The main importance of the latest Academy-Edition volume of Leibniz' *General Political and Historical Correspondence* (hereafter A I, 23) is that it contains excellent critical versions of several of Leibniz' letters to the Scottish nobleman Thomas Burnett of Kemney—letters concerning Hobbes, Locke, Cudworth, Toland, and English politics and political philosophy more broadly. The appearance of A I, 23 also offers an occasion to consider, in a more general and expansive way, the entire Leibniz-Burnett correspondence—which stretches over nearly two decades of Leibniz’ ripest maturity, and which is crucial for Leibniz’ “universal jurisprudence” or “justice as the charity of the wise.”

II. Leibniz’ Scottish Connection

Leibniz’ Scottish connections were always of some importance to him: he first met Scottish intellectuals during his visit to London in 1673 (when he was made a member of the Royal Society), and soon after his death (November 1716) it was a Scottish nobleman, John Ker of Kersland, who famously reported that Leibniz had been anonymously buried “almost like a robber,” not as “the ornament of his country.” During Leibniz’ philosophical maturity—between “Discourse on Metaphysics” (1686) and the “Monadology” (1714)—his most distinguished Scottish connection was to the Thomas Burnett relative Gilbert Burnet, the Edinburgh-born Anglican theologian who became the favorite (and favored) ecclesiastic of William and Mary after the Glorious Revolution, serving as Bishop of Salisbury and writing a celebrated history of the English Reformation which made the advent of William and Mary seem providential and fore-ordained. (Leibniz wrote hundreds of favorable pages on Burnet’s religious works for the courts of Hannover and Berlin, as Irena Backus has shown, partly because he genuinely admired them, partly because he wanted to gain Burnet’s blessing on the
Hannoverian succession to the English crown—which, after the death of William and Mary (and then of Queen Anne), would have gone to Leibniz’ friend and patron Electress Sophie of Hannover, had she not barely pre-deceased Anne (so that the crown went instead to her son Georg(e) I). 5

It was probably because of Leibniz’ strong favoring of Gilbert Burnet that he was so willing to offer friendly good offices to Thomas Burnett (or Burnet) of Kemney, when Thomas Burnett arrived in Germany in 1695 as an emissary of the English crown (who had come to shore up the Hannoverian connection and the Protestant succession). Leibniz not only devoted many hours to conversation with the visiting Scot, but recommended him to numerous German colleagues—writing to Friedrich von Steinberg, chief counselor in Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel (for example), that “un gentil homme Ecossois”, Thomas Burnett, who “often had the honor of paying court to Mme. the Electress [Sophie]”, and who “is a relative of the famous Mr. Burnet, now Bishop of Salisbury, who had so much of a part in the recent revolution in England and who is celebrated for his “History of the Reformation”, should be “honored with the goodness”6 of the court at Wolfenbüttel (whose famous library was eventually in Leibniz’ charge). Leibniz’ very last letter to Burnett, sent from Vienna in 1713, was still praising Bishop Burnet’s History: “It is certain that he does nothing that is not excellent.” (And it was in the hope that the Bishop would approve and praise the Théodicée, “the justice of God,” that Leibniz wrote to Thomas Burnett in 1710 that “it would perhaps be good that my book be translated into English.”7)

Leibniz rarely saw Thomas Burnett again after 1695, but it is thanks to this fact that we have the very extensive correspondence between the two men, which lasted for eighteen years (1695-1713) and occupies nearly 200 pages in the Gerhardt edition of Leibniz’ philosophical correspondence. But there are many other Leibniz-letters which are about Burnett: when the Scot was imprisoned in the Bastille in 1702 as a suspected spy [!], Leibniz pulled every possible string to secure his release. And Leibniz then reminded the enfranchised Burnett to thank the benefactors who had helped free him—first and foremost Electress Sophie of Hannover and Queen Sophie Charlotte in Berlin (“both of them ordered me to put everything into motion for your deliverance”), but also Cardinal Polignac, the Malebranche-defender whose Anti-Lucretius was admired by anti-Epicurean Leibniz (to Burnett, May 1704, A I, 23 No. 258).

The Leibniz-Burnett letters can be (broadly) divided into two groups: one group concerns political philosophy and politics (especially Leibniz’ growing aversion...
to “Hobbism”); the other concerns Locke, and especially Locke’s long-running quarrel with the Bishop of Worcester over the supposed theological and moral dangerousness of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Since, however, Leibniz’ letters to Burnett concerning Locke’s *Essay* were later used as a quarry when he wrote the *Nouveaux Essais* (1703-4)—Leibniz notified Burnett in May 1704 that “my remarks on the excellent work of M. Locke are almost finished” (A I, 23, No. 258)—and since Leibniz’ objections to Locke’s theory of “substance” (as thinking matter) are better worked out in the *Nouveaux Essais* than in the Burnett-letters, it seems reasonable to concentrate for the moment on Leibniz’ ever-growing anti-Hobbism in the political part of the Leibniz-Burnett *Briefwechsel*. And it seems most reasonable of all to focus on the particular Leibniz letter which is (a) least known, because not published until 1973 (by the present reviewer) and (b) most important for Leibniz’ accelerating worries about Hobbes’ “Epicurean” political philosophy. (In the pages that follow, this 1973-published letter will be referred to, for convenience, as the “new” letter, or “the present manuscript”—to keep it distinct from the other Leibniz-Burnett letters which were partly published by Dutens in the great 1768 Geneva edition of Leibniz’ *Opera Omnia*, and which were later fleshed out in the Gerhardt edition between 1875 and 1890).

The “new” or “present” letter, as soon will be clear, was occasioned by Leibniz’ reading of a text given to him by Thomas Burnett—namely William Sherlock’s *The Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers*—which Leibniz thought might be important in justifying the “Glorious Revolution” that would finally bring the English crown to Protestant Hannover, not to James II and his Catholic successors.

### III. The Leibniz-Burnett Letters

Leibniz’ commentary on Sherlock’s *The Case of Allegiance Due to Sovereign Powers* does not revolutionize one’s view of his political philosophy; but it does provide us with a “new” and wholly characteristic political letter which has the merit of helping to complete his most important correspondence dealing with theoretical and practical politics, the *Briefwechsel* with Thomas Burnett (part of which now appears in A I, 23, and the rest of which will eventually be in Reihe I, vols. 24-34). This exchange of letters contains some of Leibniz’ most significant political passages, include one (echoing Ciceronian “constitutionalism”) that has no parallel anywhere in his writings:

> The end of political science with regard to the doctrine of forms of
commonwealths [républiques], must be to make the empire of reason flourish. The end of monarchy is to make a hero of eminent wisdom and virtue reign (such as your present king). The end of aristocracy is to give the government to the most wise and the most expert. The end of democracy, or polity, is to make the people themselves agree to what is good for them. And if one could have all [three] at once: a great hero, very wise senators, and very reasonable citizens, that would constitute a mixture of the three forms. Arbitrary power is what is directly opposed to the empire of reason. But one must realize that this arbitrary power is found not only in kings, but also in assemblies, when cabals and animosities prevail over reason, which happens in judicial tribunals as well as in public deliberations. The remedy of a plurality of votes, given either publicly or secretly, in balloting, is not sufficient to curb these abuses. Elections serve after a fashion against cabals, and make it easy to assure oneself of votes by bad means; but they have this inconvenience—that each [voter] can follow his [own] whim and wicked designs, without the shame of being discovered, and without being obliged to present reasons for them. Thus one must think in this world of laws which can serve to restrain not only kings, but also the deputies of the people, and judges.\textsuperscript{11}

The letters to Burnett also contain characteristic observations on Hobbes, Locke, Cudworth, Toland, Harrington, Grotius, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Cicero, as well as good popular statements of Leibniz’ theodicy and monadology. And in a writer like Leibniz, who put some of his principal thoughts into an endless flow of letters with hundreds of correspondents, a “new” letter means more than it might in many cases.

The standard collection of Leibniz’ letters to Burnett, which is to be found in volume III of Gerhardt’s edition of the Philosophischen Schriften, contains letters from the period June 1695 to August 1713. In this preface to the letters, however, Gerhardt noted that Leibniz’ first letter to Burnett was “missing,” together with several later ones. There is good reason to believe that the present “new” manuscript constitutes at least part of that missing first letter, for at the top of the manuscript is written, “Envoyé à M. Burnet de Kemney, Avril 1695”\textsuperscript{12}—i.e., the “new” letter was sent to Burnett several months before the date of the old “first letter’ (June 1695) printed by Gerhardt. Internal evidence in several of the later letters also points to this conclusion, for in Leibniz’ letter to Burnett of July 1696 he observed that, “I sent you some notes [on Sherlock] when you had not yet left Germany”; but in April 1695 Burnett was in Germany, as an envoy of the English crown to Hannover, and...
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had had numerous conversations with Leibniz. At that time, apparently, Burnett had shown Sherlock’s work to Leibniz—who, however, knew of the book as early as 1691, to judge from some notes which seem to come from that year. Whatever the facts of the case may be, however, what is important is that a significant letter-exchange, which dominates the new A I, 23, now has a proper beginning, or at least part of one.

IV. Leibniz on “Allegiance” and “Sovereignty”

William Sherlock’s *The Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers*, published in 1691 and first noticed by Leibniz in that year, was a defense of the rights of William and Mary to the English throne; and since Leibniz concerned himself with the Hannoverian succession to that throne, it was natural for him to be interested in such a work. Sherlock’s was, however, a rather odd defense—perhaps because he had originally treated William and Mary as usurpers, and afterwards change his mind and his arguments—a defense which rested on a distinction between *de facto* power conferred by God, and *de jure* power authorized by “human” law. According to human law, in Sherlock’s views, James II’s title to the throne was still valid; but since God had seen fit to transfer power from him to William and Mary, his will conferred on them a right transcending any mere legal right. His whole view was concisely summarized in section III, prop. 8 of *The Case of Allegiance*:

> If then he who has the Legal Right may not be our King, and he who has not, may; when any such case happens, we must pay our allegiance to him who is King, thought without a Legal right; not to him who is not our King, though it is his [legal] Right to be so: And the reason is very plain, because Allegiance is due only to God’s Authority, not to a bare Legal Title without God’s Authority; and therefore must be paid to him who is invested with God’s Authority … that is, to the actual King.  

To those who would call this “Hobbism,” Sherlock maintained, the appropriate rejoinder was that while in Hobbes power in itself gives a “Right to Dominion,” in Sherlockism the possession of power does not constitute right but is only “a certain sign to us, that where God has placed and settled the Power, he has given the Authority” as well.

Leibniz’ opinion of Sherlock’s work was not every high, as is clearer in some of his later letters to Burnett than in the present manuscript: he was an “able and eloquent” man, Leibniz allowed, but did not always “take the trouble to form distinct
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ideas”; as a result The Case of Allegiance was “subject to a number of difficulties.”\textsuperscript{15} But the fact that Burnett had asked for a commentary on Sherlock gave Leibniz an opportunity to draw up an exposition of his own views on the distinction between \textit{de facto} and \textit{de jure} power, on the relation of political allegiance to the “security” provided by the state, but above all—and this is doubtless what prompted him to produce this manuscript—on “Hobbism.”

Here it is useful to recall that Leibniz’ attitude toward Hobbesianism was rather complicated, but that, on the whole, Hobbes stood for nearly everything Leibniz opposed (and Spinoza stood for the rest). Early in his philosophical career he had attempted a correspondence with Hobbes, but had been ignored, perhaps because of his left-handed compliments “(‘certain men are … wrong in ascribing license and impiety to your hypotheses;’”\textsuperscript{16} and afterwards though he always acknowledged Hobbes’ genius (“Hobbes est plein de bonnes pensées, mais il a coutume de les outrer”) he increasingly treated Hobbesian ideas as “pernicious,” particular for “beginners” in philosophy, though advanced students might (he said) find in Hobbes “truths of great profundity and errors of the most dangerous consequence.”\textsuperscript{17}

Leibniz believed that Hobbes’ theory of absolute sovereignty was as dangerous as it was erroneous (“Hobbesian Empires … exist neither among civilized people nor among barbarians, and I consider them neither possible nor desirable”\textsuperscript{18}); and he disliked Hobbes’ social contract theory, which, in his view, placed insufficient emphasis on man’s natural sociability (“Hobbes did not admit that man was made for society, conceiving that he had been forced into it by necessity … but he did not consider that the best men, free from all wickedness, united themselves to better sustain their purposes” \textit{(Nouveaux Essais} III, 1, pt1). But the Hobbesian doctrines which Leibniz particularly detested were those which held that “irresistible power,” in God or in a sovereign, gave a \textit{right} to “dominion,” and that (still worse) God is a “material” being for whom (as for men) “the mind is nothing other than a motion in certain parts of the organic body” (“but such a God is impossible”). (To Burnett, August 1704, A I, 23, No. 434\textsuperscript{19}). \textit{La philosophie trop matérielle} of Hobbes, Leibniz says elsewhere, which holds that “all substance is body,” makes the morally fatal mistake of imagining, Epicurus-like, that it “were possible to derive memory, intellect, will and consciousness from [bodily] magnitude, shape and motion alone.”\textsuperscript{20} But Leibniz was certainly enough of a Platonist to be offended by any Hobbesian insistence that only matter matters, and that the \textit{Phaedo}-inspired notion of “a spiritual and immaterial substance” is only a Hellenic “invention of heathens” (to Burnett August 1704, A I, 23, No. 434).
Though the April 1695 manuscript deals with Sherlock’s *The Case of the Allegiance* in some detail, almost everything that is of enduring interest in it turns on Leibniz’ opposition to Hobbes—except one point, and *that* is interesting because it is the single political doctrine on which Leibniz and Hobbes did consistently agree, namely the notion that allegiance to any sovereign power is relative to the security and protection which that sovereign power provides. “My definition of the state,” Leibniz wrote in 1705 in an unwontedly Hobbesian vein, “is: that it is a large society whose end is the common security,” though he quickly added that “happiness” ought to be the real objective of the state, and that security, without which “all well-being ceases,” is only instrumental to that happiness, not an end in itself. Citing the authority of Grotius, he urged that if a ruler puts the safety of the state in danger “the obligation to suffer ceases,” and that if a ruler fails utterly to provide security “it is permitted to subjects to swear an oath of fidelity to the enemy of their master who has conquered them, their master not being able to do anything more to insure their safety.”

With these passages in mind the opening paragraphs of the April 1695 manuscript should not come as a great surprise, though in this “new” Burnett-letter Leibniz appears to be more Hobbesian than anywhere else in his writings. “When an enemy makes himself a master of a place, it is agreed that the inhabitants can swear the oath of fidelity to him and are abound thereby, even if the war should be unjust on the part of the conqueror.” This is extraordinary in one who urged elsewhere that an unjust war “is almost the greatest of crimes that can be committed.” It is also extraordinary in one who commonly maintained that “one does not lose his rights … when the occasion to exercise them does not present itself”—a strong argument against the legitimacy of mere *de facto* power—and who argued in his defense of Hapsburg rights during the War of the Spanish Succession (*Manifesto for the Rights of Charles III*) that “even if it happens that *force majeure* obliges subjects and a whole country to do homage to a conquering usurper … the true lord always retains his right whole and unscathed.” The Spanish War, incidentally, occupies many Leibniz-letters in the new A I, 23—especially one to Thomas Burnett (May 1704) saying that the War (if successful) “may curb the excessive power of the House of Bourbon” (A I, 23, No. 258). (Oddly enough, Leibniz in this Burnett-letter says, “I have not read the defense of the rights of Charles III”—though he had in fact just written and published this very work in 1703.)

But, though Leibniz agrees in the manuscript with Sherlock that “even illegitimate power, when it has prevailed, is authorized by God,” he modifies this agreement
considerably in paragraph 7, which must be considered if his whole view is to emerge. In this paragraph, indeed, Leibniz insists that the notion that *de facto* and *de jure* kings “are equal before God and differ only according to human laws” is mistaken, that they differ intrinsically because “one has more right than the other,” since an unjust *de facto* king “is culpable and punishable” in the “forum” of divine justice, as are those “who have helped him to become one.” It is only in the “forum” of human law that *de facto* and *de jure* rulers are “equal,” and this, apparently, only because the security which any ruler can provide is the precondition of all further goods. One must remember that for Leibniz natural justice is not confined to human life alone, but that (as he said in his *Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf*) “not everything should be measured by the goods of this life,” since “no one will escape the divine vengeance, which is deferred to a future life; and this is a solid reason by which men may understand the duty to conduct themselves according to justice.”

In the end, then, Leibniz does not say that all power comes *equally* from God, even in the “new” manuscript considered by itself, though he comes closer to saying it here than anywhere else. (In his earlier [1691] very brief notes on Sherlock, he perhaps came closer still: recalling St. Augustine’s observation that the main difference between Alexander the Great and a pirate is that the former had a larger fleet, Leibniz suggests that “between a pirate and an unjust conqueror the difference is only one of larger or smaller [n’est que du grand au petit],” and that having submitted to a pirate “I owe him a certain degree of allegiance.”

More extraordinary than all of this, however, is the second paragraph of the present “new” Burnett-letter, in which the proportion of “Hobbism” increases, even to the point of granting the partial validity of social contract theory. “One can say that, allegiance being relative to protection, there is a quasi-∗contractus* between the government and him who enjoys the advantages of public safety.” But Leibniz *did* say “∗quasi∗ contractus,” and was quick to add that since the obligation to obey in exchange for security was analogous to what Roman law called *Actiones in factum*— that is, to situations in which what ought to be done was derived from the particular circumstances of a case, whereas *Actiones in ius* considered only established legal right, and not particular facts—the duty of allegiance “would have its force, even if one had never made an oath or an agreement,” simply because (apparently) one *naturally* owes “a certain degree” of allegiance to those who provide the “fact” of security, whatever their legal title to rule may or may not be.

While the first two paragraphs of the present manuscript at least look to Hobbesian arguments, what is said about the Roman law is thoroughly non-Hobbesian, but
is quite typical of Leibniz. Throughout his life—and one should recall that he began his professional career as an expert on law—Leibniz tried to rationalize and systematize Roman law, to relate it to his own ethical and legal theory: “I have been a jurisconsult by profession since my youth, and in more than one tribunal,” he wrote to Bourguet in 1713, “and jurisprudence comprises a part of practical philosophy.” His effort to relate the precepts of Roman law (“la raison écrite”) to his own theory of justice as wise charity formed an element of his “universal jurisprudence”—something to which it is now appropriate to turn.

V. Leibniz’ “Universal Jurisprudence”

The most characteristically Leibnizian section of this “new” April 1695 Burnett-letter is paragraph 8, which deals with Hobbes and with the “nature” of the concept of justice. This paragraph, indeed, as it stands, serves to suggest Leibniz’ view of “universal jurisprudence,” rather than to state it fully or adequately:

The author [Sherlock] refutes Hobbes in the eighth proposition, for having said that God has a right over all things in virtue of his omnipotence; instead of which the author believes that the sovereign right of God is based on his having created things. It seems to me that neither [argument] suffices, and that the universal right of God is based only on the sovereign wisdom which he possesses: which make it such that it is madness not to obey him. Now I have noted elsewhere that justice is based on wisdom. And “wisdom” is, so to speak, one-half of the “wise charity” which (for Leibniz) constitutes justice. Since, however, it is precisely Leibniz’ anti-Hobbesian “universal jurisprudence” which is the most representative part of his political philosophy, it is essential to elaborate what this paragraph only hints at. Leibniz wanted to establish a truly universal theory of justice, a standard of right common to God and man (and generally to any rational substances); anticipating Kant, he urged (in yet another letter to Thomas Burnett) that justice and injustice “do not depend solely on human nature,” but on “the nature of intelligent substance in general”—for morally “necessary truths do not depend on the senses, or experiences, or facts, but on the consideration of the nature of our soul, which is a being, a substance.” As “substances” linked by intelligence, God and man exist for Leibniz in a “society or universal republic of spirits which is the noblest part of the universe,” a moral realm within physical nature, a realm in which “universal right is the same for God and for men.” It is erroneous, Leibniz urged, to say that...

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we must not judge God in terms of the “common notion” of justice, for it must be the case that one has “an idea or notion of justice when one says that God is just, otherwise one would only attribute a word to him.” Just as the “arithmetic and geometry” of men and of God differ only in the degree of their perfection, so too “natural jurisprudence and every other truth is the same in heaven and on earth.” In jurisprudence, morality and “natural theology” Leibniz tells Burnett, “I never write anything except by definitions and by axioms”—though “I do not always use that mathematical air which repels people.”

But Leibniz used the notion of intrinsic “eternal verities” politically to attack the idea of justice as bare superior power; the “formal notion” of justice, he observed in a commentary on Hobbes, has nothing to do with the mere command of authorities: it “does not depend on the arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdom and goodness, in all men as well as in God.”

For Leibniz it was merely an “English” empiricist prejudice to see justice as “unreal” if it did not consist of tangible commands backed by power and threats. “The qualities of mind are not less real than those of body,” he wrote Platonizingly in the New Essays. “It is true that you do not see justice as you see a horse, but you understand it no less, or rather you understand it better; it is no less in acts than directness or obliqueness is in motions.” (III, V, 12) And if justice were simply derivative from the possession of power, “all powerful persons would be just, each in proportion to his power;” if an “evil genius” somehow seized supreme universal power, Leibniz urged, he would not case to be “wicked and unjust and tyrannical” simply because he could not be successfully resisted.

Those who derive justice from power, he thought, confuse “right” and “law”: the concept of right cannot (by definition) be unjust, but law can be because it is “given and maintained” by power; only in God is there an absolute coincidence of right and power which produces just law.

It is clear that Leibniz conceived God not just as the first cause or as an “imaginary metaphysical being, incapable of thought, will an action,” but as “a definite substance, a person, a mind.” God, like man, has knowledge, will and power, but Leibniz wanted to be certain that justice is not the mere “effect” of the last two attributes considered as “causes”: God acts neither necessarily nor arbitrarily, he insisted in his so-called “Refutation of Spinoza,” because “there is a mean between what is necessary and what is fortuitous, namely what is free.” (For a splendid treatment of this “refutation” see Philip Beeley’s fine article in The Leibniz Review, vol. 12, 2002.) The world is a “voluntary effect” of God, but is chosen on account
of “inclining or prevailing reasons,” so that “knowledge” and “the principle of the best” take precedence over will and power. Perhaps Leibniz’ whole doctrine on this point is best summarized in his *Meditation on the Common Notion of Justice*: “Wisdom is in the understanding, and goodness in the will. And justice as a result is in both. Power is another matter, but if it is added it transforms right into fact.”

In Leibniz’ “universal jurisprudence,” then, power simply *transforms* right into “fact”; in Hobbes, however, it is sometimes the case that the possession of “irresistible” power *constitutes* right. Hobbes is rightly famous as a social contract theorist, and ordinarily for him, all authority and right exist through voluntary “covenant” or agreement. But this is not the case when there exists an “irresistible” power in some “sovereign” (whether God or man)—a power which, according to Hobbes, gives rise to absolute rights of “dominion.” God was entitled to give laws to the ancient Jews as their “civil sovereign,” Hobbes says, because he was the beneficiary of an antecedent obligation (created by Abraham’s covenant) to obey (*Genesis* XVII, 6); but he *could have* ruled them by natural “irresistible” power. Of the several impediments which stand in the way of considering Hobbes a “consent” theorist purely and simply, one of the most problematical is the way in which he treats the relation of power to the right to rule (as Leibniz saw). While it is undoubtedly true, as Oakeshott maintains, that one of Hobbes’ central convictions was the belief that there is “no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own,” one cannot help noticing that in both *De Cive* and *Leviathan* (ch. 31) he says that “irresistible” power carries with it a right to rule. But if the right to rule can be derived from the possession of irresistible power, then a theory of obligation based on voluntary “acts of one’s own” is made superfluous: “that obligation which arises from contract … can have no place … where the right of ruling … rises only from nature.” Or rather, such acts of one’s own *would be* superfluous, if there were any person on earth naturally possessed of irresistible power; it is the fact that only God actually *has* such power which makes artificial right—right depending on covenant—necessary. But “if there had been any man of power irresistible, there had been no reason, why he should not by that power have ruled.” (In any case Leibniz doubted that Hobbes had adequate notions of “voluntariness” and “acts of one’s own”—as he made clear to Thomas Burnett in a 1710 comment on Hobbes’ *Liberty, Necessity and Chance*.)

Taking all of this into account, and recalling that if a Hobbesian man reasonably fears that the power of the Hobbesian state will not protect him he is justified (arguably) in the non-observance of his “contract” of obedience (as
Leibniz perceptively remarked). Leibniz’ constant assimilation of Hobbes to Thrasymachus’ view that *justum est potentiori utile* (*Republic*, 336a, ff.) is not so unreasonable as it might seem: the claim that “Plato Hobbesianam doctrinam eleganter exhibit, de rep. Lib. 2” is not a mere distortion (though it is not fair, either). In any case, Leibniz’ fundamental position was that saying *stat pro ratione voluntas*, let will take the place of reason, is “properly the motto of a tyrant.” If will were uppermost, there would be as many kinds of justice as there were arbitrary commands; if the justice of God were invented by *fiat* there would be no sufficient reason to praise him. This does not mean, however, that will is abolished by Leibniz in his treatment of justice; will must “strive” for those things which “our thinking recognizes.” Reason, or thought, or knowledge alone is not enough for a moral action, in God or in man; if it were, intellectual error would be equal to moral evil, and there would be no difference between a mistake and a crime. The will must be *conformed* to reason, must choose the best.

Leibniz makes human justice turn on divine justice—or rather, makes both turn on the “common notion” of justice which all rational substances share—in order to avoid arbitrariness and the equation of justice with power. But he must then explain the justice of God, given a visible world full of evil, not all of it apparently deserved, but all of it allowed, it not willed, by God. To understand why all of the (sometimes unmerited) evil in the universe is not unjust on God’s part—even though he could have avoided creating any world at all—an understanding of his *modus operandi* is required. The eternal verities and all essences are contained in God’s understanding, not in his will or power; thus “the essences of things are co-eternal with God,” who “discovers them in is essence” and “follows them.”

“The essence of God,” Leibniz tells Thomas Burnett, “encloses creatures eminently, and also has the ideas of their essences.” God’s power only *translates* a portion of essence into existence, but his choice of the “compossible” portion which he actually produces is reasonable: “All things exist as a result of the choice of a wise being, and thus owe their origin to fitness and not to a brute necessity of nature, nor to pure caprice or a will destitute of all reason.”

Now God need not create the universe, but if he does he is restricted by the eternal verities and by possibilities: “God was able to create matter, a man, a circle, or leave them in nothingness, but he was not able to produce them without giving their essential properties. He had of necessity to make man a rational animal and to give the round shape to a circle” (*Théodicée*: II, 183). It is precisely on the basis of this doctrine that Leibniz urges that while God has permitted evil, this does not
involving injustice: for God “finds” the necessarily limited and imperfect essence (or “concept”) of man in his understanding, and merely or “only” translates into existence a being whose limitation and imperfection he does not create. That such a view wreaks havoc with Leibniz’ notions of free-will and responsibility (“free will is the proximate cause of the evil of punishment, although it is true that the original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in the eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause” (Théodicée III, 288)) is perfectly obvious, just as it is clear that it is hard to operate with the “common notion” of justice and goodness if one wants to praise God for “translating” imperfect essences into a world full of moral, physical and metaphysical evil. But those problems, serious as they are, cannot be taken up here. For present purposes—and particularly in connection with paragraph 8 of the “new” Burnett-letter—what matters is the way in which Leibniz conceives the nature of “eternal verities” such as justice and goodness, the way in which he insists on the immutability of their essences. On this point Leibniz parted company not only with Hobbes, who had urged that “to know truth is to remember that it was made by ourselves,” but also with the Cartesians, who founded even the character of truth itself on the omnipotent will of God. As Descartes wrote in his Reply to the Six Objections,

It is self-contradictory that the will of God should not have been from eternity indifferent to all that has come to pass or that will ever occur, because we can form no conception of anything good or true … the idea of which existed in the divine understanding before God’s will determined him to act … Thus, to illustrate, God did not will … the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles, because he knew that they could not be otherwise. On the contrary … it is because he willed the three angles of a triangle to be necessarily equal to two right angles that this is true and cannot be otherwise. One of the most consistent things in Leibniz’ philosophy was his hostility to such notions, as an early (1677) letter of his shows: “I know that it is the opinion of Descartes that the truth of things depends on the divine will; this has always seemed absurd to me … Who would say that \( A \) is not non-\( A \) because God has decreed it?” And exactly 30 years later, in a letter to Thomas Burnett (1707) Leibniz was still complaining of those Cartesians who “will have it that the truths which are rightly called eternal depend on the will \( \text{arbitre} \) or good pleasure of God”—an example of “mauvais raisonnement.”

In the history of philosophy the idea that the notion of justice, as an “eternal verity,” is not a mere adjunct of power, that is an idea whose truth is at least
analogous to the truths of mathematics, geometry, and logic, is commonly associated with Plato. Now, while it is not true that Leibniz was a Platonist in any doctrinaire sense, nonetheless he did agree with Plato on many points of fundamental importance. “I have always been quite content, since my youth,” he wrote to Remond, “with the moral philosophy of Plato, and even in a way with his metaphysics: for these sciences accompany each other like mathematics and physics.”

(Hence Leibniz ends his May 1704 letter to Burnett, announcing the completion of the *Nouveaux Essais*, with praise of the (Cambridge) “Platonism” of Cudworth, *contra* the “materialism” of Hobbes and perhaps of Locke [A I, 23, no. 258].) Leibniz, indeed, was “Platonic” not only in the way he conceived the concept of justice, but even in some of his more practical political opinions; he always urged, for example in a letter to Thomas Burnett, that “following natural reason, government belongs to the wisest:”

... [Human] equality would be certain, if all men had the same [natural] advantages, but this not being so at all, it seems that Aristotle is more correct here than Hobbes. If several men found themselves in a single ship on the open sea, it would not be in the least comfortable either to reason or nature, that those who understand nothing of sea-going claim to be pilots [*Gorgias* 511-512]; such that, following natural reason, government belongs to the wisest. But the imperfection of human nature causes people not to want to listen to reason, which has forced the most wise to use force and cunning to establish some tolerable order, in which providence itself takes a hand. But when a [certain] order has been established, one should not overturn it without extreme necessity and without being sure of succeeding in it *pro salute publica*, in a way which does not cause worse evils.

With the possible exception of the *Republic*, the Platonic work which Leibniz admired most—at least for use in moral and political philosophy---was the *Euthyphro*, which he paraphrased almost literally in his most important work on justice, the *Meditation on the Common Notion of Justice*. In the *Euthyphro*, which deals with the question whether “the rules of goodness and of justice are anterior to the decrees of God” (in Leibniz’ words), Plato “makes Socrates uphold the truth on that point” (*Théodicée* II, 182). And the truth is (as Ernst Cassirer puts it) that the good and the just are “not the product but the objective aim and the motive of his will.” That Leibniz was much affected by Plato’s formulation of this point is evident in a bare comparison of their words:
Socrates: Then what are we to say about the holy [as justice to the gods], Euthyphro? ... Is it not loved by all the gods?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: Because it is holy, or for some other reason?
Euthyphro: No, it is for that reason.
Socrates: And so it is because it is holy that it is loved; it is not holy because it is loved.
Euthyphro: So it seems. (Euthyphro, 10 d-e)

It is agreed that whatever God wills is good and just. But there remains the question whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just: in other words, whether justice and goodness are arbitrary, or whether they belong to the necessary and eternal truths about the nature of things, as do numbers and proportions. (Meditation on the Common Notion of Justice)

It is not, of course, the case that Leibniz was single-handedly responsible for reviving the Platonic concept of justice; that had been done by Grotius, whom Leibniz always called “the incomparable,” and who had urged in De Jure Belli ac Pacis that “measurelessness as is the power of God, nonetheless it can be said that there are certain things over which that power does not extend ... just as even God cannot cause that 2 times 2 should not make 4, so he cannot cause that which is intrinsically evil, be not evil.” And Leibniz always cited this passage with approval—while adding, in a letter to Burnett, that Grotius “was not enough of a philosopher” to demonstrate what he had (Platonizingly) asserted. But, for all of his upholding of Platonism on this point, Leibniz did not go as far as Kant was later to go, and hold not only that God is not the “cause” of goodness and justice, but that the idea of God is merely deduced, as a “necessary hypothesis,” out of the concept of moral perfection. Kant, indeed, became the extreme term in what Plato had begun in the Euthyphro, when he argued in the Critique of Pure Reason that the “reality of moral laws” and their “inner practical necessity” has led men to the “postulate” of a wise ruler of the world, as a being who gives “effect” to those laws; that such laws cannot be regarded as “accidental” and as “derived from the mere will of the ruler;” that (and here the Platonism is clearest) “we shall not look upon actions as obligatory because they are the commands of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because we have an inward obligation to them” (“Canon of pure reason,” A 819/B847). This goes beyond what Leibniz could allow, in that it
treats God as a “postulate” whose objective reality is indemonstrable, who is only “practically” necessary. For Leibniz “all reality must be founded on something existent” (Théodicée II, 184), and even the eternal verities of ethics and mathematics must be co-eternal with an actual God who “finds” those verities “imbedded” [inditis] in his essence. This makes God necessary for, though not the cause of, the truth of the eternal verities; as Leibniz said in his notes on Spinoza’s Ethics,

Even if we concede that the essence of things cannot be conceived without God … it does not therefore follow that God is the cause of the essence of things … for a circle cannot be conceived without a center, a line without a point, but the center is not the cause of the circle nor the point the cause of the line.67

Whatever their differences, however, Plato, Grotius, Leibniz and Kant could agree that (in Leibniz’ words). “Non voluntas sed sapientia Dei justitae regula ultima est”68—words which correspond closely to the last sentence of paragraph 8 in the “new” Leibniz-letter to Burnett.

VI. Leibniz on Justice as Wise Charity

If the nature or the status of the concept of justice is roughly Platonic in Leibniz, the content is not merely Platonic. For while Leibniz agreed with Plato’s Symposium that justice is “wise love” (caritas sapientis), he also equated this charity with benevolentia—though Plato had denied the reality of “will,” and hence of volentia, in Protagoras(352 b). Charity, Leibniz said in a letter of 1694, “Must prevail over all other considerations in the world;”69 justice should not be understood as a negative Hobbesian mutual forbearance, but as a positive benevolence. To love wisely, Leibniz tells Burnett, is “to find one’s pleasure in the felicity of others.”70 He was therefore able to link up charity with the traditional precepts of the Roman law, converting the highest principle of that law, honeste vivere, into “live piously,” or “charitably.”71 The ius strictum of the Roman law, mere forbearance from violence, became in Leibniz’s “universal jurisprudence” simply the lowest form of justice, but certainly not adequate in itself.72 Because charity involves a positive effort to bring about the good of others, so far as one can without “offending reason,” Leibniz was able to connect human with divine justice: God cannot owe duties (and therefore the “middle” degree of Roman law, suum cuique tribuere, cannot apply to him), but he can love in proportion to merit, and charity is simply a “habit of loving.” Leibniz used the principle of charity in his life-long ecumenical effort to re-unite the Christian churches; and, while he was not a democrat, he could
concern himself, as an advocate of charitable action, much more with the welfare of ordinary people than could (say) a classical liberal like Locke—as is clear in one of Leibniz’ finest letter to Thomas Burnett (written before the great falling out with Isaac Newton):

You know, Sir, my principles, which are to prefer the public good to all other considerations, even to glory and money; I doubt not at all that a person of Mr. Newton’s strength shares my feeling. The more staunch one is, the more one has this disposition, which is the great principle of an honorable man, and even of justice [as wise charity] and of true piety; for to contribute to the public good and to the glory of God is the same thing. It seems that the goal of the whole human race should be principally the knowledge and the development of the marvels of God, and that it is for this that God has given it the empire of this globe. And, Mr. Newton being one of those men of the world who can contribute most to this, it would be almost criminal of him to let himself be diverted by impediments which are not absolutely insurmountable. The greater his talent, the greater his obligation. For in my opinion an Archimedes, a Galileo, a Kepler, a Descartes, a Huygens, a Newton are more important with respect to the great goal of the human race than great military men [capitaines], and they are at least on part with those esteemed legislators whose aim has been to lead men to what is truly good and solid. The end of politics, after virtue, is the maintenance of abundance, so that men will be in a better position to work in common concert for those solid [objects of] knowledge which cause the sovereign author to be admired and loved. Many can contribute to this by experiences which furnish materials, but those who can profit from them, like Mr. Newton, to advance the great building of science, and who can interpret its interior, are, so to speak [members] of the privy council of God.73

The idea of charity, which links together Leibniz’ ideas of justice, of reconciliation in religion, and of the proper internal government of countries, rests on the idea of perfection, which is the central metaphysical concept in his system. Charity is a habit of loving, and love is a “feeling of perfection” in others; perfection is also the regulator of love, as it is the goal of action, the essence of God (as ens perfectissimum), the principle which governs the “translation” of essence into existence, etc. (What cannot be taken up here, despite its obvious importance, is the question whether, in Leibniz, men are in a position to be more charitable than they are, to become more nearly perfect: since, as was noted, he explains human “moral evil” in terms of Augustinian “privation,” in terms of an “imperfection”
which forms part of the very “concept” or essence of humanity, it often seems that no amount of the “good will” which he constantly praises can lead to better results; but how far moral freedom, and the duty to act more charitably, are congruent with Leibniz’ “pre-established harmony,” with his determinism, and with his notion that all “predicates” of a subject flow certainly (though not necessarily) form his “concept” involves endless difficulties which must be treated elsewhere.)

VII. Conclusion

In the end what matters most in the Burnett-letters is the part which serves to bring Leibniz’ “universal jurisprudence” to mind—not least in the new A I, 23. His extended effort to show that a purely “positivistic” conception of justice, resting on will or command, would result in a universal legal and moral solipsism in which there would be as many kinds of justice as there are kinds of arbitrary volition, is an imposing undertaking which, if it is not wholly successful, still shows that the ideas of Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza on this question are even more problematical than Leibniz’. As Leibniz wrote in 1706, after a decade’s correspondence with Burnett:

Neither the norm of the conduct itself, nor the essence of the just, depends on [God’s] free decision, but rather on eternal truths, objects of the divine intellect […] Justice follows certain rules of equality and of proportion which are no less founded in the immutable nature of things, and in the divine ideas, than are the principles of arithmetic and of geometry […] Divine justice and human justice have common rules which can be reduced to a system; and they must be taught in universal jurisprudence.74

To be sure, Leibniz’ last letter to Burnett (Vienna, August 1713) reveals some (uncharacteristic) world-weariness and dejection: Leibniz says that he is being attacked with “incivility” in London by “Newton and his sectarians,” who have even let the “spirit of faction” and of “occult” philosophy invade the mathematical sciences at the Royal Society; and he complains that “bad theologians and poor philosophers” have served up tanti ghiribizzi politici e theologici, “so many political and theological whims.”75 But this dejection was as short-lived as it was atypical: Leibniz summoned up his forces, was named Director of the planned Vienna Academy of Sciences by the Holy Roman Emperor, and within the next Vienna-year produced the “Monadologie,” the “Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce,” and the great 1714 lecture on “The Greeks as Founders of a Sacred Philosophy”76—an astonishingly full recovery which (however) seems to have left no time for further
letters to Thomas Burnett of Kemney.

Patrick Riley
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Leibnutz@aol.com

Notes


7 Leibniz, letter to Thomas Burnett (1710), Ger. III, pp. 323/324.

8 Leibniz, A I, 23, op. cit., no. 258.

9 Leibniz, letter to Thomas Burnett, April 1665, now in A I, 11, op. cit., pp. 519 ff. (originally published by the present reviewer from the Hannover MS in 1973).

10 The Leibniz-Burnett correspondence should be finished (in the Berlin Academy-Edition) by (roughly) vol. 34.

11 Leibniz, letter to Thomas Burnett, Gen III, p. 277.

12 Same as 9, supra.


15 Leibniz, to Thomas Burnett, Ger. III, pp. 176, 180.
16 Leibniz, letter to Thomas Hobbes (1670), Loemker 2nd ed., p. 106.
18 Leibniz, Caesarinus Fürstenerius (1677), A IV, 2, chs. 10-11; (English in Leibniz’ Political Writings ed. P. Riley, Cambridge (U.K.) 1972, p. 120.
19 Leibniz, letter to Burnett, A I, 23, op. cit., no. 434.
22 Ibid.
28 Cf. Justinian’s Institutes, Lib. IV, tit.6, 4.
29 Leibniz, to Bourguet (1713), Ger. III, p. 559.
31 Leibniz, letter to Thomas Burnett (1695), A I, 11, op. cit., pp. 519 ff.
34 Leibniz, to Burnett, Ger III, p. 302.
39 Leibniz, Monadology, prop. 48.

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Same as note 37 (supra).


Ibid.


Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit., ch. 31.

Ibid.


Leibniz, Méditation on justice, op. cit., p. 39.


Leibniz, revision note for the Nova Methodus (1667, 1690), Loemker vol. I, p. 556.


Leibniz, letter to Burnett, Ger. III, p. 315.


Leibniz, Theodicy, op. cit., II, 183.


Leibniz, to Burnett (1707), Ger. III, p. 315.

Plato, Republic, esp. Bks IV and VII; See also Meno 82 b ff.

Leibniz, to Remond (1715), Ger. III, p. 637.

Leibniz, to Burnett, Ger. III, p. 264.

Plato, Euthyphro, 10 d-e.

Leibniz, Méditation, op. cit., p. 39.

Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis, I, I, x.

Leibniz, to Burnett, Ger. III, p. 304.


Leibniz, to Burnett, Ger. III, p. 207.

72 Ibid (Codex).
73 Leibniz, to Burnett, Ger. III, p. 261.
74 Leibniz, Monità on Pufendorf, op. cit., Dutens IV, iii, 275. Ff.
75 Leibniz to Burnett (1713), Ger. III, pp. 326-328.
76 Leibniz’ 1714 Vienna lecture was published (from the MS) by the present reviewer in Leibniz und das Judentum, Stuttgart 2008, ed. H. Rudolph (Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft 34).