Critical Review of Cover and Hawthorne on Leibnizian Modality

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In the introduction to *Substance and Individuation in Leibniz*, Jan Cover and John Hawthorne inform us that the aim of the book is to “grasp more clearly the metaphysical problems of individuation by taking seriously how these are played out in the hands of one influential philosopher standing as the important mediary between scholastic and modern philosophers.” Were the book to succeed in this modest aim it would be a significant achievement. In fact, it achieves this aim and a good deal more. One can fairly say that the book is nothing short of a philosophical *tour de force* of most major metaphysical themes in Leibniz.

While the book has a variety of impressive features, one that will strike every reader is the way in which Cover and Hawthorne force us to look hard not only at Leibniz’s own position on a particular topic, but also at what we often refer to as the surrounding nodes in logical space. In doing so, we are treated to a fuller understanding of not only the positions that Leibniz endorses, but also of some reasons why the available alternatives (some defended by philosophical ancestors and contemporaries of Leibniz, some not) were rejected. Of course, in some cases, such exercises require a bit of historical and philosophical imagination and reconstruction. But in each instance, the arguments and reconstructions are at the very least philosophical and historically plausible.

Of course, such a wide ranging discussion of controversial issues in Leibniz scholarship leaves plenty of space for critics to ply their trade in response. In what follows I will take a brief look at what will surely become one of the most widely discussed sections of the book, namely, the chapter on Leibnizian essentialism.

The disputes over Leibniz’s views on whether or not every property of an individual is essential to that individual or not have been going on full force for better than a quarter century. Some might think that perhaps it is time to admit that the texts admit of more than one interpretation, that accommodations can be made which make the Leibnizian system sail (with greater or lesser degrees of listing) on any of the main readings, and that perhaps we should let that be that. Any yet, with all the wrangling about these issues, there is good reason to think that the discussion should not yet be over. For those who are weary of the dispute, Cover and Hawthorne’s treatment repays one more visit to the topic.

The following remarks on Cover and Hawthorne’s work will be divided into three parts. First, I will raise some questions that need to be answered by defenders of the “strong essentialist” view which Cover and Hawthorne defend. Second, I
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will take a look at the objections they raise for Sleigh’s “moderate essentialism,”
arguing that the three main objections they raise are not, on their own, enough to
jettison the view, at least as the most plausible reading of Leibniz’s intention in
the key texts on the matter (i.e., the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence). Finally, I
would like to raise some methodological concerns about how interpreters approach
the Leibnizian texts and the limits of purely philosophical reconstructions of
Leibnizian doctrines.

I. Some questions about strong essentialism

Cover and Hawthorne argue that there are strong reasons for rejecting the
superessentialist reading of Leibniz, according to which every property of an
individual is had essentially by that individual. The good reasons amount this: a)
The superessentialist view is a hard pill to swallow because it is at odds with
Leibniz’s seeming attempt to be serious about defending a notion of contingency
which would do work for him concerning such issues as freedom and theodicy,
and b) the evidence does not compel one to read Leibniz in the superessentialist
way.

Cover and Hawthorne begin by providing us with a list of four key theses which
characterize the superessentialist position. They are:
1) An individual could not have a different individual concept than the one it in
fact has.
2) All properties of an individual substance are essential to it.
3) Created substances are world-bound individuals.
4) Leibniz employs a counterpart theoretic account of de re modal claims.²

The four theses are not, they show, as inseparable as Leibniz interpreters have
sometimes supposed. The reason is that, contrary to the claims of some
superessentialist defenders, (1) entails none of the other three theses as they stand.
This failure, they argue, is explained by the fact that while each individual has its
concept essentially, concepts contain only intrinsic properties. On such a view, it
is possible, at least, that relational attributions are contingently true of individuals.
Realizing the possibility will require, however, that Leibniz hold the view that
relational properties supervene on (and only on) intrinsic monadic properties of
sets of substances. This yields the result that an individual might a) be a member
of distinct sets of individuals, each set specifying its own distinct world, b) have
identical intrinsic properties in both worlds, and yet c) have different non-intrinsic
properties in each world (or perhaps, be such that different relational attributions
are true of them) in virtue of other differences between the worlds. This is, in fact, Cover and Hawthorne argue, the position Leibniz defends.3

As a result, they claim, Leibniz is not saddled with superessentialism at all, but rather “strong essentialism,” according to which intrinsic (non-relational) properties are essential to their bearer, and non-intrinsic (relational) properties are not. There are a number of controversial assumptions that are made on the way to this interpretation of Leibniz, and Cover and Hawthorne recognize and plausibly defend all of them.

With Cover and Hawthorne I agree that the superessentialist interpretation is incorrect, both as an expression of Leibniz’s intentions, and as an account of what Leibnizian metaphysical principles entail. However, I am not confident that strong essentialism fares better on either of these scores. I am not sure about this primarily because strong essentialism carries commitments I doubt Leibniz would willingly accept.

For example, on the strong essentialist view, thesis (1) is maintained while (3) is rejected. What of (2) and (4)? As explained above, (2) is preserved if “properties” are understood to be intrinsic properties. (4) seems likewise to be preserved for cases where the de re modal claims in question concern predications involving intrinsic properties. What about the contingency of non-intrinsic, relational attributions? Here, it seems, we would not need to appeal to counterpart theory. In this case, substances X and Y might be such that we can truly say of them that X bears relation R to Y, and that X might not bear R to Y because X’s concept is included in another world which contains substances distinct from those included in the actual world, and at which it is false that X bears R to Y. Here, the contingency of the relational attribution or fact is due to transworld identity rather than counterpart relations.

Do counterpart relations ever work to ground the contingency of relational attributions on this view? It is hard to see why they would not. If counterpart theory is sufficient to ground the contingency of intrinsic property attributions, why should it be incapable of doing so when it comes to relational matters? Perhaps then we have here a mixed account: some true relational attributions concerning X will be contingent in virtue of X’s existence at other worlds where the attribution is false; other true relational attributions to will be contingent in virtue of the fact that X has counterparts in other worlds where the attribution is false.

However we are to understand the view here, one wonders whether or not there is any difference between superessentialism and strong essentialism that gets one any philosophical mileage. After all, if counterpart theory really can do the work
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of grounding contingency of the properties of individuals Leibniz wished to regard as contingent, intrinsic and relational, what more does the contingency of relational properties grounded on transworld identity provide?

Perhaps we should just say: the more the merrier. Does any trouble loom for this inclusive strategy? One might think that there would be trouble if cases could be found in which the two semantics pull apart. Leibniz would surely have agreed that the following is true “Leibniz believes truly that God exists.” Note first that “believing truly that God exists” is a relational property on Leibniz’s view. Second, it seems fair to assume that Leibniz would want this claim to be contingent. Unfortunately transworld and counterpart semantics don’t deliver a univocal verdict here. On the transworld semantics, the property is necessary since every world containing an intrinsic duplicate of the Leibniz’s complete concept has the property of believing that God exists (assuming we allow that belief states for Leibniz are intrinsic), and, given God’s necessary existence, believes so truly. But the counterpart semantics undoubtedly delivers another outcome, since there are surely unbelieving Leibniz counterparts. If not, we would have to hold that “atheist Leibniz” turns out, implausibly, to be impossible!

Perhaps we could say that where both semantics are relevant to the modal status of a non-intrinsic property, the individual has the property contingently if and only if it is contingent on either semantics. But it seems more natural to say that what we have here are really two senses of contingency: contingency and contingency*. Leibniz’s theistic belief is contingent, but not contingent*! Once we are required to say this, the view begins to creak under its own weight.

Perhaps this is an unfair line of objection. Cover and Hawthorne might reply that regardless of the philosophical or explanatory power of the view, the possibility of transworld identity for Leibnizian substances, and thus a transworld semantics for modality, is just something that falls out of the view. Maybe this could do some modal work for him, maybe not. Maybe this helps, maybe not. Of course, whether or not it helps, depends on the work that Leibniz wants to a theory of contingency to do, and whether or not this mixed strategy helps him do it. This is no place for a full blown discussion of the aims of Leibniz’s defenses of contingency. But I noted earlier that he at least wants his theory of contingency to play a role in supporting his views on freedom and theodicy. Does the view described by Cover and Hawthorne help Leibniz here?
II. Moderate essentialism

It is hard to answer this question fully until we know exactly how Leibniz intended to use contingency. It is also hard to know until we know just how to divide the Leibnizian terrain between intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties. Is the property of “freely choosing to travel to Paris” intrinsic or not? Cover and Hawthorne don’t help us on this point (though they do treat at great length the general question of how Leibniz distinguishes intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties in chapter 2). But we might imagine that free choosings would be intrinsic since they would simply be perceptual or appetitive states (or conjunctions of such states), and perceptions and appetitions are, for Leibniz, rock bottom intrinsic properties.

If one grants these meager assumptions, we have reason to be concerned about Cover and Hawthorne’s interpretation of Leibniz. The reason: Leibniz seems, at least in the period surrounding the Arnauld correspondence, to insist that a) contingent properties of a substance are contingent because of their “mode of containment” in the concept and b) that free actions are so contingent. The case has been powerfully made by Sleigh and space precludes rehearsing it here. According to Sleigh, Leibniz distinguished intrinsic properties from essential ones, arguing that the latter are necessary, while the former are not. Still, even Sleigh’s reading is “essentialist” in some respects, since Sleigh’s Leibniz endorses the principle:

\[(SI1) \text{ For every property } P \text{ had by an individual } x, \text{ if an individual lacked } P, \text{ it wouldn’t be } x.\]

What is the relation between superessentialism and the view endorsed by Sleigh’s Leibniz, dubbed “superintrinsicalness”? It is easy to show that superintrinsicalness is weaker than superessentialism. According to superintrinsicalness, when X has P intrinsically in W1, nearby worlds most similar to W1 are such that substances lacking P are not X. But this is consistent with there being distant worlds at which X exists and lacks P. As a result, Sleigh’s Leibniz rejects theses (2) and (3) and appears to have no need for (4). What about (1)? It is unclear what stance Sleigh’s Leibniz is obliged to take on (1). Cover and Hawthorne argue that he rejects it. I will consider this below.

One must keep in mind however, that while the above analysis shows why superintrinsicalness is weaker than superessentialism, it is not at all clear that Leibniz intended to cash out either “intrinsic” or “essential” in terms of possible worlds as I have done here (and as Cover and Hawthorne do unapologetically in the book). In fact, there are good reasons for thinking that Leibniz’s modal
 semantics involved quite different strategies.

I find Sleigh’s moderate essentialist rendering of Leibniz plausible. Cover and Hawthorne develop three key arguments for rejecting moderate essentialism. I now turn to those arguments.

Argument 1:
First, Cover and Hawthorne claim, moderate essentialism is at a loss in explaining what Leibniz is doing in passages where Leibniz is seemingly engaged in counterpart talk. When he writes the following, something like counterparts must have been in Leibniz’s mind:

Here are the representations not only of that which happens but also of all that which is possible. . . . I have only to speak, and we shall see a whole world that my father might have produced, wherein will be represented anything that can be asked of him; and in this way one may know also what would happen if any particular possibility should attain unto existence. And whenever the conditions are not determinate enough, there will be as many such worlds differing from one another as one shall wish, which will answer differently the same question, in as many ways as possible. . . . Thus you can picture to yourself an ordered succession of worlds, which shall contain each and every one the case that is in question, and shall vary its circumstances and its consequences. . . . I will show you some, wherein shall be found, not absolutely the same Sextus that you have seen (that is not possible, he carries with him always what he shall be) but several Sextuses resembling him, possessing all that you know already of the true Sextus, but not all that is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence all that shall yet happen to him. You will find in one world a very happy and noble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, a Sextus, indeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms.

Strong essentialism motivates such appeals, moderate essentialism makes them mysterious.

Above I noted that while we might be able to draw some conclusions on the strength or weakness of the modal claims made by superintrinsicalness, we need to recognize that our employment of Lewis and Stalnaker in doing so is anachronistic. Leibniz simply did not cash out his modal claims in such terms. When we look at passages such as the Sextus text from the *Theodicy* we need to be cautious about what Leibniz does and does not mean to affirm with them. Possible worlds provided Leibniz with a device for illustrating points concerning creation. Maybe there are straightforwardly modal implications of such analogies. But it is
not clear that Leibniz saw them or cared to see them. Rather, what we might see him doing in the Sextus passage is just this: making points about creation by means of an analogy, while trying not to run afoul of his metaphysical commitments. As a result, in the above passage, the parenthetical remarks might simply be understood as Leibniz maintaining that, in these other worlds, noble and happy Sextuses are not identical with our Sextus. But if we were to ask Leibniz: “And is it these other Sextuses that provide the truthmaker for the claim that our Sextus is ignoble and unhappy contingently?” we would, I suspect, be met by a furrowed brow. Leibniz could well reply: “Of course not; it is the fact that the denial does not entail a contradiction” or perhaps something else. The point is: unless we are sure that Leibniz is providing us with a metaphysics of modality here, there is no advantage for Cover and Hawthorne.

Argument 2:

Cover and Hawthorne point out, secondly, that on moderate essentialism, there are more complete concepts than individuals, since, if individual X has property P contingently, then X could exist without P. Admitting this has certain unpalatable implications. First, it means, contrary to Leibniz’s claims, that God’s decision to create Peter does not settle all of the questions about Peter’s properties. Second, it seems to make hay of Leibniz’s claims that complete concepts are haecceities. Third, it provides him with an obvious solution to the problem of preserving freedom which he conspicuously never adopts. I will address the first here and the third below.

Concerning the first, too-many-decisions, implication, note that this simply resurrects the worries raised in the Arnauld correspondence itself over whether or not Adam has posterity essentially. Does God choose to create Adam, all other facts about Adam thus following necessarily? Leibniz says no. The superessentialist and strong essentialist try to maintain consistency here by holding that Leibniz really means “yes” but that he can fly under the radar as long as he avails himself of counterparts. The problem here is that the appeal to counterparts to ground contingency at this point precludes us from taking Leibniz at his word. The counterpart theorist contends that individuals have all properties (or in Cover and Hawthorne’s case, all intrinsic properties) necessarily, but that we can ground claims about contingency in the existence of counterparts. This is surely trying to have it both ways.

It should be noted, as well, just how awkward having it both ways is in Leibniz’s case as the superessentialists and strong essentialists understand him. Contemporary counterpart theorists endorse the view for a variety of reasons,
e.g., an inability to make sense of haecceities. But these motives do not include the one attributed to Leibniz: the belief that individuals have their properties essentially. And for good reason. If one held that individuals have their properties essentially, what would motivate one also to try to develop an account of individual’s having (those same) properties contingently? Yet, this is the very strategy attributed to Leibniz here.

The moderate essentialist, on the other hand, takes Leibniz at his word, but needs to spin the one-divine-decision passages, such as the one Cover and Hawthorne cite:

God does not decree that Peter should sin or Judas be damned, but only that, in reference to other possible individuals, Peter, who will sin—certainly, yet not necessarily, but freely—and Judas, who will suffer damnation—under the same condition—shall come into existence, or that the possible concept be actual. One can plausibly claim that this passage is simply meant to reinforce Leibniz’s repeated claim that the decree to create has worlds, not individuals, as its object. In fairness, however, one must admit that the texts do sometimes seem to favor the Cover and Hawthorn spin.

**Argument 3:**

The third argument against moderate essentialism contends that if Leibniz held moderate essentialism, he had in his possession an easy rejoinder to his critics concerning freedom which he conspicuously never deployed: simply admit that your complete concept describes only what you in fact do, not what you might have done.

Like the first argument, this only seems compelling if we assume that Leibniz wanted to couch his rhetoric in our terms. That is, the claim seems fair enough if we expect that Leibniz would have cashed out his modal talk in terms of other worlds and concepts in those other worlds. But Leibniz seems much more interested in going the route of hypothetical necessity, infinite analysis, moral necessity, and the like. Surely, the talk about infinite analysis is meant to provide a grounding for claims about contingency. Perhaps Leibniz should have cashed this out further in terms of one possibly having a complete concept different from the actual. He did not. The superessentialist and strong essentialist attribute this to the fact that Leibniz was truly an essentialist, throwing in counterparts to get by. The moderate essentialist takes Leibniz’s claims about the contingency of, for example, free actions, at face value, and assumes that a transworld or falling-under-distinct-concepts semantics of modality was not in play.
III. Modality and Methodology

I have in the past complained that our attempts to tackle Leibniz on the subject of modality are frequently one-dimensional. Despite the vast literature, few interpreters of Leibniz have tried to string together a story concerning Leibniz’s account of contingency that takes with full seriousness his views on the metaphysics of free action and demands of a theology adequate to account for evil and providence. In the final section, I would like to say briefly how I think such an integrative approach might yield some metaphysical payoff. I will provide some hints as to how this might go in, for example, helping us figure out what Leibniz is up to in the Arnauld correspondence.

One of Leibniz’s earliest attempts at solving the problem of evil occurs in the *Confessio Philosophi* where he attempts to deflect responsibility for evil from God by arguing that God does not cause, but merely permits, evil. Early in the dialogue he provides an account of permission that can be summarized as follows:

\[ P \text{ permits } E \text{ iff:} \]

1) \( P \) fails to will that \( E \)
2) \( P \) fails to will that not-\( E \)
3) \( P \) brings it about that state of affairs \( S \) obtains by willing that \( S \) obtains
4) If \( S \) obtains then \( E \) obtains
5) \( P \) knows that 4)
6) \( P \) believes that the good entailed by \( S \)’s obtaining outweighs the evil entailed by \( E \)’s obtaining.\(^{13}\)

While Leibniz was in the process of exchanging letters with Arnauld on freedom, contingency, and other matters, he was revisiting this permission theodicy in a few essays. The most critical one is “De Libertate, Fato, Gratia Dei et Connexis.”\(^{14}\) Among other things, Leibniz is, in this piece, looking to solve a knotty theological problem in which he had a keen interest, namely, the truthmaker for propositions of the form:

if \( S \) were in \( C \), then \( S \) would freely do \( A \) (where \( S \) is a being capable of free choice, and \( A \) is some free action of \( S \)).

In the discussion concerning divine providence there were two widely endorsed scholastic views on the truthmakers for such propositions, called conditional future contingents, or CFC’s, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The first view was largely defended by Dominicans. The second view was defended largely by Jesuits. For the Dominicans, CFC’s have as their truthmaker a divine decree. It is, on their view, up to God whether or not Peter denies or
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performs some other act in circumstances C. As a result, the truth value of CFC’s is said to be determined “post-volitionally”

The Jesuits held, on the contrary, that the truth values of CFC’s must be determined pre-volitionally (i.e., independently of any act of the divine will). The reason for this is the obvious one: if it is up to God what I choose under particular circumstances, then, they argued, the choice could not truly be free. Further, in those cases where what I choose is evil, God, it seems, is the direct cause of my performing the evil act since it was due to his decree that I choose to sin in those circumstances.

Surprisingly, even though Leibniz is aware that there is an issue concerning what grounds the truth of CFC’s, and he is aware of the competing solutions, it is not something that he considers in any detail in his early career. However, when we come to the period of 1685 through 1687, there is a flurry of activity on Leibniz’s part concerning this issue.

In “De Libertate, Fato, Gratia Dei et Connexis,” (henceforth, LFG) Leibniz deals with a wide range of topics concerning human freedom and divine providence. After a brief discussion of the problem of foreknowledge, Leibniz turns to the more complex problem described above, namely, the truthmaker for CFC’s. He introduces the problem by citing the stock example in discussions of this topic, an example springing from the biblical narrative in I Samuel chapter 23. In the passage, David is hiding from King Saul in the city of Keilah. David fears that Saul will besiege the city and that the residents of the city will fail to protect him. Thus, David, wondering whether or not he should flee, inquires of God concerning whether the residents of Keilah will, in fact, turn him over if Saul takes the city. God tells him that they will, and David then flees. Obviously, the knowledge that God has revealed to David is not an item of simple divine foreknowledge, and for obvious reasons: the events described by David do not occur in the actual future. The question here is what the Keilites would do, were some circumstances to arise that do not in fact arise. In other words, God is herein displaying that he has knowledge of conditional future contingents in a case where the antecedent of the conditional is not satisfied. The question then is, in virtue of what does God know what the Keilites will do, or, alternatively, in virtue of what is it the case that,

7) If the Keilites were in circumstances C (where Saul takes the city), they would deliver David to Saul.

Leibniz then undertakes a defense of the Dominican view that the truthmaker for 7) is the divine will. In the course of his defense, Leibniz reiterates the claim that God is not the author of sin because rather than willing the sin, God merely permits
Since Leibniz is defending the postvolitional, Dominican view, it is not at all surprising that the series of criticisms he raises are the stock objections of the prevolitionalist Jesuits. The first two criticisms he raises pose the natural questions: if CFC’s have a decree of the divine will as their truthmaker, then it seems that human freedom is precluded and, in light of this, it appears that sins ought to be ascribed to God and not the creature. Leibniz gives an inadequate response to the first objection by arguing that any defense of the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom, something he provides earlier in this essay, will equally suffice for showing the compatibility of the postvolitional position and human freedom. This is surely false. But my interest here is really in the second part of the objection. In response to the second part Leibniz sets forth a view much like the one we find in the *Confessio*: God is not the author of sin because he merely permits rather than wills the sin, and further such permitting is excusable since the evil permitted results in a greater good. Thus, it cannot be said that God wills sin since, on this view, “properly speaking, God does not decree that Peter sin.”

However, Leibniz was clearly dissatisfied with the view he lays out in this paragraph since he subsequently struck the entire paragraph and replaced it with a paragraph which goes in a quite different direction. What did Leibniz find unsatisfactory about the postvolitional view? Recall that in the *Confessio* Leibniz not only tells us that God’s relationship to sin in the world is one of mere permission, but he goes on to give us a detailed account of the nature of permission. In that account, the second condition was:

\[ 2) \text{P fails to will not-}E \]

This second condition is necessary since, if God were to will that E not occur, E would not occur. So, to make this account of permission work, Leibniz must be able to hold that with respect to a token evil, Peter’s denial of Christ, that:

\[ 3) \text{It is not the case that God wills that Peter denies.} \]

But in light of the account we have above it looks like Leibniz is committed to the following claims:

\[ 8) \text{God wills that if Peter is in C, then Peter denies} \]
\[ 9) \text{God wills that Peter exist} \]
\[ 10) \text{God wills that C obtain} \]
\[ 11) \text{God wills that Peter be in C} \]

It is hard to see, however, how Leibniz can coherently hold 8), 11), and 3) since it is reasonable to assume 8) and 11) entail the denial of 3). But what is it that Leibniz should surrender here? If he surrenders 3), then he must also surrender
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his account of permission since surrendering 3) would violate the first condition of his account of permission (i.e., that God does not will E where E is Peter’s denial). Surrendering 11) appears to carry a price too high to pay since 11) seems to be required by any orthodox account of divine creation. If Leibniz wants to give up 8), then he will have to surrender the claim that the divine will is the truthmaker for CFC’s. This might not seem to be a very high price to pay. After all, the view that something other than a divine decree acts as truthmaker for CFC’s was a view widely held by Jesuits, as I noted above. But the Jesuit view also required holding a libertarian view of freedom which Leibniz could not accept. Thus, giving up 8) would leave Leibniz in need of finding something else that could act as the truthmaker of CFC’s.

Leibniz does go on to provide a tentative solution to the problem, the nature of which is beside the point here. If the truth of the key conditional:

12) If Peter is in C, Peter denies.

is not grounded in the divine will, what are the options? Perhaps Leibniz could hold it to be a necessary truth. This would solve the problem of directly implicating God in Peter’s sin. Peter sins because Peter must. It is essential to Peter that he sin. However, Leibniz utterly rejects this move. Whatever the truthmaker for 12), Leibniz is committed to the claim that it is not the divine will, and it is not that Peter sins in C necessarily.

If Leibniz really is coming to these conclusions at the time of the Arnauld correspondence, we should be taking notice. In light of these theological desiderata, it seems that Leibniz is showing no affinity at all for the solution that would be the obvious one if he was leaning toward superessentialism. But it seems equally unlikely that these theological demands are compatible with strong essentialism. Peter’s freely choosing to deny in circumstances C is an intrinsic property, and one that Peter must have essentially on strong essentialism. These sorts of considerations tip the balance strongly in favor of the moderate essentialist position.

The reason for this long detour is simply that in reflecting on Leibnizian metaphysical commitments, we must keep in view the not-strictly-metaphysical aims he has for them. I think this is one (of many) examples where considerations of, for example, theology, go a long way towards settling otherwise underdetermined interpretive questions.

I suspect that this review of what amounts to a mere forty or so pages of the book provides the reader with a glimpse of the depth and rigor of Cover and Hawthorne’s work. There is so much more grist for reflection here that the book deserves to be widely discussed, and heeded, by all Leibniz interpreters who aim

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to cover the same terrain. In a volume produced by two students of Jonathan Bennett (to whom, along with José Bernedete the book is dedicated), it is fitting that it is such a rich source of reflection on Leibniz’s work. But it is equally fitting that the book be just as fruitful a source of reflection on the metaphysical themes it treats, even for those who have no interest in the historical context. It is hard to think of a more fitting tribute to a book of this sort. And it is just what the work deserves.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Notes}

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Substance and Individuation in Leibniz} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 4.
\textsuperscript{2} Cover and Hawthorne, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{3} Cover and Hawthorne, pp. 93-97.
\textsuperscript{6} On their unapologetic approach, see Cover and Hawthorne, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{7} Cover and Hawthorne, pp. 124-5.
\textsuperscript{8} T, §414.
\textsuperscript{9} Cover and Hawthorne, pp. 125-8.
\textsuperscript{10} This is slightly unfair to Cover and Hawthorne. They do not think the counterpart story is required to make sense of contingency for non-intrinsic properties and thus, they think Leibniz’s answer would rather be “yes and no.”
\textsuperscript{11} L, pp. 268-9.
\textsuperscript{12} See for example, Gr, 311. I think this text must be used with caution for reasons described below.
\textsuperscript{13} A, 6.3.129-131.
\textsuperscript{14} Gr, pp. 306-22. See also VE, n.251, pp.1105-1121. This piece carries a date of 1685-7. Other important pieces treating the topic in the period are: “Aus Ludovicus a Dola, De Modo Conjunctionis Concursuum Dei et Creaturum” (VE n.529, pp.2618-2629), and “De Libertate et Gratia” (Gr, 384-8. VE n.527, 2611-2615).
\textsuperscript{15} It is discussed in brief on a few occasions, however. For example, see “Scientia Media,” C, pp. 26-7. Leibniz says things which suggest that he holds the view I claim he held prior to 1685. Here he seems to adopt the postvolitional view concerning CFC's when he says, “God knows future absolute things because He knows what He decreed; and future conditionals because He knows what He would have decreed.” In A.6.1.545-6, a piece dating from 1670, Leibniz seems to lean in the
opposite direction (towards the prevolitional view). But here Leibniz only makes a brief mention of the prevolitional view without giving any endorsement of it. Special thanks are due to my colleague, Glenn Ross, for some very helpful conversations on the contents of this essay.

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