One of the most important and fascinating claims in Spinoza’s philosophical system is the identification of the human mind with a part of God’s infinite intellect. Spinoza says literally “that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, i.e., insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea” (Ethics II, prop. 11, cor.). Spinoza is aware just how counterintuitive (if not outright blasphemous) such a bold assertion could sound to a contemporary reader, so he hastens to add an explicative note (a “scholium”): “Here, no doubt, my readers will come to a halt, and think of many things which will give them pause. For this reason I ask them to continue on with me slowly, step by step, and to make no judgement on these matters until they have read through them all” (Ethics II, prop. 11, schol.). If indeed we continue on with Spinoza, slowly and step by step, and read through the whole of the Ethics, we will see, first, that the identification of the individual mind with a part of God’s infinite intellect, deduced from Spinoza’s basic ontology exposed in the first part of the text (namely, from the distinction between God’s attributes, infinite modes of God’s attributes and finite modes of God’s attributes), takes on a decisive role in the second part, with regard to Spinoza’s epistemology and his theory of truth (cf. Ethics II, prop. 43, schol.). Next, we will find the same identification highlighted at the apex of Spinoza’s system, where he sets out his theory of human blessedness in the fifth and final part of the Ethics. Since the human intellect is part of the divine intellect, when we truly know God and we are therefore affected by love towards God, then that knowledge can be correctly regarded as a finite part of God’s infinite self-knowledge by which God “contemplates himself, with the accompanying idea of himself,” and our love towards God is understood as “part of the infinite love by which God loves himself” (Ethics V, prop. 36 and dem.).

However, the same identification of the human mind with a part of the divine intellect is seriously challenged by a long and complicated scholium in the first part
of the Ethics (prop. 17, schol.). In that scholium Spinoza writes that “God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is really the cause both of the essence and of the existence of things. […] Therefore it must necessarily differ from them both as to its essence and as to its existence. […] But God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore, God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both as to its essence and as to its existence, and cannot agree with it in anything except in name”—as in fact do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal. The correct interpretation of this peculiar scholium is the aim of Alexandre Koyré’s article.

The article was published in 1950 in French. Until then, Spinoza scholarship had been almost unanimous in reading the scholium at face value as a clear-cut affirmation of the absolute heterogeneity of the divine intellect and the human intellect. “God is prior in causality to all things,” Spinoza says. Thus, if intellect pertains to God’s essence, God’s intellect must be a creative intellect, which knows the things before their creation and independently—an intellectus agens. Such a creative intellect obviously could not agree with the human intellect in anything but in its name. In fact, the human intellect is not at all prior to the things understood and does not create its objects of knowledge. The human intellect is rather posterior to the things understood (or, at most, simultaneous with them). Put differently, we understand the nature of our own intellect as inherently intentional, that is, as being always and necessarily intellection of something given. Hence, our intellect must be completely different from an intellect which exists before its objects in such a way that it can create them at will. Koyré’s aim is to demonstrate that such a position, albeit exposed at length by Spinoza in the scholium, was in fact not at all Spinoza’s own position. Quite the contrary, Spinoza is undertaking a reductio ad absurdum of that position. We can see it by the fact that the whole argument begins with a hypothetical “if”: “If will and intellect do pertain to the eternal essence of God, we must of course understand by each of these attributes something different from what men commonly understand.” Actually, according to Spinoza, no intellect pertains to God’s essence, and no intellect pertains to man’s essence either. Rather, God’s infinite intellect, i.e., God’s infinite self-understanding, is a creation that follows from God’s essence with eternal necessity (i.e., it is an “infinite mode”). Equally, the human intellect is a finite part of the same God’s infinite intellect (i.e., it is a “finite mode”) that follows from God’s essence with the same eternal necessity. Hence, the difference between the divine intellect and the human
intellect is not at all a difference between opposite natures. Rather, their difference concerns exclusively the incommensurability between a finite part and an infinite whole. Commentators had thus inadvertently attributed to Spinoza the very claim that Spinoza is devoted to debunking. That is to say, they committed Spinoza to the premise of the deductive chain that was to be refuted—i.e., that an intellect pertains to God’s essence—and to all the absurd consequences which follow from that premise.

The various historians mentioned and criticised by Koyré did however find themselves in good and honourable company. For the first to misunderstand the implications of the scholium was none other than Leibniz. Koyré’s article proved to be decisive for the subsequent development of Spinoza’s French scholarship. His conclusions were confirmed by Martial Gueroult and Ferdinand Alquié. Through Edwin Curley’s English translation of the *Ethics*, they were eventually received by the English-language scholarship. Hence, in a footnote added to the scholium, Curley explicitly mentions Gueroult’s reception of Koyré’s lesson: “It must be emphasized that Spinoza does not himself think that either intellect or will should be ascribed to the essence of God. He is only discussing here what follows from a common view. This has been widely misunderstood.”

The footnote in Curley’s translation has however not been sufficient to spread the message outside the Francophone context. As a matter of fact, traces of the same old error, or even out-and-out repetitions of it, can still be found, for example in Genevieve Lloyd, Susan James and Christopher Martin. Thus, an English translation of Koyré’s article is needed to improve our understanding of a seminal text, namely *Ethics* I, prop. 17, schol., which can shed much light over a crucial topic of Spinoza’s philosophy, dissipating a great and enduring confusion.

*Editorial note*

The footnotes of the article are by Koyré, unless stated otherwise. My footnotes are marked as *Translator’s notes*. For English quotations of Spinoza’s *Ethics* I have used Edwin Curley’s translation, and any departure from that translation is explicitly marked in the footnotes. In his article, Koyré quotes passages of Spinoza’s *Ethics* from Armand Guériton’s French translation. Koyré was however not completely satisfied by Guériton’s translation, which “suffers from exaggerated literalism,” as he puts it. Therefore, he always adds the original Latin text from the Gebhardt Edition in the footnotes. In translating the article, I have removed Koyré’s critical
comments to Guérinot’s translation, since Curley’s translation perfectly matches Koyré’s demands.\textsuperscript{15}

Oberto Marrama  
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières  
Département de philosophie et des arts  
3351, Boul. des Forges, C.P. 500  
Trois-Rivières, QC G9A 5H7  
oberto.marrama@uqtr.ca
II. Translation

In a well-known passage of the *Ethics* (Part I, prop. 17, schol.) Spinoza says that “if will and intellect do pertain to the eternal essence of God, we must of course understand by each of these attributes something different from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and will which would constitute God’s essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, and could not agree with them in anything except the name. They would not agree with one another any more than do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal.”

Spinoza scholars commonly interpret this passage as claiming the firm rejection of any kind of analogy between God and man. It would affirm, they also say, the absolute heterogeneity of God and man and it would establish the impossibility of applying to God any of the concepts which are applied to man.

To cite some characteristic examples, Kuno Fischer says that “if it is possible to speak in general about God’s will and intellect, then between these divine faculties and the human ones there will necessarily be an essential difference, excluding any analogy. They will have nothing in common except their name, but they will truly be as different from each other as the star of the Dog and the dog are. Or even, using the very words of Spinoza, ‘intellect and will, insofar as they are God’s essential properties, must be absolutely different from our intellect and our will and they cannot have anything in common with ours but their name, having with them the same relationship that is between the constellation of the dog and the dog that is the animal that barks.’”

Victor Brochard completely agrees with this reading. When he explains that “the theses of the *Ethics* which seem to be incompatible with the hypothesis of a personal God can be reduced to four main claims”, he presents the fact that with respect to God “his intellect and will have nothing in common with ours, and they do not resemble ours more than the dog that is a heavenly constellation resembles a dog that is a barking animal.”

Victor Delbos argues no differently: “[…] absolutely speaking, God has neither intellect nor will. If one is used to speaking about God’s intellect and will because of linguistic habits, he had better be aware that between the divine intellect and will, on the one hand, and the human intellect and will, on the other hand, there is no closer relationship than the one that is between the dog that is an astrological sign and the dog that is a barking animal.”

We can find a similar interpretation—although not at all identical—in Léon...
Brunschvicg. It begins with the correct remark that, according to Spinoza, an intellect or will which pertained to God’s essence would constitute an attribute. However, he does not draw the consequences which follow from that remark. So, Brunschvicg writes: “a true attribute can be nothing else than an activity which has neither an object, nor an end; which is autonomous and complete; which is subsequently unique, and which finds in its own unity the reason of its eternity and infinity. From time to time, one might name it intellect, or will, or even something else, in the same way in which he could also give a constellation the name of an animal which barks. There is no more difference between the celestial dog and the terrestrial dog than between intellect conceived as an attribute and human intellect.”

An agreement between Spinoza commentators does not come about very often. Moreover, the consensus of four prominent historians, like the ones I cited—and one could add many others—is striking. Unfortunately, it is an agreement which relies on an incorrect interpretation of the passage in question—an interpretation which does not suit either Spinoza’s theory or Spinoza’s text.

If there were absolutely no relationship or resemblance between the divine intellect, i.e., the infinite intellect, and the human intellect, it would mean that the term “divine intellect” or “infinite intellect” would have no sense at all for us, or a metaphorical sense at most—as it does in every theory which denies any analogical relationship between God and man. If this were the case, how could Spinoza not only talk about infinite intellect and determine its ontological status, but also make use of it when talking about what the infinite intellect “perceives” or what “falls under its sphere”? Furthermore, Spinoza does not say that between the divine intellect and the human intellect there is such a weak relationship as the one that is between the dog that is the astrological sign and the dog that is the barking animal. He says a completely different thing. Indeed, if we look closely, he says exactly the opposite. That is, if we conceive the divine intellect as belonging to God’s essence (as the theologians commonly do), then the term “intellect” must mean something very different from what we commonly understand by that word (which is absurd). In fact, between an intellect which constitutes God’s essence (that is, as Brunschvicg correctly saw, an intellect which is an attribute of God) and our intellect there will be no more
relationship than the one that is between the dog that is an astrological sign and the dog that is a barking animal (as the theologians who invented this comparison maintain).24

We can see it clearly: Spinoza’s text is not affirmative, but polemical. It is not an exposition of Spinoza’s own theory, but a *reductio ad absurdum* of the theologians’ traditional theories. This is something which has not been observed by the historians I cited before, hence their error.

Moreover, as far as Spinoza himself is concerned, he does not claim the necessity of conceiving the divine intellect as being something *toto coelo* different from the human intellect. Such a claim, in fact, is nothing but the consequence of the original error of the theologians, who wanted to make the intellect one of God’s *attributes*. If we, together with Spinoza, avoid this error, i.e., the confusion between *thought*—which truly is an *attribute* of God—and *intellect*—which is nothing but a mode of God—, we will avoid at the same time the absurd consequences to which that error leads. Among others, one absurd consequence will be the impossibility of admitting anything but a metaphorical conformity between the divine intellect and the human intellect, that is to say, a conformity identical to the one which exists—or does not exist—between the dog that is a celestial constellation and the dog that is a barking animal. In other words, because of that error we will have to give up every possible analogy between God and man. Thus, we will not be able to say anything at all about God.

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The interpretation that I have just put forward will probably not be accepted without some resistance. Without any doubt, someone could object that it would turn upside down the traditional image of Spinoza, or, at least, that it would noticeably modify it. Moreover, someone could object that this interpretation is formally contradicted by Spinoza himself. Does he not say in the very scholium of proposition 17, where we find the passage regarding dogs, “that neither intellect nor will pertain to God’s nature”? And does he not state, still in the same scholium, that the divine intellect, which is a creative intellect and “is really the cause both of the essence and of the existence of things […] , differs from our intellect both as to its essence and as to its existence, and cannot agree with it in anything except in name”?25

This objection would be conclusive if it did not clash against an insurmountable obstacle. That is, one cannot in fact give a definition of the divine intellect like...
the one which is provided here by Spinoza, and claim at the same time that such intellect does not pertain to God’s nature. It would be a flagrant contradiction. Now, the contradiction will disappear if one admits that the whole scholium has a polemical and critical purpose, and that Spinoza, by making a *reductio ad absurdum*, undertakes to demonstrate that the intellect cannot pertain to God’s *nature* (which means, to God’s *essence*), because, if it did—if it was one of God’s *attributes*, in other words—, it would be a creative intellect, it would have nothing in common with ours, etc… Put differently, it would not be an intellect. Let us examine the text of the scholium, then.

Propositions 16 and 17 aim at establishing absolute determinism, that is, that God acts by virtue of his own nature, necessarily realising everything that follows from his nature. This necessary activity is not subjected to the influence of any cause external to God, and for this reason it must be considered as a *free* activity. This is the only legitimate sense of the notion of divine freedom.

The scholium of proposition 17 is committed to destroying the traditional conception according to which God has a kind of free will. Thanks to this free will, God’s creative action would not be submitted to any rational necessity, but would rather be the effect of a “free decision” (be this decision motivated or not) and of a “choice”. Therefore, according to this conception, God—absolutely speaking—might not have done (and still might not do) what he did, and might have done (and still can do) what he did not do. It is an absurd conception, as Spinoza demonstrates, because it is incompatible with the notion of divine omnipotence. How is it possible to conceive without contradiction an omnipotence that, for fear of getting exhausted, would not produce everything it can produce? How is it possible to conceive an infinite power that would limit itself and turn into being non-infinite by itself? How is it possible to conceive this infinite power as if it were “choosing” only some effects amongst all the possible effects of its actions? Is it not clear that the divine perfection we intend to safeguard by ascribing to God a reserve of unemployed creative power is much better understood by Spinoza’s conception?

But there is something more. The traditional conception is not only erroneous. It is also contradictory and even inconceivable. The reason is that in order to ascribe to God a “free will” and the possibility of “choosing”, one is obliged to attribute to God, and to the *divine nature* as well, an intellect and will analogous to those of man. But this cannot be done, since one is then forced to deny any kind of analogy between God and man, between the human intellect and God’s intellect.


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This is why Spinoza states: “Further, I shall show later [...] that neither intellect nor will pertain to God’s nature.”\(^31\) He says to God’s nature and not simply to God, because if the divine activity was the outcome of a free choice or if God’s actions were determined by free choice, then the intellect and will would have to pertain to God’s nature. That is to say, they would have to pertain to God’s essence, and they would have to be God’s attributes. If that were so, intellect and will would occupy a place within the structure of the divine being which is completely different from the place they occupy within the structure of a human being. In fact, neither intellect, nor will pertain to the essence of human beings. Rather, it is Thought\(^32\) that occupies that place, both in God and man.\(^33\)

The source of the error made by traditional philosophy and theology is very simple. It consists in an error about the consideration of our selves: “I know there are many who think they can demonstrate that a supreme intellect and a free will pertain to God’s nature. For they say they know nothing they can attribute to God more perfect than what is the supreme perfection in us.”\(^34\) We can see it clearly: since philosophers and theologians consider intellect and will to pertain to the human essence, and since they attribute to man a “free will” or a “freedom of choice”, by analogy they attribute them to God too, that is, they consider them to pertain to the divine essence. An erroneous anthropology leads to an erroneous metaphysics. Hence, in order to avoid this error, it is enough to know that man is by no means given a “free will” and that, as I have already said, intellect and will do not constitute man’s essence.

Proceeding with the analysis, we see that the anthropological error, which is transferred to God by analogy, dismantles its own grounding, i.e., it dismantles the same analogy on which the attribution of intellect and will to God (to the divine essence) is based. That is because an intellect which was an attribute would have nothing in common with what we understand by intellect, and “they would not agree with one another any more than do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal.”

In fact, “if intellect pertains [pertained]\(^35\) to the divine nature, it will [would] not be able to be (like our intellect) by nature either posterior to (as most would have it), or else simultaneous with, the things understood, since God is prior in causality to all the things (by the cor. 1 of prop. 16). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is [would be] what it is because it exists [would exist] objectively in that way in God’s intellect. So God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is [would be] really the cause both of the
essence and of the existence of things. This seems also to have been noticed by those who asserted that God’s intellect, will and power are one and the same.”

The claim follows necessarily from the identification of the will and the intellect with the divine essence, and it destroys at the same time any analogy between the divine and the human intellect.

Spinoza continues: “therefore, since [according to this conception] God’s intellect is the only cause of things (viz. as we have shown, both of their essence and of their existence), it must necessarily differ from them both as to its essence and as to its existence. [...] But [according to this conception] God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore, God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs [would differ] from our intellect both as to its essence and as to its existence, and can [could] not agree with it in anything except in name, as we supposed.”

The disagreement between the human and the divine intellect, “both as to their essence and as to their existence, [...] in anything except in name,” applies if—and only insofar as—the latter is identified with the divine essence, or, put otherwise, if—and only insofar as—the latter is conceived as being an attribute of God, which constitutes God’s essence. In fact, it is because the divine intellect is conceived as being an attribute of God that we are led to conceive the contradictory notion of a creative intellect, which subsequently commits us to claiming the absolute heterogeneity of the divine and the human intellect. The absurdity of this final conclusion demonstrates the absurdity of the premise from which we departed.

Conversely, the falsity of the premise invalidates the conclusions which follow from it, i.e., the creative nature of the divine intellect and its heterogeneity with the human intellect.

Notes

1 Original French version “Le chien, constellation céleste, et le chien, animal aboyant”, in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 55° Année, N°1, Jan-Mar 1950, pp. 50-59.
2 Ethics I, prop. 17, schol.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. Emphasis added.
6 This has been pointed out by Mogens Lærke: see Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza,
KOYRÉ’S ARTICLE ON SPINOZA’S DOG: INTRODUCTION & TRANSLATION


13 E. Curley, op. cit.
15 I would like to thank Mogens Lærke (CNRS), Dr Beth Lord (University of Aberdeen) and Balint Kekedi (University of Aberdeen) for their kind and helpful assistance on both the introduction and the translation. I would also like to thank Professor Massimo Mugnai (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa) for his careful reading of the first draft of the whole text.
17 Victor Brochard, Le Dieu de Spinoza, in Études de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne, Paris, 1912, p. 348. See ibid., p. 349: “In the scholium of proposition 17, Part I, Spinoza wants to demonstrate that between the intellect and will of God on the one hand, and the intellect and will of man on the other hand,
there is no resemblance, except for their name. Indeed, between God’s intellect and ours there is a deep difference: the latter is posterior to its object, whereas in God the intelligible and the intellect are one and the same thing, as was glimpsed by some philosophers.”

18 Victor Delbos, *Le Spinozisme*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1926, p. 69ff. Delbos adds to the passage quoted: “As the *Ethics*, the *Cogitata* also uses this comparison (II, ch. XI), saying that there is no more of a relationship, or that perhaps there is even less. Human intellect, in fact, can only apply itself to those objects which are imposed upon it, whereas God’s intellect, or, better said, the Thinking of God is the cause of the representation of the objects that it comprehends.” See also *ibid.*, p. 72ff.


21 Such as, for example, the system of Moses Maimonides (see *Guide for the Perplexed*, p. I, ch. 56; p. III, ch. 20). The passage from the *Cogitata* quoted by Delbos accounts for this point of view and not for Spinoza’s own. Contrary to what Delbos (and others) think, a creative intellect is an absurdity for Spinoza.

22 See *Ethics* I, prop. 16, dem.; II, prop. 7, schol.

23 As far as I know, the only historian who has remarked that Spinoza’s rejection of any analogy between the divine intellect and the human intellect is only valid for an intellect (and a will) which is an attribute of God, is Lewis Robinson, who, in his excellent *Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik*, Leipzig, 1928, says for example at p. 186: “This fundamental difference is valid only for that intellect (or will) which constitutes God’s essence.” See the commentary on the scholium of prop. 17, pp. 180-190.

24 According to Wolfson (*op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 317), the comparison in question comes from Philo Judaeus (*De Plantatione Noe*, XXXVII, 155) and can be found in Maimonides (*Millot ha-Higgayon*, ch. 13) and in Averroes (*Epitome of Isagoge*, Hebr. trans. p. 2b). Robinson (*op. cit.*, p. 184, n. 2) mentions its use by Christoph Scheibler, *Metaphysica*, p. 40.


26 The creative intellect, which would differ from ours with regard both to its essence and to its existence, is precisely the intellect that is conceived as pertaining
to God’s nature.

27 *Ethics* I, prop. 17: “God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.” See also cor. 1: “From this it follows […] that there is no cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the perfection of his nature.”

28 See the illuminating commentary on Spinoza’s conception by Léon Brunschvicg, *op. cit.*, p. 83ff.

29 Spinoza’s criticism addresses both Descartes and traditional theology. Wolfson (*op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 312ff.) argues that Spinoza has the discussions about the problem of God’s omnipotence by Maimonides in mind (*Guide for the Perplexed*, II, ch. 13, 14, 18, 25) and especially by Abraham Herrera (*Sha’ar ha Shamayim*, III, 6).

Robinson (*op. cit.*, p. 180, note 1) links Spinoza’s text to a passage by Pereira, *De communis rerum naturae principium*, 1588, p. 571. In fact, the problem is traditional and discussions of it can also be found in Scheibler, *Metaphysica*, book II, ch. 3; in Heerebord, *Meletemata*, p. 358ff. and in Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. XXX, 17. Suarez, in turn, cites Saint Thomas Aquinas, Albert le Grand, etc.

30 *Ethics* I, prop. 17, schol.

31 *Ibid*.

32 The sense of the term “thought” has been somehow intellectualised since the 17th century, to the point that it is quite difficult to grasp, at least immediately, the extent of the radical distinction made by Descartes (and Spinoza) between *thought* and *intellect*, *cogitatio* and *intellectus* (see E. Gilson, *Discours de la méthode, texte et commentaire*, Paris, 1939, pp. 165-167, 302-307, 311, 361).

33 It should not be forgotten that it is the problem of the relationship between mind and body, as it was formulated by Descartes that nourished Spinoza’s thought—along with many other things, of course—, and that it is the unity of the human being, who is a thinking and an extended being at one and the same time that provided Spinoza with the model according to which he conceived the unity of the divine being. In fact, the relationship between thought and extension is exactly the same in man as in God.

34 *Ethics* I, prop. 17, schol (emphasis added).

35 Translator’s note: Spinoza uses the present tense in the original Latin text. In my translation of Koyré’s article I will follow the author’s method, that is, putting in square brackets the conditional form of the relevant verbs, since it fits better the meaning of the passage quoted. I also put in square brackets the explanatory comments added by Koyré himself.


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Ethics I, prop. 17, schol. (emphasis added). Once again, this is a polemical passage and not an exposition of Spinoza’s point of view, contrary to what Delbos thought, op. cit., p. 72ff.

Translator’s note: here I have modified Curley’s translation, since he identifies the subject of the phrase as being God and subsequently translates with “he/his”. The subject of the phrase is rather God’s intellect, which, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, is the cause of both the essence and of the existence of things, and must necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and to its existence.

Ethics I, prop. 17, schol. (emphasis added).

Recall that, according to Spinoza’s theory, God’s intellect, i.e., the infinite intellect, is not creative and is not “prior” to the things. The intellect—the whole intellect—has a completely different function, i.e., to show things as they really are: “ostedere res uti sunt.”