

## *Alter et etiam: Rejoinder to Schepers*

Marcelo Dascal, Tel Aviv University

I am grateful to my friend, Professor Heinrich Schepers, editor of volume VI.4 of Leibniz's *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, for the time and critical attention he devotes to my lengthy review of this volume,<sup>1</sup> in a detailed reply included in the present issue of this journal.<sup>2</sup> Since I believe that criticism and discussion are the master key to intellectual progress, I consider myself to be extremely lucky that my painstaking work has been the object of criticism by the scholar who is most familiar with the texts published in VI.4. I am also grateful to Professor Glenn Hartz, editor of *The Leibniz Review*, for granting me the opportunity to publish a rejoinder, generously stretching the deadline for its submission, so that it could appear along with Professor Schepers' reply. I hope this critical exchange will foster further discussion of the issues it touches upon, particularly the reassessment of the nature of Leibniz's rationalism, and that Leibniz scholarship will be thereby rewarded.

Given the short time and limited space available, I am afraid I will not be able to deal with all the points raised in Professor Schepers' reply. I will confine myself to the main divergences between us and will consider briefly some disagreements concerning the interpretation of a few texts – which illustrate those divergences. I am sure there will be plenty of occasions for discussing the remaining questions.

Since the Reply begins by mentioning “the full power of [my] rhetoric” (117; his Reply pages will not include a ‘p.’ here) let me begin by reiterating that there is nothing in my praise for VI.4 that should be viewed as ‘rhetorical’ in the eristic sense of the term. On the contrary, I think this volume deserves all the praise I *sincerely* bestowed upon it – and even more. In the spirit of the Reply's proposed division of labor between editors and interpreters (117-18), I think the editors have done an invaluable service to Leibniz's present and future interpreters, by providing them with an impeccable professional edition of the texts. I am sure they tried to be as objective and non-interpretative as possible in their editing work – and I praised them in my Review for this too (pp. 117, 152-153).

Where there may be a slight disagreement between Schepers and myself is in his description of the job of the Introduction as not being “to pave the way for further interpretations” (117-18). Were this the case, the Introduction should have

been nothing but a slightly developed version of the Foreword, contenting itself with elaborating upon editorial matters such as the dating and ordering of the texts (as in other previously edited Academy volumes) – which it is clearly not, neither in extension nor in content. I have no qualms with this. Quite on the contrary: its usefulness lies precisely in its attempt to show the connections between so many different expressions of Leibniz’s productivity in the years covered by VI.4 and to spell out the main ideas and projects underlying such connections. Since this is obviously a matter of interpretation, it is a bit unfair to present me as someone who “decides to use the publication of volume VI.4” for presenting his picture of a “new Leibniz” (117).<sup>3</sup> As I reported in my Review (p. 119), the picture I consider to be quite different from the one presented in the Introduction emerged ‘bottom up’ from the study of the texts, many of them included in the pre-edition of VI.4, which I examined much before the Introduction was available. To be sure, I could have presented this picture regardless of the Introduction – as I had partially done before.<sup>4</sup> But would it be proper in a review of the whole volume to overlook its rich Introduction? Would it be intellectually honest to avoid calling attention to the fact that this interpretation fails to do justice to important aspects of Leibniz’s conception and practice of reason I detect in the texts of VI.4? It seems to me that, were I to adopt such a course of action, I would be underestimating both the value and the impact of Schepers’ work.

The two pictures in question are described in my Review (pp. 117-123), and I will only briefly summarize them here, for the benefit of the reader. The ‘radical reason’ picture I discern in the Introduction depicts Leibniz as engaged in a “revolutionary work that will ground knowledge, the basis of our rational interaction, upon a new, more secure foundation” (p. xlviii),<sup>5</sup> i.e., as a “radical rationalist” seeking, “in all fields of spiritual activity”, a use of reason based on “the first roots” (p. xlvii).<sup>6</sup> I spell out (p. 118) this picture in terms of a number of logic-inspired parameters, which Schepers endorses in his Reply (123), and I point out the injunctions they require a ‘radical rationalist’ to observe: “analyze! demonstrate! formalize! calculate!, and axiomatize!” (p.118).

The ‘softer rationality’ picture I discern in many texts of VI.4 as well as elsewhere contrasts with the ‘radical reason’ picture in that it stresses a broad range of argumentative and reasoning practices – whose rationality Leibniz acknowledges and tries to explain and whose use is pervasive in the texts – that do not conform to the above injunctions. They display a ‘softer’ form of rationality, if compared to that of the other picture, in the sense that they are not foundational

(i.e., not seeking nor dependent upon the ‘ultimate analysis’ of concepts), not demonstrative (i.e., the conclusions they yield are not logically necessary), not formal or calculus-like (i.e., they rely on factors not capable of being fully captured by a precise formal system whose operational rules, when correctly applied, determine unequivocally the results). These (and other) characteristics endow this kind of rationality with a flexibility and context-sensitivity their ‘radical’ counterparts do not possess, as well as with a systematicity different in nature from that of axiomatic systems. The image underlying this picture is that of an old-fashioned two-scales balance, where – to use a sentence which is recurrent in Leibniz’s writings – “reasons are not to be counted, but weighed”. Its central injunction is, thus: weigh carefully!

We can now proceed to Schepers’ critique of my Review. Admitting that his Introduction is interpretative, he criticizes me firstly for “misrepresenting [his] interpretation” (118), and secondly for “a sometimes fallacious interpretation of texts used as support” (ibid.). I will discuss these charges in this order.

The alleged misrepresentation consists in my extending the notion of ‘radical reason’ presented in the Introduction beyond its scope. In so doing, I am charged with having failed to understand that it applies to *nothing but* Leibniz’s mega-project of a *Scientia Generalis*.<sup>7</sup> According to Schepers, the “*radical reason model*” I attribute to him is a “rhetorical fiction”, and the “picture [of radical reason] in the way [Dascal] describes it has certainly not been painted by me ... [it] is something that does not exist, at least not separate from Leibniz’s work on *SG*” (124); “it was never my intention” – he writes – “to argue for such a theory of radical reason, and even less to attribute to it the dominating force Dascal seems to see” (124-25). I am glad to learn that Schepers does not hold a generalized conception of ‘radical reason’ as characterizing Leibniz’s rationalism. I confess that I may have been misled into believing otherwise by the strong, unrestricted statements (quoted in notes 5 and 6) he makes when depicting Leibniz’s radical rationalism. The welcomed clarification of his intention, which narrows considerably the scope of those statements, might put an end to the debate between us. For I have never denied that *SG* is a central project of Leibniz; nor did I deny that the ‘radical reason’ picture is its core (although I have shown that, even within this project there is an important role for the ‘soft rationality’ picture as well, especially in what concerns the *ars inveniendi*).

Furthermore, since Schepers declares that the ‘soft rationality’ picture is a research program “definitely worth pursuing” (123-24), and I never suggested that

this picture should *replace* the ‘radical reason’ picture (whatever its scope), but rather that both co-exist side by side, often in the same text, we would be in agreement also in this respect: *both* pictures co-exist in Leibniz’s rationalism. This is what the presence of the word *etiam* in the title of my Rejoinder, echoing that of his Reply, is intended to express. The conflict between us would thus prove to be apparent, and easily resolvable by clearing relatively simple misunderstandings. This would be a typical case of what I call ‘discussion’ in my typology of polemical exchanges, where a ‘solution’ can be reached, the truth can be found, mistakes corrected, and harmony among scholars restored.<sup>8</sup>

Unfortunately, the debate does not end on this ecumenical note. For the Reply, having declared its restriction of the scope of ‘radical reason’ and having thus given up its dominating role, proceeds – in consonance with the Introduction – to expand again its scope, even more radically and explicitly than the Introduction. Concomitantly, having declared its sympathy towards the idea of ‘soft rationality’, it proceeds to downgrade the *otherness* of this idea, and on to subsume it under ‘radical reason’. As a result, the disagreement between Schepers and myself, far from subsiding in the wake of the correction of my alleged misrepresentation – thanks to Schepers’ clarification of his intention – is rather enhanced. I cannot thus avoid pursuing its further examination. Not only by virtue of my duty as a ‘defender’ of my position, but also – and mainly – because I think in this way the deeper character of our divergent interpretations and of the two pictures will be better understood. In fact, in terms of my typology of polemical exchanges (see note 8), it turns out that the disagreement acquires at this point the characteristics of a ‘controversy’, in which no relatively easy way to find a mutually acceptable ‘solution’ is available.

Like myself in the Review (pp. 150-152), Schepers in the Reply speaks of a ‘division of labor’. Yet, he employs this expression for an entirely different purpose. Instead of suggesting a distinct but complementary role of ‘radical reason’ and ‘soft rationality’ as I do, he in fact has in mind the radically different aims pursued by Leibniz’s *SG* project and by his metaphysics, which, according to him “went in a completely different direction” (119): the former, to create a procedure for evaluating and increasing our knowledge; the latter, “to secure the freedom of man and to clarify the place of the individual in the world and his relation to God” (*ibid.*). What matters for our discussion is not the content of these descriptions, but the fact that, in spite of stressing the profound difference of aims, Schepers subsumes both these central philosophical concerns of Leibniz

under the *radical use of reason* and its ‘rational implications’ – by which he means their inherent *demonstrative/analytic* character.<sup>9</sup>

There is a further ‘division of labor’ Schepers has in mind. Obviously, Leibniz did not write all his metaphysical pieces, and not even all his *SG* pieces, in strict demonstrative/analytic form. In fact, he rarely *did* this, even though he *affirmed* this manner of writing should be reserved for – and used in – only those matters of utmost interest to humans, namely matters that have to do with salvation.<sup>10</sup> An example of ‘deviation’ from the demonstrative/analytic mode of presentation is Leibniz’s abundant and systematic use of analogy and metaphor, a typical ‘soft’ means of conceptualization and expression, which he rarely if ever cashes out into deductions and literal paraphrases.<sup>11</sup> In order to explain such ‘deviations’, Schepers resorts to Russell’s distinction between Leibniz’ ‘serious’ vs. ‘public’ writings, without including the obvious falsity of claiming that the former are in Latin and the later in the vulgar languages: “**All** the writings intended for an outside audience show **a different kind of reason at work** than that associated with the *rigor metaphysicus* on the one side and on the other side the future ideal of the *Calculemus*” (119; boldfacing mine). This brings us to the role Schepers assigns to ‘soft rationality’. It belongs mainly – if not exclusively – to the ‘public’ mode of writing; it is a practical means of addressing ‘outsider’ non-professionals, who are not really able to understand rigorous thinking; and in no way can it be viewed as an essential component of both Leibniz’s metaphysical and epistemological – or other fundamental theoretical – endeavors.

The downgrading of ‘soft rationality’ as a different strand of Leibniz’s theory and practice of rationality begins with the hedges that qualify Schepers’ expressions of sympathy towards this idea. ‘Soft rationality’ is branded “a concept which seems to be never properly explained” (123),<sup>12</sup> and it is claimed that it “or something like it, is suitable in all cases of purely pragmatic or exoteric arguments” (125). It culminates in denying any substantive difference between the two pictures by reducing the differences I pointed out to the mere division of labor between the needs of public communication and serious work, thereby suggesting that ‘soft rationality’ has nothing to do with the latter, but only with the former.<sup>13</sup>

In the light of this downgrading, it is now my turn to feel ‘misrepresented’. For I think I have clearly shown in my Review, with a profusion of examples and arguments, based on the analysis of many texts, including three key texts of the “breakthrough year of 1686” (to which – strangely enough – Schepers’ Reply hardly refers), that a non-demonstrative or non-calculative rationality is both ac-

knowledge and widely used by Leibniz. I have argued and illustrated<sup>14</sup> that this kind of rationality is not marginal but absolutely needed by Leibniz in a wide range of his central interests – from metaphysics to science, from jurisprudence to theology, from medicine to history, and even in mathematics and logic themselves. I have shown the fundamental role ‘soft rationality’ has at the highest level of *rigor metaphysicus* if one is to account for contingency and existence in a world of utmost complexity (see my Review, p. 120) – which shows that the distinction between the two types of rationality is *theoretically fundamental*, since it corresponds to the basic distinction between the “two great principles” that rule the world. I have explained the not-less-fundamental epistemological implications this has for understanding Leibniz’s cooperative, dialectical, eclectic,<sup>15</sup> and dynamic conception of the formation, evaluation, and evolution of knowledge – as well as his practical activities in the field of scientific policy.<sup>16</sup>

To affirm, in the light of the evidence I have provided, that “there is no distinction between stronger and less strong reasons” (125), the difference being thus no more than ‘pragmatic’, seems to me a bit far-fetched.<sup>17</sup> For it implies, among other calamitous consequences, that there is no difference in the strength or weight of reasons that incline and reasons that necessitate, that the central argument of the *Discours de Metaphysique* concerning miracles and their apparent violation of the laws of nature, which makes essential use of the notion of presumption (see my Review, pages 142-143) is entirely mistaken,<sup>18</sup> that Leibniz is not speaking in earnest when he repeatedly employs the metaphor of the balance and insists that one cannot content oneself with *counting* reasons, but must *weigh* them, and that the ‘new logic’ he longs to develop must provide the non-calculative means for this ‘balance of reason’ to operate adequately.

At one point in the Reply, “the *right use of reason*” is no longer identified by the attempt to apply the parameters and injunctions I single out above and Schepers endorsed (at least as characterizing the *SG* project), but said to be “characterized by its specific characteristics” (124). This move allows subsuming under ‘the right use of reason’ virtually everything. Indeed, the paragraph it opens lists, in addition to *SG* and metaphysics, domains as far apart as mathematics, physics and astronomy, on the one hand, and “settling religious disputes”, “combating atheism or skepticism without appealing to revelation but using the *right* logic and metaphysics”, “resolving controversies” and “convincing opponents”, on the other (*ibid.*).

I welcome this contextualization of the applications of reason to the particular domains and conditions of its use, for I do agree with Schepers that Leibniz “was perceptive enough not to try to tackle all problems with the machinery of formal logic” (ibid.). What this implies, however, is that Leibniz was aware of the fact that, for each of these different tasks, *quite different methods of reasoning and argumentation* were needed. Furthermore, as I have shown, these differences are not mere variations on the same theme or adaptations of a core theoretical paradigm to the practical circumstances of its application. They are rather deep enough to justify seeing them as not subsumable under a single notion of ‘right reason’ inspired by the analytic/demonstrative ideal. Together, they suggest another, context-sensitive, flexible and softer pattern of the uses of reason, substantially different from the ‘radical’ pattern. It is the extent and depth of the difference between these patterns, as well as of their metaphysical and epistemological grounds and corresponding theoretical significance – in short, their essential *otherness*, that Schepers refuses to acknowledge, in his eagerness to preserve the standard way of conceiving the unity of Leibniz’s rationalism.

The issue at stake, thus, is not the *existence* of ‘soft rationality’ or “something like it” in Leibniz’s writings, which Schepers, in spite of his attempts to downgrade its specificity, does in fact acknowledge. Nor is it the *existence* of a ‘radical reason’ picture, which Schepers, in spite of his attempts to confine it to the SG mega-project, actually upgrades to the role of the paradigm of *recta ratio*. The issue is to what extent these two pictures differ and how they are related.

In Schepers’ view, their apparent difference is rather superficial, and can be easily explained in terms of such distinctions as ‘public’ and ‘serious’, ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’, ‘pragmatic’ and ‘rigorous’. Their relationship can be accordingly explained in hierarchical terms: the core, the decisive feature of rationality for Leibniz lies in analyticity and its cognate properties; ‘soft rationality’ must be, in one way or another, derivative from this core, and ultimately reducible to it. The Review’s title employs a carefully crafted phrase, *non alter, sed etiam* (‘not other, but also’), that synthesizes marvelously these two components of Schepers’ position: the otherness of ‘soft rationality’ is explicitly denied (*non alter*) and its existence is admitted (*etiam*), provided it is understood correctly (*sed*).<sup>19</sup>

In my view, in contrast, the fundamental otherness of ‘soft rationality’ cannot be thus overlooked. Rather than being relatively superficial, it draws its existence in Leibniz from basic features of his thought and from the very nature of his

encompassing rationalism. It cannot, therefore, be explained away as a derivative of the ‘radical reason’ picture, and must co-exist side by side with it, in the capacity of a full-fledged independent and different counterpart and partner. It is fully there and fully other, not just there. The *et* in my title, *alter et etiam*, which is neither adversative nor asymmetrical, is intended to indicate exactly this kind of non-hierarchic presence and relationship – whose more precise features should be the object of further investigation.

Having tried to uncover a facet of Leibniz’s rationality which is substantively different from the generally accepted picture, I willingly accepted the burden of proof and undertook to show how this picture emerges from VI.4, if only one tries to make the appropriate gestalt shift when reading many of its texts. Maybe my way of reading some of these texts is indeed “fallacious” or “purely speculative” as Schepers argues. In my defense I can only say here that I did my best to be as faithful to the texts as possible. Unfortunately I cannot here address the details of all his critical remarks regarding my textual analyses and of the alternative interpretations he proposes – from both of which I have learned a lot, and for which I am grateful. I will have to content myself with a very brief discussion of a few points, which seem to me relevant to a better understanding of what is at stake in this rewarding debate.

*Eclecticism and hermeneutics.* Schepers questions my translation of the title of *Spongia exprobationum* as “A shield against censorship” (p. 120), and proposes the more literal translation “a sponge which would absorb and neutralize the accusations different disciplines level against one another” (128). I could defend my translation.<sup>20</sup> But this is beside the point, because we are in fact in agreement about what this text is all about, namely the rejection of an overly critical attitude of a discipline or doctrine against the others, which prevents true interdisciplinary or inter-doctrinal cooperation. Against this Leibniz argues that all disciplines and all doctrines have strengths and weaknesses, which must be both duly recognized, evaluated, and eventually incorporated in one’s own doctrine. What Schepers objects to is my calling a text like this “a true eclectic manifesto”. He objects, anachronistically, that “we would not want to call Leibniz an eclectic”. Well, I, for one, would want, and actually have, called him so,<sup>21</sup> and so did Diderot in the *Encyclopédie*, where he considers eclecticism a highly praiseworthy philosophy. For Schepers – but not for Diderot and myself – “an eclectic accepts ideas uncritically by relying on the authority of the source”, whereas Leibniz never adopts traditional positions “without transforming them, and *never* with-

out demonstrating their truth within his philosophy” (ibid.; italics mine). Regardless of whether this generalization is true or not, Schepers and myself surely agree that the pre-condition for being able to adopt positions drawn from other doctrines, eras, or cultures and therefore for being an eclectic is abandoning an a priori reproachful attitude against other doctrines or disciplines – which is precisely what the shield or sponge this text talks about should help us to do.

How far Leibniz follows the opposite attitude is explained in a letter to Placcius of 28 April 1695, where he also criticizes his eclectic colleague, Christian Thomasius, whom he says to admire and approve “more readily when he expounds his own views than when he rejects those of others”. Leibniz declares that by experience he learned that “[t]here are profound reflections in every kind of doctrine, each with its own usefulness, even though they are not so obvious. Therefore, what has been reflected upon in various kinds of interpretations usually deserves from me applause rather than contempt, so as to stimulate the learned to explore those deeper notions rather than being deterred by them”; furthermore, “by nature and education” – he concludes – “I am prepared to look for, in the writings of others, [what contributes to] my own improvement rather than to the failure of others”.<sup>22</sup>

The insistence on the valuable pieces of knowledge possibly hidden in any doctrine not only paves the way for making use of them (which is what eclecticism – rather than syncretism – is all about), but it is also morally and politically important, since it fosters tolerance and anti-sectarianism. This is one of the important themes treated in the *Recommendation*, which I discuss in my Review (pp. 123-125). My objective was to show how a text predominantly oriented towards the ‘radical reason’ ideals, also makes use – and quite significantly – of the ‘soft rationality’ tools. The example I highlight is Leibniz’s treatment of Descartes’ principle that one should consider a proposition as false until one has demonstrated it (which implies an a priori bias against past doctrines, among others) as a recommendation, i.e., as a *presumption* – a presumption Leibniz proposes to replace by the opposite one, namely that “the oldest and the most accepted propositions are the best, provided one interprets them equitably” (A VI 4, p. 703). Nor does he seem to realize that the shift of attitude and of presumption in question implies a deeper respect for “the place of the other” embodied in a principle of charity in the interpretation of texts, which in turn amounts to the need to take seriously hermeneutics as a methodical part of the construction of knowledge. To all these points Schepers’ response amounts to asserting that what I actually point

out and show by means of quotations cannot be in the text, because there cannot be room for hermeneutics, presumptions, charity of interpretation, etc. in texts such as the *Recommendation* which deal with the SG mega-project and seek patrons to support it.<sup>23</sup>

*Probability and presumption.* When trying to show the strength and sufficiency of a ‘radical reason’ program, and its ability to deal also with what supposedly would belong to ‘soft rationality’, Schepers often gives the example of probabilities.<sup>24</sup> It is indeed well known that Leibniz was a pioneer in developing what came later to be known as the *calculus* of probabilities, as illustrated by his early writing “The estimation of the uncertain”, to which Schepers’ Reply as well as my Review refer. In so far as they can be reduced to a calculus, probabilistic inferences indeed belong to the ‘radical reason’ picture. In fact this is why I did not include them in my list of examples of ‘soft rationality’. But probabilities also have a ‘soft’ side, hardly reducible to a calculus, which I explained on page 121, and to which I refer Schepers and the reader.

But it is a bit odd to mention a borderline case such as probabilities and totally ignore presumption, which I consider to be a typical case of ‘soft rationality’, and which figures prominently in my list of examples as well as in the desiderata Leibniz formulates for the ‘new logic’ he would like to develop. The use of presumptions is also highlighted in my analysis of several texts, e.g. the *Discours de Metaphysique* and the *Recommendation*. Presumptions are ‘soft’ rules of inference because they are not, strictly speaking, demonstrative, since their conclusions can be turned down – if there are good reasons for that – without contradiction. The acceptance or not of a presumptive conclusion depends on the non-existence or existence of ‘good reasons’; but what is a ‘good reason’ is, typically, not something that is liable to quantification, and has to be weighed against the ‘good reasons’ that support the presumptive rule and its application in the case under consideration. I would be interested in learning how Schepers would subsume presumptive reasoning, a form of thinking and acting well known, studied and used by Leibniz the jurist (not only in juridical contexts), under the ‘radical reason’ picture.

*Division of labor.* But the most surprising silence of the Reply concerns the core of my Review’s textual analysis, dealing with the three major texts of the breakthrough year of 1686, where I undertake – for the first time, as far as I know – to view the achievement of this year in terms of an intertwined reading of these texts. I doubt this silence is due to Schepers’ agreement with my reading, especially of the *Discours de Metaphysique* and the *Examen Theologiae Christianae*.

He also would object to my showing that even in the *Generales Inquisitiones*, an unquestionable bastion of the ‘radical reason’ picture, there is a non-negligible role for metaphor and analogy when this text deals with its metaphysical implications.<sup>25</sup> So, in eager expectation for Schepers’ sharp criticism of this section of the Reply – and especially of its ‘division of labor’ subsection where I venture some hypotheses about the ‘proportions’ and inter-relations of the types of rationality present in them – let me simply take this opportunity to conclude by expanding a bit on what may be far-reaching implications of the functions these different types of rationality are required to fulfill in Leibniz’s philosophy.

Ultimately, the radical otherness of the different paradigms of rationality Leibniz acknowledges and employs stems from the *encompassing* nature of his rationalistic vision. What he undertakes to provide is a full account of a world that comprises perfection as well as imperfection – God as well as man – without sacrificing the limited rationality of the latter on the altar of the perfect rationality of the former. This undertaking requires that both imperfect and perfect reason be somehow put to work *together*, rather than at the expense of each other.

The difficulty in accepting the undeniable otherness, co-existence, and cooperation in human knowledge of the two pictures of rationality is understandable for those who, although acknowledging the importance of multiplicity in Leibniz’s thought, seek to reduce it to some sort of ultimate underlying unity. For my part, I do believe that true, irreducible plurality is a key component of his thinking.<sup>26</sup> Plurality is everywhere in his system: in the number of monads, in their inter-relations and in their internal states; in the variety of fundamental principles; in the use and valuation of a multiplicity of semiotic systems, both formal and informal; in the domains the system seeks to cover; and also in methodology, where analysis and synthesis pull in different directions to ensure at the same time ever more solid foundations for our knowledge as well as its progress. No wonder that, as the inspiring theme of such a system, rationality itself should have a variety of faces.

Marcelo Dascal  
Department of Philosophy  
Tel Aviv University  
Tel Aviv 69978, Israel  
dascal@post.tau.ac.il

Notes

<sup>1</sup> “*Ex pluribus unum?* Patterns in 522+ Texts of Leibniz’s *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe VI.4*”. *The Leibniz Review* 13: 105-154, 2003.

<sup>2</sup> “Non alter, sed etiam Leibniti. Reply to the Review *Ex pluribus unum?*”. *The Leibniz Review* 14: 117-35, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> This allegation is later repeated: “Without any justification, Dascal uses my Introduction as a launching pad for his idea of *soft rationality*” (123).

<sup>4</sup> E.g., “Nihil sine ratione → blandior ratio” (‘Nothing without a reason → softer reason’), in H. Poser (ed.), *Nihil sine ratione* (= Proceedings of the VII. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress), Berlin, Volume I, pp. 276-280, 2001; “La balanza de la razón”, in O. Nudler (ed.), *La racionalidad: su poder y sus límites*, Buenos Aires/Barcelona/México, Paidós, pp. 363-381, 1996 (English version, soon to be published, available on my home page).

<sup>5</sup> “... einem gleichsam revolutionärem Werk, das die Wissenschaft, die Grundlage unseres vernünftiger Handels, auf ein neues, sicheres Fundament stellt”.

<sup>6</sup> “Auf allen Feldern geistiger Aktivität sah er seine Stärken im radikalen, bei den ersten Wurzeln ansetzenden Gebrauch der Vernunft”.

<sup>7</sup> “Dascal rightly observes that the *parameters of radical reason* (p. 118) characterize the enormous project of the *SG*, **but in fact they characterize nothing else**” (123, boldfacing mine).

<sup>8</sup> See “Types of polemics and types of polemical moves”, in S. Čmejrková, J. Hoffmannová, O. Müllerová, and J. Světlá, *Dialogue Analysis VI*, vol. 1, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, pp. 15-33, 1998; “Controverses et polémiques dans la science classique”, in M. Blay and R. Halleux (eds.), *La Science Classique, XVIe-XVIIIe: Dictionnaire Critique*, Paris, Flammarion, pp. 26-35, 1998; “The study of controversies and the theory and history of science”, *Science in Context* 11(2), pp. 147-154, 1998.

<sup>9</sup> “When speaking of a *radical use of reason* I mean first of all the far-reaching rational implications Leibniz has drawn from the supposed analytic nature of our concepts and our mind, up to and including the idea of realizing a revolutionary new kind of *demonstrative encyclopedia*” (119, italics Schepers’).

<sup>10</sup> See his letter to Gabriel Wagner of 27 February 1697, in G. W. Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften* (edited by C. J. Gerhardt), vol. 7, pp. 520-522.

<sup>11</sup> From the radical reason perspective this seems to be immaterial, since its defenders *understand precisely* what these metaphors mean: “What the monad does – and it is essential to see this clearly – is nothing else than to create the entire world and its past and future history from its own point of view. For it is

precisely this that the metaphor of the living mirror and the assumption that there is nothing but monads and their perceptions and their *appetitus* is meant to establish” (119). Notice that ‘point of view’ is also a conceptualization based on a metaphor. For the broader context of the use of mirror metaphors in Leibniz, see my “Language in the mind’s house”, in *Leibniz Society Review* 8, pp. 1-24, 1998; and the chapter on mirror metaphors in Cristina Marras, *The Metaphorical Network of Leibniz’s Philosophy*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> If by ‘properly explained’ it is meant ‘not formally defined’, I admit my guilt. But ‘radical use of reason’, for that matter, has not been formally defined either – or is it such a clear concept that it does need to satisfy such strictures? Nevertheless I endeavored to explain the concept (of ‘soft rationality’) “extensionally” – through a quite long and explicit list of the phenomena it is designed to cover. I also anticipated possible objections to it and provided replies to them. And, above all, I analyzed at length several texts showing how ‘soft rationality’ is either dominant or significantly present in them.

<sup>13</sup> “Even though the *more agreeable* mode of presentation is also one adopted by Leibniz in his correspondence, his dialogues and public letters describing his *SG*, I do not think it to be sufficient evidence to argue for a *different Leibniz*, nor to contrast the rhetorical fiction of the *model of radical reason* with the concept of *soft rationality*, even less so when arguing that strong rationality completely obscures the conception of the weak one” (132).

<sup>14</sup> In what follows I refer both to the Review and to other papers, especially to those mentioned in notes 4 and 16.

<sup>15</sup> On Leibniz’s eclecticism see below my discussion of *Spongia exprobatum* and *Recommendation*.

<sup>16</sup> See, in particular, “Leibniz and epistemological diversity”, in A. Lamarra and R. Palaia (eds.), *Unità e Molteplicità nel Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico di Leibniz*, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, pp. 15-37, 2000.

<sup>17</sup> Unless one means by this term the discipline of pragmatics which studies the *uses* of language and (in my view) the *uses* of reason, a discipline whose concerns definitely do include several of the manifestations of ‘soft rationality’. See, for example, chapters 11 and 18 of my book *Interpretation and Understanding*, Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 2003. Although there are good reasons to believe that Leibniz was not alien to the concerns of this discipline, I don’t believe this is what Schepers is referring to when he dismissingly assigns to ‘soft rationality’ a mere ‘pragmatic’ slot in Leibniz’s conception and practice of rationality.

<sup>18</sup> For more on presumptions, see below the paragraph “Probability and presumption”.

<sup>19</sup> German (*sondern, aber*), Spanish (*sino, pero*), Hebrew (*ela, aval*) and other languages have two words for the conjunction that Latin (*sed*), French (*mais*), Portuguese (*mas*), English (*but*), etc. express by the same word. The two meanings are adversative in that they share a ‘corrective’ character. Both introduce an asymmetry between the antecedent (p) and the consequent (q) of the locution ‘p but q’ – the latter stressing the position favored by the speaker. This corrective function and asymmetry is stronger in *sondern, sino, pero* than in *aber, pero, aval*, since the former are syntactically marked by the presence of an explicitly negative morpheme such as *non*, whereas the later cannot be thus marked. For this syntactic reason I take the title’s *sed* as corresponding to *sondern* rather than *aber*. If so, then *sed etiam*, which provides the correction for *non alter*, means that the speaker categorically emphasizes the *mere* existence (in Leibniz) of ‘soft rationality’ and stresses that its acknowledgment should not be taken to imply in any way that the author also admits its otherness and independence vis-à-vis the familiar picture of Leibniz’s rationality. Rather, it should be viewed as a mere appendix, an ‘also’ that can be easily accommodated within and explained by the familiar picture, which thus needs not be modified and keeps its status as the basic, fundamental picture. (I apologize for this long linguistic disquisition and refer the reader interested in further details to Chapter 6 of *Interpretation and Understanding*, where I have analyzed the logic, semantics and pragmatics of *aval* and *ela* and their correlates in other languages.)

<sup>20</sup> *Spongia* has a the figurative meaning ‘coat of mail’, which clearly refers to protection; *exprobatio*, akin to opprobrium, means a very strong kind of reproach or accusation, namely ‘upbraiding’.

<sup>21</sup> See note 16 and also my paper “One Adam - many cultures: the role of political pluralism in the best of possible worlds”, in M. Dascal and E. Yakira (eds.), *Leibniz and Adam*, Tel Aviv, University Publishing Projects Ltd., pp. 387-409, 1993.

<sup>22</sup> In G. L. Leibniz, *Opera Omnia* (edited by L. Dutens), Geneva, 1768, vol. 6.1, p. 53.

<sup>23</sup> “In order to understand Leibniz’s plans for *SG* it is inadvisable to refer to hermeneutics” (129). “Leibniz’s aim in this text is not the development of a hermeneutics or hermeneutical rules but explicitly to find patrons and collaborators for his project of a science based on analysis ...” (ibid.).

<sup>24</sup> Here is one example: “Even when dealing with probabilities it would still be possible to determine for any set of data which of these would be the most likely” (129).

<sup>25</sup> See my Review, pp. 138-139. In fact the Reply flatly denies any role for ‘rhetorical principles’ (which I assume to include the use of metaphor) in the *Generales Inquisitiones* (134), and considers the particular metaphor of ‘infinite analysis’ applied to contingent propositions as pure literal cash, in spite of Leibniz’s warning against such an assumption in this very text.

<sup>26</sup> For a brief aperçu, see my “Leibniz: une pensée plurielle”, in *Leibniz: Philosophe de l’Universel*, Dossier Spécial, *Magazine Littéraire* 416, pp. 24-27, 2003.