

**Definitions, Sorites Arguments, and
Leibniz's *Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice***

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As Leibniz points out in the *Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice*, justice—defined as charity of the wise and universal benevolence¹—belongs “to the necessary and eternal truths about the nature of things, as numbers and proportions.”² According to the interpretation of Patrick Riley, from this perspective the two manuscripts usually regarded as belonging to the *Méditation*³ should be seen as complementary parts of a unitary Platonizing work.⁴ According to Riley, the manuscript that now constitutes the first part of the *Méditation* is concerned with definitions of ethical concepts viewed as “quasi-mathematical, demonstrable ‘eternal verities’”⁵, whereas the manuscript that now constitutes the second part of the *Méditation* is concerned “with Platonic ‘ascent’, in the manner of *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*,” which recommends the transition from mere negative forbearance from harm to doing positive good.⁶ In formulating these claims, Riley uses scare quotes to indicate that he uses the terms “eternal verities” and “ascent” in an unusual way that diverges from the views of the historical Plato. According to his interpretation, Leibniz’s modifications of Platonism are restricted to (epistemologically) peripheral parts such as the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul or Pythagorean components such as the doctrine of metempsychosis.⁷ Therefore, Riley claims that when Leibniz is talking about knowing eternal truths, what he has in mind is literally the view that we know the same truths as the truths that the gods know and love but do not cause or change.⁸

Although this interpretation nicely captures the Platonic terminology of the *Méditation*, it all too well warrants Riley’s conclusion that Kant’s verdict to the effect that Leibniz’s philosophy was a “dogmatism” that “said more than it knew” was basically right.⁹ The present paper argues that there is more to the epistemology of the concept of justice in the *Méditation* than can be described in traditional Platonic terms. In particular, the view of the nature of definitions of ethical and mathematical concepts in the first part of the *Méditation* should be seen against the background of Leibniz’s earlier modifications of the Platonic view of the nature of definitions. According to Leibniz, definitions of philosophical concepts are not abstract objects but rather make implicit presupposi-

tions of rational thought explicit. Moreover, Leibniz's modified theory of definitions has consequences for the nature of the Platonic ascent in the second part of the *Méditation*: What Leibniz does there should be seen against the background of his earlier use of sorites arguments to show that a conception of universal justice as *caritas sapientis* is implicitly contained in our everyday conception of justice.

1. Definitions and Justice

In the first part of the *Méditation*, Leibniz ascribes to the definition of justice a role analogous to that of the definitions of mathematical, logical, and metaphysical concepts:

The same is true of justice. If it is a fixed term which has some determined meaning; if, in a word, it is not a simple sound, without sense, like *blitiri*; this term, or this word, justice, will have some definition or some intelligible notion: and from every definition one can draw certain consequences, by using the incontestable rules of logic; and this is precisely what one does in building the necessary and demonstrative sciences which depend not at all on facts, but solely on reason, such as logic, metaphysics, arithmetic, geometry, the science of motion, and the science of right as well.¹⁰

From the beginning of his philosophical development, the nature of Leibniz's Platonism is closely connected with his views on the nature of definitions. Famously, Leibniz early on accepted Hobbes's theory of proof, according to which proofs are nothing else than chains of definitions.¹¹ But contrary to Hobbes, Leibniz never understood definitions as mere stipulations. As Marcelo Dascal has argued, in Leibniz's view there is a syntactic constraint on definitions. Although the same facts can be represented by means of different arbitrarily chosen systems of signs, the relations that guarantee mutual translatability of these systems are non-arbitrary.¹² Over and above these syntactic constraints, Leibniz also claims that definitions express the nature of the defined. Particularly, the importance of this claim makes itself felt in the context of his view of the role of definitions in practical philosophy. According to him, this is an area in which the nature of the defined objects coincides with the nature of mind. In this sense, Leibniz writes in the Appendix to the *Dissertation on the Art of Combinations* (1666):

Although each *method* can be applied in each discipline; so that we follow in our research either the traces of our own investigations or productive nature;

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it nevertheless happens in the practical disciplines that the *order of nature* and the *order of knowing* coincide, because here the *nature of the thing* has its origin in our *thought* and production. Since the goal moves us to produce the means, and at the same time leads us to recognize them; which is not the case for objects that we only know but cannot produce. Apart from this, even if each method is permissible, not every one is useful.”¹³

In the *New Method of Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence* (1667), Leibniz takes up the idea that definitions in the realm of ethics are expressions of the nature of the mind, and extends this idea to the nature of logical definitions:

Sensible qualities are of two kinds: some perceived in the mind alone, others in fantasy or by means of mediating bodily organs. In the mind only two sensible qualities are perceived: thought and causality. *Thought* is a sensible quality either of the human intellect or of something ‘I know not what’ within us, which we observe to be thinking. But we cannot explain what thinking is any more than what white is or what extension is. ... *Logic* is built on the sensible quality called thought ... The other sensible quality found in mind alone is *causality*—when it can be proved demonstratively from an effect that it has some cause, even though latent. This quality, abstracted from others such as motion and figure, is in the cause of the world or God ... and in our own minds as the cause of bodily motion. But we cannot explain the method of causality. This is the subject matter of *pneumatics*, which deals with the external actions of incorporeal beings, as logic deals with their internal actions, or thought. Here belongs also *practical philosophy*, or the doctrine of the pleasant and the useful, and of justice or what is of common value in a community.¹⁴

Moreover, in a letter to Hermann Conring of 1670 Leibniz describes the relation between logic and law as an application of logic to the realm of practical reasoning: “... wisdom in jurisprudence or the art to reach a verdict can be outlined by means of a very few rules, because it is nothing but logic applied to morals.”¹⁵ Thus, if logical definitions express the nature of the mind, the applicability of logic to law implies that law is not derived from arbitrary definitions.

This radically non-Hobbesian view of definitions is the framework for Leibniz’s attempts at providing a satisfactory definition of justice. In the Appendix of the *Dissertation on the Art of Combinations* he tries out a version of a broadly Aristotelian concept of justice:¹⁶ “(Particular) *Justice* is a virtue, which consists in the mean in the affects of a human being towards another human being ... The rule of

this mean is: *it is permissible to help another person (or myself) as long as no harm is done to a third person (or a second person).*¹⁷ As Leibniz points out, this claim is meant to defend a broadly Aristotelian theory of justice against Hugo Grotius' conception of natural law. Grotius objected to Aristotle that in the case of justice he made an unwarranted transition from the idea of the mean in affects in the case of virtues other than justice to the idea of the mean in the objects with which justice is concerned.¹⁸ Although Leibniz shares this critique, his strategy is to apply the Aristotelian solution of elucidating the nature of a given virtue as the mean in affects to the case of justice.¹⁹

The theory of justice in the *Elements of Natural Law* (1670-1671 [?]) can be seen as an expression of a similar strategy. In the third MS of the *Elements of Natural Law*, Leibniz objects to Aristotle's suggestion to look for the mean only in relations between things: "... if one has obtained a more precise insight into this problem, one realizes that justice governs love and dislike of a human being towards another human being ... Now there are two rules to moderate this emotion: 1. to hurt nobody, 2. to help everyone, as far as no-one else is hurt by this."²⁰ The idea of the mean consequently is described as a process of deliberation between various affects: "*What is just* is not precisely enough defined as what is useful for the community, since it is permissible to prefer the death of many to my own death. ... The just is the well-proportioned relation between self-love and the love for another person."²¹ Thus, in this context the search for rational proportions underlying the Platonic component of Leibniz's theory of justice is not introduced as an alternative to an Aristotelian conception of justice but rather as an attempt at realizing what Aristotle himself was unable to attain: applying to the concept of justice the basic Aristotelian insight into the nature of virtue.

Moreover, this definition of justice is not only conciliatory; it is also more than purely conventional. The way Leibniz makes use of the analysis of everyday language in the fourth MS of the *Elements of Natural Law* underlines the non-arbitrary character of the definition of justice:

The doctrine of right belongs to those sciences that depend on definitions and not on experience and on demonstrations of reason and not of sense; they are problems of law, so to speak, and not of fact. For since justice consists in a kind of congruity and proportionality, we can understand that something is just even if there is no one who practices it or upon whom it is practiced. Just so the relations of numbers are true even if there were no one to count and nothing to be counted ... We need not wonder, therefore, that

the principles of these sciences possess eternal truth. For they are all *conditionalia*, conditional truths, and treat not of what exists but of what follows if existence were assumed. They are not derived from sense but from a clear and distinct imagination, which Plato called an idea, and which, when expressed in words, is the same as a definition.²²

The view of concepts of reason articulated in this passage does not amount to a full-blown version of Platonism. Although juridical and arithmetical axioms and definitions in some sense are said to be eternal, they are this not in the way of abstract objects, but rather in the way of being the foundation of conditional truths. In this sense, they belong to the nature of rational beings, and therefore are accessible by means of a comparative method:

The method of our investigation is to gather the more important and distinctive examples of the use of these terms and to set up some meaning consistent with these and other examples. For just as we construct a hypothesis by inductions from observations, so we make a definition by comparing propositions; in both cases we make a compendium of all other instances, as yet untried, out of the most important given cases. This method is necessary whenever it is not desirable to determine the use of terms arbitrarily for one's self.²³

Again, it is the common conceptual equipment of rational beings that guarantees that the definitions of concepts of reason are not arbitrary. Leibniz here refers the reader back to what he said in his *Preface to Nizolius* (1670), where he emphasizes the non-hypothetical nature of logical—and more generally philosophical—concepts:

The true logic is not only an instrument, but also contains somehow the principles and the true reason of doing philosophy, because it provides the general rules, through which the true and the false can be discerned, and by means of which through the mere application of definitions and experiences all conclusions can be proven. But also, they are not the principles of philosophy, or of propositions themselves, and they do not make the truth of things but rather show it; nevertheless, they make the philosopher and are the principles of the right way of doing philosophy, which—as Nizolius has observed—is enough.²⁴

This leads Leibniz to the claim that philosophers do not know things other than ordinary people know, but rather the same things in a different way:

And it is very true that there is nothing that cannot be explicated in popular terms, only using more of them. Therefore, Nizolius rightly urges at various places that what does not possess a general term (i.e., as I understand him, what conjoined with other general terms can in particular express a thing) in common language should be regarded as nothing, as a fiction, and as useless. For philosophers do not always surpass common men in that they sense different things, but that they sense them in another way, that is with the eye of the mind, with reflection or attention, and comparing things with other things.²⁵

Although the example of “comparing things with other things” mentioned here concerns Joachim Jungius’ attempt at classifying birds through a comparison of their external features, the point Leibniz has in mind seems to be a more general one. According to his view, applying a comparative method to the problems of logic and philosophy leads to an insight into facts that are implicitly already commonly known. Thus, his suggestion to use a comparative method in the theory of law should be seen in the broader context of the application of a comparative method in making commonly shared implicit knowledge explicit.

This view of the nature of philosophical definitions has interesting consequences for the nature of Leibniz’s Platonism. In a *Note on the Universal Characteristic* (spring 1682 [?]), Leibniz writes: “Plato should be understood on the basis of his own writings, not of those of Plotinus or Marsilio Ficino ... Wondering about the idleness of human nature, I noticed that the later Platonists have shifted to the background the excellent and well-founded doctrines of the master concerning virtue and justice, the state, the art of defining and categorizing concepts, the knowledge of eternal truths and the innate knowledge of our mind ...”²⁶ Among the Neo-platonic doctrines Leibniz there rejects are the theory of a world soul, the theory of the subsistence of ideas outside of objects, and the theory of the purification of souls in the underworld. Nevertheless, he thinks that the Platonic theory of the eternal nature of truths of reason has a kernel of truth: “In our mind there are innate ideas, which represent the universal essences of things to us: our knowledge therefore is reminiscence, and our perfection can be reduced in the last analysis to a community with God: all this is, if it is rightly interpreted, entirely true and of highest importance.”²⁷ Thus, the way Leibniz modifies Platonism not only involves a rejection of Neo-platonic doctrines that are peripheral to the Platonic theory of ideas. Leibniz also rejects the idea of the existence of ideas as abstract objects and emphasizes the role of eternal truths of

reason as knowledge that is innate to the human mind. Moreover, this is the line of thought taken in the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686). There, Leibniz criticizes the combination of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence with the idea of the pre-existence of the soul and the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis.²⁸ He also offers an alternative to the Platonic doctrine according to which in rational insight we “see” God’s ideas²⁹ by pointing out that—even if ideas in the human mind represent ideas in the mind of God—we think by means of our own ideas.³⁰

2. Sorites Arguments and Justice

The view of the definition of justice in the first part of the *Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice* should be seen against the background of this modification of the Platonic view of the nature of ideas. For the theory of justice, this has the consequence that the Platonic “ascent” in the second part of the *Méditation* should be understood in the framework of a theory of reason that concerns not only the realm of ideas in a Divine mind (which somehow can be “seen” by human beings) but also the realm of ideas in human minds. Leibniz’s ontology of ideas has the advantage that it provides him with a precise view as to how the Platonic “ascent” can be achieved from a methodological point of view: We have to find ways to tease out implicit assumptions contained in the everyday use of human reason.

In order to tease out the implicit assumptions concerning the nature of justice—in addition to the above-mentioned comparative method—Leibniz makes use of sorites arguments. Such arguments can be found in Leibniz’s early writings on justice, and they provide a clue as to how the Platonic “ascent” in the second part of the *Méditation* is supposed to work. In the context of Leibniz’s early theory of justice, André Robinet has pointed out the importance of a sorites type of reasoning leading from natural law to Roman law, and from Roman law to the law of Leibniz’s days.³¹ However, Leibniz’s early application of sorites arguments goes beyond the idea of a gradual difference between natural law, Roman law, and contemporary law. Clearly, Leibniz is aware of the fact that sorites arguments lead to the classical Stoic paradoxes.³² Nevertheless, he holds the view that sorites arguments in certain contexts can be logically valid, even if they do not simply coincide with a chain of syllogisms or definitions. A first context is constituted by arguments concerning transitive relations.³³ Here, the

validity of a sorites type of arguing only depends on the absence of equivocations in the description of transitive relations. A second context is constituted by arguments concerning continuous qualities. According to Leibniz, in this case sorites arguments show that the transition from one state to another one leads through minimal changes and therefore presupposes the existence of minimal quantities.³⁴ Moreover, the application of sorites arguments to the case of continuous qualities is part of an argumentative strategy that Leibniz explicitly characterizes as an instance of “the Socratic method of discoursing, as it is exposed in the Platonic dialogues”.³⁵

In a similar perspective, Leibniz makes use of sorites arguments in the second MS of the *Elements of Natural Law*. These arguments start from our everyday understanding of the concept of justice. One of them begins with the observation that “whoever in the middle of mutual boxing on the ears draws a knife or a sword first, by universal consent is held to be the accused.”³⁶ Leibniz applies this everyday conception to a chain of situations of gradually increasing generality:

But also between states something similar happens, when in war certain obligations can be recognized and battles are only fought where armed men stand against each other. From this it is once more apparent that someone who, although he could react to violence with equal weapons nevertheless uses unequal ones, acts in an unjust way. Thus under all circumstances, someone who has first brought deadly weapons to the scene of a fight, although it would have had been possible to fight with other weapons, has acted in an unjust way. Even more unjustly, who first used missiles (*missilia*), from which there is even less protection.³⁷

A further application of sorites arguments can be found in the extensive discussion of rescue conflicts in the *Elements of Natural Law*. Leibniz’s starting point here is that in the case of two drowning persons of which only one can be rescued, it is—according to our everyday conception of justice—justified to rescue the one to whom we are related by closer personal ties.³⁸ Leibniz develops the implications of this intuition in two directions. On the one hand, he replaces the criterion of personal ties by other criteria such as moral and intellectual qualities, the indispensability for other persons, or the usefulness for the state. If only one of these criteria is applicable, the initial intuition (that rescuing the person that has a particular significance for someone) is justified and can be applied to cases of increasing generality.³⁹ On the other hand, Leibniz discusses cases in which several criteria are in conflict with each other. In such cases, the everyday intuition

(that the closeness of personal ties outweighs other criteria) functions as the basis of a sorites argument: “The question was ... whether it can be approved that I prefer the misery of my father to the misery of a thousand other persons or already the misery of two or a hundred; in this a sorites reasoning takes place.”⁴⁰ Because our everyday intuition justifies rescuing the father at the expense of a small number of other persons, the sorites argument shows that justice does not coincide with utility for the community. Thus, the sorites arguments in the second MS of the *Elements of Natural Law* provide the foundation for the above-cited passage about what justice is (and what it is not) at the beginning of the third MS of the *Elements*.⁴¹ In this way, a sorites type of reasoning makes our views about the connection between justice and the proportions between natural affects explicit—views which are already implicitly contained in our everyday conception of justice.

The idea of a continuum between negatively refraining from doing harm and positively being benevolent and charitable in the *Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice* can be understood in a similar perspective. Leibniz there claims that the Platonic-Augustinian *caritas sapientis* is nothing else than the *honeste vivere* and *neminem laedere* of Roman law, because there is only a gradual difference between these forms of justice.⁴² As he did in the *Elements of Natural Law*, Leibniz uses sorites arguments to prove this claim. In order to show the equivalence of *justitia particularis* and *justitia universalis*, in the *Méditation* he constructs cases that lie in between these extremes. One of these arguments runs as follows:

One will perhaps wish to doubt whether a man free of commitments or a sovereign of a state has these same obligations ... But has one not reason to fear that men will hate us if we refuse them aid which does not inconvenience us at all, and if we fail to arrest an evil which is going to overwhelm them? Someone will say: I am content that others do not harm me, I do not ask at all their aid or their beneficence ... But can one hold to this language sincerely? Let him ask himself what he would say and hope for if he should find himself actually on the point of falling into an evil, which another could make him avoid by a turn of his hand. Would one not hold him for a bad man and even for an enemy, if he did not want to save us in this situation?⁴³

Later in the text, Leibniz takes up a similar argumentative strategy:

I wish to propose an intermediate case once again. A great good is going to come to you; an impediment appears; I can remove that impediment without

pain: would you not believe yourself to have a right to ask it of me, and to remind me that I would ask it of you, if I were in a similar position? ...

If you refuse the request, he has reason to complain, since he can judge that you would make the same request if you were in the place of him who makes it. And it is the principle of equity, or, what is the same thing, of equality or of the same reason, which holds that one should grant whatever one would wish in a similar situation, without claiming to be privileged, against reason, or to be able to allege one's will as a reason.⁴⁴

Riley gives the following interpretation of these passages: "Leibniz relies not so much on Christian exhortation as on the notion of what reasonable people would ask for or complain of in everyday moral experience. It is not just 'Rome' and 'reason' that are appealed to, but garden-variety practice as well."⁴⁵ By contrast, Emily Grosholz understands these passages as a combination of the application of imagination with an application of the principle of continuity: "Leibniz explicitly invokes the principle of continuity, [and as he] sets up his *continuum*, he insists on the primacy of imagination that permits one to put oneself in another's position, to transcend one's own *point de vue*."⁴⁶ However, in his famous letter to Sophie Charlotte ("On What Goes Beyond Sensation and Matter") Leibniz explicitly points out that reflection goes beyond imagination: imagination comprises only the ideas of the external senses and the ideas of the *sens commun*, not the ideas of reason.⁴⁷ At the same time, in the *Méditation* Leibniz does not apply a metaphysical *principle* such as the principle of continuity. Rather, he tries to prove that there is continuity between particular and universal justice by using a sorites argument that shows that we cannot find a point where our intuitions about particular justice cease to be applicable to more general cases. Thus, it is also not mere "garden-variety practice" that is a stake here but rather an analysis of our everyday conception of justice which leads to transforming implicit knowledge about the universality of justice into explicit knowledge. This is the strategy that leads to the conclusion:

Led by degrees, one will agree not only that men should abstain from wrongdoing, but also that they should prevent evil from happening and even relieve it, when it is done; at least insofar as they can without inconveniencing themselves (and I do not examine now how far this inconvenience may go).⁴⁸

In this way, the cases that lie in between the extremes of particular and universal justice make it clear that the differences between particular and universal justice are not generic differences but only gradual ones. Thus, the intermediate cases

are the degrees that show that there is a continuum between particular and universal justice. In this way, sorites arguments show that the conception of universal justice as wise charity and universal benevolence is a necessary condition of our everyday conception of justice. Because it is a necessary condition of rational thought about justice, the conception of universal justice can be understood as belonging to the realm of necessary and, in this sense, eternal truths. Moreover, because sorites arguments show the continuity between the *honeste vivere* and *neminem laedere* of Roman law and the *caritas sapientis* of universal jurisprudence, they also combine elements from Roman law with a Platonic view of the nature of justice. This way of integrating Platonism leads to a view of the concept of justice as something that does not belong to a realm of abstract objects but rather to the intellect of rational beings, human or Divine. Therefore, using sorites arguments for Leibniz is a technique of understanding the concept of justice as belonging both to the realm of necessary, quasi-mathematical, verities and to the natural order.

3. Conclusion

If, as Riley has argued, the *Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice* uses the “standard platonic method to throw light on morally problematical and elusive notions ... by attempting to relate them to ... the ‘necessary’ truths of mathematics and geometry which all rational beings see in the mind’s eye”⁴⁹ then the reinterpretation of the Platonic theory of ideas in Leibniz’s theory of definitions bears on the nature of ethical knowledge. Leibniz’s modification of Platonism does not amount to abandoning the view that truths of reason, including those about the nature of justice, are necessary, eternal, and common to all rational beings. However, it affects the way this claim is integrated into a theory of human reason. Leibniz regards definitions of philosophical concepts as something that makes implicit knowledge explicit, and he applies this view of the nature of definitions to the concept of justice. Therefore, the role of the definition of justice in the first part of the *Méditation* should be seen in the context of the development of Leibniz’s views on the nature of justice. Moreover, in order to bring out such implicit knowledge concerning the nature of justice, the early Leibniz uses comparative strategies that try to reveal the common rational core of everyday propositions about justice. Early on, he adds to the comparative strategy the use of sorites arguments that show how everyday intuitions concerning particu-

lar justice can be gradually generalized to more cases involving more complex situations. The argumentative strategy of the second part of the *Méditation* should be seen as taking up this application of sorites arguments. Moreover, using sorites arguments to bring out implicit assumptions contained in our everyday notion of justice provides Leibniz with a strategy that reconciles, in a methodologically well-founded way, Platonic features with others drawn from the traditions of Aristotelianism and Roman law. Thus, the interpretation defended here understands Leibniz's concept of justice as less dominantly Platonic, but at the same time opens a way to understand it as part of a philosophy that is less dogmatic and more descriptive than Kant had thought.

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Notes

¹ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Political Writings*, trans. and ed. Patrick Riley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1988, p. 54.

² *Political Writings*, p. 45.

³ Cf. Grua, II, 447.

⁴ Patrick Riley, "Leibniz's *Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice*, 1703-2003", *Leibniz Review* 13 (2003), pp. 67-81, p. 69.

⁵ Patrick Riley, "Leibniz's *Méditation . . .*", p. 67.

⁶ Riley, "Leibniz's *Méditation . . .*", pp. 67, 69, 71.

⁷ Patrick Riley, "Leibniz, and 'Universal' Justice. The Influence of Plato's *Euthyphro*", in Günter Abel, Hans-Jürgen Engfer, Christoph Hubig (eds.), *Neuzeitliches Denken. Festschrift für Hans Poser zum 65. Geburtstag*, Berlin – New York: De Gruyter, 2002, pp. 195-208, pp. 207-208.

⁸ Riley, "Leibniz's *Méditation . . .*", pp. 67-69. See Plato, *Euthyphro* 9e-10e.

⁹ Patrick Riley, *Leibniz' Universal Jurisprudence. Justice as the Charity of the Wise*, Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 6; Cf. Kant, *Werke*, ed. Ernst Cassirer, VI, 68-70.

¹⁰ *Political Writings*, pp. 46-47.

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- ¹¹ Leibniz to Hermann Conring (beginning May [?] 1671), A II, 1, 95. Except where otherwise noted, translations are my own.
- ¹² Marcelo Dascal, "Leibniz's Early Views on Definitions", in Marcelo Dascal, *Leibniz. Language, Signs, and Thought*, Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1987, pp. 61-80. Cf. *Dialogus* (August 1677), A VI, 4, 20-25.
- ¹³ *Dissertatio de arte combinatoria*, Appendix, A VI, 1, 229.
- ¹⁴ *Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae*, I, §§ 34-35; A VI, 1, 286-287.
- ¹⁵ Leibniz to Hermann Conring, 9/ 19 April 1670, A II, 1, 41.
- ¹⁶ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b32, 1105b5.
- ¹⁷ *Dissertatio de arte combinatoria*, Appendix, A VI, 1, 229-230; Leibniz's emphasis.
- ¹⁸ See Hugo Grotius, *DeJure belli ac pacis libri tres*, Paris 1625, Prolegomena, § 44.
- ¹⁹ *Dissertatio de arte combinatoria*, Appendix, A VI, 1, 230.
- ²⁰ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Third MS, A VI, 1, 455.
- ²¹ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Third MS, A VI, 1, 455.
- ²² *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Fourth MS, A VI, 1, 460; L 133.
- ²³ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Fourth MS, A VI, 1, 461; L 133.
- ²⁴ *Marii Nizolii De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi libri IV*, praefatio, A VI, 2, 408.
- ²⁵ *Marii Nizolii De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi libri IV*, praefatio, A VI, 2, 413.
- ²⁶ *Ad constitutionem scientiae generalis*, A VI, 4, 479.
- ²⁷ *Ad constitutionem scientiae generalis*, A VI, 4, 480.
- ²⁸ DM § 26, A VI, 4, 1570-1571.
- ²⁹ Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 75d.
- ³⁰ DM § 29, A VI, 4, 1574; cf. Andreas Blank, *Der logische Aufbau von Leibniz' Metaphysik*, Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2001, especially pp.127-134.
- ³¹ André Robinet, *G. W. Leibniz. Le meilleur des mondes par la balance de l'Europe*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, pp. 42-46. Cf. Leibniz to Hermann Conring (beginning 1670 [?]), A II, 1, 32.
- ³² Cf. *Demonstratio Substantiarum Incorporearum*, Sixth Draft (autumn 1672 [?]), A VI, 3, 88.
- ³³ Cf. *Disputatio de casibus perplexis in jure* (5/ 15 November 1666), A VI, 1, 244-245; *Demonstratio Substantiarum Incorporearum*, Sixth Draft, VI, 3, 88-89.

- ³⁴ Cf. *Pacidius Philalethi* (29 October – 10 November 1676), A VI, 3, 538-541.
- ³⁵ *Pacidius Philalethi*, A VI, 3, 529.
- ³⁶ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Second MS, A VI, 1, 438.
- ³⁷ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Second MS, A VI, 1, 438-439.
- ³⁸ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Second MS, A VI, 1, 439-440.
- ³⁹ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Second MS, A VI, 1, 441-442.
- ⁴⁰ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Second MS, A VI, 1, 443.
- ⁴¹ *Elementa Juris Naturalis*, Third MS, A VI, 1, 455.
- ⁴² *Political Writings*, pp. 54, 60.
- ⁴³ *Political Writings*, p. 54.
- ⁴⁴ *Political Writings*, pp. 55-56.
- ⁴⁵ Riley, *Leibniz' Universal Jurisprudence*, p. 189.
- ⁴⁶ Emily Grosholz, „Leibniz and the Two Labyrinths“, in Marcelo Dascal and Elhanan Yakira (eds.), *Leibniz and Adam*, Tel-Aviv: University Publishing Projects, pp. 65-77, p. 76.
- ⁴⁷ *Sur ce qui passe les sens et la matiere* (1702), GP VI, 500-501.
- ⁴⁸ *Political Writings*, p. 55.
- ⁴⁹ Riley, *Leibniz' Universal Jurisprudence*, p. 26.