(iv) other relevant passages, (v) a short commentary on the section, and (vi) a list of key words. Rescher follows Robinet in taking the final version of secretarial copy B as the definitive copy of the text, but he includes in (i) and (ii) material (set in brackets) from earlier copies subsequently deleted by Leibniz. Between them, (iii) and (iv) give the student quite a lot of text outside the Monadology: (iv) subsumes the entirety of Principles of Nature and of Grace, with judicious but liberal selections added from the Discourse, Correspondence with Arnauld, New System, the New Essays and elsewhere. All selections are accompanied by reference to sources (typically to Gerhardt, Grua, or Couturat and to Loemker, Ariew and Garber, etc.). Rescher’s short commentaries explain and elaborate on Leibniz’s words, and—what I found especially helpful—orient Leibniz’s thought in historical context. Students will encounter more than passing reference to classical, medieval, and Renaissance thinkers, and to Leibniz’s contemporaries as well. (Rescher’s commentary deserves treatment all of its own, which can’t be given in such a short review. I’ll just mention one item: the additional passages brought alongside the Monadology stretch from 1685 to 1716, but it is somewhat unclear to me whether a single view of substance emerges from these texts and Rescher’s commentary on them.)

Rescher’s new volume is closer to the book Leibniz never wrote than is the Monadology. Rescher is to be congratulated for giving us a splendid text, ideal for use in the classroom.


For those interested in issues raised in P. F. Strawson’s Individuals (Methuen, 1959), Brown’s book is a welcome sign. Despite the subtitle, it does not address the topic of revisionary vs. descriptive metaphysics. But it does break new ground on the question of how the historical Leibniz compares with Strawson’s by taking a careful look at the relevant texts. Strawson says he’s only calling his target “Leibniz.” Brown rightly contends that this “possible philosopher” is enough like the actual one to make Strawson’s frontal assault of interest to the Leibniz scholar, and that it “does set the issues with uncommon clarity” (13-14).

Among other things, Brown claims that Strawson is wrong to suggest (i) that all the relations of Leibniz’s substances are reducible to non-relational qualities (Ch. 4); (ii) that Leibniz should make the identity of indiscernibles a contingent truth (Ch. 6); and (iii) that Leibniz’s “complete concepts” for individuals contain only “purely universal, or general terms” (Strawson, 120) and hence can be multiply instantiated. Brown argues persuasively against (iii) by noting Leibniz’s distinction between “full concepts” like king and “complete concepts” like that of Caesar. Only full concepts contain purely general terms. “Particular terms” (40) referring to particular events (e.g., crossing the Rubicon) must be included in the complete concepts, which do the individuating (36-40; 88-89). Finally Strawson suggests that (iv) Leibniz’s monads have no bodies and aren’t in a world of spatio-temporal objects. I’m only able to discuss (iv) in detail.
To defeat (iv), Brown points to texts which say monads are never severed from matter (e.g., G II 253; New Essays ii, 21, 73). An early solipsist text (G I 372-73) from 1675 is balanced, the author claims, by many later ones upholding the reality of body (48-49) and relegating a world of bodiless monads to a remote, unlikely possibility (49; cf. New Essays iv, 2, 14). Still, Brown realizes that the “predicate in subject” and (the very late) “monads have no windows” texts make it hard to see even the mature Leibniz as always requiring monads-cum-bodies. (There are others which aren’t addressed — e.g., “as though only God and it existed in the world” G II 57.)

In one text crucial to Brown’s interpretation, Leibniz says that even if a monad were miraculously deprived of “secondary matter,” God would have to furnish it with the “function [munus] of matter” (G II 324). The “function of matter” secures interrelationships between monads which allow them to perceive or “express” one another, and hence to “stand in relation to [their] world” (51). This “common world” contains other monads, and probably, given the majority of texts, also bodies (73-74). Thus, for Leibniz, perception is “relational” (51, 73), and Strawson can’t have monads which perceive without ipso facto admitting the existence of the relata — i.e., the “objective correlatives for their perceptions” (78). But Brown offers no argument for taking the “function of matter” passage as defeating other perfectly representative texts which seem to allow a monad to conduct its perceptual affairs in windowless (except for a skylight?) solitude, sundered from all bodies and even all other finite minds.

Brown discusses one such text (G II 451-52), which says that in order to have agreement among various souls, “...it is enough for the things taking place in one soul to correspond with each other as well as with those happening in any other soul... ...we mean nothing else when we say that Socrates is sitting down than that what we understand by ‘Socrates’ and by ‘sitting down’ is appearing to us and to others who are concerned.” The author claims that, interpreted in light of G VII 322, this text indicates a mind-independent Socrates because the perceptions of two people looking at him are caused by “the same nature” — i.e., God.

Brown’s conclusion: “Plainly Leibniz intends that the Socrates who appears to me is the same Socrates who appears to others. So for my phenomenal Socrates there is indeed an objective correlative, viz., a particular finite substance actually existing beyond my phenomena in the one common world” (78). That “particular finite substance” will have to be either (a) a corporeal-substance-Socrates, or else (b) a mental-substance-Socrates (or “monad-Socrates”). Since this and other texts question the reality of body, option (a) isn’t available. That leaves (b). But Brown’s own interpretation rules out (b). The text gets us to a common God, but not a common Socrates. It guarantees perceivings-of-Socrates are relational. But the relevant relations hold between perceiver and (via the skylight) God, not between perceiver and other finite monads.

The author’s reply, expressed in private correspondence, is that we should read the passage with Leibniz’s strong concept of “expression” (as indicated at G II 112) in mind. Leibniz’s claim that “everything must necessarily express the same nature” (G VII 322) thus entails that there is a public monad-Socrates which is that “same nature” perceived by other minds. My reply is that the text seems to allow us to take as the relevant nature, not an actual monad-Socrates, but God’s concept of Socrates. That is certainly “expressed,” even in the strongest
sense, when God causes anyone to perceive Socrates: there is a "constant and regular relation" between God’s concept and the person’s perception; when another person is simultaneously caused to perceive Socrates, both of their perceptions express a "common nature" — viz., God’s concept of Socrates.

Notice that only the unavailable (a), a corporeal-substance-Socrates, would help Leibniz answer Strawson’s most poignant philosophical challenge — his call for a common spatio-temporal world complete with a "demonstrative element" for reidentifying particulars (Strawson, 119). Brown doesn’t address the reidentification issue. He does consider the spatio-temporal requirement, claiming that even the monad-world “could not exist deprived of spatio-temporal phenomenal bodies and their objective correlatives” (79). To bolster this claim, Brown cites Leibniz’s claim that monads “have a certain kind of situation in extension” (G II 253). That’s pretty vague. Leibniz is handwavingly saying, somehow monads and extension are related. (Notice also: “extension,” not “space.” I’m letting Brown and Strawson follow some texts in blurring that important distinction here.) It’s a very thin textual thread on which to hang a response to Strawson’s worry that there’ll be no way for someone in Leibniz’s world to point to a public place at a time and indicate that this snub-nosed guy, the same one that I saw when I was here yesterday, is Socrates. Indeed, in the text which mentions Socrates, Leibniz’s perceiver, on saying “there’s Socrates,” seems merely to be noting that a Socrates-sense-datum in what Strawson calls her “private space” (Strawson, 124) resembles yesterday’s Socrates-sense-datum — or perhaps someone else’s Socrates-sense-datum in his private space. Nothing in the passage forces us to look on Socrates as a reidentifiable particular enduring through time and inhabiting a public, extra-perceptual space.

Much remains to be done to turn back the full force of the Strawsonian front advancing on Leibniz. But Brown’s study helps show that the historical Leibniz isn’t as hopelessly outmaneuvered as Strawson lets on.

RECENT WORKS ON LEIBNIZ (1990-91)


Kulstad, Mark, Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness and Reflection (Philosophia, 1991).
