The book under review contains a selection of the papers presented at the conference "Leibniz and Adam," held in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem from December 29, 1991 to January 2, 1992. The object of the conference and the book was to consider the role of Adam, the first man, in Leibniz's thought and, in doing so, "to provide an unusual view of the interrelations between his metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, theory of knowledge, logic, attitude vis-à-vis mysticism, philosophy of history, philosophy of nature, ethics, and philosophical anthropology" (p.iv).

A natural concern regarding such an undertaking would be that the collection of essays would be fragmented, with each essay, although nominally touching on Leibniz and Adam, existing, as it were, worlds apart. This is not the case with this book. Indeed, just as Dascal and Yakira had hoped, one finds interesting connections between the individual papers, connections that suggest paths for further profitable research. In such a short space, I cannot possibly do justice to the entire collection of essays but shall limit myself to a discussion of the connections between two pairs of essays. First, I shall examine Kuno Lorenz's "The pre-established harmony between the two Adams" and Hans Burkhardt's "Adam's mind and body." Second, I shall consider Ursula Goldenbaum's "From Adam to Alexander and Caesar: Leibniz's shift from logic and metaphysics to a theory of history" and Richard Popkin's "Leibniz and Vico on the pre-Adamite Theory."

In their papers, Lorenz and Burkhardt treat the issue of the relation between monads in a composite substance both in terms of mereology and in terms of the representational content of the monads constituting a composite substance. Lorenz, in his paper, points to the difficulty associated with the manner in which the monads of a composite substance are related "if we obey the Leibnizian insistence that there cannot be external relations between them." (p. 26) Indeed, according to Lorenz, monads can relate to each other "only indirectly via their representational character" (p. 26), and the well-known distinction between internal and external denominations corresponds to a distinction between the level of signs (representations of the monads) and the level of objects or bodies resulting from the simple substances. This is a point one encounters fairly often in the literature, but Lorenz's further point—that there will be a correspondence between the part-whole relation at the


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level of bodies and the object-property relation on the level of monads—does suggest a relatively uncommon way of looking both at the relation between monads in a composite substance and at the distinct, though related, issue of the relation between bodies. Burkhardt, too, picks up the issue of the part-whole relation in Leibniz’s work and suggests that it is far more important than most scholars have thought. He wants to show in part how the different kinds of whole—essential wholes, integral wholes and aggregates or heaps—are related to Leibniz’s picture of the world. His conclusion is that there are, for Leibniz, three ontological levels and that these ontological levels correspond to the three kinds of whole: monads are, as it were, essential wholes, for they have no parts that are separable; “compound corporeal substances” are integral wholes, for some parts are separable some not; and, finally, the aggregates, beings that possess only phenomenal unity, will be mere heaps, for their parts are all separable. This picture, however, seems only a step in the right direction, for the point that corporeal substances *qua* integral wholes have essential and non-essential parts and are therefore divisible is a rather trivial one. It amounts to saying little more than some “parts” of a composite substance can be separated from the whole and some feature of the whole will remain. The real puzzle with respect to Leibniz’s ontology is how bodies, or corporeal substances, are related to monads at all; and this is not a question that is so easily handled by simply looking at the mereological relation. Burkhardt acknowledges this difficulty, pointing out that monads are not, strictly speaking, parts of bodies; rather, bodies “result” from monads. In order to establish how this comes about — how the phenomena of bodies and how composite or corporeal substances arise from the level of monads—one must ultimately turn to the representational level of monads. And ultimately, Burkhardt makes a point very similar to the one with which Lorenz concludes his paper: that the part-whole relation on the level of bodies is grounded in the substance-accident relation.

These essays are quite helpful in the study of Leibniz’s metaphysics. The next step is to combine the views of Lorenz and Burkhardt, stating explicitly that the relation between simple substances, monads, and a composite (or corporeal) substance has two distinct components. First, monads in a composite substance are unified by a dominant monad; that is, there is the relation of domination and subordination in all composite substances. And this relation of domination and subordination may be understood in terms of the representational content of the individual monads. Although Leibniz is nowhere terribly clear on the subject, the relation of domination and subordination is perhaps best understood in the following way: domination and subordination consists in degrees of perfection (letter to Des Bosses of 16 June 1694).
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1712; GP II, 451); and one thing may be said to be more perfect than another when it explains a priori what happens in the other thing (Monadology §50; GP VI, 615). In other words, a monad may be said to be dominant when it contains reasons for everything that occurs within or to other monads. And this explanation must certainly take place on the level of the representations of the monads of a composite substance. Second, the relation between monads and corporeal substances is one in which the latter result from the former. While one may analyze the phenomena of bodies in terms of the part whole relation, there is a deeper level at which the relation between bodies and monads cannot be a mereological relation because monads and bodies are heterogeneous. What I take to be Burkhardt’s insight, however, is this: the condition for regarding a corporeal substance as an integral whole lies at the monadic level. Just as relations in general, on Leibniz’s view, have their foundations in the simple substances, so the mereological relation within corporeal substances, qua phenomena so to speak, has its foundation in the simple substances. Or put somewhat differently: with respect to composite substances, the mereological relation is grounded in the relation of domination and subordination, and the relation of domination and subordination ought to be seen as dealing with the representations of monads.

Goldenbaum and Popkin treat an entirely different subject in their papers—namely, Leibniz’s view of history and historical understanding. Their essays also point students of Leibniz’s thought in an interesting direction. Goldenbaum, in her paper, notes that history did not have a secure place among the sciences in the 17th century, that it was regarded as less than a strict science because it was merely a collection of experiences, memories or sensations. The reason for this was, in part, that history did not depend upon laws and provided no explanation of the necessary connection of events. The point of Goldenbaum’s paper, however, is to show that Leibniz’s analysis of the problem of free will, in general, and the metaphysical components of that view, in particular, make possible for Leibniz the study of history as a science. In other words, the possibility of history as a science is grounded in Leibniz’s particular conception of the nature of individual substances. Our history of Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon will count as a real science insofar as we are able to appeal to the individual nature of Caesar. But, naturally, there are limits to our historical and scientific understanding, as Goldenbaum points out: “for an intuitive knowledge like God’s a demonstrative science of the history of human actions would be possible. We can have a knowledge of the complete concepts of individuals, too, but only through an infinite historical science” (p. 371). While history cannot truly be a demonstrative science for human
beings, Goldenbaum argues that Leibniz will understand history to be an empirical science similar to physics or medicine, where the phenomena will be grounded in the natures of individual substances. Popkin’s paper also relates Leibniz’s account of history to the metaphysical foundations of individual substances. The subject of the paper is the pre-Adamite theory—the theory that human beings lived before Adam—as it was treated both by Vico and by Leibniz. According to Popkin, ”for Leibniz the evidence that Adam was the first man is not historical, but rather metaphysical. It is one of the attributes of his monad. It is included in his definition. The only ‘reason’ Leibniz offered for this was that that is how he is presented in Scripture” (p. 380). Leaving aside the issue of the apparent differences in Popkin’s and Goldenbaum’s use of “history,” Popkin’s claims ought in some ways to be taken to be similar to Goldenbaum’s principal claim: that, for Leibniz, historical truths depend upon the natures of individual substances. This claim is perhaps not stunning in itself. But Popkin and Goldenbaum both combine the issues of the study of history and Leibniz’s metaphysics in a novel way. We come to know that, for Leibniz, history as a science is possible insofar as it is grounded in the natures of individual substances and that the nature of individual substances can in fact give us some kind of historical truth: for example, that Adam was the first man.

I have only discussed a small selection of the insightful papers in this volume. Leibniz and Adam represents a successful attempt to connect the various features of Leibniz’s thought and is thus a welcome contribution to the field.