to at any one time). But apperception of what is in us and focused reflection are not identical. Apperception of what is in us is the wider term, sometimes involving considerations of abstraction and order (p. 144). We can order truths (more correctly, propositions) according to whether they are primitive or derived by deduction or demonstration and with varying degrees of complexity. All these truths count as being 'in us' and so are susceptible to being apperceived. Only human and higher beings are granted such rational capabilities. Beasts, not being able to direct their attention to their own mental operations, are restricted to lower apperception and empirical, not deductive, reasoning.

This approach towards a solution of the tension finds its best expression in the *New Essays*. But by the time of the *Principles*, Leibniz has almost reverted to the denial of animal apperception, although examination of the context of §4 and its drafts reveals that the reversal was not perhaps complete and definitive. Leibniz is still vacillating. And why? Possibly because the distinction between humans and animals, if the *New Essays* solution was adopted, would come to rest on the distinction between those beings which can direct their attention to the operations of their own minds (focused reflection) and those which can practise reflection, even to the extent of perceiving the workings of their own souls, but which cannot focus their attention on those actions. A fine and delicate distinction. Too fine to carry the weight of the City of God, especially since there seems to be no reason why animals, if they can direct their attention to some things, would not also be able to direct their attention to the operations of their souls. Maybe the tension could never be resolved for the great chain of being will dictate that the borderline is always fuzzy.

Kulstad is exceptionally fair throughout, subjecting each alternative reading, including those he most prefers, to penetrating criticism. His writing displays the clarity of his thought, with carefully chosen words and a system of textual signposts guiding the reader through the argument. On account of both its contribution to the study of Leibniz and the method of historical philosophy employed, this book is a delight to scholars and advanced students alike.


This erudite book is aimed more directly at specialists in theories of right and law, than at Leibniz scholars. Acknowledging a debt of inspiration to the remarkable historical work of André de Muralt,¹ the author introduces in variable detail the legal philosophy of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, with substantial forays into Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham. Leibniz fits into this study less as its *raison d'être* than as a piece in the puzzle, one local system of thought amid the galaxy of the modern school of natural right.

The great project of the modern school is to determine the degree to which moral principles may be established apart particular they are concerned with two
questions: What is the ontological status of Good and Evil? What is it that obliges us to pursue the one and flee the other (p. 33)? The answers of the school are distinctive to the extent that they foresake traditional naturalism, embracing voluntarism in its place. This they do particularly concerning the second question. Grotius adopts a "creationist" position, holding that the good is good-for-us, because we have been so created. Pufendorf, still more radically voluntarist, holds that the good is good merely because it was commanded. Leibniz differs from both, though more sharply from Pufendorf, in not admitting the distinction upon which their thought is based, namely that between something’s being good or evil and there being an obligation to pursue or flee it.

The interest of Sève’s account lies not so much in the originality of its conclusions about Leibniz as in the size and detail of the background picture in which they are located. A couple of unfortunate technical points, which might easily have been avoided, increase the difficulty of reading with profit this in any case challenging book. First, the bibliography provided (233f), and referred to by abbreviations in the text, is slight. (The unconventional abbreviations for works of Leibniz also make it less helpful than would have been the standard ones of Studia Leibnitiana.) In the second place, the footnotes of this scholarly work are thick with further references which, according to a practice lamentably widespread in France, appear in a usable form only when first cited, and are not found in the bibliography. Since this book also lacks an index, the reader whose interest is caught by a particular reference to a given work has no choice but to trudge back through as many previous footnotes as may intervene until coming to its first mention.

Notwithstanding these objections, however, the specialist with an interest in the history of modern legal philosophy and Leibniz’s place within it will find here an able and learned guide.


2 Of a doctrinal sort. Of course the notion of God continues to play its important role.


Mates’ book has already been widely read and justly praised. It is full of clear, interesting arguments on most of the topics which engage contemporary readers of Leibniz, expertly and extensively marshalls texts, and includes a short but unusually good biography and outline of Leibniz’s system. Since I write here for an unusually well-informed and well-motivate audience, I allow myself compressed formulations of controversial arguments, antecedently acknowledging need for elaboration. I focus on a cluster of interconnected, central concerns: the nature and role of nominalism, individual concepts, contingency, rational explanation, bestness and perception.

On Mates’ nominalist account of Leibniz, reality is just substances-with-