lead to the conversion of all of humanity, the man would do it.²⁹ If a man is sane and content, he will do whatever is necessary to save

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his life when it is endangered.³⁰ If a poor man is offered great riches at no expense to himself, he will do what he needs to do to obtain it.³¹ If a mother is sane and knows that available medicine will cure her child, she will administer it.³² And so on.

It is with respect to just such cases that Ruiz and Granado invoke this new modality of moral necessity. Such actions will infallibly be performed under such circumstances even though, given the nature of the will, it is physically possible for the will to refrain from the act. As a result, a will that is morally necessitated in this choice of A still retains the power to do non-A:

For a thing which is necessary simpliciter is diametrically opposed to liberty, because it wholly excludes the possibility of its opposite. On the contrary, moral necessity leaves the absolute possibility of the opposite untouched, and thus liberty is taken care of.³³

And yet while choosing the perceived lesser good is still in the power of the will it is something which never in fact happens:

For this is the essence of moral infallibility that the will is able to fail to perform this [act], though as a matter of fact it never does.³⁴

Those things which are morally necessary have this condition, that although they can fail to exist, these very things are always future, for if some one of these things were to fail to obtain, they would not, by this very fact, be morally necessary . . .³⁵

As is clear from some of the passages above, the application of moral necessity is not restricted merely to the anthropological examples of free choosing. Ruiz and Granado also apply moral necessity to the divine case, arguing that in those cases in which God must choose among alternatives, one of which is clearly the best, God's choice of the best is necessary, even though only morally.

God always and infallibly wills the good, which in the order of the universe of things is simply the best. . . . although this choice is physically and absolutely free, nevertheless it is infallible and morally necessary.³⁶

that God wills the best, although it is not physically necessary, but absolutely free... is still morally necessary.³⁷

And it is easy to see how this modality might be applied in all sorts of cases in which one wants to claim that a certain event is inevitable, while also wanting to deny that the event comes about through a causal necessity. So, for example, moral necessity is applied not only to the kinds of cases described above, but to the case of God's bringing about the Incarnation in order to redeem fallen humanity, the occurrence of the original sin in humanity, and the occurrence of sin in the life of each created human.³⁸

Moral necessity then is not inimical to freedom because it merely requires that the will accept that towards which it is most inclined. And this sort of necessitation is benign because (i) the inclination which moves the will in such cases is not necessitating *per se*, something true only of the will's inclination toward its proper object, and (ii) the inclination which moves the will would not have moved the will if there had been some other greater perceived good available.

As Sven Knebel notes, the moral necessitarian's picture was generally rejected in the first half of the seventeenth century. This was due in large measure, he claims, to the fact that the phrase "moral necessity" was originally used in the context of discussions of weakness of will. In particular, as mentioned above, the phrase was used to describe the will's inclination toward the desire induced by passions in *akrasia*.³⁹ Thus, when the term was applied to God's choosing, many were reluctant to consider the view seriously. Even before the view was defended in print, arguments were being raised against it and the negative reaction continued until mid-century.⁴⁰ Critics of the view charged either that moral necessitation was too strong or too weak. It was too weak, argued some, since God's essential perfection necessitates His choosing the best, where the necessitation here is metaphysical. Others argued that it was too strong since moral necessitation, they claimed, either amounts to physical necessitation, turning God "into a machine," thus destroying divine freedom, or, when applied to the doctrine of creation, makes God "subject" to creatures since there is something about the goodness of the creatures that would then infallibly move God to create them. After mid-century, however, the view began to generate a wider following. These later advocates of the view advanced and refined it in a number of ways. I would like to conclude this section by looking at two of these refinements.

The first involves a codification of the notion of moral necessity so that it is clearly set off from both physical and metaphysical necessity. One of the earliest texts I have found which attempts to define the three species of necessity appears in 1670 in a work by the widely known Sebastian Izquierdo. Izquierdo distinguishes them as follows:

Thus, a subject has a metaphysical necessity to act when . . . if it failed to happen, two contradictories would be given, which is certainly repugnant. Something is physically necessary, however, when it could not fail to happen naturally and without a miracle, even if it could happen miraculously. Thus, finally, something is morally necessary when, by way of inclination, that which usually, or always, or almost always is accustomed to occur, cannot fail to happen, even if it can fail absolutely or in light of a law of nature.⁴¹

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Izquierdo goes on to argue that within moral necessity there are three degrees, supreme, middle, and least, only the first of which is applicable in the case of willing and choosing the best. He characterizes this supreme variety as follows:

... it is supreme when the subject itself, and in this place, is necessitated to the act such that when situated with the same circumstances and things, it never happens without the act occurring.⁴²

So, where A is some event or state of affairs, we can say that A is metaphysically necessary if A's failure to occur entails a contradiction. A is physically necessary, if A will occur unless it is prevented by a miracle. A is morally necessary (in the supreme variety, i.e., when applicable to the choice of the best) when (i) the will is inclined towards A, (ii) the will is inclined towards A counterfactually implies that A is willed, and (iii) it is metaphysically and physically possible that not-A.

This first development reflects a natural extension of the program defined by Ruiz and Granado in the early part of the century. But later advocates of the view take moral necessity and employ it in a stricter sense. This second development is important, especially since it is this later version of the doctrine, I will argue, that Leibniz adopts.

Ruiz, Granado, and their followers were willing to admit, as their examples show, that there are cases in which motives can morally necessitate the will, while leaving the act of the will physically contingent. But they did not think that *every* choice of the will was morally necessitated. Moral necessitation of the will occurs only in cases like those noted above, viz., cases in which one motive is overwhelmingly stronger than its competitors. In cases where the motives for the available courses of action are of roughly equal strength, Ruiz and Granado side with their Jesuits brothers in endorsing an active indifference on the part of the will that allows choosing any of the roughly equivalent motives.⁴³ Some later figures, however, adopt a stronger account of moral necessitation according to which a) the will cannot choose unless one motive is stronger than all the others and b) moral necessitation occurs every time there is one motive which is in the least measure stronger than the competing motives. This is the view found in, for example, the work of French Franciscan Jeronimo de Sousa.⁴⁴

Sousa, like Ruiz and Granado, makes it clear that moral necessitation is a form of necessity that applies to the will in choice. Further, he is explicit that this form of necessitation differs from both physical (efficient causal) necessity, and metaphysical necessity.⁴⁵ But unlike Ruiz and Granado, Sousa claims that when one object of choice is represented as being better than the others, there is a moral necessity to choose that one:

When the will is in equilibrium, for example, when out of the all the connected features of the case it is neither inclined nor averse to some food, the smallest reason or circumstance would suffice for necessitating it and luring it to embrace one part of the contradiction [i.e., one of the alternatives]. . . . You object that in this case this meager amount of goodness in the object certainly suffices to move and determine the will, but it does not seem to be prove from this fact that it will be necessitated. I respond: By this very fact that some object efficaciously moves the will it necessitates it morally.⁴⁶

Furthermore, Sousa claims that there is a moral necessitation in every choice of the will:

You ask . . . whether the will, whenever it acts, always acts in a morally necessitated way. . . . I respond affirmatively, for this necessarily agrees with the will; just as it is necessary that the will have the good for its motive object when it operates, for this good both lures and moves and, and also predetermines and necessitates it.⁴⁷

Even in those cases in which we believe ourselves to be in equilibrium with respect to two or more choices, Sousa claims we are simply mistaken:

I respond that even in those cases of [so-called] equilibrium, the will operates by being morally necessitated. For if we do not experience any great force or efficacy in the enticing or attraction of the object, it is because the force is not great absolutely in itself; still it remains the case that it is great with respect to the state and disposition of the will excited at that time which is sufficient for it to be morally necessitated.⁴⁸

Thus, in Sousa, the doctrine of moral necessity finds its strongest expression. The will, the appetite for good, chooses only objects represented *sub ratione boni* and among those objects chooses the best. And this requirement of choosing the best alternative seems to spring naturally from the characterization of the will as a faculty which loves the good by its nature, and is necessitated in the strongest sense to love the highest good, God seen in His essence. When the will is in equilibrium with respect to two choices, then, it seems quite plausible to argue that the will is simply unable to choose. Thus, all instances of choice require that there be a preponderating good. And this choice of the preponderating good by the will is neither metaphysically necessitated (such that its failing to obtain entails a contradiction), nor physically necessitated (such that only a miracle could prevent its occurrence), but only necessitated in this weakest, moral sense.

The doctrine of moral necessity continued to be actively defended at least until the mid-eighteenth century. However, the doctrine was most actively debated from

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1630 to the end of the century. During the second half of the century the doctrine was widely known, was a staple in scholastic discussions of creation, and was universally discussed by philosophers who were schooled in Spain, or who were students or colleagues of such.⁴⁹ However, the doctrine never enjoyed wide acceptance and according to Grua, the doctrine that God was morally necessitated in creating was finally condemned by the Catholic Church.⁵⁰

Section IV

Anyone with even a passing acquaintance with Leibniz's writings on freedom, especially those texts which concern the issue of freedom from the perspective of Leibniz's faculty psychology, cannot fail to notice the parallels between his views and those of the moral necessitarians. My purpose in this final section is to argue that these parallels are not merely coincidence. I will begin with a general discussion of Leibniz's doctrine of freedom, focusing on those texts which concern the faculty psychology axis of his view. Through this I will show that Leibniz's views are the same as that of the moral necessitarians with only minor modifications. I will then look at a final bit of external evidence that argues in favor of the claim that Leibniz in fact adopted the view of the moral necessitarians.

As we will see, Leibniz was well aware of the competing scholastic theories on the operation of the intellect and will in free choice and like them, he casts his theory of action in terms of these faculties and how they cooperate in the free act. Furthermore, he argues for his own view against the background of what he sees as two inferior scholastic positions, those of the voluntarists and intellectualists. Like both of them, Leibniz affirms that the two faculties of intellect and will are real, distinct faculties of the soul which participate in the free human act. Like them Leibniz also acknowledges that each faculty has a distinctive orientation, one towards truth, the other towards good, and that each has a proper object towards which they are necessitated.⁵¹

Further, like them, Leibniz argues that the role of the intellect in the free act is deliberation, the role of the will, choice. But Leibniz is transparently clear that the role of the will is not, as the voluntarists held, to select among means judged eligible in deliberation. The problem with this position, according to Leibniz, is two-fold. First, echoing one of the intellectualist criticisms, this view seems to make the will into a faculty which deliberates *after* deliberation. The following passage comes from a section of the *Theodicy* in which Leibniz is responding to the voluntarist view:

If the will is to judge, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the understanding or the sense offer it, it will need another understanding in itself, to understand what is offered. The truth is that the soul, or the thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations, and decides according to predominance of representations modifying its active force, in order to shape the action.(emphasis mine)⁵²

But secondly, and more importantly, the voluntarist position requires that the will be able to choose among means judged equally suitable, or to select means which are judged less suitable. In either case, the will exhibits the ability to choose without sufficient reason, and this, not surprisingly, Leibniz will not allow. It was freedom of this sort, freedom which violated the principle of sufficient reason, that Leibniz called the freedom of equipoise, and he rejected it without exception:

By this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the Molinists were much embarrassed. They were asked . . . how it is possible that [a choice] should finally result there from a determination for which there is no source: to say with Molina that it is the privilege of the free cause is to say nothing, but simply to grant that cause the privilege of being chimerical.⁵³

Notice that this criticism is much akin to the one raised by intellectualists such as Bellarmine who argued that the voluntarist view requires, *per impossibile*, that the will be a self-moved mover.

Thus, Leibniz argues that the will must be made determinate in its choice by something distinct from the will. However, he differs from the intellectualists in two respects. First, he does not think that the sufficient reason which accounts for choice is always the last practical judgment of the intellect. All free beings are bound to choose in accordance with their strongest inclination, and in the ideal case, represented in God and the blessed, the strongest inclination is found in the last practical judgment. However, other free beings are subject to certain hindrances which can prevent the last practical judgment from having sway over all of the inclinations to which the agent is subject. For such agents, Leibniz denies that the last practical judgment always determines the choice of the will:

I think it is only God's will that will always follow the judgments of the understanding: all creatures are subject to some passions, or to perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call *adequate ideas*. And although in the blessed passions always tend toward the true good, by virtue of the laws of Nature and the system of things pre-established in relation to them, yet this does not always happen in such a way that they have perfect knowledge of that good. . . . As for us, in addition to these judgments of the understanding,

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of which we have an express knowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses, and these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of which we are not always aware. These movements often thwart the judgment of the practical understanding.⁵⁴

Here Leibniz not only tells us that the last judgment does not always determine the choice; he also indicates some of the factors which can thwart it: passions and imperceptible inclinations, elsewhere equated with unconscious perceptions. Of course this innovation does not help Leibniz respond to the main charge brought against the intellectualists. Intellectualists were charged with destroying freedom because choice, on their view, is the act of a will determined by an intellect which is in turn determined in its deliberation. Leibniz is in no better shape here, since on his modified view the will is determined either by the last practical judgment, or by the passions or unconscious perceptions over which one has no control. However, Leibniz resists this voluntarist criticism, arguing that this sort of determination is compatible with freedom. It is this very objection that he addresses below:

The [critic of Leibniz's view] sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who believe that the will is prompted by the judgment of the understanding, or by anterior inclinations of the desires, to resolve upon the course it adopts. But [the critic] confuses these authors with those who assert that the will is prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity, and who maintain that the person who wills has no power over his volitions: that is he confuses a Thomist with a Spinozist. . . . Thence he imputes to them the opinion that there is therefore no such thing as contingency, and that all is connected by an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy manner of reasoning . . .⁵⁵

Leibniz then points out that the resolution of this difficulty was provided just a few pages earlier in the *Theodicy* where he wrote:

. . . one is justified in making a great difference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good, and which is *termed moral*, even existing in relation to God, and that blind necessity whereby, according to Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr. Hobbes, things exist without intelligence and without choice, and consequently without God. . . . moral necessity contains an obligation imposed by reason, which is always followed by its effect in the wise. This kind of necessity is happy and desirable, when it is prompted by good reasons to act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute would subvert piety and morality.⁵⁶

Thus, Leibniz differs from the intellectualists in this second respect, siding with the moral necessitarians, in introducing the moral modality to govern the relationship

between the inclinations of the will and its choice. And it is worth noting that this is no stray remark. There are a number of passages in which Leibniz's thought mirrors that of the moral necessitarians. For example,

But provided that i) it is understood that necessity and possibility, taken metaphysically and strictly, depends solely on this question, whether the object in itself, or that which is opposed to it implies a contradiction or not; and that ii) one takes into account that contingency is consistent with the inclinations, or reasons which contribute toward causing determination by the will; provided that iii) one also knows how to distinguish between necessity and determination or certainty, between metaphysical necessity, which admits of no choice, presenting only one single object as possible, and moral necessity, which constrains the wisest to choose the best; finally, provided iv) that one is free of the chimera of complete indifference, which can only be found in the books of philosophers, and on paper (for they cannot even conceive the notion in their heads, or prove its reality by an example in things) one will easily escape from a labyrinth. . . . A Thomist and even a wise Jansenist will content himself with certain determination, without going on to necessity: and if someone goes so far, the error may perhaps lie only in a word. A wise Molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to necessity, but this does not exclude prevailing inclinations.⁵⁷

Thus, Leibniz holds that God, the angels, and the blessed are all morally necessitated to choose in accordance with the last practical judgment of the intellect. But Leibniz goes even further than that, arguing that all other free beings are governed by moral necessity as well. However, what other free beings are morally bound to is not the last practical judgment but the strongest inclination arising from conscious deliberation, unconscious perceptions, and passions together:

We must also distinguish between a necessity which takes place because the opposite implies a contradiction (which necessity is called logical, metaphysical, or mathematical) and a necessity which is called moral, whereby a wise being chooses the best, and *every mind follows the strongest inclination*.⁵⁸

Leibniz's general point is that all free creatures are in the same boat, i.e., they are all bound, morally necessitated, to follow the prevailing inclination, it just so happens that for God, the angels, and the blessed, the prevailing inclination is always found in the last practical judgment while this is not the case for other free beings. Thus we see Leibniz frequently making the point, in keeping with his commitment to the principle of sufficient reason, that all free choices require determination, albeit a determination consonant with freedom:

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For no inclination is given in the freely acting mind which is so great that the act follows from it necessarily. [Still] in every agent, immediately before the action, something must hold from which the action certainly follows given the present circumstances. . . .⁵⁹

In this way then Leibniz thinks that freedom and the principle of sufficient reason are reconciled. Each free choice has a sufficient reason, but the way in which the sufficient reason determines the choice is benign, since, while the choice is (morally) inevitable given the past, it is an inevitability which does not destroy freedom:

And therefore I say that motives incline without necessitating and that there is certainty and infallibility but not an absolute necessity in contingent things. . . .

And I have shown sufficiently in my *Theodicy* that this moral necessity is a good thing, suitable to the divine perfection, and suitable to the great principle . . . which is the need of a sufficient reason, whereas absolute and metaphysical necessity depends on . . . the principle of identity or contradiction.⁶⁰

Thus, in light of Leibniz's commitment to the principle of sufficient reason and the need for a robust account of freedom, the position of the moral necessitarians was a perfect match. Like the intellectualists, the moral necessitarians agreed that the will could not be a self-moved mover, and that something distinct from the will had to determine the choice of the will among the alternatives. And the doctrine of moral necessity gave Leibniz a way of preserving such sufficient reasons without surrendering the freedom that orthodoxy required.

There are two sorts of objections that are likely to be raised against this interpretation of Leibniz. The first is this. It is frequently held that while Leibniz does employ the term "moral necessity," its function is merely deontic. That is, an act is morally necessary if an agent must perform it to be counted as good. Thus, some hold, when Leibniz speaks of God, the angels, and the blessed as morally necessitated, he simply means that they infallibly live up to that which is required of them to be counted as good; they never do wrong. Further, the critic argues, this is why Leibniz only applies moral necessity to those beings who infallibly do what they ought.⁶¹

There is no doubt that Leibniz sometimes uses the phrase moral necessity in a purely deontic manner.⁶² But there is also no doubt that he sometimes uses it in contexts where it cannot be understood in this deontic fashion. As we saw above, Leibniz says that it is by way of a moral necessity that "a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination."⁶³ However, the point is made emphatically clear when Leibniz uses the term to apply not only to the choice of the

best by God and the blessed, and to the choice of the prevailing inclination in others, but also to the sinning of the demons and the damned:

It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions, such as that I have frequently urged between the necessary and the certain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. It is the same with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose opposite is contingent, even as that whose opposite is impossible, is necessary. . . . It may be said in a certain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin; that *the devils and the damned should sin*; that God himself should choose the best; that man should follow the course which all things considered attracts him most. But this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kind called logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite implies a contradiction. (emphasis mine)⁶⁴

Surely the use of “moral necessity” here is inconsistent with the deontic use of it on other occasions.⁶⁵

A second objection that might be raised against my claim that Leibniz adopted, with minor modification, the views of the moral necessitarians is this: the moral necessitarians introduce the new modality as a way of preserving creaturely choice from both metaphysical and physical necessitation, but Leibniz opposes moral necessity only to metaphysical necessity and thus, unlike the moral necessitarians, is likely using moral and physical necessity interchangeably.⁶⁶ This is especially likely in light of the fact that Leibniz believed that all physical states of a substance were physically necessitated by prior physical states of the substance. And since corporeal states of a substance are merely well-founded phenomena, at least for the mature Leibniz, this same modality must surely govern the relationship between the successive states at the monadic level. But notice then that every monadic state is physically determined by the prior state and thus moral necessity and physical necessity must be one and the same.

Grua, for example, holds that moral and physical necessity are one and the same for Leibniz, as do all of those, that I know, who argue that Leibniz is a compatibilist (in a contemporary sense).⁶⁷ Leibniz seemed to be under the impression that Clarke was pushing a similar objection in sections 1 and 2 of his Fourth Reply. Thus, in two places in his Fifth Paper, he responds to it. In both places Leibniz argues that while the two spheres, mental and physical, are harmonized, they operate via different laws, one physical, the other moral:

It is true that, according to me, the soul does not disturb the laws of the body, nor the body those of the soul; and that the soul and the body do not only agree together, the one acting freely, according to the rules of final causes, and the

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other acting mechanically, according to the rules of efficient causes. But this does not derogate from the liberty of our souls; as the author here will have it. For, every agent which acts with choice in accordance with final causes, is free, though it happens to agree with an agent acting only by efficient causes without knowledge, or mechanically; because God, foreseeing what the free cause would do, did from the beginning regulate the machine in such manner that it cannot fail to agree with the free cause. . . . All the natural forces of bodies are subject to mechanical laws; and all the natural forces of spirits are subject to moral laws. The former follow the order of efficient causes; the latter follow the order of final causes. The former operate without liberty, like a watch; the latter are followed with liberty although they agree with that watch-like entity [i.e., the body], which another cause, free and superior, has adapted to them beforehand.⁶⁸

Notice that not only is it the case that different laws govern the operation of the physical body and the mind, but that the latter are established by God in such a way that they accommodate the choices of the former. Thus there is a sense, even on my interpretation, according to which Leibniz is a compatibilist, although it is compatibilism of an odd sort. On this view, free choices of minds, which are made by minds that are both morally necessitated and free, are harmonized with bodies whose states follow from prior states by way of physically necessary natural laws. But this does not mean that Leibniz would agree to the sort of compatibilism according to which the mind's choice itself is both free and causally determined via prior states.⁶⁹

Overall, I think that the texts make it clear that Leibniz adopts the view of the moral necessitarians and that he believes that such a view allows him to preserve freedom, on the one hand, and the principle of sufficient reason on the other. For those who are still skeptical of the case I have made from the texts, let me offer two final reasons why casting Leibniz as a moral necessitarian seems to be the right way to go.

First, seeing Leibniz in this way helps us to make sense of a number of features of Leibniz's work that are otherwise puzzling. While I think there are many such features, I will mention two here.⁷⁰ The first is that understanding Leibniz this way makes sense of an essay that others have argued makes little if any sense for Leibniz, the essay entitled by Couturat "Necessary and Contingent Truths." There are many strange passages in this text but one of the most frequently cited is this:

From this it can be understood what is that 'indifference' which accompanies freedom. Just as contingency is opposed to metaphysical necessity, so

indifference excludes not only metaphysical but also physical necessity. It is in a way (*quodammodo*) a matter of physical necessity that God should do everything in the best possible way. . . . It is also a matter of physical necessity that those confirmed in the good . . . should act in accordance with virtue Again, it is a matter of physical necessity that something heavy tends downwards But it is not a matter of physical necessity that men should choose something in this life, however specious and apparent a good may be; though there is sometimes a very strong presumption to that effect. It indeed may never be possible for there to be an absolute metaphysical indifference, such that the mind is in exactly the same state with respect to each contradictory, and that anything should be in a state of equilibrium with, so to speak, its whole nature. . . . Yet the mind has this much physical indifference, that it is not even subject to physical necessity, far less metaphysical; that is, no universal reason or law of nature is assignable from which any creature, no matter how perfect and well-informed about the state of the mind, can infer with certainty what the mind will choose—at any rate naturally, without the extraordinary concurrence of God.⁷¹

Even on the interpretation I offer here there are some puzzling lines in this passage.⁷² But notice that if we view Leibniz as a moral necessitarian, this passage becomes far less puzzling than it is on other readings. It is not at all puzzling, or even surprising, that Leibniz, who endorses the view of the moral necessitarians, would argue that free choices are both physically and metaphysically contingent. On the contrary, it is to be expected. While moral necessity is not mentioned here, it is clear that Leibniz is not here toying with libertarianism, or better, voluntarism, as some have argued, because he denies the possibility of equilibrium. Thus, unless we say that Leibniz is working towards moral necessitarianism, the passage seems to make no sense.

Further, understanding Leibniz this way makes sense of a puzzling view he endorsed concerning divine freedom. In number of passages Leibniz argues that even though the divine will infallibly chooses the best, the choice is free simply because there are other possible sequences of things. This is the widely discussed “possible-in-its-own-nature” account of the contingency of choice. For example, in *Theodicy* §45 Leibniz says that God, the angels, and the blessed always choose the apparent good, and then says,

God fails not to do the best, but he is not constrained to do so: nay, more, there is no necessity in the object of God’s choice, for another sequence of things is equally possible. For that very reason the choice is free and independent of

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necessity, because it is made between several possibles, and the will is determined only by the preponderating goodness of the object.⁷³

Many have commented that this is an odd response because it seems wholly irrelevant.⁷⁴ Leibniz's critic is arguing that God, who must choose the best, is thereby determined in his choice as long as the world chosen is the best world necessarily. So, to say that there are other options possible-in-themselves seems to miss the argument of the critic entirely. It is well-known that Leibniz tries out two different ways of responding to the problem. The first is to deny the claim that the actual world is the best world necessarily.⁷⁵ The second is to deny that it is necessary that God choose that which is best, as in the passage above. There is some controversy over which view Leibniz favors but one can plausibly argue that Leibniz moves away from the former move and toward the latter as his career progressed.⁷⁶ But notice that if we attribute the view of the moral necessitarians to Leibniz, adopting the latter strategy makes perfectly good sense. The moral necessitarians did in fact admit that God was bound (morally) to choose the best. But, recall, they argued that this was consistent with the act being contingent since (i) the inclination which moves the will in such cases is not necessitating *per se*, and (ii) the inclination which moves the will would not have moved the will if there had been some other greater perceived good available. One might then say, and I contend Leibniz does say here, that concerning created (participated) goods, a free being can be determined (morally) to the best and still be free if there are other possible, although less good, alternatives available. So, even if it is necessary that the actual world is the best, and it is infallibly true (i.e., morally necessary) that God choose the best, the existence of this world is still metaphysically contingent. In this way, the possible-in-its-own-nature defense of divine freedom becomes quite sensible if one counts Leibniz among the moral necessitarians.⁷⁷

But, in addition to the fact that this interpretation of Leibniz helps us make sense of some otherwise puzzling features of his philosophy, there is a second consideration in its favor. One would think that if Leibniz was a moral necessitarian, and if knowledge of this doctrine was as widespread as I have claimed it to be, that his position would have been recognized by his contemporaries who read the *Theodicy* and that this would have been a matter of discussion among them in light of the fact that the doctrine itself had been disputed amongst seventeenth century scholastics (and especially because it had since fallen out of favor). In fact, this is just what one finds. Knebel notes that the poor reception accorded the *Theodicy* in the *Mémoires de Trévoux* was due in large measure to the fact that Leibniz endorsed the doctrine of God's moral necessitation to the best.⁷⁸ Furthermore, in the Preface to the first

Latin edition of the *Theodicy* published in 1719, Des Bosses, the editor and translator, quotes at length an official Catholic censure of the *Theodicy*. Of the seven claims in the *Theodicy* singled out for censure, the first is that Leibniz endorses the doctrine of moral necessity. The author of the censure argues, as critics of the doctrine were wont to do, that despite the claims of its defenders, moral necessity entailed metaphysical necessity and is thus inconsistent with freedom:

It is not agreeable, as he has it, that God was morally necessitated when he created, so that out of all of the possibles he chose the best. From this it seems to follow that it is as impossible that this world not exist as it is impossible for God not to choose its existence. Nevertheless, according to this Author, God would sin against his infinite wisdom and goodness if he were not to choose the existence of the best world: but this implies a contradiction since that God would sin against his wisdom and goodness is not only morally but even metaphysically impossible since God would not have willed the existence of this world which is the best; just as it is metaphysically impossible that God would have sinned against His wisdom and goodness. As a result, as much as it is necessary that God is knowing and good in the highest respect, which is necessary in the highest respect, so much is it necessary that this world exists.⁷⁹

After quoting from the censure, Des Bosses attempts to respond to the criticisms raised. But far from denying that Leibniz endorsed moral necessity, Des Bosses argues that the doctrine of moral necessity was not heterodox because of its widespread endorsement by seventeenth century Jesuits. He cites passages from numerous defenders of moral necessity including Granado, Ruiz, Izquierdo, Esparza, Maurus and others. Des Bosses attempts to defend Leibniz against the charges raised in the Censure by arguing, as defenders of the doctrine do, i) that morally necessary claims are not metaphysically necessary because their denials do not entail contradictions, and ii) that freedom to choose less than the best is a freedom unworthy of God.

On the one hand, the Preface to the 1719 edition of the *Theodicy* indicates only that someone else reads Leibniz's use of moral necessity as I have above. But, of course, Des Bosses is not just anybody. In addition to being one of the more learned of Leibniz's correspondents, he was a Jesuit who was well-acquainted with the theological movements of the day, including the view of the moral necessitarians. Further, Des Bosses and Leibniz had corresponded on the issue of moral necessity. In those letters, Leibniz not only acknowledges his acceptance of the view, but also claims to have read the works of some of its proponents in his youth.⁸⁰ And Des Bosses is certainly not the only one to see the doctrine of the moral necessitarians

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in Leibniz. At least one early eighteenth century defenders of Leibniz's account of freedom, Emer de Vattel, argues that Leibniz was adopting just this account, an account which Vattel then goes on to defend.⁸¹ Thus, I hold that the censure included in the Preface by Des Bosses and his subsequent defense of moral necessity on Leibniz's behalf provide some good evidence that Leibniz did, in fact, understand and use "moral necessity" as those from this Sevillian school did.

In conclusion, then, we can say that Leibniz's views on freedom were hardly novelties in the seventeenth century. From his "inclination without necessitation" to his doctrine of "moral necessity," the outlines of his view had already been well-worked out and criticized by his scholastic predecessors and contemporaries. Recognizing this scholastic heritage not only helps to sort out the details of what Leibniz held, but gives us deeper insights into how Leibniz situated himself with respect to competing views of the day.⁸²

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NOTES

¹ See my "Leibniz on Divine Knowledge of Conditional Future Contingents", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, April 1995.

² Some of the more significant contributions in this direction can be found in G.H.R. Parkinson, *Leibniz on Human Freedom*, *Studia Leibnitiana*, Weisbaden: Sonderheft 2, 1970; Michael Seidler, "Freedom and Moral Therapy in Leibniz", *Studia Leibnitiana*, 17, 1; and Gaston Grua, *Jurisprudence Universelle et Théodicée selon Leibniz*, New York: Garland, 1985.

³ See, for example, *Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics*, Bk.7, L.III, 1342-1353, and *Summa Theologiae (ST)*, IaIIae Q.10, a.3, resp.

⁴ *ST*Ia Q.82 a.2 resp.; *De Malo* Q.6 a.1 resp.

⁵ *ST*IaIIae Q.10 a.1 ad 2.

⁶ *ST*Ia Q.82 a.2 resp.; IaIIae Q.10 a.1 resp.

⁷ *ST*IaIIae Q.10 a.1 ad 2, *De Malo* Q.16 a.7 ad 18.

⁸ David Gallagher, "Free Choice and Free Judgment in Thomas Aquinas", *Archiv für Geschichte Philosophie*, Volume 76, pp.247-277.

⁹ *ST* IaIIae Q.76, a.1.

¹⁰ *ST* IIaIIae Q.24, a.11.

¹¹ *ST* IaIIae Q.77, a.2.

¹² See, for example, *ST Ia IIae*, Q.9, a.3, ad 3.

¹³ And Aquinas seems to indicate that this (too?) is right in *ST Ia IIae*, Q.9, a.6, ad 3.

¹⁴ *Metaphysical Disputations (DM) XIX*, section 4. The passages cited here are from *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*, Alfred Freddoso (trans.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

¹⁵ *DM XIX*, section 5, n.12.

¹⁶ That is, these participated goods can be viewed as good or not good as means to an intended end, depending on which aspects or features of the object we focus on.

¹⁷ One might be inclined to think that once this horn is eliminated the game is up, since he has already shown that the other horn fails in section 5 (as described above). No doubt Suarez would agree, but he nonetheless has a further argument against the view which he develops here and as I discuss in what follows.

¹⁸ An elicited free act is one which is free in virtue of the free operation of the faculty performing the act. A commanded free act is an act of a faculty which is free in virtue of some other elicited free faculty operating on it. Thus, we call the movement of my hand free, but it is not elicited free, since my hand itself is not free, but commanded free in light of the fact that it is freely moved by the will.

¹⁹ *DM XIX*, section 6, n.5.

²⁰ As Freddoso notes, page 350, note 8.

²¹ *DM XIX*, section 6, n.5.

²² Well, nothing at all moves the will to make the final choice, one might suggest. But while this move might sit comfortably with the contemporary libertarian, it does not sit as comfortably with the scholastic Aristotelian who thinks that reduction from potency to act requires the agency of something external. This last claim, however, is controversial. Scotus and later Scotists categorically reject the maxim “whatever is moved is moved by another.” And if one rejects this maxim, defending the voluntarist line becomes much easier, though at the price of straining one’s Aristotelian metaphysics.

²³ In fact, St. Thomas seems to make this very move himself concerning the relationship between intellect and will. See *ST Ia IIae*, Q.9, a.1, resp.

²⁴ See Bellarmine, *Controversias de Gratiae et Liberi Arbitrii*, 1619, Book III, c.7.

²⁵ Diego Ruiz de Montoya, *Commentaria ac Disputationes ad quaestiones 23 et 24 ex primam partem S. Thomae: De Providentia*, Lyon, 1631, pp.162b-163a.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.163a.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.162a.

²⁸ Ruiz de Montoya, *Commentaria ac disputationes in primam partem S. Thomae:*

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de scientia, ideis, de veritate ac vite Dei., 1629, p.607a.

²⁹ Diego Granado, *Comentarii in primam partem Summae Theologicae S. Thomae*, Pont-a-Mousson, 1624, pp.377b-378a.

³⁰ Ruiz de Montoya, 1629, 835b; Bernardo Aldrete SJ, *Commentariorum ac Disputationum in tertiam partem S. Thomae de mysterio Incarnationis Verbi Divini*, Lyon 1652, Volume 1, p.3a.

³¹ Ruiz de Montoya, 1631, 111b.

³² *Ibid.*, 158b.

³³ *Ibid.*, 111b.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 116a.

³⁵ Granado, 430.

³⁶ Ruiz de Montoya, *Commentaria ac Disputationes in primam partem Summae Theologicae S. Thomae. De voluntate Dei et propriis actibus eius*, Lyon 1630, 77a.

³⁷ Granado, 430.

³⁸ And here one can see connections between seventeenth century discussions of philosophical theology and their contemporary correlates. If there is some necessity that each human will sin in his or her life, there may be no person that God could create who avoids sin, a rough equivalent to Plantinga's "trans-world depravity." Likewise, there is a fair bit of discussion among these scholastics about the possibility of there being a man confirmed in his sin to such an extent that no amount of grace might lead the man to salvation (thus making his salvation a moral impossibility). Such a creature was called a *creatura rebellis* in these discussions. Such an idea is roughly equivalent to recent discussions about the possibility of "transworld damnation" by William Lane Craig, William Hasker, and others.

³⁹ See for example, Domingo Bañez, Part III, 96, and Francisco Zumel, *In Primam Secundae Commentaria*, 1594, Vol. II, 109a.

⁴⁰ Knebel notes that a colleague of Granado and Ruiz, Jorge Hemelman, wrote a tract in 1616-7, based on his lectures, against the moral necessity view as it was defended by Granado in a work not published until 1623. Ruiz later takes the criticisms of Hemelman and includes them anonymously in his later defense of the doctrine published in 1630. In this work he responds to Hemelman's charges point by point. Still, it is these criticisms which appeared in Ruiz that became the focus of the critic's charges against him. It should be noted that while Hemelman disagreed with the doctrine he was not in favor of it being suppressed. In fact it was he in 1623 who convinced Rome that Granado's work should be published. See "Necessitas moralis ad optimum (II)" *Studia Leibnitiana*, Heft XXIV, Band I, 1992.

⁴¹ Sebastian Izquierdo, *Opus theologicum iuxta atque philosophicum de Deo uno*,

Volume 2, Tractatus X, disp.32, Q.3. Rome 1670, p.454. Similar passages seem to abound in later defenders of this view. Here is one from Leonardo de Peñafiel: "In things and in objects there exists many necessities concerning existence or essence. The first is called Moral, and this occurs when a thing occurs always or almost always in the same manner. But this necessity does not exclude Physical and Metaphysical contingency: not Physical because the thing is able to happen otherwise Physically; not Metaphysically because of the fact that if some other thing would happen, a contradiction does not follow. The second necessity is Physical, which excludes Moral contingency because out of the nature of the thing it exists as it does, since it cannot naturally happen otherwise since the thing not have the Physical power to the opposite effect; for example, when fire is applied to a combustible patient and it does not burn, it is a miracle, and thus it cannot happen otherwise naturally. But this necessity does not exclude Metaphysical contingency because if combustion did not occur a contradiction would not follow. The third necessity is Metaphysical, which excludes all contingency, Moral and Physical, because it is impossible that a contradiction ever occur, and the Physical power for this to occur cannot be given, and this is the highest of all necessities." *Tractatus et disputationes in primam partem D. Thomae: De deo uno et trino*, Volume 1, 1663, p.522a.

⁴² Izquierdo, p.454.

⁴³ Ruiz de Montoya, 1629, pp.771-86.

⁴⁴ Knebel has argued furthermore, that such a view was the official position of the Franciscans at the Sorbonne around 1680. Knebel makes his case based on the fact that the text representing this view, Jeronomo de Sousa's (d.1711) *Futororum contingentium Polysophia seculis decretis omnibus et scientia media ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis* (Paris, 1680), was published in the same year it was completed while the usually lag time was about five years. Knebel argues that de Sousa was the protégé of Claude Fraasen, the leading Franciscan theologian in France, who was also one of the referees for the manuscript. See Knebel, op. cit., p.25, note 127.

⁴⁵ See especially, Sousa, pp.35-6.

⁴⁶ Sousa, *Ibid.*, Q.1, a.3, p.31.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.29.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.29.

⁴⁹ At least I have found no counter-example to this claim.

⁵⁰ Grua, *Jurisprudence*, p.304, n.33.

⁵¹ *Theodicy*, §311; G VI 300-1.

⁵² *Observations on King*, p.421; G VI 415.

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- ⁵³ Theodicy §48; G VI 129.
- ⁵⁴ *Theodicy* §310; G VI 300. See also *New Essays* 180, *Theodicy* §51; G VI 130, and *Textes Inédits*, Gaston Grua (ed.), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, pp. 253, 272, 276, 301.
- ⁵⁵ *Observations on King*, §13; G VI 412-3.
- ⁵⁶ *Reflections on Hobbes*, p.395; G VI 390.
- ⁵⁷ *Theodicy* §367; G VI 333. See also, *Theodicy* §310; G VI 300.
- ⁵⁸ Leibniz's Fifth Letter to Clarke, L696; G VII 389; See also L697, §7; G VII 390.
- ⁵⁹ Grua, p.384.
- ⁶⁰ Fifth Letter to Clarke, L697; G VII 390.
- ⁶¹ Robert Adams argues for such an understanding of moral necessity in "Leibniz's Theories of Contingency," in *Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, Michael Hooker (ed.), p.253 and in *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, pp.21-2.
- ⁶² See for example, G III 386, Grua 608 and, A.6.1.465, 471.
- ⁶³ Fifth Letter to Clarke, L696.
- ⁶⁴ *Theodicy* §282; G VI 284.
- ⁶⁵ It is worth noting that this the above cited passage from the *Theodicy* is raised by Des Bosses in correspondence with Leibniz. Des Bosses asks Leibniz whether he admits a moral necessity to sinning and if so, how we can avoid making God responsible for the sin of Adam and the demons. Leibniz responds by denying any moral necessity to evil in a way that might make one think that he is taking back what is said in §282. However I take it that what Leibniz means to reject here is a moral necessity to sin *sub ratione mali*. The problem with the demons and the damned is that their intellects always represent evils *sub ratione boni*, and thus they always (freely), by a moral necessity, choose that which is evil. No doubt I am reading much into a brief exchange about an issue Leibniz seems to wish to duck.
- ⁶⁶ One may read Leibniz thus in his letter to Des Billettes, L472; G VII 451, and in "On the Ultimate Origination of Things," L486-8 and A&G 149-151; G VII 304. No doubt these are troubling passages for my interpretation.
- ⁶⁷ See Gaston Grua *Jurisprudence*, p.234. See also, as example of latter, Sleight, "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge," *Faith and Philosophy*, Volume 11, number 4, October 1994, pp.547-571.
- ⁶⁸ "Leibniz's Fifth Paper", §§92 and 124, G VII pp.412 and 419. Many similar passages describing the two realms governed by two sets of laws can found in Leibniz, particularly after 1695.
- ⁶⁹ In "Leibniz on Divine Knowledge of Conditional Future Contingents" I have

argued on other grounds that it is unlikely that Leibniz would have found anything like contemporary compatibilism congenial. See pages 93-5.

⁷⁰ Some further reasons are discussed in section V. part A of my, "Leibniz on Divine Knowledge of Conditional Future Contingents."

⁷¹ *Philosophical Writings*, Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson (trans. and eds.), London: Dent, 1970, pp. 100-102; Louis Couturat, *Opuscules et Fragments ineditis*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1988, pp.21-2.

⁷² For example, it is hard to see why Leibniz would ascribe physical necessity to God and those "confirmed in the good" on my view. But these become less puzzling when we note, first, that he hedges on ascribing physical necessity to God's choice of the best, arguing that it is "in a way (*quodammodo*) physically necessary," and second, that those to whom he refers here as "confirmed in the good" are the angels and the beatified ("*angeli aut beati*") who may be physically necessitated since they *do* see God in His essence, i.e., the will's proper object.

⁷³ Almost the very same claim can be found in relatively early texts as well. See, for example, AG20; Grua 288.

⁷⁴ For an example see Robert Adams', "Leibniz's Theories of Contingency," p.252, and *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, p. 36.

⁷⁵ See for example, AG30; Grua 305-6.

⁷⁶ I have discussed this issue in some detail in a review of Robert Adam's *Leibniz: Theist Determinist, Idealist in Faith and Philosophy*, forthcoming.

⁷⁷ Or at least the view becomes as sensible as the doctrine of moral necessity itself.

⁷⁸ Sven Knebel, "Necessitas moralis ad optimum," *Studia Leibnitiana*, BandXXIII, Heft 1, 1991, p.4.

⁷⁹ *Tentamina Theodicaeae de Bonitate Dei Libertate Hominis et Origine Mali*, Bartholomaeus Des Bosses (editor and translator), Frankfurt, 1719, text from the "Monitum Interpretis."

⁸⁰ This issue was discussed in the letters written between September 12, 1708 and February 2, 1709, and again between January 6, 1711 and September 7 of the same year—after which the matter is abruptly dropped. It is unclear what relationship the discussion in these letters bears to Des Bosses remarks in the Preface to the 1719 edition of the *Theodicy*. No doubt Des Bosses was working through and thinking about the *Theodicy* at least during the time of the second exchange on the issue. We know this because, first, Des Bosses had completed his translation of the *Theodicy* by 1712, and second, because in the letter of April 25, 1711 he quotes three sections of the *Theodicy* on the issue of moral necessity. It is also worth noting that while Leibniz admits to having read at least Perez and Esparza, in his letter of October 2,

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1708, he also says that he recalls little of what they had said.

⁸¹ See especially, Emer de Vattel, *Defense du Systeme Leibnitien Contre les Objections et les Imputations de Mr. de Crousaz*, Leiden, 1741, especially pp. 282-3 and 296-7.

⁸² Special thanks are due to Sven Knebel for providing me with copies of most of the texts referred to in Section III along with invaluable advice on the matters discussed in that section. Special thanks are due to Fred Freddoso for providing me advance copies of his translations of Suarez's *Metaphysical Disputations*. I also thank Robert Sleight for his comments on the thoughts contained in this paper. Finally I thank Franklin and Marshall College for their generosity in providing leave support so that I could pursue the issues discussed herein. The research for this paper was also funded in part by a Summer Stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities.