Leibniz’ central practical idea is that “universal” justice, rightly conceived, is a positive, other-aiding caritas sapientis seu benevolentia universalis (“the charity of the wise, that is, universal benevolence”);¹ that such justice “contains” or encloses all of the moral virtues;² and that it relates to “the common good” or “the perfection of the universe” or “the glory of God”—where these three distinct things are morally equivalent in Leibniz’ usual sense (the sense that in working with wise charity for the common good of humanity one is following the “presumptive will” of God as just monarch of the best of all possible worlds).³ The finest pieces in the new Politische Schriften vol. 6⁴—especially Apologia Catholicae veritatis and Novissima Sinica—throw invaluable light on this Leibnizian jurisprudentia universalis.

These finest pieces, indeed, help us to recover a tradition of thinking about justice which (since the eighteenth century) has largely disappeared from view: the tradition which defines justice as positive love and benevolence and “charity” and generosity, not as merely following authoritative sovereign law (as in Hobbes’ “legal positivism”)⁵ or negatively “refraining from harm” (the neminem laedere which is the lowest degree of Roman law⁶). There is (or rather was) a tradition which one can (roughly) call “Christian-Platonic,” which is to be found in Augustine, Dante, Shakespeare and Leibniz (inter alia)—and, in a proto-Leibnizian way, in Cicero’s insistence on justice as caritas naturalis [natural charity] “between good men” (in De Finibus and De Natura Deorum⁷)—which claims that justice should not content itself with mere law-observance (since law can be unjust), should not content itself with avoiding injury, but that love and charity as the first of the social virtues should be “ascended” to and embraced (through the “sublimated Platonic erotism” of Euthyphro, Phaedrus, and Symposium⁸) in a completely adequate theory of justice. This Platonic-Christian tradition comes out in its first full form in Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana I, 27/28, with its notion that the “just” person will feel “ordered” or measured love which is proportional to the moral perfection of fellow men⁹—here St. Paul (I Corinthians xiii, “the greatest of these is charity”) supplies the element of love, and Plato supplies the mathematizing-geometrizing
notions of order, measure and proportion (especially in the *Philebus*); it continues in Dante’s notion of loving ascent to a *Paradiso* which embraces Justinian and “higher” Roman justice (Canto VI, “so much does living justice sweeten our affection that we cannot ever then take on the ways of wickedness”); it expands in Portia’s eloquent speech in *The Merchant of Venice* Act IV (“though [legal] justice be thy plea, consider this, that in the course of justice none of us should see salvation: we do therefore plead for mercy”), and in Isabella’s speeches in *Measure for Measure* privileging charity and mercy and generosity over sovereignty and the letter of the law; and it culminates in Leibniz’ great synthesizing-recuperative effort, at the dawn of the Enlightenment, to say that justice rightly understood is *caritas sapientis seu benevolentia universalis*, “the charity/love of the wise, that is universal benevolence.”

(That Leibniz shores up *justitia caritas sapientis* through constant invocations of “wise love” in Plato, Cicero, St. Paul, St. John, and Augustine, is well-known; what is less familiar is his appeal to Dante in *De Tribus Iuris Naturae et Gentium Gradibus*, “On the three gradations of natural law and the law of nations,” in which Leibniz translates into Latin a characteristic line from *Paradiso* XII, 3, “Those who guide themselves very much toward justice will shine like the stars”—since they are “those who love.”)

We are reminded of all this by the appearance of *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, with which Dr. Hartmut Rudolph retires from the editorship of Reihe IV of the Academy Edition—after fourteen years of dedicated and enlightened service which have yielded three large and remarkable volumes of Leibniz’ political, moral, religious, and jurisprudential writings.

**I. Apologia Catholicae Veritatis—and contra Pascal**

For Leibniz’ practical philosophy (including moral theology as the “divine jurisprudence” of “the republic of the universe”) the most important single piece in the *Politische Schriften* vol. 6 is the 1685 *Apologia Catholicae Veritatis*—which now appears among the *Nachträge* at the end of the new volume because a substantial part of the *Apologia* was first published (from the Hannover manuscript) in *Politische Schriften* vol. 3 (Berlin 1986), under the title *De Schismate*, but without its crucial opening pages (LH I 7, Bl. 9-10), which are presently restored to their correct introductory place. (The *Apologia* is one of many pieces from the period 1683-86 which are concerned with Leibniz’ life-long project for the charitable...
The hitherto “missing” opening pages of the Apologia are extremely important, for they reveal Leibniz’ view that schism within the spiritual body of the church is fatal to charitable social unity: here Leibniz obviously follows I Corinthians xii-xiii, in which St. Paul presents caritas as both the highest of the theological virtues (“the greatest of these is charity”) and as the sovereign antidote to any schismatic division in which some parts of the body say “I have no need of you” to the other parts.19

Charity is the highest precept . . . Nothing, however, is more adverse to charity than schism, which dissolves the unity of the body of Christ, and extinguishes fraternal love, and fights against the fundamental laws of divine government. What in a commonwealth [Respublica] is rebellion, in the Church [Ecclesia] is divisive schism.20

Nor is this only an “ancient,” Roman (Pauline) problem: the recent rebellion and schism of the Thirty Years’ War in the “Holy Roman Empire” of Germany, Leibniz adds, brought about “misery, crime, pestilence, famine and war” in place of “loving Church concord.”21 And that violence attacks the precept that “charity must prevail over all other considerations in the world” (Leibniz to Bossuet’s friend Mme. de Brinon, 169422).

Leibniz’ privileging of charity, while principally Pauline and Johannine (“a new law”), is also Ciceronian and jurisprudential (an old law)23— as the Apologia makes clear by lauding Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, the anti-Epicurean work in which the greatest of all Roman jurisconsults lamentingly asks, “Is there no caritas naturalis between the good?”24 And Leibniz’ Ciceronianism is probably what leads him to decry “rebellion” not just in Ecclesia but in Respublica (Ecclesia est quasi Respublica sacra25), as parallel uncharitable attacks on “divine” governance (echoing Cicero’s criticism of Marc Antony as a “monstrously uncharitable” republic-destroyer in De Officiis26). For Leibniz, one recalls, agreed with Erasmus that Cicero merited “salvation” for having said, in the Quaestiones Tusculanae, that “the wise will experience love”—as “our Plato” had already insisted in Phaedrus and in Symposium.27

It’s worth pointing out that when Leibniz says, in the “new” opening lines of the Apologia, that schism uncharitably “fights against the fundamental laws of divine government,” he is re-locating and re-writing and amplifying a passage which had earlier been buried unobtrusively in the center of the text;28 Leibniz transferred (and transformed) this passage from its inconspicuous place to the “new”
beginning of the whole Apologia, and enriched it by saying that schism not only destroys “fraternal love” and the “unity” of Christianity, but also annihilates divine “government” through “fundamental law” itself. (But what “law” is “fundamental” (foundational) in Leibniz’ account of jurisprudentia universalis? Caritas sapientis, which if truly universal “governs” God as well as men.29)

Here a comparison of the original, “buried” text with Leibniz’ definitive re-working of these lines (to serve as the new opening of the Apologia) will be illuminating. In the original text (Bl. 14 verso), Leibniz had urged that “…nihil magis caritate Christianae contrarium esse, quam schisma, quod fraternem amorem extingit, unitatemque Ecclesiae solvit.”30 But in the new, re-worked version which now opens the Apologia, Leibniz revised words are these:

Nihil magis caritati adversum est quam schisma, quod unitatem corporis Christi solvit, et fraternem amorem extingit, et Divinae gubernationis fundamentales leges oppugnat.31

Here Leibniz (to use a good Hegelianism) “cancels and preserves”32 his original thought: in the “new” version schism damages not “the unity of the Church” but “the unity of the body of Christ” (an ironic, “ecumenical” expansion); in this version it is not “Christian” charity but caritas (simpliciter) which is at risk (not just Paul but Cicero); but above all in the “new” version Leibniz adds to the list of schism-victims the “fundamental laws of divine government.” Schism now uncharitably opposes not just “fraternity” and “unity” but divine law itself. And therefore the definitive re-working is much more effective and complete than the buried original: God as legislator joins Christ and fellow-men in being unjustly endangered.33

If on its positive side Leibniz’ practical thought rests on a “universal” charity that should equally terminate doctrinal disputation, end schism, restore the respublica Christiana, revive Ciceronian iurisprudentia, shape the benevolent domestic policies of princes,34 and even animate God in creating the “best of all possible worlds” from a range of logically possible ones35—as the Apologia reveals—on its negative side it is colored by its ever-growing hostility to “Hobbism” and “Spinozism.” To restore Christian unity and charitable concord, Leibniz was willing to countenance fairly heterodox religious and moral views; but Hobbism and Spinozism were (the Apologia urges) “opinions worse than any heresy”—opinions through which not just Christianity but “every religion is made to fall” (“this gangrene spreads itself more and more”).36 (At Bl. 16 recto Leibniz even numbers Spinoza among “the newest of all atheists” who “wreck” divine justice.37) Leibniz’ real worry is not over “libertines” who err through mere “lightness of mind,” but over “pseudo-phi-
As a Platonic believer in uncreated eternal verities, Leibniz had always been distressed (as even the Cartesian Malebranche had been) by Descartes’ notion in the *Reply to the Six Objections* that God creates even logical and mathematical (as well as moral) truth; and in Spinoza’s *Ethics* he saw a dangerous extension of this Cartesian voluntarism. In Spinoza, Leibniz complains in the *Apologia*, everything is established by a blind “decision of will, from which it follows that the object of the divine will is not good and that the object of the divine intellect is not true” (*nec objectum voluntatis divinae esse bonum, nec objectum intellectus divini esse verum*). But it is “the most serious error” to believe that “the nature of the true depends upon the divine will;” here “becoming” (Creation in time) must yield to Parmenidean changeless Being, or else “Pyrrhonism” will be the morally fatal result.

To be sure, for Leibniz, the eternal verities must be grounded in the eternal divine mind (in which they are “imbedded”), but an eternal ground is not a temporal cause. For Leibniz “all reality must be founded on something existent,” and even the eternal verities of ethics and mathematics must be coeternal with an actual God who “finds” these verities in his essence (as Leibniz argues at length in *Nouveaux Essais IV*, x-xi). This makes God necessary for, though not the cause of, the truth of the eternal verities; as Leibniz said in his *Notes on Spinoza’s Ethics*,

> Even if we concede that the essence of things cannot be conceived without God…, it does not therefore follow that God is the cause of the essence of things;… for a circle cannot be conceived without a center, a line without a point, but the center is not the cause of the circle nor the point of the cause of the line.

Turning in the *Apologia* to Hobbes, whose doctrine of unaccountable divine “irresistible power” he always lumped with Thrasyemachus’ views in the *Republic* (“*Plato Hobbesianam doctrinam eleganter exhibet, de rep. Lib. 2*”), Leibniz grants that Hobbes is “a man of some ingenuity and of acute eloquence” who is “not to be despised when talking of civil matters” (*in rebus civilibus non contemnendus*) but whose “crass errors in mathematics” (let no one ignorant of geometry enter here!) have shown that he is “a man little capable of profound meditation”—as evidenced by Hobbes’s view that “all substance is body.” Here Leibniz’ more-than-vestigial Platonism shines through variously: to be guilty of “crass errors” (vain circle-squaring) in geometry is morally problematical if even Meno’s slave “sees” virtue as he sees the Pythagorean theorem, and if harmony (for Leibniz as

...
for the *Republic*, Book IV) links eternal mathematical verity to psychology, ethics, politics, and cosmology by instantiating mathematical relationships in an available (here “audible”) pre-established form—with harmony ever-expanding in concentric circles from the well-tuned psyche to the polis to the kosmos. As Leibniz urged in a letter of 1696 to Electress Sophie of Hannover,

> the eternal truths are the fixed and immutable point on which everything turns. Such is the truth of numbers in arithmetic, and of figures in geometry.

That postulated, it is well to consider that order and harmony are also something mathematical and which consist in certain proportions; and that justice being nothing else than the order which is observed with regard to the good and evil of intelligent creatures, it follows that God, who is the sovereign substance, immutably maintains justice and the most perfect order which can be observed.\(^48\)

To fit Christian caritas and bona voluntas into this particular kosmos admittedly taxed Leibniz’ ingenuity: if charity can be viewed as a demi-Platonic erotic “ascent” from the concupiscent love of bodies to disinterested love of eternal verity, to being “in love with the eternal,”\(^49\) the “will” is both hard to incorporate into the Platonic notion that “knowledge is virtue”\(^50\) (and that akrasia is a fiction\(^51\)) and difficult to reconcile with Leibniz’ own belief that the eternally-given “complete concept” of a person merely unfolds in time.

Hobbes, the Apologia allows, is “not to be despised” (a left-handed compliment) when speaking of “civil matters,” but he will never uncover a universal jurisprudence as geometrically necessary as the “absolutes” of Plato’s *Phaedo*.\(^52\) That is partly because his notion that “all substance is body” destroys the autonomy of the mind that Plato and Aristotle had first demonstrated (“Plato explains divinely well incorporeal substances distinct from matter and ideas independent of the senses,” but Hobbes by contrast speaks “as if it were possible to derive memory, intellect, will and consciousness from [bodily] magnitude, shape and motion alone.”)\(^53\) For Plato and Leibniz (and then later for Kant) *Leviathan*’s notion that “there is no conception in a man’s mind” that has not “been begotten upon the organs of sense” by the pressure of “outward objects”\(^54\) makes moral ideals (including Hobbes’s own) literally inconceivable. (Whether Hobbes can account for the conceivability of the “oughtness” of covenant-keeping which he insists on in *Leviathan*, ch. 14, is doubtful.)\(^55\) In reading the “new” Apologia one appreciates afresh George Kelly’s insistence that one of Leibniz’s greatest contributions was to convey a chastened Platonism into the modern world for the use of Kant\(^56\)—in the moral sphere the

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greatest “idealist” since Plato himself. And in finally having available the restored opening pages of the *Apologia*, one can now see Leibniz’ argument that “in the new philosophy which flourishes among the French, English and Dutch” there is not only “*impietas et atheismus*” from which “superstition and barbarism” may be born, but broader social danger as well: “nothing is more adverse to the good of the human race and to the progress of the sciences” [Bl. 9 verso] than the “willful” modernity which pays “no attention at all” to the “intimations of Platonic and peripatetic philosophy.”57

Since “the charity of the wise” is Leibniz’s most distinctive contribution to political and moral philosophy58 and since intelligent benevolence is obviously intuitively attractive, a further word on this point may be of use. To be sure, one can wonder how successfully Leibniz makes his case for a “universal” justice so conceived: one might think that a truly charitable God would simply contemplate his own perfection *ad infinitum* (in the manner of Aristotle’s divinities)59 and not create a finite world which, though it may be “best,” cannot be good (and is in fact riddled with moral, physical, and metaphysical evil, on Leibniz’s own account);60 and one can wonder whether human beings as conceived by Leibniz can act with more “wise charity,” whether Sextus Tarquinius “could have” refrained from the rape of Lucretia (since he was “wicked from all eternity” (*Théodiceé* III, 416).61

But if one provisionally brackets these theological and metaphysical worries, the notion of *caritas sapientis* is among the more appealing moral theories.

Leibniz’s *version* of charity is nonetheless peculiar to him, as emerges most clearly in brief contrast with Pascal’s *Pensées*—since a small essay in the new *Politische Schriften* vol. 6 treats Pascal as a man “of great force of mind” whose “scrupulousness” drove him “almost to madness” in his effort to “sound the depths of religion” (c. 1684-1698).62 For Pascal men live in three “orders” simultaneously: the lowest order, that of the “flesh,” is miserable and requires constant *divertissement* to al- lay reflection and despair; the middle order, that of mind or esprit, encompasses intellectual activities (including Pascalian geometry); the highest order is that of charity or *la volonté* and is “infinitely” separated not just from “mind” (which at least knows its finite misery)63 but even more decisively from the flesh (which is mindless matter). Now what is characteristic of Pascal is that he consigns politics wholly to the lowest, fleshly order: it is simply a matter of power, force and useful illusions64 (“three degrees of latitude overturn the whole of jurisprudence”);65 but love is saved for the saved, a body “full of thinking members” held together by the spiritual gift of *la charité*.66 Pascal drives to brilliant extremes mere fleshly
politics and supernatural caritas: they are separated by a fearful infinity ("the eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me"),\textsuperscript{67} and Christian love has no effect on a carnal sphere in which "force is Queen."\textsuperscript{68} Politics is part of a fallen nature, but supernatural grace is needed for the infinite ascent to charity: when Pascal called himself an "Augustinian," as did all Jansenists, he knew whereof he spoke.\textsuperscript{69}

By contrast Leibniz strives to close up the "infinite distance" separating politics and charity: politics, "mind" and caritas converge in a kind of synthetic middle. No doubt this accounts for Leibniz’s collapsing of everything that Pascal tried to keep infinitely distanced, as one of Leibniz’s letters from 1697 (to Thomas Burnett) shows clearly:

...the fine accomplishments of M. Pascal in the most profound sciences [mathematics and geometry] should give some weight to the Pensées which he promised on the truth of Christianity.... [But] besides the fact that his mind was full of the prejudices of the party of Rome... he had not studied history or jurisprudence with enough care... and nonetheless both are requisite to establish certain truths of the Christian religion.\textsuperscript{70}

Evidently Leibniz either missed Pascal’s point altogether or (more likely) thought it was wholly misconceived. For Leibniz “universal” jurisprudence and universal religion are grounded in the same rational “eternal verities,” while for Pascal the impotence of reason (as revealed by Montaigne in the Essais)\textsuperscript{71} drives one to fideism. For Pascal, St. Paul was right to mock Greek philosophia ("where is the wise?") and to cling to “faith, hope, charity, these three.”\textsuperscript{72} Leibniz had an equal reverence for Greek philosophy and for Pauline charity, as is clearest in his great Vienna lecture of 1714, “On the Greeks;”\textsuperscript{73} but his synthetic moderation certainly made him incapable of appreciating Pascal’s tortured extremism. Indeed Leibniz, who maintained that “men usually hold to some middle way,"\textsuperscript{74} would have approved Apemantus’s remark to the protagonist of Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens: “The middle of humanity thou never knewest, but the extremity of both ends.” [IV, iii, 300-301]. The Leibnizian fusion of Greek philosophia and Christian caritas, linking Athens and Jerusalem (contra Tertullian and also Pascal) comes out in a characteristic paragraph which Leibniz wrote for the Journal des Scavans in 1696:

...Our perfection consisting in the knowledge and in the love of God, it follows that one advances in perfection in proportion as one penetrates the eternal verities, and as one is zealous for the general good. Thus those who are truly enlightened and well-intentioned work with all their power for their
own instruction and for the good of others; and if they have the means they strive to procure the increase of human enlightenment, Christian virtue, and the public happiness. This is the touchstone of true piety.75

II. Novissima Sinica (“Latest News from China”)

The most-anticipated piece in Politische Schriften vol. 6 is surely Novissima Sinica, “Latest News from China” (1697), the remarkable work which has been receiving ever-increasing attention during the past decade—beginning with the international conference in Berlin in 1997 to mark the 300th anniversary of the first publication (organized by Hans Poser and Wenchao Li at the Technische Universität76), continuing with the publication of the Berlin conference papers in 2000 (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 33),77 and culminating in the Beijing Conference in 2005 on “Leibniz’ Political Philosophy and his Novissima Sinica” (to mark the first Chinese edition of the “Latest News”).78

The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica (the only part wholly by him)79 contains an important but highly compressed and abbreviated quintessence of his theory of justice or jurisprudence universelle—a version so compressed and abbreviated, indeed, that one must have a broader and fuller understanding of this universal jurisprudence before one can entirely appreciate what Leibniz has to say about charity, about Platonism, and about geometry in the Novissima Sinica itself. Above all, one wants to know: why should Leibniz, in the key paragraph of the Preface to Novissima Sinica, describe the Chinese emperor as just and charitable and as a (more or less) Platonic geometer who is as wise as he is charitable? And why should Leibniz contrast this wisely charitable Chinese ruler with the Pontius Pilate who irresponsibly said, “What is truth?”, and then permitted the judicial murder of the very Christ who did most to make charity and justice coextensive—by saying, “A new law I give unto you, that ye love one another”?80 The wise course, therefore, is to throw enough light on Leibnizian universal jurisprudence (in general) to make his moral-political utterances in Novissima Sinica intelligible (in particular).

Leibniz understood justice (as was seen earlier in Apologia Catholicae veritatis) not just in terms of wisdom and of Platonic geometrizing “eternal verity,” but in terms of charity and benevolence as well. And that is why he always defined justice as “the charity of the wise”. “The proper treatment of justice and that of charity cannot be separated”, he urged in one of his earliest jurisprudential writings.

Neither Moses, nor Christ, nor the Apostles nor the ancient Christians regulated
justice otherwise than according to charity … (and) I, too, after having tried countless definitions of justice, finally felt myself satisfied only by this one; it alone I have found universal and reciprocal.\(^8\)

Charity is a “universal benevolence, which the wise man carries into execution in conformity with the measures of reason, to the end of obtaining the greatest good.”\(^8\)

What is essential, for Leibniz, is that Christian charity and Platonic wisdom be in equilibrium:

General benevolence is charity itself. But the zeal of charity must be directed by knowledge so that we do not err in the estimation of what is best: since in consequence wisdom is the knowledge of the best or of felicity, we cannot perhaps better capture the essence of justice than if we define it as the charity which resides in the wise.\(^8\)

In the history of philosophy the idea that the concept of justice, as an “eternal verity,” is not a mere adjunct of power, that it is an idea whose necessary truth is at least analogous of the truths of mathematics and logic, is commonly associated with Plato. Now while it is not true that Leibniz was a Platonist in any doctrinaire sense, he did agree with Plato on many points of fundamental importance. “I have always been quite content, since my youth,” he wrote to Rémond in 1715 (in a letter describing his own early self-education), “with the moral philosophy of Plato, and even in a way with his metaphysics; for those two sciences accompany each other, like mathematics and physics.”\(^8\)

Leibniz, indeed, was Platonic not only in the way he conceived the concept of justice, but even in some of his more practical political opinions: he always urged, for example, that “following natural reason, government belongs to the wisest.”\(^8\)

It is a standard Platonic method (and one much appreciated by Leibniz) to throw light on morally problematical and contested notions, such as justice and virtue, by attempting to relate them to (or sometimes indeed even to equate them with) the necessary truths of mathematics and geometry which all rational beings see in the mind’s eye, and certainly do not learn from the empirical observation of mere phenomena. That is clear in the *Phaedo*, where all “absolute” ideas are placed on a footing of logical equality: “absolute goodness,” “absolute beauty,” and “absolute (mathematical) equality” are mentioned in one single breath.\(^8\) But in some ways the most striking example of the Platonic method is in the *Meno*, where a discussion between Socrates and Meno over the nature of virtue gets hopelessly bogged down until Socrates takes aside Meno’s utterly uneducated slave and shows (in effect) that *any* rational being has within him (what we would now call) a priori
knowledge of mathematical and geometrical truth which cannot be learned, but which can be drawn out and brought to full consciousness by Socratic probing:

Socrates: “What do you think, Meno? … These (geometrical) opinions were somewhere in him, were they not?”
Meno: “Yes”
Socrates: “… At present these opinions, being newly aroused, have a dream-like quality. But if the same questions are put to him on many occasions and in different ways, you can see that in the end he will have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody’s … This knowledge will not come from teaching, but from questioning. He will recover it for himself.\(^{87}\)

After Socrates draws this pure rational knowledge from Meno’s slave, the conversation turns from geometry back to virtue; and we now learn (\textit{Meno} 89a. ff.) that virtue is wisdom—much as mathematics and geometry are wisdom. The very structure of the \textit{Meno}—first virtue, then geometry, then virtue again—makes no sense at all unless Plato is trying to suggest that moral knowledge is logically like mathematical-geometrical knowledge: necessary, universal, eternal, not subject to Heraclitean flux, loved by the gods (who do not cause it in time), and so on.

Leibniz’ demi-Platonism—his tendency to say, in the matter of the \textit{Phaedo} and the \textit{Meno}, that all absolute ideas are on a plane of logical equality (reason-provided, not learned from phenomena, universal, changeless)—is clear from the earliest period of his life to the latest; it is evident, for example, in the \textit{Elements of Law and Equity} which he wrote in 1669-70 (at the age of twenty-three).

The doctrine of law [right] belongs to those sciences that are not built on experiments but on definitions, not on the senses but on demonstrations according to reason; it deals with questions, as we say, of law and not of fact (\textit{juris non facti}). Since justice consists in a certain harmony and proportion, its meaning remains independent of whether anybody actually does justice to others, or conversely, is treated justly. The same holds for numerical relationships…Hence it is not surprising that the propositions of these sciences possess eternal truth.\(^{88}\)

And these mathematical and jurisprudential “sciences,” he adds, “also do not take their point of departure from the senses, but from a clear and distinct intuition or, as Plato called it, Idea, a word which itself signifies discernment or definition.”\(^{89}\)

This notion of an intellectual intuition which yields ethics as well as mathematics Leibniz traces not just to \textit{Phaedo} (and \textit{Euthyphro}), but to \textit{Meno} as well; and he makes it plain in proposition 26 of the \textit{Discourse on Metaphysics} (1686) that
the doctrine of *Meno* is fundamentally correct if that dialogue is purged of certain Pythagorean extravagances.

The mind at every moment expresses all its future thoughts and already thinks confusedly of all that which it will ever think distinctly. Nothing can be taught us of which we have not already in our minds the idea. This idea is as it were the material out of which the thought will form itself. That is what Plato has excellently brought out in his doctrine of reminiscence, a doctrine which contains a great deal of truth, provided that it is properly understood and purged of the error of pre-existence, and provided that one does not conceive of the soul as having distinctly known at some other time what it learns and thinks now.\(^90\)

Plato, Leibniz goes on to say, has confirmed what is true in his position by “a beautiful experiment”: he introduces a boy, Meno’s slave, “whom he leads by short steps to extremely difficult truths of geometry bearing on incommensurables, all this without teaching the boy anything, merely drawing out replies by a well-arranged series of questions.” A purged and chastened version of the *Meno* shows, Leibniz concludes, “that the soul virtually knows those things and needs only to be reminded (animadverted) to recognize the truths.”\(^91\)

Leibniz’s thought is quite inconceivable then, without its almost-dominant Platonic component: he does insist, after all, that “the doctrine of Plato concerning metaphysics and morality … is holy and just,” and that “everything he says about truth and the eternal ideas is truly admirable.”\(^92\) If Pauline charity and Augustinian *bona voluntas* are also crucial (not to mention the whole of modern science and mathematics), that just helps to prove the synthetic quality of Leibniz’ thought (which he himself insisted on).\(^93\)

With the Christian-Platonist foundations of Leibniz’ universal jurisprudence roughly in place—with Platonic geometrical wisdom, Pauline love, and Augustinian good will fused in the definition, “Justitia est caritas sapientis seu benevolentia universalis”\(^94\)—one can move on to the way in which Leibniz deploys his *jurisprudence universelle* in the *Novissima Sinica*.

It is usually said that Leibniz’ serious study of Chinese civilization was occasioned (or at least greatly encouraged) by his meeting with Father Claudio Filippo Grimaldi in Rome in 1689.\(^95\) (Father Grimaldi, who was President of the Mathematical Tribunal in Beijing, was one of the leading figures in the Jesuit enterprise of finding an accommodation between Chinese and Western thought.\(^96\)) In section 8 of the Preface to the *Novissima Sinica*, Leibniz says that he remembers Father
Grimaldi’s “telling me in Rome how much he admired the virtue and wisdom” of the Chinese ruler, whose “love of justice” and “charity to the populace” were so meritorious; but he goes on quickly to say that “Grimaldi asserted that the Chinese monarch’s marvelous desire for knowledge almost amounted to a faith,” and that this faith-knowledge was revealed by the fact that (after years of Euclidean study) “the emperor prepared a book on geometry, that he might … bequeath the wisdom he had brought into his empire as an inheritance to his realm, having in view the happiness of his people even in posterity.” There immediately follows a Platonic passage, clearly traceable to the virtue-geometry linkage in the *Meno*, in which knowledge of geometry (as something “amounting to a faith”) is crucial:

Now geometry ought not to be regarded as the sphere of workmen but of philosophers; for, since every virtue flows from wisdom, and the spirit of wisdom is truth, those who thoroughly investigate the demonstrations of geometers have perceived the nature of eternal truth, and are able to tell the certain from the uncertain; other mortals waver amid guesses, and, not knowing the truth, almost ask with (Pontius) Pilate, what it is. But there is no doubt that the monarch of the Chinese saw very plainly what in our part of the world Plato formerly taught [in the *Meno*], that no one can be educated in the mysteries of the sciences except through geometry … The strength of our geometry, as soon as it was tested by the King, was so much to his liking that he easily came to believe that those who had learned thus to reason might teach correctly in other things.

Here as in *Meno*, “every virtue flows from wisdom”: a geometry-loving ruler who cannot have absorbed Augustinian grace is nonetheless both just and charitable. In this astonishing part of the *Novissima Sinica*, indeed, one finds *Meno*’s virtual equation of knowledge, geometry, virtue, and justice—and this amounts to the (unorthodox) faith which a Chinese ruler might have. And if that ruler knows eternal truth and is just and charitable, he is (in effect) a better Christian than Louis XIV., the self styled Rex Christianissimus (whom Leibniz called Mars Christianissimus). In the preface to the *Novissima Sinica* all good things—truth, wisdom, Platonic geometry, charity, justice, virtue, popular happiness—are strongly related to one another, if not fully equated. The Chinese ruler is wise, knows the eternal truths; he is just and charitable. But if he is wise and charitable, is that not caritas sapientis? By contrast Pontius Pilate lacks wisdom (“what is truth?) and is neither just nor charitable: he permits the judicial murder of Christ, who did the most to make charity the central virtue on earth. It is no accident that the wisely charitable
virtues of an enlightened ruler—a Platonic geometer—are contrasted with the weak viciousness of Pilate: Leibniz could have pitched upon many bad rulers, but he singled out the one who publicly executed caritas’ embodiment.100

Leibniz doesn’t confine his praise to the charity and the wisdom—caritas sapientis—of the Chinese emperor, however; he finds wise charity and love and benevolence concretely realized in existing Chinese moral and political practices. The Chinese, he urges, “behave to each other so lovingly” that they “despise everything which creates or nourishes ferocity in men”—to the point that, “almost in emulation of the higher teachings of Christ,” they are “averse to war.”101 (And what is the “higher” teaching of Christ, if not “a new law I give unto you, that ye love one another”—from the Gospel according to St. John?102) Indeed Leibniz insists that the Chinese “surpass us (Europeans) in comprehending the precepts of civil life … certainly they surpass us … in practical philosophy, that is in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to present life and use of mortals.”103 Indeed, for Leibniz, “the laws of the Chinese … are directed to the achievement of public tranquility and the establishment of social order.” And that “order” is needed, for … certainly by their own doing men suffer the greatest evils and in turn inflict them upon each other. It is truly said that “man is a wolf to man.” Our folly is indeed great, but quite universal. We, exposed as we are to natural injuries, heap woes on ourselves, as though they were lacking from elsewhere. What harm, then, if some nation has found a remedy [for these evils]? Certainly the Chinese above all others have attained a higher standard. In a vast multitude of men they have virtually accomplished more than the founders of religious orders among us have achieved within their own narrow ranks. So great is the obedience toward superiors and reverence toward elders, so religious, almost, is the relation of children toward parents, that for children to contrive anything violent against their parents, even by word, is almost unheard of, and the perpetrator seems to atone for his actions even as we make a parricide pay for his deed. Moreover, there is among equals, or those having little obligation to one another, a marvelous respect, and an established order of duties.104

By contrast, Leibniz urges, in Europe “respect and careful conversation last for hardly more than the first few days of a new acquaintance … [and soon] circumspection is gladly put away for a sort of freedom which is quickly followed by contempt, backbiting, anger, and afterwards enmity.”105 Then, in section 5 of Novissima Sinica (perhaps fearing that he has uncharitably maligned the Euro-
peans) Leibniz quickly says that “the Chinese do not attain to full and complete virtue” because they lack “heaven’s grace and Christian teaching.” But if their “loving” conduct already manifests “emulation of the higher teachings of Christ,” then surely the (lower) “teachings” which they don’t yet know can’t be as crucial as Pauline love: for “the greatest of these is charity.” Even if they lack faith and grace, they don’t lack the love which matters more.

In the moral-political sphere, then, Leibniz doesn’t have to recommend mere Jesuitical “accommodation” of Chinese practices—for in the practical sphere China is superior. To be sure, we cannot know how far Leibniz really believed in Chinese moral-political superiority; but for practical philosophy it doesn’t matter if he is idealizing China and then using that utopian “ideal type” (in the Weberian sense) to criticize modern European morals—much as Rousseau used “Sparta” to chastise modern Europeans in the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1750), and as Montesquieu used Persia for similar ends in the *Lettres persanes*. For Leibniz’ philosophical purposes, it needs only be (in principle) possible that some human beings be as wise and as charitable as (he says) the Chinese are.

Certainly Leibniz says in the *Novissima Sinica* that the Chinese are “men who have been living well morally”—for they (as a people) are “loving” and “respectful,” and their monarch is “just,” “charitable” and geometrically “wise.” So much is that the case that Leibniz briefly fears for European civilization:

I fear that we may soon become inferior to the Chinese in all branches of knowledge. I do not say this because I grudge them new light; rather I rejoice. But it is desirable that they in turn teach us those things which are especially in our interest: the greatest use of practical philosophy and a more perfect manner of living, to say nothing now of their other arts. Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology. And so I believe that if someone expert, not in the beauty of Goddesses but in the excellence of peoples, were selected as judge, the golden apple would be awarded to the Chinese, unless we should win by virtue of one great but superhuman thing, namely, the divine gift of the Christian religion.

Leibniz was clear, in any case, that what matters most in social life is a charitable and benevolent ruler: it is “necessary,” he urges, in the *Lettre sur l’éducation d’un prince*, that a statesman be “a man of good will, a courageous man, a man of judgment, and an honorable man”—for the *homme de bien* will have “great feelings of...
piety, of justice and charity, and will apply himself strongly to his duty.” Such a statesman, according to the Novissima Sinica, is already at the helm in China—but not in England or in France. Even if Leibniz was idealizing the Chinese and their ruler, that still shows clearly what he admired in the political and moral sphere. And what he admired was wise charity and universal benevolence, whether he found it in Paris, Hannover, Berlin,… or China. (It is a happy coincidence, by the way, that the new editor of Leibniz’ Politische Schriften, Professor Wenchao Li, embodies a “personal union” of Berlin and China; that would certainly have pleased Leibniz himself.)

III. Leibniz’ Notes on William Penn (1695)

A ready and easy way to see how much weight Leibniz gives to enlightened charity in ordinary, everyday life—unlike, say, Bossuet, who limits caritas mainly to the period “before the Fall” —is to examine his remarkable notes on William Penn from 1695 in Politische Schriften vol. 6. In these notes Leibniz does not confine himself to “charity” in a strictly religious sense (though he certainly begins with theology), but branches out to find wise caritas in those beneficent scientific endeavors which advance the general good of the human race. (If, from a Pascalian perspective, this is a diluted and attenuated charity which goes beyond the grace-saved “members” of a church, for Leibniz that is pure gain.)

To be sure, Leibniz begins his Penn notes with Christ himself, and with charity as recommended in the New Testament. After complaining of Penn’s “far-fetched” and “mysterious” language, with its echo of “the cabal,” Leibniz says that “I would not disapprove these ways of making good things valued, if I found them joined to a clear and luminous doctrine, such as was that of Jesus Christ and of the Apostles; and to the practice of a true charity such as was seen in the first Christians.” For Christ teaches that “God has care of everything and that everything is numbered by him, down to our hairs; that those who love him are eternally happy…; that the slightest good will be recompensed, even to a glass of water given through charity to a poor person who is thirsty; and that one must rest on his providence after having satisfied one’s duty.” And when, Leibniz goes on, Christ “urges us to love, above all things, this great God whom he has depicted as so lovable and so good, and our neighbor as ourselves, he draws together theory and practice at once.”

So far the stress is on charity in a sense that would be recognized by St. Paul or St. John, or even Pascal; but then caritas begins to turn into scientia and “the
general good.” “Now that providence has enriched our century through so many new lights which result from the marvelous discoveries which have been made in nature, and which more and more show us its beauty, we should profit from them by applying them to the ideas which Jesus Christ gives us of God.” For nothing “could better mark the divine perfections that the admirable beauties which are found in his works.” Leibniz now goes on to complain that “those who pretend to a greater spirituality, and particularly the Quakers, strive to show distaste for the contemplation of natural truths.” But they should “do just the opposite, if they do not want to sustain our own laziness or ignorance.”

Leibniz then moves on to link up rightly understood love with the science and enlightenment of his own century, saying that “the more one knows nature and the solid truths of the true sciences, which are beams [rayons] of divine perfection, the more one is capable of truly loving God.” Since Christ has “laid the foundations of the love of God, through knowledge common to all men, it is for us to fortify those great ideas from day to day,” through “new natural lights which God has given us expressly for this [purpose], and whose grace works according to the disposition of each one.” And Leibniz adds that “we are ingrates if we do not profit from his benefits.”

Here, rather radically, as so often happens in Leibniz, “grace” and scientific lumière naturelle seem to have blended. (“When God uses the natural dispositions of our mind and the [natural] things which surround us, in order to give enlightenment to our understanding, or warmth to our heart for well-doing, I take that to be grace.”)

To be sure, Leibniz instantly recalls that good practice does not require theory or advanced knowledge: “It is true that religion and piety do not depend at all on the deeper sciences, for it must be available to the simplest. But those to whom God has given the time and the means of knowing him better, and consequently of loving him with a more enlightened love, must not neglect the occasions for it, and by consequence the study of nature.” Those obscurantists who “try to distance men” from such study “on the pretext of certain illuminations which they vaunt, and which consist only in the over-heated imagination, make us leave what is solid for chimeras, and flatter our negligence.”

In this paragraph, love is at its best when it is “enlightened”: caritas and la lumière illuminate each other. And in the very next paragraph, advanced theory and good practice come back together: “The knowledge of the greatness of God and the traces of his goodness and of his wisdom consisting principally in the contemplation of the marvelous order which is revealed in all things in proportion as one penetrates
to the bottom” it is clear that the love of God (and of the divine order which results there from) “makes it the case that we too shall strive to conform ourselves to this order, and to that which is the best.” Leibniz goes on to urge that “the wise are not at all discontented with that which has come to pass, knowing well that it cannot fail to be the best,” but they nonetheless “strive to make the future . . . as good as possible, knowing that if we fail in this the general order or the harmony of things will lose nothing, but it will be we who shall lose because we shall have less connection [rapport] to it.”¹¹⁷

And in the final page of the Penn notes, all of Leibniz’ concerns—theology, charitable practice, scientific advance, enlightenment, the imitatio Dei—come together effectively:

The more one loves God, the more one will strive individually to take part in the divine perfections which are spread out in things, and above all in the happiness of souls, which are the best beings which we know, by contributing to our own instruction and to that of others. For all of true happiness consists only in a perpetual progression of joys coming from celestial love or form the contemplation of the true beauties of the divine nature. It is this internal taste and this inexpressible pleasure which arises from knowledge of divine and eternal truth which makes one detach oneself easily from the vanities of the world and from all perishable things; and a person penetrated by all of this will use all of his study solely to spread this happiness to others as well, for it is thus that he takes the greatest part in the general good and in the harmony of this great order.¹¹⁸

The whole of Leibniz is present in these 1695 notes on Penn: they combine his theology (the best), his metaphysics (the perfect), his science (the general good), and his universal jurisprudence (the wisely charitable). No other piece in Politische Schriften vol. 6 is so characteristic of Leibniz.

### IV. Three political pieces, 1694-96

Limited time and space permit only a brief treatment of three further pieces from Politische Schriften vol. 6: the first on the English “Glorious Revolution” (and on “Hobbism”), the second on Pufendorf’s posthumous work concerning reconciliation between Lutherans and Calvinists, the third on the constitutional structure of the Holy Roman Empire (and on the excesses of “Hobbesian” sovereignty).
An important piece dealing with the English “Glorious Revolution,” in the new vol. 6, is a set of notes made by Leibniz in early 1695 on William Sherlock’s *The Case of the Allegiance due to Soveraign Powers*; this set is apparently the forerunner of Leibniz’ more complete and finished commentary on Sherlock written in April 1695, but first published from the Hannover manuscript (by the present reviewer) only in 1973.\(^{119}\) (The April 1695 finished version constitutes the beginning of the well-known correspondence between Leibniz and Thomas Burnett of Kemney.\(^{120}\) 

Sherlock’s *The Case of the Allegiance*, published in 1691, was a defense of the rights of William and Mary to the English throne after the Glorious Revolution of 1688; and since Leibniz concerned himself with the Hannoverian succession to that throne, which finally came about in 1714, it was natural for him to be interested in such a work. Sherlock’s was, however, a rather odd defense—perhaps because he had originally treated William and Mary as usurpers, and afterward changed his mind and his arguments—a defense which rested on a distinction between *de facto* power conferred by God, and *de jure* power authorized by “human” law. (An odd reversal—*de facto* trumps *de jure*.) According to human law, in Sherlock’s view, James II’s title to the English throne was still valid; but since God had seen fit to transfer power from him to William and Mary, his will conferred on them a divine right transcending any mere legal right. His whole perspective was concisely summarized in a single paragraph:

> If then he who has the Legal Right may not be our King, and he who has not, may; when any such case happens, we must pay our allegiance to him who is King, though without a legal right; not to him who is not our King, though it is his [legal] right to be so. And the reason is very plain, because allegiance is due only to God’s authority, not to a bare legal title without God’s authority; and therefore must be paid to him who is invested with God’s authority . . . that is, to the actual King.\(^{121}\)

To those who would call this “Hobbism,” Sherlock maintained, the appropriate rejoinder was that while in Hobbes “irresistible” power in itself gives a “Right to Dominion” (*Leviathan* ch. 31), in Sherlockism the possession of power does not constitute right but is only “a certain sign to us, that where God has placed and settled the Power, he has given the Authority” as well.\(^{122}\)

Leibniz’ opinion of Sherlock’s work was not very high: he was an “able and eloquent” man, Leibniz allowed, but did not always “take the trouble to form distinct ideas;” as a result *The Case of the Allegiance* was “subject to a number of difficulties.”\(^{123}\) But those very difficulties gave Leibniz an opportunity to draw up
an exposition of his own views on the distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* power, on the relation of political allegiance to the “security” provided by the state, and (above all) on “Hobbism.”

As might be expected, Leibniz uses his April 1695 finished commentary on Sherlock (now also in AI, 11, no. 349) partly to mount a familiar attack on Hobbes:

The author [Sherlock] refutes Hobbes in the eighth proposition, for having said that God has a right over all things in virtue of his omnipotence; instead of which the author believes that the sovereign right of God is based on his having created things. It seems to me that neither [argument] suffices, and that the universal right of God is based not only on the sovereign power but also on the sovereign wisdom which he possesses: which makes it such that it is madness not to obey him. Now I have noted elsewhere that justice is based on wisdom.\textsuperscript{124}

This echoes Leibniz’ *Codex Iuris Gentium* of 1693 (in which *iustitia est caritas sapientis*), and it foreshadows Leibniz’ 1700 *Observationes de Principio Iuris*: neither Hobbesian “irresistible” power nor “Lockean” creation can underpin universal jurisprudence; only the “sovereign” Platonic “wisdom,” which then becomes half of “wise charity,” can do so.\textsuperscript{125} Once again, then, the *caritas* which is at the heart of the *Apologia Catholicae veritatis*, of the Preface to *Novissima Sinica*, and of the notes on William Penn, rises up against Hobbes: *caritas* overwhelms *potestas*—as it most famously does in *Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice* from 1703 (in which Hobbes=Thrasymachus and Leibniz=Plato).\textsuperscript{126}

The “new,” early-1695 Sherlock notes in *Politische Schriften* Vol. 6 contain an interesting variation on Leibniz’ usual anti-Hobbism: in the early-1695 version Leibniz merely notes that Sherlock himself rejects the notion that “his doctrine is an Hobbesianism,” that while Hobbes “establishes right only on power,” Sherlock by contrast says that “God is the master because he made the world.”\textsuperscript{127} But in early 1695 Leibniz says nothing against either Hobbesian “power” or Lockean/Sherlockian “creationism”: here the finished version of April 1695 will be much more critical (insisting on *sapientia* and hinting at *caritas*). And this is why both of Leibniz’ Sherlock-pieces from the first half of 1695 should be read together: each supplements the other, and gives us a fuller view.

If Leibniz viewed Hobbes as a brilliantly wayward, sometimes-dangerous genius,\textsuperscript{128} by contrast he treated his German colleague Samuel Pufendorf with contempt (“not much of a lawyer and even less of a philosopher”\textsuperscript{129}). In *Politische Schriften*
vol. 6 one finds Leibniz’ (characteristically hostile) comments on Pufendorf’s posthumous irenical effort, *Ius Feciale Divinum*\textsuperscript{130}: indeed Leibniz complains that while “one would have expected that he [Pufendorf] would propose some considerable expediens to conciliate at least the Reformed [“Calvinists”] with the gentlemen of the Confession of Augsburg [“Lutherans”],” Pufendorf instead attacks “the doctrine of the Reformed concerning predestination and grace” with “much liberty”—though “one does not see that he has sufficiently studied these matters,” that indeed he has written “with as much negligence as boldness.”\textsuperscript{131} (This is uncharitably harsh, given Leibniz’ own frequent animadversions against hyper-Calvinist notions of an extra-rational, even “tyrannical,” “absolute decree” of reprobation—for example in the *Unvorgreifliches Bedencken* of 1698-1702, in which both Calvin and Descartes appear as partisans of arbitrary *stat pro ratione voluntas*\textsuperscript{132}).

Yielding a little, Leibniz goes on to grant that Pufendorf’s books “on modern history are good enough,” and that he “didn’t write badly in Latin;”\textsuperscript{133} but Pufendorf’s celebrated works on legal theory by contrast are much over-rated: “since he had not studied jurisprudence deeply, nor solid philosophy, one finds him rather superficial.”\textsuperscript{134} The “best” that Pufendorf can offer, Leibniz goes on, “is a paraphrase of the sentiments of Grotius, and sometimes of Hobbes”—and this “more popular manner” might be of some use to “the young who study in the universities of Germany”\textsuperscript{135} (damnation with faint praise!). And all of this hostility to Pufendorf anticipates the great *Monità (Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf, 1706)*, which became disseminated and celebrated through Barbeyrac’s French translation, and which summarized Leibnizian *iurisprudentia universalis* with compact eloquence:

Neither the norm of conduct itself, nor the essence of the just depends on God’s free decision, but rather on eternal truths, objects of the divine intellect, which constitute, so to speak, the essence of divinity itself; and it is right that our author is reproached by theologians when he maintains the contrary; because, I believe he had not seen the wicked consequences which arise from it. Justice, indeed, would not be an essential attribute of God, if he himself established justice and law by his free will. And, indeed, justice follows certain rules of equality and of proportion [which are] no less founded in the immutable nature of things, and in the divine ideas, than are the principles of arithmetic and of geometry. So that no one will maintain that justice and goodness originate in the divine will, without at the same time maintaining that truth originates in it as well: an unheard-of paradox by which Descartes showed how great can be
the errors of great men; as if the reason that a triangle has three sides, or that
two contrary propositions are incompatible, or that God himself exists, is that
God as willed It so. It would follow from this, too, that which some people
have imprudently said, that God could with justice condemn an innocent per-
son, since he could make it such that precisely this would constitute justice.
Doubtless those who attain to such aberrations do not distinguish justice from
unaccountability [ἀνιπευθυνια]. God, because of his supreme power over all
things, cannot be made to submit his accounts [ἀνυπεύθυνος], inasmuch as
he can be neither constrained nor punished, nor is he required to give reasons
to anyone whomsoever; but, because of his justice, he accomplishes all things
in a way which satisfies every wise man, and above all himself.\textsuperscript{136}

The final political writing (or rather group of related writings) from \textit{Politische
Schriften} vol. 6 to be treated here has to do with the constitutional structure of
the 17\textsuperscript{th}-century \textit{Reich}, and above all with the question where “sovereignty” lay
within so loose and centripetal an empire. The immediate occasion of Leibniz’
1694-96 reflections on this question was the appearance of a now-obscure book,
\textit{Glorwürdiger Adler}, published in 1694 by “Caesareus Turrianus,” against which
Leibniz wrote more than a hundred printed pages (now all in Vol. 6);\textsuperscript{137} ironically,
Leibniz himself had used the pseudonym “Caesarinus Fürstenerius” in his first
sustained treatment of these same matters in 1677, the \textit{De Suprematu Principum
Germaniae}, which ascribed “sovereignty” to the individual members of the \textit{Reich},
while keeping a higher Dantine \textit{Majestas} for the Empire as a whole.\textsuperscript{138}

The most interesting of these 1694-96 writings is called “\textit{Judgment of the Estates
of the Reich Against Turrianus}” (early 1696)—most interesting because most \textit{theo-
retical}. After discussing at some length in the “Judgment” theories of state-form
and sovereignty from Book IV of Aristotle’s \textit{Politics} to Bodin’s \textit{Six Livres de la
république} (1576) and Hobbes \textit{De Cive} (1642) and \textit{Leviathan} (1651)—with unusual
reflections on where the “soul” and the “will” lie in a natural body or in a body-
politic\textsuperscript{139}—Leibniz finally says that “when one applies all of this to the \textit{Römische
Reich}, and considers its fundamental laws [grundt-gesetze] one concludes that it
is truly a state and in no way a simple confederation.”\textsuperscript{140} (But he allows that the
eminent French historian De Thou was right to say that while the \textit{Reich} was “cer-
tainly a state, its like had never been seen in ancient or in modern history.”\textsuperscript{141}

The reason that the \textit{Reich} might be mis-conceived as “a simple confederation”
flows from over-rigid Bodinian-Hobbesian notions of “absolute sovereignty” ("giv-
ing laws and receiving none"); but, beginning with his 1677 activities as “Caesarinus
Fürstenerius,” Leibniz always thought that such “absolute” sovereignty was both illusory and dangerous.

To be sure, Leibniz did believe, with Hobbes, that the state is simply an aggregation, like a herd or an army, and that its unity is found in the unity of its rulership; the doctrine of “substance,” of course, requires that only individuals be real, and thus on this point Leibniz’ metaphysics and politics coincide exactly. A state, like a marble pavement made up of smaller stones, is only an unum per accidens; it is not a true unity, “any more than would be the water of a pond with all the fish it holds, even though all the water and the fish were frozen together.”142 But Leibniz broke with the Hobbesian view of law as the command of an “authorized” sovereign: for him it is the content of law—its charitable promotion of the common good and the “eternal verity” of justice—which matters. (In his pages “Against Turriannus,” Leibniz says that “the general welfare” is the central concern of the state.143)

Leibniz’ treatment of sovereignty was, of course, affected by his being the official apologist for a German principality; indeed the immediate purpose of his writing his main work on sovereignty (the so-called Caesarinus Fürstenerius of 1677) was to show that the minor German princes were as “sovereign” as the kings of France and Spain.144 But he did not have to do violence to his own views of law and of legitimate rule to do this. Throughout his life (but especially in the 1670s) Leibniz clung to the belief that the medieval Majestas of the Holy Roman Empire—perhaps understood only as a court of last resort for all of the “Republic of Christendom”—was better than the modern states-system; and, this being so, he was quite willing to pull down what Bodin and Hobbes had carefully built up. “Sovereign,” Leibniz said in the Entretiens de Philarète et d’Eugène (a French summary of the Caesarinus Fürstenerius), “is he who is master of a territory” and who is “powerful enough to make himself considerable in Europe in time of peace and in time of war, by treaties, arms and alliances.”145 He removed the character of “absolute” supremacy from the concept of sovereignty, making it only a comparative rather than a superlative standard; and, taking the fantastic morcellization and diversity of German political forms into account, urged that it did not matter whether the sovereign “holds his lands as a fief, nor whether he recognizes the majesty of a chief, provided that he be master at home and cannot be disturbed except by arms.”146 Leibniz adhered to this merely descriptive and nonlegal conception of sovereignty long after his hopes of a revived Imperial Majestas, together with his hopes of a reunified respublica christiana, began to wane.
If Leibniz had immediate practical reasons for wanting to weaken the idea of sovereignty, he had more purely philosophical ones as well; and not surprisingly, he began with an attack on Hobbes. “If we listen to Hobbes,” he said in the Caesarinus Fürstenerius, “there will be nothing in our land [the Empire] but out and out anarchy,” for “no people in civilized Europe is ruled by the laws that he has proposed.” Leibniz went on to discuss, with some accuracy, Hobbes’ idea of the war of every man against every man, caused by man’s “natural right” to all things; his conception of the transfer of these rights (save self-defense) to the state, such that (in Leibniz’ words) “each man is understood to will whatever the government or person who represents him wills.”147

Leibniz, having described Hobbes’ political ideas, flatly denied their accuracy. “Hobbes’ fallacy,” he said, “lies in this, that he thinks that things which can entail inconvenience should not be borne at all.” This insistence, according to Leibniz, is “foreign to the nature of human affairs.” He admitted that “when the supreme power is divided, many dissensions can arise; even wars, if everyone holds stubbornly to his own opinion.” But experience, he said, shows that “men usually hold to some middle road, so as not to commit everything to hazard by their obstinacy.”148

Leibniz then turned to an attack on Pufendorf, whom he considered an inferior German version of Hobbes, and who had called the Empire a “political monster” in his De Statu Imperii Germanici.149 “If this is true,” Leibniz retorted, “I would venture to say that the same monsters are being maintained by the Dutch and the Poles and the English, and even by the Spanish and French.” The components of the French state were not managed by “mandates given from the plentitude of power (as they say),” but by “requests, negotiations, and discussions.” “Hobbesian empires,” he concluded, “exist neither among civilized people nor among barbarians, and I consider them neither possible nor desirable—unless those who must have supreme power are gifted with angelic virtues.” Hobbes’ “demonstrations” thus “have a place only in that state whose king is God, whom alone one can trust in all things.”150 (And even in that “state,” as the Theodicy will later show, sovereign power is only the instrument of wise charity.)151

Taking this view of sovereignty, Leibniz could not but reject the Hobbesian doctrine of law as command (hedged round by formal requirements such as promulgation and “authentic interpretation”);152 Leibniz was a natural law theorist (though he usually preferred the term “universal jurisprudence” to natural law) who held that the “fault of those, who have made justice depend on power, is partly a consequence of their confounding right [droit] and law [la loi]. Right cannot be
There are “fundamental maxims constituting the law itself,” Leibniz observed in the *Nouveaux Essais*, “which, when they are taught by pure reason, and do not arise from the arbitrary power of the state, constitute natural law.”

All of these matters come out once again in Leibniz’ writings “gegen Turrianus” from the mid-1690’s (now in *Politische Schriften* vol. 6), but they all go back finally to “Caesarinus Fürstenerius” of 1677. And is it merely accidental that the year 1677 yielded, not just Leibniz’ first large published criticism of Hobbesian “sovereignty,” but also his first rigorous formulation of the definition, *iustitia est caritas sapiens*?

Was it by mere Epicurean “chance” that in 1677 *caritas* and *sapientia* ascended while *potestas* and *voluntas* declined, that the Thrasymachus who had been praised in 1667 (*Nova Methodus*) had become “tyrannical” and proto-Hobbesian only a decade later? If all this was fortuitous, it was an astonishing coincidence.

Though Leibniz wrote “gegen Turrianus” (and still more “gegen Hobbes”), he was by no means merely (or mainly) a Gegner; and one can—and should—end with a characteristically favorable encomium of a great contemporary to whom he felt deeply indebted, namely Christian Huygens. The great Dutch mathematician and astronomer, who had befriended and educated Leibniz in Paris, died in June 1695; Leibniz waited until April 1696 (perhaps for equanimity to return), then wrote a fine Latin memorial-poem, *In Hugenium*—of which he also produced a French prose paraphrase.

In the paraphrase, Leibniz says charmingly that “if those souls which are turned toward the heavens should pass among the stars,” it would be necessary to “give the globe of Jupiter to Galileo…but to leave Saturn to M. Huygens.” For Saturn, Leibniz notes—turning from early modern astronomy to Greek mythology—“reigned during the Age of Gold, and his reign was that of peace and of the sciences.” (“Is it not a strange thing that Messieurs les dieux should learn from us? … To raise oneself to the level of the gods, the true path is that of the sciences (which make us their colleagues); and it is important for our contentment that men know their power, which now goes so far as to give laws to the heavens themselves.”) And peace and science, for Leibniz, were the principal outcomes of the *caritas* and *sapientia* which shaped (or should shape) the jurisprudence of “the republic of the universe”—as Leibniz had already insisted in the *Apologia Catholicae Veritatis*. 
V. Conclusion

Now that *Politische Schriften* vol. 6 has seen the light of day; now that Hartmut Rudolph has earned an honorable retirement, and Wenchao Li is at the helm of Akademie-Ausgabe Reihe IV; one can begin to look forward to *Politische Schriften* vol. 7, which will be dominated by one of Leibniz’ greatest irenical works, the *Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken* of 1698,\(^{160}\) “Unprejudiced Thoughts” on charitable religious reconciliation (which the eminent Leibnizian Paul Schrecker rightly called “*un vrai trésor de philosophie et de théologie*”\(^{161}\)). That is indeed something to look forward to.

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Notes

6 Leibniz, *Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio)*, op. cit., pp. 60ff.
9 St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* (c. 395 A.D.), Book I, ch. 27/xxviii.
15 *Politische Schriften* vols. 4-6, under Hartmut Rudolph, appeared in 14 years’ time; *Politische Schriften* vols. 1-3 took almost 55 years (!).
16 In *Politische Schriften* vol. 5, ed. H. Rudolph et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), No. 70, p. 551 (“De Fine Scientiarum”).
17 For an illuminating account of the vicissitudes surrounding the full publication of the *Apologia*, see the Potsdam editors’ *Stuckeinleitung* at pp. 714-716 of the new *Politische Schriften* vol. 6.
21 Ibid.
23 On Leibniz’ reading of Ciceronian *iurisprudentia*, see the reviewer’s review of *Politische Schriften* vol. 5, ed. H. Rudolph et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004),
26 Cicero, De Officiis, Lib. I, 17, lvii.
27 Cicero, Quaestiones Tusculanae, Lib. 4, xxiv.
28 See the Potsdam editors’ notes to the Apologia, op. cit.
29 By the “moral necessity” which—since reasonable—does not derogate from freedom. (Cf. Leibniz’ fifth letter to Clarke [1716], sec. 7, L 697.).
30 Leibniz, Apologia, op. cit., p. 730. Leibniz struck out this passage, then re-wrote it and placed it at the beginning of the Apologia.
33 Pour ainsi dire.
35 Leibniz, Théodicée, III, pars. 367.
36 Leibniz, Apologia, op. cit. pp. 753-754.
37 Ibid., p. 733.
38 Ibid., pp. 753-754.
40 Leibniz, Apologia, op. cit., p.754.
42 Leibniz, Théodicée, II, pars. 184.
44 Leibniz, “Notes on Spinoza’s Ethics,” in The Philosophical Works of Leibniz,


52 Plato, *Phaedo* 75d, in *Collected Dialogues*, op. cit. Leibniz made his own Latin version of *Phaedo* (together with *Theaetetus*) in 1676.


55 On this point see the reviewer’s “Kant contra Hobbes,” in *Journal of Moral Philosophy* (UK), vol. iii, Spring 2007 (from the 2004 St. Andrews conference on Kant’s *Theory and Practice*).


57 Leibniz, *Apologia*, op. cit.


60 Leibniz, *Théodicée*, op. cit., Book I (passim).

61 Ibid., III, pars. 416. For worries about III, 416, see the reviewer’s “Response to Rutherford” in *The Leibniz Review*, vol. 7, pp. 95f.

62 Leibniz, “De La Mothe de Vayer, de Balzac et de Pascal” (c.1684-1698), in *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, op. cit., p. 709.


64 Ibid., Nos. 294 and 298 (*inter alia*).
65 Ibid., No. 294.
67 Ibid. (Penseés), No. 206.
68 Ibid., No. 311.
70 Leibniz, letter to Thomas Burnett, February 1697), GP III p. 196.
72 St. Paul I Corinthians 1 and 13 (KJV).
74 Leibniz, *Caesarinus Fürstenerius (De Jure Suprematus ac Legationis)*, in *Politische Schriften* vol. 2 (Berlin 1963), op. cit., p. 59.
75 Leibniz, Letter to Étienne Chauvin (For the *Journal des Scavans*, 1696), A I, 11, p. 232.
76 Hans Poser and Wenchao Li are also responsible for the superb edition of Leibniz’ 1716 “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese” (Hannover: Leibniz-Archiv Band 13, 2002).
77 The present reviewer was honored to have his essay, “Leibniz’ Political and Moral Philosophy in *Novissima Sinica,*** appear in *Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa* 33.
78 The present reviewer was honored to have his essay appear in the Proceedings of the 2005 Beijing *Novissima Sinica* conference.
79 The rest of *Novissima Sinica* was simply assembled by Leibniz (mainly from Jesuit accounts of Chinese life).
80 St. John 13:34 (KJV).
82 Leibniz, letter to Antoine Arnauld (1690), Leibniz’ last Arnauld-letter, in Loemker (L), p. 360.
84 Leibniz, letter to Remond (1715) GP III, p. 637.
85 Leibniz, letter to Thomas Burnett (1699), GP III, p. 264.
86 Plato, *Phaedo*, op. cit., 74b-75d. For a wonderful account of Leibniz as a descendant of Plato (*via* Grotius), see Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the*
87 Plato, Meno, in Collected Dialogues, op. cit., 85 b-d.
89 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
93 Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, op. cit., Préface.
94 Leibniz, Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio), op. cit., pp. 60 ff.
95 See D. Cook and H. Rosemont, Introduction to Leibniz’ Writings on China (Chicago and La Salle 1994) (an illuminating essay).
98 Ibid. (“Praefatio”), pp. 368-369 (Cook-Rosemont pp. 50-53).
100 See Leibniz’ letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (1671) in Loemker (L), pp. 496-497.
102 St. John 13:34 (KJV).
103 Leibniz, Novissima Sinica, op. cit., p. 363 (Cook-Rosemont p. 46).
104 Ibid., pp 363-364 (Cook-Rosemont pp 46-47).
105 Ibid., pp 364-365 (Cook-Rosemont pp 47-48).
106 Ibid.
108 Montesquieu, Lettres persanes, in Oeuvres Complètes, ed. D. Oster (Paris 1949),
pp. 112 ff.


112 Leibniz, “Remarques sur le journal du voyage que William Penn a fait” (1696), in *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 338 ff.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.


117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.


120 Ibid.


122 Ibid. (“Sur Sherlock”).

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 See Leibniz’ *Observationes de Principio Iuris* (1700), in Dutens, *Leibniti…Opera Omnia*, op. cit., vol IV, III, pp 270 ff. (See also the reviewer’s lengthy treatment of this work in *The Leibniz Review*, vol. 16, December 2006, pp. 159 ff.).

126 Leibniz, “Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice,” in G. Mollat (ed.) *Rechtsphilosophisches aus Leibznizens Ungedruckten Schriften*, op. cit., pp. 43 ff. (See also the reviewer’s detailed treatment of the “Méditation” in *The Leibniz Review* vol. 13, December 2003—marking the 300th anniversary of this most important of Leibniz’ writings on justice.).
Leibniz, “Sur Sherlock,” in *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, op. cit., p. 103.

128 “Hobbes est plein de bonnes pensées, mais il a coutume de les outrer” (Leibniz to Pierre Coste, GP III, p. 419.).


130 Leibniz, “Sur le livre intitulé *Ius Feciale Divinum* de Pufendorf” (October/November 1695), *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 300-302. (In the same vein see other Leibniz-pieces contra Pufendorf, vol. 6, pp. 300-320, esp. *De Pufendorfii Libro Ius Feciale Divinum.*

131 Leibniz, “Sur le livre ... de Pufendorf,” op. cit., *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, p. 301.

132 Leibniz, “Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken,” in *Textes inédits*, ed. Grua, op. cit., I, pp. 430 ff. (See also the reviewer’s detailed treatment of this work in *The Leibniz Review* vol. 12, December 2002, pp. 107 ff.).

133 Leibniz, “Sur le livre ... de Pufendorf,” op. cit., p. 301.

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid., p. 302. Here Leibniz, as usual, praises *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, “The excellent book of the late M. Grotius.”


137 See *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, pp. 121-238. *(A clear instance of Leibniz’ seizing on a trifling (if massive) book to make serious points.).

138 On this see Patrick Riley, *Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence*, op. cit., ch. 5.


140 Ibid., p. 179: the Reich is “Wahrhafftig ein staat und keines weges eine blosse Confoederation.”

141 Ibid., p. 174.

142 Leibniz, letter to Arnauld, GP II, p. 76.

143 Leibniz, “Judgment...against Turrianus,” in *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
146 Leibniz, *Caesarinus Fürstenerius*, op. cit. ch. XI, p. 57 ff.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
155 Leibniz, letter to Johann Friedrich of Hannover (1677), in G. Grua, *Justice Universelle et Theodicée selon Leibniz* (Paris 1953), ch. V.
158 Leibniz, *In Hugenum* (1696) in *Politische Schriften* vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 619-621.
159 Ibid, p. 622.
160 The *Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken* are already available as a “Vorausedition” on the web-site of the “Leibniz Editionsstelle Potsdam” (Berlin-Bradenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften).