
Reviewed by Massimo Mugnai, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa.

This book offers a careful investigation of Leibniz’s theory of truth and, at the same time, an accurate analysis of many aspects of Leibniz’s ontology and philosophy of logic. Given its complexity and richness, I limit myself to illustrating certain aspects of Rauzy’s inquiry and to expressing some, albeit moderate, disagreement. Despite this disagreement, the author’s achievement is extraordinary. Anyone interested in Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics will read it with great profit.

1.

Rauzy’s main thesis is that Leibniz accepts the traditional correspondence theory of truth, even though modified in a relevant respect; the correspondence subsists between sentences and concepts, not between sentences and states of affairs. In Rauzy’s own words, for Leibniz the doctrine of «the *adaequatio rei* continues to be the general framework out of which the truth-predicate ceases to be meaningful. Concepts and connections among concepts however, are the reasons for which a particular sentence is true [...] they play the role of truth-makers» (p. 47). Rauzy argues quite convincingly against the thesis that attributes a coherence theory of truth to Leibniz (pp. 34-35), and interprets the so-called “predicate-in-subject principle” as not merely syntactical (pp. 48-51). As is well known, this principle plays a central role in Leibniz’s philosophy (Mates, 1986, pp. 84 ff) and there are several formulations of it in Leibniz’s writings. The following—taken from a text composed at about the same time as the *Discourse on metaphysics*—is one of them: «An affirmation is true if its predicate inheres in its subject. Therefore, in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of the predicate is somehow contained in the notion of the subject [...]» (A VI, 4B, p. 1515). However, Leibniz’s endorsement of the predicate-in-subject principle is wedded to an acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth, as the following quotation from the *New Essays* seems to imply: «Let us be content with looking for truth in the correspondence between the propositions which are in the mind and the things which they are about» (A VI, 6, pp. 397-98). This text fits Rauzy’s interpretation only if one interprets “the propositions which are in the


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mind” as *sentences* and “the things which they are about” as *concepts* or *propositions* in the proper sense, but I will return to this point further on.

Even though Leibniz never ceased to express his sympathies for a kind of moderate nominalism throughout his entire philosophical career, he was forced to accept the existence of a realm of ideas and propositions independent of the human mind. This is considered by Rauzy as a commitment to *platonism*—a platonism which derives from the necessity of finding an identity principle for sentences [*enuntiationes*]. Reacting to Hobbes’ extreme nominalism, Leibniz believes that different sentences belonging to different linguistic universes may be reduced to unity only if «certain trans-linguistic entities» exist which are the basis for the non-arbitrariness of truth (p. 27). These entities are what we may call *propositions*, i.e. items to which Leibniz attributes a reality stronger than that of the mere informational content of phrases. On p. 46 however, Rauzy observes that «Leibniz’s logical realism concerns the propositional contents and does not imply a commitment to a realistic account of universals», thus undermining the alleged platonism.

Introducing Leibniz’s theory of truth, Rauzy lays down the following principle:

«(6) ‘Φ’ is true if and only if Φc,
where Φ is a variable which ranges over the set of the well formed propositions of the language, and Φc is the proposition corresponding to Φ in which
— all the categorems ‘(...)’ have been replaced by the locution ‘the concept of (...)’;
— the copula has been replaced by the containment relation» (p. 79).

Rauzy calls ‘Φc’ «the conceptual restriction of Φ». The French text has (the French expression corresponding to) «“Φ” is true if Φc” instead of ‘if and only if’, but this seems to be a mere misprint. Because here the object named ‘proposition’ depends on a given language, perhaps a French word equivalent in meaning to the English *sentence* would have been a better choice. At any rate, *principle* (6) simply states that a sentence, as for instance, ‘Socrates is running’ is true if and only if the concept of Socrates contains the concept of running. Rauzy argues that *principle* (6) implies an existence and unicity postulate about concepts and propositions. If, as principle (6) states, for every proposition Φ there is a corresponding proposition Φc, then to every categorematic expression ‘(...)’ occurring in Φ a unique categorematic expression corresponds which may be written as ‘the concept of (...)’. Therefore “for every proposition Φ there exists one and only one proposition Φc such that ‘Φ’ is true if and only if Φc» (p. 85). On ‘Φ’ Leibniz—so
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claims Rauzy—imposes the constraint that it must have the subject-predicate form (the fundamental form of every proposition) and that ‘Φ’ must be affirmative.

Rauzy’s opinion is that Leibniz does not identify true propositions with facts. Given a true sentence p, Leibniz denies that the propositional content of p is identical with the fact (or facts) described by p; and this, Rauzy argues, because Leibniz considers concepts as mind-dependent entities. At the same time Rauzy states on p. 88 that the constraints imposed by the «conceptual restriction of sentences» show that the only way to understand the core of the Leibnizian doctrine of truth consists in assimilating his ‘notions’ and ‘concepts’ to what we name ‘states of things’ (this claim is reinforced on pp. 94-95, where Rauzy observes that there is an implicit factualism in Leibniz’s doctrine of truth). This contrast, however, is determined mainly by the ambiguity of the word ‘concept’. To understand Rauzy’s position it may be useful to briefly recall some semantic and ontological distinctions.

According to Rauzy, there are three ‘things’ involved in Leibniz’s theory of truth: 1) the linguistic expressions (terms and sentences) belonging to a given language; 2) the concepts—and relations among concepts—which are thought by us; 3) the concepts—and relations among concepts—as they are in themselves, independently of any act of thinking (p. 46). Items mentioned in points 2) and 3) differ one from the other for their ‘location’: the concepts thought by us are obviously located in our mind, whereas the concepts as they are in themselves are located in God’s understanding. From this difference other differences follow; our concepts for instance, may be confused or obscure, whereas the concepts in God’s understanding are all clear and adequate; Leibniz attributes a dispositional nature to ideas in the human mind (cf. A VI, 4B, pp. 1370-71), whereas ideas in God’s mind are all real. Moreover, Leibniz seems to be quite skeptical that human beings may have a direct access to concepts and ideas. For Leibniz, men cannot properly think without the aid of signs of some sort, i.e. without a kind of language. We find the same opinion in Frege. This is the tribute Leibniz pays to his acceptance of moderate nominalism and to the influence of Hobbes. Thus, when Rauzy writes that for Leibniz the propositional content of p is not identical to the fact (or facts) described by p, he is speaking about the propositional content of p insofar as it is conceived by us (he is referring to ‘concepts’ in the human mind). But when Rauzy says that the core of the Leibnizian doctrine of truth consists in assimilating ‘notions’ and ‘concepts’ with ‘states of things’, he is certainly speaking about concepts in God’s understanding. However, in the New Essays Leibniz observes: «It would be better to assign truth to the relationships amongst the objects of the
ideas, by virtue of which one idea is or is not included within another». Here
Leibniz distinguishes the ideas from the objects of the ideas. This distinction may
fit Rauzy’s interpretation only if the word ‘ideas’ refers to psychological entities
(something belonging to the human mind, like representations), whereas the ex­
pression ‘objects of the ideas’ refers to the conceptual content of ideas, conceived
as something existing in itself and totally independent of the human mind. In this
interpretation, propositions as the conceptual content of sentences (in the human
mind) are the truth bearers, whereas concepts in God’s understanding (and rela­
tions among concepts, i.e. propositions in the sense of Frege’s Gedanken) are
truth makers. Thus, Rauzy may conclude that the point of view «for which the
truth-predicate is the name of a relationship amongst concepts or ideas is that
mainly adopted by Leibniz» (p. 21).

2.
Rauzy carefully investigates the notion of ens in the General Inquiries and other
logical texts, and traces the doctrine of concepts shared by Leibniz back to Fran­
cisco Suarez (pp. 111-17). He observes that for Leibniz the expressions possible,
being (ens) and thing (res) are in a certain sense synonymous. Introducing the
Leibnizian concept of the possibility of a term, Rauzy gives the following defini­
tion:

\[
\text{\text{P\left(A\right)}} = \text{\text{def.}} \text{A non est non-A,}
\]

and explains that ‘A’ is any term whatsoever and that \(\text{P\left(A\right)}\) means ‘A is possible’
or—equivalently—‘A is a thing (res), ‘A is a being (ens)’. Commenting on this
definition, Rauzy writes that it «does not imply any extension of the formal lan­
guage, because possibility may be analysed using conceptual inherence and nega­
tion» (p. 123). Therefore, if a given concept does not imply a contradiction, it is a
possible one and, in virtue of this very fact, it is a being. But, as Rauzy observes,
attributing a predicate to something, without implying a contradiction, amounts to
saying as well that the complex determined by the subject plus the predicate con­
stitutes a being. Therefore Rauzy remarks: «If predicating something of a subject
and claiming that the complex term composed of both (the subject and the predi­
cate) is possible, it amounts to the same. In other words, if one may claim

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\text{\text{\left(4\right) some A est B \leftrightarrow AB est Ens,}}
\]

then it is completely superfluous to distinguish the esse by means of which the
inherence of a given term in another is stated from the esse possibile by means of
which some simpler terms are combined together to give rise to more complex
terms. It is mainly on this point that Leibniz distances himself deeply from Ockham
and joins the new metaphysical doctrines supported by the Jesuits» (pp. 108-9).
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The ‘Jesuits’ here—as I remarked previously—are mainly Suarez and his followers.

If Leibniz’s theory of being (ens) implicitly assimilates true predication to the assertion of logical consistency of a given conceptual complex, the principle of restriction of propositions to their conceptual form «is correlated to a deep doctrine for which ‘true’ means ‘thinkable’» (p. 128). The principle of restriction as mentioned above needs to be reformulated taking into account that the concept involved must be logically coherent, i.e. possible. Therefore, the truth conditions for a given proposition ‘Φ’ become the following:

«‘Φ’ is true if and only if
1) all the concepts expressed by the terms of Φ are possible;
2) all the concepts expressed by the terms of Φ are compatible;
3) between the concepts expressed by the terms of Φ subsists the same relation which is expressed by Φ» (p. 129).

Concerning compatibility, Rauzy writes: «the terms of Φ are compatible, if they may be together in the same subject». On the basis of this definition, Rauzy concludes that if Φ has the form ‘S is P’, then the existence of Φ(c) needs another concept, say Q, such that both S and P inhere simultaneously in Q.

From Leibniz’s theory of truth Rauzy infers the doctrine that Mondadori has dubbed ‘superessentialism’. If Leibniz does not accept the counterfactual identity, this is due neither to the distinction between essential and existential predicates nor to theological reasons. All these reasons may be alleged, but they are a posteriori; Leibniz believes in the unity of the concept of truth. Accepting counterfactual identity destroys this unity and amounts to rejecting the claim that the principle of unicity and existence applies to contingent propositions (pp. 85-88). (The principle states that for every proposition Φ, one and only one proposition Φc exists, such that ‘Φ’ is true if and only if Φc: see above.)

Rauzy corroborates this interpretation with a careful analysis of many of Leibniz’s texts, taking advantage of his excellent French edition (introduction and commentary) of Leibniz’s logical papers (cf. G. W. Leibniz, Recherches générales sur l’analyse des notions et des vérités. 24 thèse métaphysiques et autres textes logiques et métaphysiques, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998). As we have seen, Rauzy attributes to Leibniz the view that objective concepts (and their mutual relations) in God’s understanding make sentences true. Roughly speaking, the domain of interpretation of Leibnizian sentences becomes a realm of complete concepts, not of individuals (real and possible). Logical consistency assumes in the realm of concepts the same role that existence has for individuals. Obviously, for
Leibniz (in Rauzy’s view) a possible individual corresponds to each complete concept. But, sharing an ontological point of view analogous to that of Suarez, Leibniz sharply distinguishes between existence and logical consistency. The first is in some sense secondary, and enters into play only when consistency is satisfied and God’s plans become reality. What is important from the logical and ontological perspective is the latter.

I am not sure however, that Rauzy’s interpretation is right on this point. It seems to me that it can be generalized only up to a certain point (as unfortunately happens very often with Leibniz). As Rauzy himself recognizes, some texts do not fit his reading. In the *Additions* to the *Specimen of a Universal Calculus* (A VI, 4A, p. 289), for example, Leibniz lists six ‘propositions true in themselves’, two of which are true only if they refer to individuals. Allow me to limit myself to consider proposition 5: «qui non est a est non a» - literally: «who is not a is not-a». As Rauzy recognizes, to assume that here the Latin word ‘qui’ refers to an individual is the only way to make this sentence true. However, he refuses to accept this interpretation, preferring to claim that in this context Leibniz has made a mistake. But it is quite difficult to say what kind of mistake Leibniz is supposed to have made. It is worth noting that the Latin expression used by Leibniz is very peculiar. He uses the personal pronoun here in the singular form of the masculine gender, avoiding the neuter ‘quod’ (‘what’). Consider that if Leibniz had employed ‘quod’, then the *proposition true in itself* would have been false, because ‘quod’ may refer to many different things: to properties and to individuals as well. Therefore, Leibniz’s choice of the word ‘qui’ seems to be completely intentional, not a mistake. Commenting on Lenzen’s interpretation of this passage, which reads ‘qui’ as referring to an individual, Rauzy remarks: «It is true that any other interpretation of the rule is false. But the argument from grammar seems weak [...]». But here the point is that the argument adduced by Lenzen is a logical one, and it has nothing to do with grammar.

3.

Attempting to determine the genesis of Leibniz’s main ideas on the philosophy of logic, Rauzy devotes many pages to clarifying the Leibnizian notion of intension. Comparing Leibniz’s distinction between intension and extension with that of Arnauld and Nicole between comprehension and extension, Rauzy concludes that Leibniz’s position fits better with contemporary views. The extension of an idea in Arnauld and Nicole’s sense includes «the multitude of all the lower entities that fall under it: therefore a universal may belong to the extension of an idea». Whereas the comprehension of an idea in Arnauld and Nicole’s sense is the set of all the
attributes that belong to this idea and that cannot be removed without destroying it (p. 155).

Connected with this issue is Rauzy's analysis of Leibniz's critical examination of Nizolius' work. As is well known, in 1670 Leibniz re-edited a book (De veris principis seu de vera ratione philosophandi: 'DVP' henceforth) [About the true principles and the true method of using philosophy] by the Renaissance humanist Mazio Nizzoli (1498-1576), introducing it with a long preface. Nizolius was a fierce enemy of scholastic philosophy and of logical medieval teachings in particular. As Ignacio Angelelli has shown (I. Angelelli, Leibniz's Misunderstanding of Nizolius' Notion of 'Multitudo', in the 'Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic', VI, 1965, pp. 319-322), Nizolius proposed an extensional theory of universals that contains many interesting things. In particular, Nizolius develops a coherent theory of universals conceived as collections of individuals, which foreshadows an extensional theory of classes.

Leibniz attacks Nizolius' theory of universals on the basis of a twofold strategy. On one hand, he aims to show that it is not fully adequate from the logical point of view, giving rise to some paradoxical sentences. On the other, he emphasizes that, if universals are mere collections of individuals, then they can only follow, and not precede, these collections. The inadequacy that Leibniz points out in the first place concerns the fact that Nizolius completely disregards the distributive meaning of universal terms. It is precisely because Nizolius does not consider the distributive interpretation of universals, besides the collective one, that Nizolius is forced to admit the paradoxical sentences which Leibniz proposes to counter the extensional theory of universals. Yet, as Angelelli has shown, Leibniz's criticism does not work at all: Nizolius' theory of universals has all the resources to answer the questions posed by Leibniz, and Leibniz's critical remarks are based on a substantial misunderstanding of Nizolius' doctrine. On this point Rauzy agrees, admitting plainly, «Angelelli's critical remarks seem to be acceptable» (p. 200). However, Rauzy criticizes Angelelli for not having given due importance to the second point of Leibniz's criticism—i.e. the issue concerning the priority of universals with respect to individuals. Now, Rauzy seems to me to be a little unfair towards Angelelli, but before explaining why, let me briefly summarize the core of the question.

Nizolius distinguishes the continuum whole (totum continuum) from the discrete whole (totum discretum). The first is the whole in the proper sense—i.e. a singular thing like an individual man, an individual horse, etc. The second is a collection or multitude of wholes in the proper sense—i.e. of singular things. Com-
menting on this passage in a marginal note, Leibniz observes that besides the *continuum whole* and the *discrete whole* there is a third kind of whole; the *disjunctive one*. Leibniz’s comment is the following: «Rather there is a third kind of whole: the disjunctive whole, for instance *animal* is *either a man or a brute*, not *a man and a brute*. Nor *all animals* are *men and brutes*, but *either men or brutes*. Indeed the multitude of all animals is men and brutes. Therefore all animals are one thing, their multitude another; one thing the genus, another the whole; one thing the distributive whole, another the collective» (A VI, 2, pp. 453-54). In the edited Preface to DVP, Leibniz contracts this marginal note, giving rise to a shorter and more intelligible text: «The discrete whole contains another genus besides the collective, namely the distributive. For when we say: *every man is an animal*, or *all men are animals*, the acceptation is distributive; if you take that man (Titius) or this man (Caius), etc. you will discover him to be an animal, or a sentient being» (L, p. 129). It is precisely because he does not consider the *distributive whole* that —on Leibniz’s reading of DVP—Nizolius is forced to allow sentences which are clearly absurd (these are the counterexamples I alluded to above). As Leibniz writes: «If, as Nizolius holds, *every man*, or *all men*, is a collective whole, and the same as the whole genus man, an absurd expression will result. For, if they are the same, we may substitute the whole genus man in the proposition that all men are animals or *every man is an animal*, and we have the following very inept proposition: the *whole genus man is an animal*» (L, p. 129). This claim, however, as Angelelli has remarked, is not only uncharitable to Nizolius, but is also based on a misunderstanding. In DVP Nizolius repeatedly stresses that, in sentences like ‘*every man is an animal*’, the copula expresses the relation ‘to be in’ (*esse in*): therefore, on the basis of this interpretation, ‘*is*’ expresses what properly has to be considered class-inclusion, not membership. Therefore, nothing absurd follows from Nizolius’ theory, which is contrary to Leibniz’s claim.

However, Rauzy writes that precisely because Nizolius often reiterates that for him ‘*is*’ is equivalent to ‘*to be in*’, Leibniz must be well aware of that very fact. This means that Leibniz purposely ignores the meaning of ‘*is*’ in Nizolius’ work. The point is—Rauzy argues—that Leibniz is primarily interested in the second, and more important critical remark he puts forth against Nizolius, concerning the priority of universals. Now in Rauzy’s opinion, as I understand him, neither Nizolius nor Angelelli give due importance to the problem of priority; and this in some sense undermines Angelelli’s criticism. Yet, it seems quite difficult to me to follow Rauzy here. The priority of universals in respect to collections of individuals is *explicitly* denied by Nizolius² and, at any rate, from the acceptance of priority
the absurdities that Leibniz imputes to Nizolius’ theory of collections do not follow. The two horns of Leibniz’s criticism seem to be totally unrelated. At the same time, Angelelli’s paper attempts to show that Nizolius’ theory of collections is fully coherent. If an author is mainly interested in investigating whether some conclusions correctly flow from the assumed premises, it is unfair, as I have previously remarked, to reprove him for not having subjected the premises to criticism.

Fairness apart however, Rauzy argues—as we have seen—that even though Nizolius’ theory of collections resists Leibniz criticism, nevertheless it is Leibniz, not Nizolius, who is right about the nature of universals. Thus, Rauzy’s statement has force only if it succeeds in showing where Nizolius’ theory of universals is wrong. Now, it is at this point that the priority claim comes into play. It is precisely because a universal is (ontologically) prior in respect to a given collection that it can individuate the parts of the collection. Otherwise, on the basis of Nizolius’ theory, it is quite mysterious how it is possible that different individuals are sorted into different species belonging to the same collection. Moreover, the collection theory denies the possibility that the same universal, identical in number, will be in several subjects at the time. But precisely this—in Rauzy’s opinion—is «the higher function» the prevailing traditional view amongst scholars typically attributes to universals (p. 191).

To be frank, I find Rauzy’s arguments in favour of Leibniz’s position quite puzzling. Appealing to similarity may easily solve the problem of sorting the individuals belonging to a collection. Concerning similarity, Nizolius assumes a position, which is very common amongst nominalists. Nizolius writes that any thing existing in nature (rerum natura) is either a substance or a quality, and that both (substances and qualities) are either «singular things (res singulares)» or «collections of singular things (multitudines rerum singularium)». Against the argument that concludes from the non-existence of universals to the impossibility that Socrates and Plato have something on which they agree, Nizolius states: «They [i.e. Socrates and Plato] agree indeed, insofar as they have the same name ‘man’ and are contained in the same kind of men as two soldiers are contained in the same army, and in general, insofar as both are endowed with reason and with many other similarities». These ‘similarities’—as Nizolius emphasizes in the same passage—are certainly in nature (in rerum natura).

To be sure, Rauzy reports Leibniz’s critical remarks to Nizolius, with great care and investigates with acumen the reasons on which they are grounded. Nevertheless, Leibniz’s criticism seems to be quite off the mark. In his Nominalism and
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Realism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, vol I), David Armstrong develops a multitude of arguments against several kinds of nominalistic theories, and maybe one or two of these arguments are able to defeat Nizolius’ type of nominalism. But what Leibniz and Rauzy say does not correspond to any of the arguments proposed by Armstrong.

4.

For Couturat (and Brody), Leibniz’s bias towards the principle of inherence was grounded on the principle of sufficient reason, whereas for Robert Sleigh and Robert Adams it was determined by theological and metaphysical reasons. On this point Rauzy is on the side of Couturat: «Even though one can no more identify the principle of inherence with the principle of sufficient reason (as Couturat did), inherence is considered by Leibniz, throughout his philosophical development, as the only means for constructing a general and uniform reason of the truth of general sentences»

On pp. 213-14 Rauzy rightly observes that Leibniz has recourse to the inherence principle of truth with a twofold aim: 1) to solve the problem about truth; 2) to answer the question about individuation. The second problem is connected with the search for the metaphysics of the individual; and the metaphysics of the individual calls into play the long-disputed question about the ontological status of relations. Concerning this question, Rauzy claims that Leibniz distinguishes the relations in a proper sense from the relational predicates: the first are abstract things and have a merely mental nature, whereas the second are particular accidents. To illustrate Rauzy’s interpretation, let me refer once more to the well-known example of the two lines of different magnitude in the fifth letter to Clarke. Given two lines L and M, with L greater than M, Leibniz considers three ways of conceiving «the ratio or proportion» between them: 1) «as a ratio of the greater L to the lesser M»; 2) «as a ratio of the lesser M to the greater L»; 3) as «the ratio between L and M without considering which is the antecedent or which the consequent, which the subject and the object». Leibniz’s conclusion is that «In the first way of considering them, L the greater, in the second, M the lesser, is the subject of that accident which philosophers call ‘relation’» (L, p. 704; GP 7, p. 401). Rauzy reads Leibniz’s words as if he aimed to distinguish between the universal accident ‘GreaterThan(LM)’ on one hand and the two individual accidents ‘greaterthan(LM)’, ‘lesserthan(ML)’, on the other. The universal accident is ‘outside’ the subjects L and M, and it is said of them, whereas the two individual accidents inhere each in one of the two subjects—respectively: greaterthan(LM) in L and lesserthan(ML) in M—but are not said of them. Rauzy explains that
`greaterthan(LM)` is an individual relation «which does not denote a universal but a particular—i.e. the exact magnitude of \(L\) and the exact ratio that \(L\) has to the magnitude of \(M\)» (p. 294). Therefore, Leibniz—on Rauzy’s interpretation—accepts the existence of *individual accidents*, relational and non-relational, and rejects the existence of relations as *universal accidents*, i.e. as something outside the related subjects. That Leibniz accepts the existence of individual relational accidents is «a point which Mugnai does not remark» in his book on Leibniz’s theory of relations, and it is supposed to be an improvement made by Rauzy’s interpretation (p. 292).

It seems to me, however, that if Leibniz accepts the doctrine of individual accidents, it is not said that he accepts the existence of individual relations (relational accidents). The problem with relational accidents is that, if they are real, it seems quite difficult to determine their nature. Suppose, for example, that `greaterthan(LM)` denotes a relational accident *inhering* in a real line \(L\) of some finite length. Does this mean that in \(L\) there is some reference to \(M\)? And if there is, how can it be? Surely, to inhere in \(L\) is a peculiar length which constitutes what one today might call a *trope*, but neither \(L\) nor \(L\)’s peculiar length contain either \(M\) or any explicit reference to it. At any rate, if the relational accident inheres in \(L\), it may also inhere following Aristotle’s taxonomy in *Cat. 2 b* but not as a part of it. Leibniz seems quite skeptical about the possibility of characterizing the meaning of *inhering in a subject* without being a part of the subject. He observes, for instance, «a point is in a line not as a part of it and it is impossible to separate it from the line, but this notwithstanding, the point is not in the line as in a subject» (VE, vol. 5, p. 1084).

Moreover, the traditional theory of relations undergoes a radical change in Leibniz’s hands, insofar as he considers the basic subjects or substances that compose the world (the monads) as purely spiritual beings endowed with a representative power. This fact, wedded with the assumption that each representation internal to a given substance *expresses* the most intimate nature of all other substances surrounding it, gives rise to something very similar to a theory of individual relations (or relational accidents). If Paris loves Helen, Paris’ love towards Helen is a quality or *status* internal to Paris; it is an *intra-monadic* relation subsisting between Paris and some representation internal to him. All internal statuses of a given monad are the basis or the foundations for *external* or *intramonadic* relations. It is God, however, who accommodating the internal statuses of each monad in a world, gives rise to relations. Therefore, as Leibniz repeatedly attests, relations *result* on the basis of the internal modes of being of substances. What is new in Leibniz’s account of relations (in respect to the scholastic tradition), is the complete absorp-
tion of any modification—relational or not—inside the subject, conceived as a merely spiritual thing. I wonder if the old relational accidents of the scholastic tradition perfectly fit with Leibniz’s idea of an internal modification of a subject.

However, as I have emphasized above, I have considered only a few topics of this excellent book—including the central one about the nature of truth. For people interested in Leibniz’s philosophy of logic and in Leibniz’s ontology this essay, well written and well argued, is a mine of information, packed with interesting ideas and scholarly results.

Massimo Mugnai
Scuola Normale Superiore
Piazza dei Cavalieri 7
Pisa, Italy
m.mugnai@sns.it

Notes

2 Cf De veris principiis, I, p. 111.
3 De veris principiis, I, p. 101.
4 De veris principiis, I, p. 93.
5 De veris principiis, I, p. 95.