A Conjecture about a Textual Mystery: Leibniz, Tschirnhaus and Spinoza’s *Korte Verhandeling*

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**Abstract**
In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s *Korte Verhandeling* (KV) in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but mainly through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to *Ethics*. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s.

1. Introduction

One would expect a paper about Leibniz and Spinoza’s *Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-being* to be very short indeed. The *Short Treatise* (hereafter KV) was published for the first time in 1862. Only close friends of Spinoza had access to the manuscript. Leibniz was not a close friend of Spinoza. It could thus seem that we should assume the uncomplicated conclusion that Leibniz had no knowledge whatsoever of KV. It however recently dawned upon me that the situation might be a bit more complicated. In this article, I present a conjectural story concerning the transmission and diffusion of KV in the mid-1670s with Leibniz as one of the protagonists. I admit that the conjecture is and remains just that, i.e. a conjecture. Nonetheless, the exercise is instructive and allows pointing to a mystery that needs solving. Moreover, if true, it can shed important new light on the role Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus played in the diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and, finally, help explaining some real oddities in the reception of Spinoza’s philosophy by the young Leibniz.
2. The Mystery

The complications stem from certain remarks occurring in a short report on Spinoza’s philosophy that Leibniz wrote after one or several conversations with Tschirnhaus in Paris, probably some time in the early months of 1676—hereafter I will simply refer to it as “the Report.” It has been known for some time. It was first published in 1889 by Gerhardt in the *Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie*, and reedited the following year by Ludwig Stein as an appendix in his *Leibniz und Spinoza*. Stein used it to bolster his hypothesis of a *Spinoza-freundliche Periode* in Leibniz’s philosophical development. Half a century later, Georges Friedmann discussed the Report in his *Leibniz et Spinoza* from 1946, but dismissed it as a confused mix of poorly formulated Spinozistic ideas and ideas completely foreign to Spinoza’s thinking. Indeed, on the basis of the Report, Friedmann concluded that “Leibniz’s interlocutor has only skimmed through an excerpt from the *Ethics* or only heard about it.” Friedmann interpreted the text in view of supporting his general hypothesis that the young Leibniz, while still hesitant about his own views, never acquired sufficient knowledge of Spinoza’s doctrine to be tempted himself to go in that direction. In 1978, G.H.R. Parkinson returned to the Report. Through a phrase by phrase study systematically comparing Leibniz’s account with Spinoza’s *Ethics*, he attempted to show that Leibniz did in fact obtain sufficient information about Spinoza’s philosophy in the mid-1670s to have been able to evaluate it and, indeed, reject it. Taking into consideration Tschirnhaus’ correspondence with Spinoza, he also showed that Tschirnhaus was in possession of a copy of *Ethics*. I have myself, in my *Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza*, mimicked Parkinson’s reading strategy, but only to reach a somewhat different conclusion. While I follow Parkinson in categorically denying that Tschirnhaus had only “skimmed through” an excerpt of *Ethics*, I also disagree with Parkinson, arguing that while the Report testifies to some knowledge of Spinoza, it still remains fairly imprecise about key Spinozistic doctrines, leaving rather wide margins for creative reinterpretation of what that doctrine consists in.

The analysis I propose in *Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza* is still valid for the purposes it is supposed to serve, namely showing that Leibniz did not know Spinoza’s doctrine sufficiently well to necessarily reject it off hand in 1676, but still well enough to speculate creatively about it. Nonetheless, on closer inspection, the Report contains elements that put into doubt the pertinence of the strategy employed by both Parkinson and myself for evaluating it, namely systematically comparing
with the completed five-part *Ethics*. For it is possible that the relevant comparison in at least some cases is with a different text, namely *KV*. What has brought me to consider this at first sight implausible hypothesis are the first lines of the Report:

[1] Mons. Tschirnhaus m’a conté beaucoup de choses du livre Ms. De Spinoza [. . .]. Le livre de Spinosa sera de Deo, mente, beatitudine seu perfecti hominis idea, de Medicina Mentis, de medicina corporis.

[2] Mons. Tschirnhaus has told me many things about Spinoza’s book in manuscript [. . .]. Spinoza’s book will be about God, mind, blessedness or the idea of the perfect man, on the medicine of the soul, and medicine of the body. It is not clear whether this description and the structure of the “livre de Spinoza” it suggests are merely thematic indications or whether they are supposed to render an actual title. In either case, however, the description only fits the five-part *Ethics* uneasily. In fact, Leibniz’s wording sounds conspicuously like a Latin rendering of the full title of *KV*, i.e. *Korte Verhandeling van GOD, de MENSCH en deszelvs WELSTAND*. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the additional descriptive notion of “the perfect man” strongly evokes *KV*, where Spinoza frequently refers to such a “perfect man” (*volmaakt mensch*)

So here is our true mystery. How are we to account for the fact that a fairly unambiguous allusion to the title of *KV* shows up in this unexpected context? To my knowledge, none of the great specialists on the genesis and transmission of Spinoza’s texts—including Mignini, Steenbakkers, Akkerman and Totaro—discuss this curious aspect of Leibniz’s Report. Mignini, however, considers a parallel case, namely the reference to a work of Spinoza found in the epilogue to Lodewijk Meyer’s *Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres* from 1666—a work which is said to be *de Deo, Anima rationali, summa hominis felicitate*. This description does indeed sound much like the title of *KV*. But it sounds just as much like the “book” Leibniz speaks of in the Report. Now, while Mignini does see a reference to the title of *KV* in Meyer’s epilogue, he suggests that the text in question is fact the early three-part version of *Ethics*, arguing that Spinoza’s friends out of habit continued to speak of the geometrical treatise that is *Ethics* in terms of the title of its first draft, namely the non-geometrical *KV*. In a recent article, Steenbakkers has argued in favor of a similar hypothesis, i.e. that the allusion in Meyer’s epilogue is to the three-part early *Ethics* and not to *KV*, albeit on slightly different grounds. According to Steenbakkers, the allusion cannot be to *KV* because Spinoza had
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definitively abandoned the text sometime around in late 1662 or early 1663. Both explanations appear to me reasonable when it comes to the text by Meyer, who in 1666 had been Spinoza’s friend for many years and had followed Spinoza’s thought through its various developments. My problem is whether similar explanations are available when it comes to Leibniz’s Report.

It seems not. It just appears odd if Tschirnhaus should refer to Ethics following a habit among long-term members of the Spinozistic circles who had followed the elaboration of Spinoza’s philosophy through its different stages. For Tschirnhaus was exactly not one of those long-term members. He only became personally acquainted with Spinoza in 1674 at a time when Spinoza’s work in progress had already been renamed “Ethics” and also undoubtedly taken its final five-part form. But it is unlikely that Tschirnhaus should refer to a five-part work of which he held a copy, i.e. Ethics, in terms of the title of a three-part work, i.e. KV, abandoned by Spinoza more than a decade before Tschirnhaus met him and of which Tschirnhaus did not hold a copy. This leaves open two options: either Tschirnhaus referred vaguely to the content of the five-part Ethics in terms that just coincidentally sound exactly like the title of KV; or he was in fact referring to KV and we have to revise our previous understanding concerning Tschirnhaus’ access to this text. I think the first option is implausible. The problem is that the second option has a pretty wild implication, namely that Tschirnhaus brought a copy of KV with him to Paris.

3. The Conjecture

Let us clarify the situation. First, I am not suggesting that Tschirnhaus held a manuscript copy of KV instead of a manuscript of Ethics. His correspondence with Spinoza contains precise references to Ethics at least up to around the middle of part II. Moreover, the manuscript that Tschirnhaus gave to Nicolas Steno in Rome in September 1677—now published by Pina Totaro and Leen Spruit—was undoubtedly the same manuscript as the one he brought with him from Holland in July 1675, first to London and then to Paris, and that manuscript is of the five-part Ethics, not the early three-part Ethics or KV. Finally, there are elements in Leibniz’s Report that cannot be accounted for except by reference to Ethics. For example, Leibniz reports that “the union of the body arises from a kind of pressure [oriri unionem corporum a pressione quadam].” I have found nothing equivalent in KV. According to Ethics, however, “when a number of bodies, whether of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one
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another [coercentur, ut invicem incumbent] [...] we shall say that those bodies are united with each other and that they all together compose one body or individual [...]”¹⁹ The “constraint” in question here can reasonably be interpreted in terms of the “pressure” mentioned by Leibniz.²⁰ So I will not put into doubt that Tschirnhaus had *Ethics*, that he spoke to Leibniz about it and that Leibniz recorded it. The question is whether it is at all possible that Tschirnhaus also held a copy of KV and whether parts of the information he related to Leibniz was drawn from KV rather than *Ethics*. Besides the Report, I have only scattered circumstantial evidence for this possibility, but here it is.

The manuscript of KV circulated among Spinozists around 1661-1662, but probably also later than that. In his 1704 diary, Gottlieb Stolle reports a conversation he had with the son of Spinoza’s publisher, Jan Rieuwertsz the younger, presumably about KV. Stolle writes:

> According to Rieuwertsz, some friends of Spinoza had copied this manuscript, but it had never been printed, because there was already in print a fine edition of the more orderly Latin version, whereas the work which had been overlooked was written far too freely.²¹

This piece of information is confirmed by the manuscript annotations to Colerus’ *Vie de Spinoza* copied by Monnikhoff and published by Boehmer in 1852:

> One will find among certain amateurs of philosophy a manuscript treatise by Spinoza which, even though it is not in geometrical form like his *Ethics*, nonetheless contains the same thoughts and arguments.²²

One may wonder who were “the friends of Spinoza who had copied the manuscript.” Might Tschirnhaus have been among them? If it appears unlikely, it is not impossible, and these testimonies make it clear that Spinoza’s manuscript continued to circulate in Holland long after Spinoza himself abandoned the text some time around 1662-63.

Next, we know that, in Letter 72, Spinoza rejects a request made by Schuller on Tschirnhaus’ behalf that Leibniz should be allowed to see Spinoza’s writings. Tschirnhaus, replies Spinoza, should wait until he has had “a longer acquaintance and a closer knowledge of [Leibniz’s] character.”²³ This short exchange is the last of several between Schuller, Tschirnhaus and Spinoza concerning the diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy. Thus, already in Letter 63 from July 1675, Schuller alludes to some “instructions” given by Spinoza apparently to the effect of refraining from discussing him or his philosophy with other people.²⁴ In letter 70, the nature of these instructions becomes clearer. Here, Schuller reports that Tschirnhaus had
refrained from mentioning to Huygens the existence of other writings than the book on Descartes and TTP.25 Thus, it seems, Spinoza had cautioned his disciples not to speak about his unpublished works. Now, the “instructions” Schuller refers to may very well have been given orally, but they may also refer to something actually written down. Spinoza’s known writings contain two such “instructions.” The first is in the preface to TTP, where he commends his book to the *philosophe lector* while imploring the “common man” to “neglect [the] book entirely.”26 While this passage may provide some of the rationale for the instructions given to Schuller and Tschirnhaus, it can hardly pass for being those instructions themselves. If, however, we turn to the conclusion of KV, we find a passage that fits the bill perfectly:

[…] as you are also aware of the character of the age in which we live, I would ask you urgently to be very careful about communicating these things to others. I do not mean that you should keep them altogether to yourselves, but only that if you ever begin to communicate them to someone, you should have no other aim or motive than the salvation of your fellow man, and make as sure as possible that you will not work in vain.27

Were these the specific instructions Schuller referred to already in Letter 63? That impression is reinforced by the fact that the request Schuller later makes on Tschirnhaus’ and Leibniz’s behalf is written as if *specifically designed* to address the requirements stated in KV:

[Tschirnhaus] further relates that in Paris he has met a man named Leibniz of remarkable learning, most skilled in the various sciences and free from the common theological prejudices […] he finally concludes that he is a person most worthy of having your writings [*Scripta*] communicated to him, if consent is given; for he thinks that the Author will derive considerable advantage therefrom, as he undertakes to show at some length, if this should please you.28

If, however, the “instructions” Schuller refers to in Letter 63 are indeed those expressed in the conclusion of KV, and Tschirnhaus was aware of them, he must have known KV. Finally, we should notice in Letter 70 how Schuller requests that Leibniz be communicated Spinoza’s “writings” (*scripta*). While one may not infer too much from the plural here (after all it may simply be understood as an idiom signifying whatever Spinoza has written), it does suggest Tschirnhaus had several manuscripts to divulge (for details, see the following section.)29

I realize that this is not much to go by. But since no more biographical evidence is available, the only approach we can take to further clarify the question is a textual one, considering whether the Report provides a better or more accurate account of
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KV than of *Ethics*. This is exactly what I will do below, i.e. compare the contents of the Report with *Ethics* and KV see what will make for the best fit. In this analysis, I have excluded the option that the “book” in question is the three-part, early version of the *Ethics*. Recall also that, strictly speaking, the version of *Ethics* relevant for this comparative analysis is the Vatican manuscript. However, on verification, this text is not different from the published *Ethics* in any respect relevant for the matter at hand, so for easier reference I will continue in the following to quote Gebhardt’s edition (and Curley’s translation) of *Ethics* rather than the new manuscript.

4. The Report

Let us first take a look at the complete Report. I give the original Latin (note however that the beginning of the text is originally in French) as established in vol. A VI, iii. I also provide the translation proposed by Richard Arthur in *The Labyrinth of the Continuum* (although I do modify it a bit).

[1] Mons. Tschirnhaus m’a conté beaucoup de choses du livre Ms. De Spinosa. Il y a un marchand à Amsterdam (nommé Gilles Gerrit, puto), qui entretient Spinosa. Le livre de Spinosa sera de Deo mente, beatitudine seu perfecti hominis idea, de Medicina Mentis, de medicina corporis. Il pretend de demonstrer de Deo des choses. Quod sit solus liber. Libertatem in eo consistere putat, cum actio seu determinatio non ex extrinseci impulsu, sed sola agentis natura resultat. Hoc sensu recte ait solum Deum esse liberum. Mens secundum ipsum est quodammodo pars Dei, putat sensum quendam in omnibus esse rebus pro gradibus existendi. Deum definit Ens absolute infinitum, item Ens, quod omnes continet perfectiones, id est affirmationes, seu realitates, seu quae concipi possunt. Item Deum solum esse substantiam, sive Ens per se subsistens seu quod per se concipi potest, creaturas omnes non nisi modos esse; hominem eattenus liberum esse, quatenus a nullis externis determinatur. Sed cum hoc sit in nullo actu hinc hominem nullo modo esse liberum. Etsi plus participet de libertate quam corpora. Mentem esse ipsam corporis ideam. Putat etiam oriri unionem corporum a pressione quadam. Vulgus philosophiam incipere a creaturis. Cartesium incipisse a mente, se incipere a Deo. Extensionem non inferre divisibilitatem inque eo lapsum esse Cartesium, lapsum item esse Cartesium cum clare se videre credidit ac distincte, quod mens agat in corpus vel a corpore patitur. Putat nos morientes plerorumque oblivisci et ea tantum retinere, quae habemus cognitione, quam ille vocat intuitivam, quam pauci


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norint. Nam aliam esse sensualem, aliam imaginativam, aliam intuitivam. Credit quondam transmigrationis Pythagoricae speciem, nimirum mentes ire de corpore in corpus. Christum ait fuisse summum philosophum. Putat infinita alia esse attributa affirmativa praeter cogitationem et extensionem, sed in omnibus esse cogitationem ut hic in extensione; qualia autem sint illa a nobis concepi non posse, unumquodque in suo genere esse infinitum, ut hic spatium.  

[2] Mons. Tschirnhaus has told me many things about Spinoza’s book in manuscript. There is a merchant in Amsterdam (named Gilles Gerrit, I think) who supports Spinoza. Spinoza’s book will be about God, mind, blessedness or the idea of the perfect man, on the medicine of the soul, and the medicine of the body. He claims to demonstrate things about God; that he alone is free. He thinks freedom consists in this, that an action or determination results not from an extrinsic impulse, but solely from the nature of the agent. In this sense he is right to say that God alone is free. Mind, according to him, is in a way a part of God; he thinks there is some sensation in all things in proportion to their degree of existing. He defines God as an absolutely infinite being, likewise as a being that contains all perfections, i.e. affirmations, or realities, or things that can be conceived. Likewise God alone is substance, or, a being subsisting through itself, or, that which can be conceived through itself, and all creatures are nothing but modes. Man is free to the extent that he is not determined by anything external. But since this is not the case in any of his acts, man is in no way free—even if he participates in freedom more than bodies do. Mind is the very idea of the body. Moreover, the union of the body arises from a kind of pressure. The vulgar begin philosophy with created things, Descartes began with the mind, he begins with God. Extension does not entail divisibility, and in this Descartes was mistaken. Descartes was likewise mistaken in believing he could see clearly and distinctly that the mind acts on the body, and that the mind is acted upon by the body. He thinks that when we die we forget almost everything, and retain only those things that we have thought through a knowledge that he calls intuitive, and which few people attain. For sensual knowledge is one thing, imaginative knowledge another, and intuitive another again. He believes in a kind of Pythagorean transmigration, at least that minds go from body to body. He says Christ was the greatest philosopher. He thinks there are infinitely many other affirmative attributes besides thought and extension, but that there is thought in all of them, as there is here in extension; but that we cannot conceive what they are like, each one being infinite in its
own kind, as, here, is space.\textsuperscript{32}

When analyzing the Report for our specific purposes, there are some constraints that will allow limiting the scope of the investigation and clarify what will count as evidence. These constraints concern the fact that Tschirnhaus and Leibniz were quite familiar with other texts by Spinoza. Totaro and Spruit cautiously suggest (or at least do not exclude) that Tschirnhaus may also have brought a copy of TIE with him to Paris, basing this on Tschirnhaus’ April 1678 Letter to Leibniz, where he speaks of “Spinoza’s \textit{On the emendation of the intellect}, the manuscript of which Schuller has transmitted to me.”\textsuperscript{33} It is very unclear, however, when exactly Schuller transmitted the manuscript and it seems odd that Tschirnhaus should stress that he had received the text from Schuller in 1678 if he had already discussed it with Leibniz in Paris in 1676. It seems more likely that Schuller only just sent him the text in April 1678.\textsuperscript{34}

Moreover, from Leibniz’s answer—somewhat dryly pointing out that the text is now in a printed edition and that he was disappointed when reading it—it is at least clear the \textit{he} had not read the text before its publication in the \textit{Opera posthuma}.\textsuperscript{35} Totaro and Spruit also suggest that Tschirnhaus may have brought copies of the three last letters from Spinoza to Oldenburg, and subsequently transmitted them to Leibniz.\textsuperscript{36} The evidence available for that possibility is that Leibniz annotated these letters at some point before they were published.\textsuperscript{37} I see no good reason however to challenge the suggestion by the Academy editors that Leibniz obtained those letters, not from Tschirnhaus, but directly from Oldenburg when visiting London in October 1976.\textsuperscript{38} What is certain, however, is that both Tschirnhaus and Leibniz knew Spinoza’s published book from 1663, i.e. the PPD including CM, although there is no evidence that they explicitly discussed this work. Leibniz studied the TTP closely (and probably together with Tschirnhaus) during the latter months on 1675.\textsuperscript{39} Consequently, some of the information in Leibniz’s report may refer to this work. A similar point applies to all information related in Tschirnhaus’ correspondence with Spinoza (including the part mediated by Schuller) up until February 1676 (i.e. Letters 57-60, 63-66, 70, and 72.) Moreover, Tschirnhaus held a copy of Letter 12 (Leibniz will recopy it and annotate it around April 1676.) Thus, for example, when Leibniz reports that “extension does not entail divisibility, and in this Descartes was mistaken,” this may either refer to EIP15S or to KV, I, ii. § 18-21, although none of these texts explicitly mention the opposition to Descartes. The point, however, is also developed in length in Letter 12. Consequently, it is to some extent futile to discuss whether the information originates from \textit{Ethics} or KV, since it may originate from none of them. Thus, what we are looking for
in the Report are points of doctrine expressed more clearly in KV than in *Ethics*, while not being clearly expressed in Spinoza’s book on Descartes, the TTP, or in the Letters known by Tschirnhaus in February 1676.

5. Comparative Analysis

Let us now finally get the evidence on the table. I will not discuss in detail all the statements in the Report, but only those I consider to be decisive and interesting. I have indicated in the previous section (including note 20) the information that I think can only originate from *Ethics*, and I will not discuss these texts any further. Moreover, there are a few reasonably clear but not so very interesting statements that indeed do fit KV better than *Ethics*, but that I will not discuss in any detail.\(^{40}\)

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The Report adds to the KV-like description that Spinoza’s book will be about “the medicine of the soul, and the medicine of the body.” The expressions *Medicina mentis* and *medicina corporis* do not figure anywhere in that form in Spinoza’s work. They do, of course, figure in Tschirnhaus’ later work, the *Medicina mentis* first published in 1686 (including an annexed *Medicina corporis*).\(^{41}\) The Report probably to some extent reflects the way in which Tschirnhaus interpreted, and indeed inherited, Spinoza’s doctrine.\(^{42}\) The question is whether it reflects Spinoza’s views or not. If we consider *Ethics*, it seems not. In the preface to part V, Spinoza writes:

> Here [...] I shall treat of the power of reason, showing what it can do against the affects, and what Freedom of mind, or blessedness, is. From this we shall see how much more the wise man can do than the ignorant. But it does not pertain to this investigation to show how the intellect must be perfected, or in what way the Body must be cared for, so that it can perform its function properly. The former is the concern of Logic and the latter of Medicine.\(^{43}\)

Spinoza here implicitly denies that the ethics of *Ethics*, and in particular part five of the work, can be described in terms of a medical metaphor, i.e. as “medicine of the soul.” For the spiritual equivalent of *medicina corporis* is not ethics, but logic, which is a propaedeutic preparing the mind for ethics. In other words, if the “book” Tschirnhaus described was indeed *Ethics*, his description is wrong from a strict Spinozist perspective.
If we turn to Spinoza’s early writings, however, the situation is different. The “medicine of the soul” is a recurrent theme in TIE. The *emendatio intellectus* figuring in the title of the work has strong medical connotations and could in principle also be translated by “healing of the intellect.” Thus, in TIE, Spinoza writes:

[...] attention must be paid to Moral Philosophy and to Instruction concerning the Education of children. Because health is no small means to achieving this end, fourthly, the whole of Medicine must be worked out [...]. But before anything else we must devise a way of healing the intellect [*emendendi intellectus*], and purifying it, as much as we can in the beginning, so that it understands things successfully, without error and as well as possible.\(^{44}\)

Spinoza here describes the aim of TIE in terms very similar to those used when explicitly describing what the aim of *Ethics* is not. This report may then lend some credence to the otherwise unlikely suggestion that Tschirnhaus knew of the TIE in 1676 and maybe even already had the manuscript copy he subsequently speaks of in his April 1678 letter to Leibniz. If we consider the KV, we will however reach similar conclusions. In Letter 6, Spinoza speaks of KV saying that “I have composed a whole short work devoted to this matter [i.e. how things have begun and depend on their first cause] and also to the emendation of the intellect.”\(^{45}\) More importantly, however, according to the long subtitle of KV, the treatise was written in order “to cure [*geneezen*] those who are sick of mind [*kank in’t verstand*] through the spirit of gentleness and forbearance.”\(^{46}\) Admittedly, this preface was not written by Spinoza (it refers to Spinoza in the third person singular.) Maybe it was Jarig Jelles. In any case, the phrase does not in itself prove anything concerning Spinoza’s views, but only concerning the views about Spinoza of whoever wrote it. This is however of little importance for the question at hand, which is not whether Tschirnhaus knew of the views that *Spinoza* held in KV, but whether he knew of the views *expressed in KV, including the preface*, and whether he communicated those views to Leibniz. In that respect, the description of “Spinoza’s book” as dealing with *medicina mentis* in Leibniz’s Report does advance us a small step towards an answer in the affirmative.
The Report contains an extended account of Spinoza’s conception of freedom:

He claims to demonstrate things about God; that he alone is free. He thinks freedom consists in this, that an action or determination results not from an extrinsic impulse, but solely from the nature of the agent. In this sense he is right to say that God alone is free […] Man is free to the extent that he is not determined by anything external. But since this is not the case in any of his acts, man is in no way free—even if he participates in freedom more than bodies do. That God alone is free is stated in EIP17C2: “God alone is a free cause.” But the information may just as well stem from KV I, iv, § 5, which also states that “God alone is the free cause.” As for the definition of freedom as action not “from extrinsic impulse” but “solely from the nature of the agent,” Spinoza never states it in those exact terms, but it corresponds fairly well to EID7 according to which “that thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone.” The passage in KV that most clearly mirrors Leibniz’s report on this point is a note at KV II, xxvi, § 9, according to which “the bondage of a thing consists in being subjected to external causes; freedom, on the contrary, in being freed of them, not subjected to them.” Note also that Letter 58 to Tschirnhaus contains a definition of freedom. The determination of God as an “agent” (agens) is absent from Ethics, but appears in KV when Spinoza speaks of how God is an immanent cause: “[...] substance, because it is the principle of all its modes, can with much greater right be called an agent [Doender], rather than one acted upon [Leyder] [...].” In this respect, the fit to KV is better. At first sight, the report concerning man’s lack of freedom may stem from both Ethics and KV: the general outlook of the two texts is equally deterministic. As for the idea that man “participates” in freedom, we note that Spinoza in Ethics occasionally has recourse to the neo-platonic language of participation, notably in EIIP49S according to which his doctrine teaches “that we participate [participes] in the divine nature,” and EIVP45S2 and EIVCap31 according to which “the greater the Joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, i.e., the more we must participate [participare] in the divine nature.” KV does not speak as much of our “participation” (deelnemen) in divine nature as of our “community” (gemeenschap) with God. In that respect, then, the fit to Ethics is better. So at this point of our investigation, we find ourselves in an impasse.

The report does, however, contain two disconcerting elements that I believe can
be best explained by a comparison to KV. The first concerns the idea that man is “in no way [nullo modo] free.” The statement appears contradictory in relation to the following statement according to which man “participates more in freedom.” Moreover, in the context of Ethics, assuming that “man is in no way free” is odd. Indeed, the entire part five de libertate humana about how we can liberate ourselves by means of the “power of reason” then comes out as a bit of a non-starter. If however Leibniz/Tschirnhaus only had in mind the kind of absolute freedom pertaining to God, and not specifically human freedom, then the “in no way” (nullo modo) remains unexplained. I am not sure the problem can be entirely resolved. Leibniz’s report does, however, gain a certain consistency when compared with the more pessimistic (or at least less rationalistic) KV, where “true freedom is nothing but [being] the first cause” and it is an “error” to think that man is a first cause of his own actions. In KV, even reason has no power to bring us any kind of freedom: “reason […] has no power to bring us to our well-being.” Only intuitive knowledge can. Indeed, in KV, human freedom receives a formulation with an almost quietist ring to it that differs markedly from the “activation” of man described by Spinoza in Ethics V. Hence, Spinoza writes in KV, “I define [human freedom] as follows: it is a firm existence, which our intellect acquires through immediate union with God” and maintains that “true freedom is to be and to remain bound by the lovely chains of the love of God.” In this case, one might say that man is in no way free because he is always “chained” or “united” with God by love, but also that man participates more in divine freedom (rather than his own) because of this very enchainment or union.

Second, maintaining that man “participates more in freedom than bodies” is very odd because it seems to imply that the concept of “man” does not involve the concept of a body. This is not acceptable on any account of Spinoza. Thus, according to Ethics, “man consists of a Mind and a Body” and, according to KV, “all man’s limbs […] are parts of man.” There seem however to be two reasonable interpretations we can give of the Report. Leibniz may mean by “man” both the human mind and the human body, and by “bodies” corporeal things deprived of a mind or anything equivalent to a mind. In that case, the idea is that man (as a body united with a mind) “participates” more in freedom than do inanimate bodies (i.e. bodies not united with a mind.) As a second interpretive option, Leibniz may mean by “man” the “human mind.” In that case, the idea is that the human mind “participates” more in freedom than do bodies, including the human body. Both accounts are however in violation of Spinoza’s parallelist principles in Ethics, in
that it suggests a dissymmetry between the mental and the corporeal with regard to freedom, i.e. that “man,” or rather “man’s mind” may be liberated while the body is not liberated, or even that man’s mind may be liberated from the body. I see no way to squeeze any such doctrine out of Ethics. However, as we have seen, in KV human freedom consists in our union or community with God and is identical with our enchainment to God. Now, in relation to Spinoza’s discussion of such union with God, he states that “the Soul can be either united with the body of which it is the Idea or with God.” Moreover, “once we come to know God […], we must then come to be united with him even more closely than with out body, and be, as it were, released from the body [lichaam ontslagen].” For in this case, “we now see […] that we depend on what is most perfect in such a way that we are part of the whole, i.e. of him, and so to speak contribute our share [meede het onse toe brengen] to the accomplishment of as many well-ordered and perfect works as are dependent on him.” Clearly, then, when we are “united with God,” we attain some sort of freedom in virtue of the fact that our mind participates in divine freedom though knowledge of God, and our mind certainly does so more than our body, from which we are in fact released when entering this community or union.

5.3

“Mind [Mens], according to him, is in a way a part of God [pars Dei] […]. Mind is the very idea of the body [corporis ideam],” states the Report concerning Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. The second part of the statement renders faithfully Spinoza’s position, both in Ethics and in KV. The first part, however, is problematic because it clearly reflects some knowledge of a key element in Spinoza’s doctrine while still rendering it in a way that is importantly wrong from the point of view of both Ethics and KV. The concern is mereological. According to EIIP10C, “[…] the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications [modificationibus] of God’s attributes.” According to EIIP11C, “the human Mind is a part [partem] of the infinite intellect to of God.” What should be noted is the distinction between modifications and parts. For Spinoza, substance only has modes and no parts, only modes have parts. This is also the upshot of Spinoza’s discussion of “corporeal substance” in EIP15S. However, the same doctrine is also developed in KV, where Spinoza writes that “man […] consists of certain modes […],” and that “our soul is either a substance or a mode; not a substance […]. Therefore, a mode.” The absence of parts in infinite nature (i.e. substance) is also strongly emphasized:

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“[...] it is impossible that parts could be conceived in an infinite Nature, for all parts are, by their nature, finite.” In KV, Spinoza even illustrates the distinction between modes and part, not only by means of his habitual example of “water,” but also the example of “a man”:

Furthermore, concerning the parts in Nature, we say (as we said before) that division never occurs in the substance, but always and only in the modes of the substance. So if I want to divide water, I divide only the mode of the substance, not the substance itself; the substance is always the same. // Division, then, or being acted upon, always happens in the mode, as when we say that a man perishes, or is destroyed, that is only understood of the man insofar as he is a composite being and mode of substance, and not the substance itself on which he depends.

No doubt then, that the Report misrepresents Spinoza’s position. The mind is not a part of God, because God has no parts. Instead, according to Ethics, the mind can be considered in two distinct ways: either as a part of the infinite intellect of God (i.e. of the immediate infinite mode of the attribute of thought) or as a mode of the substance of God (i.e. of the attribute of thought.) It is, however, a point on which KV is much more ambiguous than Ethics. Thus, according to KV II, xviii, § 1, “man is part of the whole of nature [en deel van geheel de Natuur],” which is a curious statement indeed for someone who earlier in the same text has deployed considerable energy in demonstrating that “in Nature there are neither whole nor parts [en zyn in de natuur nog geheel nog deelen].” Thus, while a close reading of both Ethics and KV will lead to the conclusion that Leibniz’s note strictly speaking misrepresents Spinoza’s position, I still believe KV is much more likely to induce this misunderstanding than Ethics is.

5.4

“Descartes was likewise mistaken in believing he could see clearly and distinctly that the mind acts on the body, and that the mind is acted upon by the body.” The locus classicus of Spinoza’s doctrine of mind-body relations and his critique of Descartes’ interactionism is the preface of Ethics V. One may also easily deduce Spinoza’s opposition to Descartes on this point from EIIP5 and EIIP6. Prima facie, Ethics thus appears as the most plausible source. The situation is however complicated by Tschirnhaus’ correspondence with Spinoza (via Schuller) in October-November 1675. Thus, in Letter 70, Schuller transmits an objection from...
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Tschirnhaus relying on the premise that in EIIP5, “it is maintained that ideata are the efficient cause of ideas.” The proposition appears to Tschirnhaus to contradict the famous “parallelist” proposition EIIP7. Now, EIIP5 does of course in reality state the exact opposite of what Tschirnhaus assumes. Spinoza does not fail to point this out in his reply: “[…] this point is expressly denied in that same proposition,” suggesting that the misreading is due to a corrupt manuscript: “I must wait until you explain his meaning to me more clearly, and until I know whether he has a sufficiently correct copy.” On this point, comparison with the Vatican manuscript does come to our aid, since by consulting this text we can actually make the verification suggested by Spinoza. In fact, in Tschirnhaus’ manuscript of Ethics the text of EIIP5 is not corrupt.

There is however another explanation available for this astonishing misreading, namely that Schuller did not transmit the objection correctly and that Tschirnhaus had not drawn the idea of interaction between attributes from a misreading of EIIP5, but from an entirely different text, namely the following paragraphs in KV, II, xix:

So when these attributes come to act on one another, there arises from this a passion produced in the one by the other; e.g., through the determination of motion, which we have the power to make go where we will. The actions, then by which the one comes to be acted on by the other, are as follows: the soul [acting] on the body, as we have already said, can bring it about that the spirits would otherwise have moved in one direction, should not, however, move in another […]. Having said this much about the actions on the soul on the body, let us now examine the actions of the body on the soul. We maintain that the principal one is that it causes the soul to perceive it, and thereby to perceive other bodies too.

In this text, at least when read in isolation from the broader context of KV, Spinoza seems to endorse interactionist views of the kind Tschirnhaus deemed contradictory in relation to the doctrine of parallelism stated in EIIP7. Indeed, saying that the body causes the soul to perceive it sounds very much like saying that the ideata causes the soul’s ideas. This does not mean that Spinoza in KV defends a completely different doctrine than Ethics. After all, only a couple of paragraphs later, Spinoza emphasizes that “regarding the body, and its effects, Motion and Rest, they cannot act on the soul otherwise than to make themselves known to it as objects.” Nonetheless, one can easily see how Tschirnhaus could have been mislead by the interactionist phrasing of the passage cited above, especially when seen in the context of a multitude of other places — especially in Appendix II — where
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Spinoza speaks of how “the Idea proceeds from [voortkomt] the existence of the object,” about “Ideas that arise [ontstaan] from corporeal modes,” and about how the soul “has its origin [oorsprong] from the body” and “is an Idea arising from [ontstaande] an object which exists in Nature.”

So maybe what we are dealing with is not, as Spinoza thought, an objection about an internal contradiction in Ethics occasioned by a wildly corrupt manuscript or a spectacular misreading hardly worthy of Tschirnhaus’ intellect, but with an objection badly transmitted by Schuller that originally was about an apparent contradiction between the doctrines of Ethics and KV. Hence, if one is willing to grant the possibility that Tschirnhaus had a copy of KV, we would have a better explanation of Tschirnhaus’ curious query in Letter 70 than simply assuming, like Samuel Shirley, that he was “confused.” Hence, while the Report clearly presents the doctrine of Ethics, when read in the light of Tschirnhaus’ previous exchanges with Spinoza, there is in fact in relation to the question of mind-body interaction an interesting argument to be made in favor of the idea that Tschirnhaus at first drew his information about Spinoza’s philosophy not only from Ethics, but also from KV.

5.5

According to the Report, Spinoza distinguishes between three kinds of knowledge: (i) “sensual” (sensualem), (ii) “imaginative” (imaginativam), and (iii) “intuitive” (intuitivam). According to EIIP40S2, however, we should in fact distinguish between these three kinds: (i) “opinion” (opinio) or “imagination” (imaginatio) stemming from “random experience” (experientia vaga) or “signs” (signis), (ii) “reason” (ratio), and (iii) “intuitive knowledge” (scientia intuitiva). According to KV, on the contrary, we should distinguish: (i) “opinion” (Waan) stemming from “experience” (ondervinding) or “report” (hooren zeggen), (ii) “belief” (geлоof), sometimes called “true belief” (waar geloof) and associated with “true reason” (waare Reeden), and (iii) “science” (Weeten), also called “clear and distinct comprehension” (klare en onderschede bevatting), “clear distinct knowledge” (klare onderscheide kenis), or simply “clear knowledge” (klaare kennis). This last kind of knowledge is associated with someone who “immediately sees through his intuition” (dewyle hy door zyne deurzigtigheid terstond).

Both Ethics and KV thus defend the view that there are three kinds of knowledge: one related to the world of experience, the second to reason, and the third to intuition. The Report corresponds to neither. At first sight, however, the Report’s classification
seems to be a deformation of the doctrine from *Ethics*, since it refers to a notion present in *Ethics* but absent from KV, namely “‘imagination,” notwithstanding the bewildering fact that imagination is classified as the second kind of knowledge.

Structurally, however, there is something similar about the account in the Report and the classification we find in KV. Thus, the Report mentions three kinds of knowledge, the first two of which—i.e. sensation and imagination—a reader of *Ethics* would expect to find classified under a single, first kind of knowledge. This, however, is also the case in KV, where a reader of *Ethics* would expect both “opinion” and “belief” to fall under the first kind of knowledge, whereas, in fact, they are described as two different kinds of knowledge, “belief” somewhat surprisingly being identified with “reason.” This determination of “belief” as understanding and rational knowledge in KV is part of a rationalistic attempt to naturalize the notion of “true belief” in the sense of faith and true religion. This is clear from the fact that KV describes “true religion” (*Waare Godsdienst*) also as “true belief” (*ware gelove*).

There is moreover something in the account of “understanding” (*verstand*) in KV that could lead a reader to associate it with the “imagination.” In the Cartesian tradition, the imagination is traditionally associated with the ideas we form about the relation our body upholds to external bodies. This is incidentally how Spinoza himself speaks of the imagination in *Ethics*: “Next, to retain the customary words, the affections of the human Body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things […]. And when the Mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines.” Since the imagination is thus, in the Cartesian tradition, essentially related to the way in which we are subject to external determinations, it is also essentially related to passivity. Now, KV does not discuss the notion of “imagination” (Dutch *inbeelding* or *verbeelding*). But it does discuss how our minds are passive subjects to external determinations. And here, in KV, we realize that understanding involves such passivity of the mind:

[[…] the understanding is wholly passive [*het verstaan een pure Lydinge is*], i.e., a perception in the soul of the essence and existence of things. So it is never we who affirm or deny something of the thing; it is the thing itself that affirms or denies something of itself in us.*

The passive role Spinoza here assigns to the understanding may very well explain why Tschirnhaus or Leibniz would be tempted to associate it with the “imagination.” Such a conception of the understanding is however contrary to *Ethics* where the formation of adequate ideas by the understanding—this involving both the second
and third kind of knowledge—is exactly what allows us to become active. In this case, the comparison with KV, as opposed to Ethics, provides a plausible explanation for the Report’s otherwise inexplicable classification of knowledge.

5.6

Spinoza, Leibniz reports, “believes in a kind of Pythagorean transmigration, at least that minds go from body to body [mentes ire de corpore in corpus].” As has been noted often enough, the report is very puzzling. None of Spinoza’s texts endorse the transmigration of souls. Alexandre Matheron has, in Le Christ et le salut des ignorants, developed an interesting argument showing that the different dispositions that an individual is structurally capable of assuming (and thus will assume at some point, given Spinoza’s necessitarianism) are not necessarily actualized in immediate succession. There may be “jumps” in the actualization of a given individual’s full range of forms, in such a way that a kind of rebirth could in principle occur. Matheron’s analysis has the sort of merits that his analyses always have: it shows just how much ground Spinoza’s metaphysics is capable of covering. The reading, however, has very little foothold in the available texts. Indeed, the only textual evidence that Matheron provides for the existence of any such theory in Spinoza is Leibniz’s Report! Admittedly, there is early modern precedence for reading Spinoza as holding a theory of transmigration. Thus, in his Elucidarius Cabalisticus, published in 1706, Johann Georg Wachter maintained that while Spinoza never explicitly asserts that minds migrate from body to body, inferri tamen ex sententia ejus posset. He argued for this by reference to EVP23S, according to which “though we do not recollect that we existed before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind […] is eternal.” Wachter’s curious cabalistic reading can however hardly pass as an authoritative reading of Spinoza’s original intentions. In our specific context, we should also note that Leibniz, when commenting on Wachter around 1707-1709, explicitly rejected that any such doctrine could be derived from Spinoza’s principles in Ethics, noting concerning this specific point in Wachter’s interpretation of Spinoza that “our author is in error [sed errat noster].” After reading Ethics, Leibniz clearly did not attribute a theory of soul-migration to Spinoza.

There is however material in KV that comes reasonably close not only to stating the basic principle of Matheron’s analysis, but also to relating this principle to a theory according to which the soul may unite itself to something else than its own body:
[...] if such a body has and preserves its proportion—say of 1 to 3—the soul and the body will be like ours are now; they will, of course, be constantly subject to change, but not to such a great change that it goes beyond the limits of from 1 to 3; and as much as it changes, so also the soul changes each time. // But if other bodies act on ours with such force that the proportion of motion [to rest] cannot remain, that is death, and a destruction the soul, insofar as it is only an Idea, knowledge, etc., of a body having this proportion of motion and rest. // However, because it is a mode in the thinking substance, it has been able to know and Love this [substance] also, as well as that of extension; and uniting itself with these substances (which always remain the same), it has been able to make itself eternal.¹⁰⁵

Following this text, the soul may unite itself with something else than the body of which the soul is the idea, namely with the eternal substance of thinking and extension, i.e. with God. The idea reappears in part II, xix, § 14: “[...] if we once come to know God […], we must then come to be united with him even more closely than with our body, and be, as it were, released from the body.”¹⁰⁶ More importantly, however, Spinoza also pursues this theme in a chapter explicitly dealing with the question of “rebirth” (Wedergeboorte). Hence, in KV II, xxii, § 7, while discussing the effects of our union with our body, Spinoza writes:

When we become aware of these effects, we can truly say that we have been born again. For our first birth was when we were united with the body. From this union have arisen the effects and motions of the [animal] spirits. But our other, or second, birth will occur when we become aware in ourselves of the completely different effects of love produced by knowledge of this incorporeal object […]. This, therefore, may the more rightly and truly be called Rebirth, because, as we shall show, an eternal and immutable constancy comes only from this Love and Union.¹⁰⁷

Admittedly, what Spinoza has in mind here is very different from Pythagorean soul-migration, and rings more like an intellectualized version the Christian doctrine of regeneration.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, one must ask whether it is most plausible to understand Leibniz’s report about “Pythagorean transmigration” as a deformation of a somewhat oriental theory of soul-migration which might be structurally possible from the point of view of the doctrine of Ethics, but actually absent from the work, or whether it refers to a deformation of a finally somewhat Christian theory of rebirth that is in fact explicitly stated in KV. In terms of textual evidence, I think the balance weighs in favor of the second option.

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Leibniz reports that, for Spinoza, “Christ was the greatest philosopher.” *Ethics* says almost nothing about Christ, except for a passage in EIVP68S from which we can conclude that Spinoza identified “the Spirit of Christ” with the “idea of God” (“… *Spiritu Christi, hoc est, Dei idea*…”). This conception is mirrored by a passage in KV where, after having argued that, in relation to matter, motion “is a Son [zone], product or effect, created immediately by God,” Spinoza states that “as for the Intellect in the thinking thing, this too is a Son, product or immediate creature of God, also created by him from all eternity [een zone, Maaksel, of onmiddelyk schepzel van God].” Still, the main text of KV contains no explicit references to Christ. However, in the long subtitle (probably) by Jarig Jelles, we learn that KV was written for the “disciples” (*Leerlinge*) of Spinoza, so that they may follow “the example of the Lord Christ, our best teacher [naa’t Vorbeld van de Heer Christus, onze besten Leermester].” It is characteristic that this description of Christ does not allude to the fact that he was the son of God or a divine person in any proper sense. It only sets him up as an “example” (*Vorbeld*) and, more importantly, as a “teacher” (*Leermeester*). If indeed Tschirnhaus had access to KV, he and Leibniz may very well have drawn the conclusion that “Christ is the greatest philosopher” from this remark in the subtitle. To be sure, the more obvious fit for the report remains TTP, according to which “Christ […] communicated with God mind to mind.” Here, Spinoza holds that “except for Christ no one has received God’s revelations without the aid of the imagination” and that “in this sense we can also say that God’s Wisdom, that is, a Wisdom surpassing human wisdom, assumed a human nature in Christ […].” We should however note that while any such theory is only very remotely alluded to in *Ethics*, it is—without however including the conception of God’s son as a man—quite clearly prefigured in KV when Spinoza explains how God communicates with us through the intellect only:

> Because we maintain such a community between man and God, one might rightly ask how God can make himself known to man […]. We answer: not in any case by words […]. We also consider it unnecessary that this should happen through anything other than God’s essence alone and man’s intellect […]. For since that in us which must know God is the intellect, and the intellect is so immediately united with him that it can neither exist nor be understood without him, it is incontrovertibly clear that no thing can ever be joined to the intellect as God himself is. // It is also impossible to be able to know God through anything else […].

The most enigmatic bit of Leibniz’s report is undoubtedly the following:

He thinks there are infinitely many other affirmative attributes besides thought and extension, but that there is thought in all of them, as there is here in extension; but that we cannot conceive what they are like, each one being infinite in its own kind, as, here, is space.

The account is as condensed as it is confused. Moreover, the search for the original source of information is complicated by the fact that the doctrine of the attributes was the topic of intense correspondence between Spinoza and Tschirnhaus (sometimes via Schuller) from July 1675 (Letter 63) to around November 1675 (Letters 63-66, 70, 72). The account contains elements familiar to the reader of *Ethics*, e.g. that attributes are infinite in their own kind, that there are an infinity of them, and that thought and extension belong among them. There is however very little in those determinations that a reader of KV would not find equally familiar. But there are also very disconcerting elements, namely the assumptions that (i) thought is in all the attributes; (ii) that thought is in extension, and finally (iii) that space is an attribute. Assumptions (ii) and (iii) are accompanied by the adverb “here” (*hic*).

I have in my analysis in *Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza* suggested that this involves a shift in Leibniz’s report from relating the content of Spinoza’s “book” to reporting from his conversation *hic et nunc* with Tschirnhaus about this book. In that case, assumptions (ii) and (iii) may very well refer to their tentative interpretation of Spinoza’s views rather than Spinoza’s views themselves. I consider this a plausible explanation, but it does not account for the general principle stated in (i), namely that *thought is in all the attributes*.

What I think Leibniz/Tschirnhaus had in mind is the idea that thought thinks or understands all the attributes and their modes and nothing but the attributes and their modes, along the lines of EIP16 stating that “from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow […] everything which can fall under an infinite intellect” and EIP30, according to which “an actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, must comprehend God’s attributes and God’s affections, and nothing else.” The same reciprocal principles are also clearly stated in KV. Thus, “in God’s infinite intellect there is no substance which does not exist formally in nature” and “a perfect thought must have knowledge, idea, mode of thinking, of each and every thing that exists, both of substances and of modes, without exception.” Contending that, for Spinoza, “thought is in all the attributes” would then not be an inexplicable
misrepresentation of his views, but rather a somewhat imprecise formulation of
the famous argument that Tschirnhaus makes against Spinoza in Letter 70 from
November 1675, namely that “the attribute of thought is given a much wider scope
than the other attributes.”

There is little we can do in terms of picking out with certainty the exact sources of
both the Report and Tschirnhaus’ objection in Letter 70. It should however be
noted that the exact textual grounds upon which Tschirnhaus’ objection in Letter
70 rests are unclear. Schuller’s letter simply refers to “the explanation as set
out” (explicationem exhibitam) without specifying where exactly it is “set out.” It
is possible that Tschirnhaus is referring to the brief explanations provided by
Spinoza in the short Letter 66 concerning the way in which an infinity of modes
are expressed by ideas in the infinite intellect of God and how those ideas relate
to our mind. There is however also a text in KV that seems particularly liable to
prompt Tschirnhaus’ objection in Letter 70 and that moreover strongly evokes the
formulation in the Report. Thus, in Appendix II, Spinoza writes:

[…] the essence of a soul consists only in the being of an Idea, or objective
essence, in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which
in fact exists in nature. I say of an object that really exists, etc., without further
particulars, in order to include here not only the modes of extension, but also
the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have a soul just as much as those
of extension do.

This, combined with the doubts I have already raised above as to the provenance
of Tschirnhaus’ other major objection in Letter 70 (see section 5.4), warrants some
cautions before we point to Ethics as the sole source of the Report and that we
seriously consider KV as a live option.

6. Conclusion

What conclusions can be drawn from this comparative exercise? Admittedly, it
will not yield a clear decision with regard to our initial conjecture. It does not
demonstrate that Tschirnhaus must have brought a manuscript copy of KV with
him to Paris. Nonetheless, turning to KV allows accounting for many of the “ideas
completely foreign to Spinoza” that Friedmann detected in the Report. It also
accounts for anomalies otherwise only explicable as astounding misinterpretations
of Ethics on Tschirnhaus’ part. On the whole, then, this comparative analysis
does lend some credence to the conjecture that Leibniz’s mysterious reference to
“Spinoza’s book” *de Deo, mente, beatitudine seu perfecti hominis idea*, did in fact not (only) refer to *Ethics*, but (also) to the homonymous *Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being*. In that case, as Leibniz’s informant on Spinoza, Tschirnhaus would not come out as badly informed or sloppy in his presentation of Spinoza’s doctrines as Friedmann believed, or even as free in his presentation of Spinoza’s views as I have myself suggested previously. In fact, he would rather stand out as a particularly well-informed informant with access to the majority of Spinoza’s philosophical texts and an understanding of those texts that was considerably better than previously assumed. Moreover, if Tschirnhaus’ account of Spinoza’s philosophy to Leibniz was deliberately colored by *KV*, Spinoza’s metaphysics may at first have appeared less “radical” to Leibniz than did *Ethics* when he later read the *Opera posthuma* in 1678. As Curley notes, “though it contains many propositions incompatible with Christian dogma, the *Short Treatise* is nevertheless much more open to a Christian reading than *Ethics*.”

Maybe Tschirnhaus was not providing Leibniz with a confused and/or unfaithful introduction to Spinoza, but rather a strategic one? This interpretation gains some plausibility from the fact that this was already how Tschirnhaus proceeded when discussing Spinoza with Boyle and Oldenburg in London a few months earlier. Thus, Schuller reports:

[Tschirnhaus] relates that Mr. Boyle and Oldenburg had formed a very strange idea of your character. He has not only dispelled this, but has furthermore given them reasons that have induced them to return to a most worthy and favorable opinion of you, and also to hold in high esteem the *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*.

Much has been said about Tschirnhaus’ apparent lack of respect for Spinoza’s guidelines with regard to Leibniz. Clearly, Tschirnhaus did not respect the spirit of Spinoza’s original “instructions” as stated in the conclusion of *KV* which would have required him to keep his mouth shut. Instead, he may have done the second-best thing (or, in hindsight, the best thing, regardless of Spinoza’s instructions.) He did not keep silent, but proceeded with caution, much in the same way as Spinoza himself did (recall his motto: *caute!*). Spinoza guided prospective followers towards his authentic position through preliminary steps, making them approach his thinking not directly, but either via Descartes as he did with his lodger Casearius (and more generally by publishing PPD), or via *KV* which provided an introduction to Spinozistic ideas better suited for the religiously minded (such as for example Jarig Jelles.) When presenting Spinoza’s views to Leibniz, Tschirnhaus may have been mimicking Spinoza’s own strategy of diffusion, slowly leading his new friend...
from the religiously less shocking KV towards the absolute rationalism of *Ethics*. This would help explain not only the curious reference to the title of KV in the Report, but also the initial goodwill that Leibniz in 1675-1676 showed towards a philosophy that some commentators have dramatically claimed he was destined to oppose.\(^1\)^ All this, however, must for the moment remain a conjecture about a true mystery. It does, however, provide us with an incentive to look for a manuscript of KV outside Holland, a manuscript that made it to the French capital and probably elsewhere as well, accompanying Tschirnhaus on his travels.

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*Notes*

\(^1\) I use the following abbreviations for Spinoza: WORKS: E = *Ethics*, where D = Definition; Ax = Axiom; P = Proposition; D = Demonstration (when following a proposition); C = Corollary; S = Scholium; Exp = Explication; App = Appendix);


3 Friedmann, Leibniz et Spinoza, 62: “Il y a là un fouillis assez étrange où voisinent des idées dont certaines vigoureusement exprimés, d’autres confuses, les unes et les autres empruntés à diverses parties de la doctrine, certaines même lui étant tout à fait étrangères.”


5 M. Lærke, Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, Paris: Champion 2008, 68-70. On this point, Friedmann inherited a long tradition of commentary. Arguing along these lines was already a popular strategy among German scholars such as Erdmann, Guhrauer, Dillmann, Fischer, Gerhardt, Kabitiz, and even Cassirer, who felt that it was of paramount importance to acquit Leibniz of any Spinozistic influences. Ursula Goldenbaum has stressed the ideological underpinnings of such exorcism (cf. U. Goldenbaum, “Why Shouldn’t Leibniz have studied Spinoza? The rise of the claim of continuity in Leibniz’s philosophy out of the ideological rejection of Spinoza’s impact on Leibniz,” in The Leibniz Review 17 (2007), 107-38). I have myself insisted on the interpretive circularity that this kind of argumentation involves (cf. M. Lærke, Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, 69-70; and “Leibniz’s encounter with Spinoza’s monism, October 1675 to February 1678,” in M. Della Rocca (ed.),
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The editors of the Pléiade edition of Spinoza suggest that Welstand translates the Latin Beatitudo, a suggestion that Curley does not object to, although he maintains the traditional translation “well-being” (C, 59, note 1). Jöel Ganault translates by French “bien-être,” reserving the term “béatitude” to render the Dutch gelukzaligheid (cf. KV II, xix, Oeuvres I, 350-51). Curley translates gelukzaligheid by “blessedness” which also translates the Latin beatitudo in Ethics (cf. C, 129; e.g. EVP33S, G II 301/C 611). On the information available, Curley and Ganault are right. It is incorrect to translate Welstand in the title by “blessedness” or “béatitude.” As far as I can see, however, welstand does not have a conceptual value different from that of gelukzaligheid.

Cf. KV II, iv, § 5 and § 7, G I 60/C 103; KV II, vi, § 7, G I 67/C 109; KV II, ix, § 6, G I 72/C 114; KV II, xiii, § 2, G I 76/C 117; KV II, xvi, § 1, G I 80/C 121.

G I 208/C 545.

Pina Totaro shortly discusses Leibniz’s description of “Spinoza’s book” in “Documenti su Spinoza nell’archivio del sant’uffizio dell’inquisizione,” in Nouvelles de la République des lettres 20 (2000), 111-112. She does not however notice the allusion to the title of KV. As a minor detail, she also misrepresents the document as accounting for correspondence rather than conversation with Tschirnhaus.


Spinoza first uses this title in Letter 23 to Blijenbergh from March 13 March 1665 (G IV 151/S 834). See also Letter 62 from Oldenburg, written in July 1675 (G IV 273/S 915): “[…] it is your intention to publish the five-part Treatise of yours.” Finally, the Vatican ms. is in five parts.

I will refrain from speculating about whether that copy would have been the original Latin version or the Dutch translation handed down to us. Tschirnhaus was
German and the education he received at the University of Leiden was in Latin, so he may not have known Dutch. If indeed he did not, he would not have had any use of the Dutch version. Tschirnhaus’ *Medicina mentis* refers to a number of Dutch authors, but never to writings written in Dutch (for editions, see note 41). However, someone with a Germanic language as his mother tongue who stayed in Holland for several years is likely to have picked up enough of the language to be able to read it (Tschirnhaus lived in Holland from winter 1668 to spring 1674, and again end 1674 to spring 1675. He also served in the Dutch army for 18 months in 1672-73.) I am grateful to Wiep van Bunge, Edwin Curley, and especially Piet Steenbakkers for their opinion on the matter and for providing me with the (meager) information currently available on Tschirnhaus’ language skills.

19 G II 100-101/C 460.
20 Note that Tschirnhaus explicitly refers to the Lemma of the “Physical Digression” in Letter 59 from January 1675 (G IV 268/S 911). A couple of other examples: (i) Leibniz reports: “[…] he thinks there is some sensation in all things in proportion to their degree of existing.” The passage normally quoted here is EIIP13S, according to which all individuals “all [individuals] though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate [omnia, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata tamen sunt].” There is nothing equivalent in KV. (ii) Leibniz reports “that when we die we forget almost everything, and retain only those things that we have thought through a knowledge that he calls intuitive, and which few people attain.” The note clearly refers to the differential aspect of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind and the role that intuitive knowledge has in making a bigger part of our mind eternal, as developed in EVP31, EVP36S, EVP38, and EIP39 (cf. P.-F. Moreau, *Spinoza. L’expérience et l’éternité*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France 1994, 532-49). There is nothing equivalent in KV. Here, the immortality of the soul, or our “eternal duration” (*eeuwigdurendheid*), is described in terms of a “union” with God which is attained though intuitive knowledge (cf. KV II, xxii, §2, G I 100/C 139; KV II, xxiii, § 2, G I 103/C 141).
21 Cit. in the editorial preface in C, 46. On the diffusion of KV, see also F. Akkerman, “*Tractatus theologico-politicus*: texte latin, traductions néerlandaises et *Adnotationes,*” in F. Akkerman and P. Steenbakkers (eds.), *Spinoza to the
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Letter. *Studies in Word, Texts and Books*, Leiden: Brill 2005, 230-34.) Among the “friends,” we should include Johannes Bouwmeester and Lodewijk Meyer (who are the candidates for translating the Latin KV into Dutch) and Jarig Jelles (who probably wrote the long subtitle.) But there is no good reason to restrict diffusion to these three.

22 E. Boehmer, *Benedicti de Spinoza Tractatus de Deo et homine eiusque felicitate lineamenta atque Adnotationes ad Tractatum theologico politicum*, Halle: J.F. Lippert 1852, 46: “Inter amatores quosdam philosophiae servatur manu scriptus tractatus Spinozae qui quanquam non mathematico more ut eius typis excripta compositus, tamen cogitationes et res compectitut […]” Cf. F. Mignini, “Introduction au Court traité,” 159-61. Mignini also sees an implicit, but clear reference to KV II, xxv (“Of Devils”) in Baltasar Bekker’s 1697 *Life of Philopater*. If correct, the hypothesis is important in that it shows how the manuscript circulated and was discussed also long after the *Ethics* was conceived, completed, and published, and this outside the circles of Spinoza’s immediate friends.

23 Letter 72, G IV 305/S 941.

24 Cf. Letter 63, G IV 276/S 917.

25 Cf. Letter 70, from Schuller, G IV 302/S 938: “Tschirnhaus replied [to Huygens] that he knows none [of the writings of the author of the TTP] except for the Proofs of the First and Second Parts of Descartes’ ‘Principia’. Otherwise he said nothing about you except for the above, and hopes that this will not displease you.”

26 TTP Preface, G III 12.

27 KV Conclusion, G I 112/C 150.

28 Letter 70, from Schuller, G IV 303/S 939.

29 In this context, it is worth noting that in the report submitted by Steno to the Inquisition in September 1677, now held at the Vatican library, he speaks of “a manuscript” (*un manuscritto*, in the singular) that he received from the “stranger of the Lutheran religion” (i.e. Tschirnhaus). If Tschirnhaus held more than one manuscript, it could then seem that it is not in the Vatican that we should expect it/them to show up (cf. Censura librorum 1680-82. Folia extravagantia n. 2: “Libri prohibiti circa la nuova filosofia dello Spinosa,” published in Totato, “Documenti su Spinoza,” 100-103; see especially 101; for an English translation, see Totaro and Spruit, “Introduction,” in *The Vatican Manuscript*, 9-13.)

30 A VI, iii, 384-85.

31 The person Leibniz has in mind is probably Jarig Jelles.

A II, i, 613; cf. Totaro and Spruit, “Introduction,” 16, including n. 41, and 18.


A II, i, 623.


A VI, iii, 364-71.


There are two such statements: (i) Leibniz reports that Spinoza “begins with God [incipere a Deo].” Now, Ethics begins with the definition of the causa sui, only to define God in definition VI. The existence of God is only established in EIP11. KV, on the contrary, opens with a chapter establishing God’s existence (Dat God is), only to be followed by a chapter on God’s nature (War God is). (ii) Leibniz reports that “all creatures [creaturas] are nothing but modes.” That all things are modes is a doctrine common to both Ethics and KV. That they are creatures, however, is a problematic assumption. The term creatura is completely absent from Ethics. Spinoza does speak once of “created things” (res creatas) in the context of those who “did not observe the proper of philosophizing” (EI10S2). Spinoza also uses the verb creare on a number of occasions, but mainly in order to reject other doctrines, such as those holding that substances can be “created” (rejected in EIP8S1 and EIP1S) or those holding that God “had created all things in his intellect” (rejected in EIP17S), when adopting the vocabulary of his adversaries (in EIP33S2 and EIApp) and, finally, when referring to the biblical story of the creation of man (once, in EIVP68S). Creatio appears once in EIP1App when Spinoza is refuting the doctrines of the “metaphysicians and theologians.” Hence, at no point in Ethics does Spinoza adopt the term “creature” or any associated term as his own. The footnotes in KV explicitly rejects the idea that existent things have been created (scheppen), arguing that they have only been “generated” (generen) (cf. KV I, ii, § 5, note, G I 20/C 67; Letter 4, G IV 14/C 172.) Nonetheless, in KV, Spinoza frequently speaks of
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God’s “creation” and of “creatures,” including when presenting his own views (cf. KV I, ii, §§ 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, G I 22/C 68-69; iv, § 7, G I 39-40/C 83; ix, §§ 1 and 3, G I 48/C 91-92; II, xvi, § 3a, G I 82/C 123; see also Letter 6, G IV 36/C 188).


42 In a letter to Huygens written in 1682, Tschirnhaus refers to his own work in Spinozistic terms: “tractatus quem conscripsi de Emendatione Intellectus” (cit. in Wurtz, “Introduction,” in Tschirnhaus, Médécine de l’esprit, 12).

43 EV Preface, G II, 277/C 595.

44 TIE, §§ 15-16, G II 9/C 11. The relevant context for Spinoza’s use of the terms medeor and expurgatio is probably Francis Bacon’s Novum organon, I, 115, 139; II, 32 (cf. C, 11, note 10; and Oeuvres, I, 144, note 21). It should be noted that the notion medicina mentis was common in the literature of the period, although in most cases the “medicine” was religion rather than philosophy. It is in this sense, for example, that Leibniz employs the notion in Nouveaux essais (IV, vii, § 11) or the Halle pietist Joachim Lange uses it in his Medicina mentis from 1704.

45 Letter 6, to Oldenburg, April 1662, G IV 36/C 188; cf. Letter 11, G IV 51/C 200. I am not suggesting that we should revive Gebhardt’s long departed hypothesis that the TIE was planned as a part of KV. Nonetheless, Spinoza clearly saw a tight connection between the two texts.

46 KV, Subtitle, G I 59/C 59.

47 G II 61/C 425.

48 KV I, iv, § 5, G I 38/C 82. On God as a free cause, see also KV I, iii, § 2, G I 35/C 80, and KV I, iv, § 8, G I 39/C 83.

49 G II 46/C 409.

50 G I 112/C 149; cf. KV I, iv, § 5, G I 38/C 82: “[…] outside [God] there is no external cause which would force or necessitate him.”

51 Letter 58, G IV 265/S 908-909: “[…] I say that that thing is free which exists and acts from the necessity of its own nature, and I say that that thing is constrained which is determined by something else to exist and to act in a fixed and determinate manner.”

52 KV I, ii. § 25, G I 26/C 72.

53 G II 135/C 490; trans. modified.
I quote the wording of the scholium (cf. G II 244/572). For the chapter, see G II 275/C 593.

55 KV II, xxiv, § 7-9, G I 105-106/C 143-44.
56 KV I, iv, § 5, G I 37/C 82.
57 KV II, xii, § 2, G II 75/C 116.
58 KV II, xxii, § 1, G I 100/C, 138; cf. KV II, xiv, § 2, G I 77/C 118; KV II, xix, note b, G I 89/C 129. See also KV II, v, § 3, G I 62/C 105, according to which “it is necessary that we not be free of it [i.e. the passion of Love], because, given the weakness of our nature, we could not exist if we did not enjoy something to which we were united […]”; and KV II, xvii, § 4, G I 86/C 127: “But perhaps he has a freedom to put aside that appetite which he has? From this it would follow that this appetite could indeed begin in us without out freedom but that we would equally have a freedom in us to put it aside. But this freedom cannot stand up to examination.”

59 Note, however, that the text at times is contradictory, notably in KV II, xxvi, § 1, where Spinoza says that “we have also shown in the preceding how, both by reason and by the fourth kind of knowledge, we must attain our blessedness […]” (G I 108/C 146).
60 KV II, xxvi, § 9, G I 112/C 149.
61 KV II, xxvi, § 5, G I 129/C 147.
62 EIIP13C, G II 96/C 457.
63 KV I, v, § 2, G I 40/C 84.
64 KV II, xxiii, § 1, G I 103/C 141.
65 KV II, xix, § 14, G I 93/C 133.
66 Ganault has “nous participons à la réalisation” (Oeuvres, I, 347).
67 KV II, xviii, § 2, G I 87/C 128.
68 Cf. EIIP11, G II 94/C 456; EIIP13, G II 96/C 457; KV II, xx, § 4, note, G I 98/C 137.
69 G II 93/C 454.
70 G II 94/C 456.
71 KV II, Preface, § 1, G I 51/C 93.
72 KV II, [Note], G I 51/C 94.
73 KV I, ii, § 19, G I 25/C 71.
74 KV I, ii, § 21-22, G I 26/C 72.
75 KV II, xviii, § 1, G I 86/C 127: see also KV II, xiv, § 6, G I 105/C 143, and KV I, Dialogue I, G I 30/C 76.
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76 KV I, ii, § 19, G I 24/C 71.
77 G IV 302/S 938.
78 Letter 72, G IV 305/S 491. Incidentally, this response can shed some light on a question Edwin Curley put to Pina Totaro at the recent The Young Spinoza conference organized by Yitzhak Melamed at Johns Hopkins University (18-19 sept. 2011), namely whether Spinoza might have verified the manuscript copied by Pieter van Gent before it was communicated to Tschirnhaus. Spinoza’s reply to Schuller suggests that this was not the case.
79 EIIP5 in the Vatican ms. only varies from the Opera posthuma in one (insignificant) respect: in the proposition where the Opera posthuma has “hoc est, tam,” the Vat. ms. only has “hoc est” (Totaro and Spruit, The Vatican Manuscript, 124).
80 KV II, xix, §§ 11 and 13, G I 92/C 132-33.
81 Letter 70, G IV 302/S 938.
82 KV II, xix. § 15, G I 93/C 133.
84 KV App. II, § 12, G I 120/C 155.
85 KV App. II, § 3, G I 117/C 152.
86 KV App. II, § 12, G I 119-120/C 155.
87 S, 938, note 260.
88 It is worth noting that the quasi-Spinozist system drafted by Leibniz in this period involves a parallelist doctrine that, somewhat paradoxically, allows for a complex kind of interaction between thought and extension, quite similar to the doctrine in KV (cf. Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, 517-40). Consider moreover a curious analogy between Leibniz’s formulation of this parallelism in a text from April 1676 and a passage in KV. Thus, Leibniz writes in a marginal note of De origine rerum ex formis (I add the letters [a], [b], and [c] in order to highlight the symmetry of the passages): “[a] Common terms: God. Form, absolute, affirmative, perfection. Change. Modification. // [b] Belonging to thought: Mind. Primary intelligence. Soul. Universal Republic. Idea. Thought. // [c] Belonging to extension: The extended. The immeasurable. Place. Universal space. Shape. Motion” (A VI, iii, 521, trans. in Leibniz, De summa rerum, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson, New Haven: Yale UP 1992, 81). Compare this account with the note in KV I, vii, § 1, G I 44/C 88: “[a’] […] that God is one, eternal, existing through himself, infinite, the cause of everything, immutable — these things are attributed to God in consideration of all his attributes. // [b’] That God is omniscient and wise, etc., are attributed to him in consideration of the attribute of thought. // [c’] And that he is omnipresent and fills all etc., are
attributed to him in consideration of the attribute of extension.” The similarity is quite striking, although I will not attempt to draw any conclusions on that basis. With regard to Spinoza’s parallelism and its reception in Leibniz’s metaphysical texts from 1675-1676, see M. Lærke, “De Origine Rerum ex Formis (April 1676): A Quasi-Spinozistic Parallelism in De Summa Rerum,” in M. Kulstad, M. Lærke and D. Snyder (eds.), The Philosophy of the Young Leibniz, Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 35, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2009, 203-20; and Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, 477-499.

89 Cf. KV I, i, title, and § 1, G I 54/C 95, and KV II, ii, §§ 1-2, G I 55/C 98-99.
80 KV II, i, § 3, G I 55/C 98; Curley renders deurzigtigheid by “penetration.” I follow Joël Ganualt (and Piet Steenbakkers) in translating “intuition” (cf. Spinoza, Oeuvres, I, 264-65)
91 Admittedly, KV sometimes suggests there are four and not three kinds of knowledge. See for example KV II, xxvi, § 1 (G I 108/C 146), where Spinoza speaks of “the fourth kind of knowledge.”
92 KV II, iv, § 1, note a, G I 59/C 102 : “Belief is a strong proof based on reasons, by which I am convinced in my intellect that the thing truly is, outside my intellect, such as I am convinced in my intellect that it is.”
93 KV II, xviii, § 7, G I 87-88/C 127-19.
94 KV II, xix, § 1, G I 88/C 129.
95 EIIP17S, G II 106/C 465.
96 Spinoza employs the term “imagine” (inbeeld) at KV II, xvi, § 7, in his discussion of how certain errors occur in “weak souls” (cf. G I 84/C 125). I do not think however we make any systematic conclusions about the “imagination” on the basis of this isolated occurrence.
97 KV II, xvi, § 5, G I 83/C 124; trans. modified.
100 Matheron, Le Christ, 234-35. One could eventually invoke the example of the “Spanish poet” in EIIP39S, where Spinoza recounts the case of a poet who lost his memory following an illness. After the incident, the poet was such that he “could hardly be said to be a same man,” and Spinoza concludes from this that it can occur that “the human body can […] be changed into another nature entirely different from its own” (G II 240/C 569). Without going into the intricate details of Spinoza’s argument, it suffices to note that this sounds more like a case where
a same body has somehow acquired a different mind and not, as in the doctrine of transmigration of souls, a case where a same mind has acquired a different body.


102 G II 296/C 608.

103 Note in particular that Wachter completely overlooks the fact that, according to Spinoza, this eternal existence “cannot be defined by time or explained through duration” (EVP23S, G II 296/C 608).


105 KV, [Note], 12-14, G I 53/C 96.

106 G I 93/C 133.

107 G I 102/C 140.

108 John 3:3: “Jesus answered and said unto him, ‘Verily, verily I say unto thee, unless a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God.’”

109 EIVP68S, G II 262/C 585.

110 KV I, ix, § 2, G I 48/C 92.

111 KV I, ix, § 3, G I 48/C 92; cf. TTP I G III, 21: “God revealed himself to the Apostles through Christ’s mind, as previously he had revealed himself to Moses by means of a heavenly voice. And therefore Christ’s voice, like the one Moses heard, can be called the voice of God. And in this sense we can also say that God’s Wisdom, that is, a Wisdom surpassing human wisdom, assumed a human nature in Christ.”

112 KV II, xxiv, §9-11, G I 106/C144; KV II, xxii, § 5, note, G I 105/C 139.

113 Compare with TTP VII, G III 103: “Christ […] did not institute laws as a legislator, but taught doctrines as a teacher […].”


115 KV II, xxiv, § 9-11, G I 106/C 144.

116 Cf. KV I, vii, § 1, note, G I 44/C 88: “Regarding the attributes of which God
consists, they are nothing but infinite substances, each of which must, in itself, be infinitely perfect [...]. So far, however, only two of all these infinite attributes are known to us through their essence: Thought and Extension.”

117 See for example KV I, Dialogue I, § 9, G I 31/C 75.


119 G II 60/C 424.

120 G II 71/C 434.


122 KV, [note], § 4, G I 51/C 95.

123 Letter 70, from Schuller, G IV 302/S 938; cf. note by Curley, at C 154, note 5.

124 KV App. II, § 9, G I 119/C 154 (my italics). See also KV, App. II, § 12, G I 120/C 155 (my italics): “[…] we have sufficiently explained what the soul is in general, understanding by this expression not only the Ideas that arise from corporeal modes, but also those that arise from the existence of each mode in the remaining attributes.”

On Appendix II, see also Y. Melamed’s forthcoming “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Thought,” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.


127 On Leibniz’s “quasi-spinozism” in the 1675-1676 *De summa rerum* papers, see my *Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza*, 361-556, and the numerous articles by Mark Kulstad on this topic.