superintrinsicalness, I cannot grasp the intended difference between it and superessentialism.

None of the foregoing must obscure the fact that Professor Sleigh’s book is now the standard work on a philosophically very important portion of the Leibnizian corpus, a work that will be most useful and stimulating to all future students of Leibniz’s metaphysics.

AUTHOR Responds TO REVIEW: R. C. Sleigh, Jr., University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

I appreciate Benson Mates’s generous review of my book, and also the editor’s willingness to allow me to comment on it. There is one point where Professor Mates attributes to me a view I did not intend to assert, although what I did say is so compressed that even I have had some difficulty divining my intentions. And it may well be that Professor Mates will find the view that I did intend to assert even less satisfactory than the view that he attributes to me, which I did not intend to assert.

Let me begin by saying what I wanted to say on the topic in question: I believe that Leibniz held that for each possible individual substance there is exactly one complete individual concept that is the individual concept of that possible individual substance. That is what I intended to assert on p. 51 (last full paragraph), when I said that Leibniz took the first step toward superessentialism. In fact, putting aside my somewhat quixotic speculations in section 6 of chapter 7 concerning the thesis of radical world-apart (see p. 180), I am inclined to hold that Leibniz held that each possible created individual substance exists in exactly one possible world. On p. 51 I noted that in order to reach superessentialism from these beginnings a second step is required, i.e., commitment to a specific modal semantics based on this particular structure of possible individuals in possible worlds. Some of David Lewis’s work indicates that this particular structure of possible individuals in possible worlds will permit the elaboration of a modal semantics that does not imply superessentialism. On p. 51 I suggested that Leibniz did not take the second step toward superessentialism -- not because I see him as a precursor of David Lewis -- but because I believe that he really had no modal semantics based on possible world theory. His primary characterization of the crucial modal notions in question was of a quite different kind.

Even were I right in all of this it might well be that Leibniz reached superessentialism by some other route. One thesis for which I argued in the book is this: at the time of the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz wanted to avoid the commitment to superessentialism. But there is strong textual evidence that he was then committed to the thesis I called superintrinsicalness (see sect. 4 of ch. 4). Professor Mates has problems with the alleged distinction between superessentialism and superintrinsicalness. So do I. I think the distinction has all sorts of difficulties; I intended to convey some of my concerns in the last paragraph commencing on p. 71. My recommendation there was that we try various readings of the relevant doctrines that Leibniz might have had in mind before we rush to judgment. My claim was that if Leibniz held a fully coherent view on these matters, there must be some interpretation of the relevant notions, plausibly attributable to Leibniz, according to which superessentialism comes out false and superintrinsicalness, true. In fact, I doubt that Leibniz’s views on these matters are fully coherent, but that is a matter beyond the scope of my book, and surely beyond the scope of this note.