mine the truth value of the relevant conditionals. Through a history of free activity we come to acquire virtues and vices of intellect, will, and passion. These dispositions are sufficient to allow God to infallibly predict what the creature will do in the circumstances in which they might be found.

Of course, one might argue that while this is not physical determinism, it is determinism nonetheless. If God can infallibly predict what a free creature will do under specified circumstances by appealing to the dispositions of the psychological faculties, then what we have is psychological determinism. However, Leibniz argues that the sort of necessity here is sui generis. It is neither a metaphysical nor physical necessity but a moral necessity. And in certain contexts Leibniz uses this locution as a description of a modality weaker than metaphysical or physical necessity, and yet a necessity nonetheless.

I then discuss what this account tells us about Leibniz’s view of freedom. I argue that it shows us first that Leibniz was not a straightforward compatibilist, in the contemporary understanding of the term. Although he may have held that the behavior of all physical bodies is determined by natural necessities this cannot be the case for the operation of freely choosing wills. Second, it provides us with a reason for thinking that Leibniz’s account of contingency is not amenable to a possible worlds semantics and that this may have provided some of the motivation for finding the infinite analysis account of contingency attractive.

A more thorough account of these ideas is available in my doctoral dissertation, The Second Leibnizian Labyrinth: Psychology, Theology, and Freedom, and also in a greatly expanded manuscript under the same title which is currently under review.

"Leibniz and the Problem of Soul-Body Union," by Donald Rutherford, Emory University.

A number of recent authors have raised the question of Leibniz’s commitment, during the 1680s and after, to the reality of corporeal substances. In contrast to the standard reading of him as embracing early on a view of substance which is in all essential respects that of the "Monadology", it has been argued that Leibniz is in fact inclined to recognize two distinct types of substance: on the one hand, unextended soul-like substances (the precursors of his monads); on the other hand, quasi-Aristotelian corporeal substances. Some commentators have seen Leibniz as deciding definitively by the late 1690s in favor of the monadic theory. Others (Garber, Wilson), however, have argued for a more complicated reading of his development, seeing Leibniz as struggling with the problem of corporeal substance for much of his career.

In this paper, I limit my attention to one aspect of the corporeal substance question, mainly as it is played out in Leibniz’s later writings. The issue concerns his understanding of the union of the soul and the body. The relation of this topic to the more general question of corporeal substance is as follows. If Leibniz is committed to the existence of corporeal substances, a paradigm of which is the embodied human being, then he
owes us some account of how such substances are possible. On his considered view, it is a necessary condition for something's being a substance that it be a "true unity" or "unum per se." In the case of a corporeal substance, however, we are presented with an entity which is prima facie not a unity, but a duality (or even a plurality): a composite of a soul, which is a true unity or substance, and a body, which is itself composite in nature. Now, the most plausible way for Leibniz to surmount this difficulty is to offer some account of the union by which a soul and a body are conjoined so as to form a single entity. And in fact, this is exactly what he does. Throughout his later writings we find an intensive discussion of the problem of soul-body union in conjunction with the larger topic of corporeal substance.

I trace the development of Leibniz's response to this problem through three stages. The first extends from the "New System" until roughly 1703. During this period, Leibniz maintains that the relation of the soul and the body is limited to a "physical" union, which is determined by their preestablished harmony. Given this account, I argue, it is extremely difficult to see how the soul and the body might together form a genuine unum per se or composite substance. The second stage is initiated by a challenge issued to this position by Tournemaine in 1703. In response to this criticism, Leibniz acknowledges the possibility of a "real" or "metaphysical" union between the soul and the body, but claims that such a union adds nothing to the phenomena and that no intelligible notion has ever been given of it. During the first decade of the eighteenth century, Leibniz appears to waver between these two positions, sometimes affirming the existence of a real union (e.g. in the Theodicy), sometimes expressing considerable skepticism concerning it (as in the De Volder correspondence).

The third stage is represented by Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses. Prompted by Des Bosses, Leibniz offers in 1709 exactly what he had earlier doubted was possible: an account of the metaphysical union which might exist between the soul and (the monads constituting) its body. This union takes the form of what he calls a "substantial chain" [vinculum substantiale]: a substantial being, which (a) is the subject of the active and passive force of the composite substance, (b) is not itself a monad but is always associated with the dominant monad or soul of the composite substance, (c) "requires" but does not formally "involve" the flux of monads which constitute the body of the composite substance. Throughout the latter half of their correspondence, Leibniz presents Des Bosses with the following dilemma: either there are no composite substances and all bodies are merely phenomena or there exists a substantial chain capable of conferring on a plurality of monads the true unity of a substance. With a couple of exceptions, Leibniz himself appears to remain neutral as regards the horns of this dilemma.

In the final section of the paper, I try to give some context to Leibniz's position in the Des Bosses correspondence by examining his attitude towards corporeal substance in several contemporary texts. I argue that the most reliable texts support the view he once lets slip to Des Bosses: "I consider the explanation of all
phenomena solely through the perceptions of monads functioning in harmony with each other, with corporeal substance rejected, to be useful for a fundamental investigation of things.” I conclude with the question of why Leibniz ever wavers from this position. I suggest that the most likely explanation is that in specific texts designed for specific purposes he is unwilling to make public the full force of his monadic metaphysics. [The material in this paper will appear as part of my chapter on the later metaphysics in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. N. Jolley]

RECENT WORKS ON LEIBNIZ (1991-92)


Leibniz, le meilleur des mondes: Table Ronde... Domaine de Seillac (Loir-et-Che), 7 au 9 juin 1990, Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 21 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992).


A NEW JOURNAL: BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Roger Woolhouse, of the University of York, sends an announcement concerning a new journal, The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, to be published twice yearly (Feb. and Sept.) commencing in February 1993. The Editor is G. A. J. Rogers of Keele University. It is "focused generally on the history of European philosophy," and is the official journal of the British Society for the History of Philosophy. Details are available from the Editor at Keele University, Staffordshire