

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY¹

THE ancient and beautiful city of Prague is one of the few spots in Central Europe where liberal principles are still espoused and where opposing views as to the function of government and the proper end of man can be freely aired, though not without some ominous reflections of the flames of social wars elsewhere. And since the invitation to attend the Congress stressed the ancient ideal of philosophy as a director of man's efforts toward the good life, it was natural that the social problems of the Continent and the intellectual and spiritual issues which they raised should be, explicitly and implicitly, the chief topic of discussion. More than any previous Congress the one just concluded was characterized by an atmosphere vibrating with the notes of national and social conflict. What was surprising to me was that even in the sections devoted to "pure" philosophy, the same tension was to be found. Not explicitly, of course, but in the social implications which allegiance to strict logic was made to develop, and in the sad sight of leading students of scientific method being refugees from political hysteria. Once before, in 1869 after the Austro-Prussian war, a philosophical congress was held at Prague, called to protest against the shame and madness of another war. May the present Congress not have an aftermath as fatal as did the convocation half a century ago.

The Congress was formally opened in the impressive Hall of Parliament by Minister of Education Krčmář. He welcomed the delegates in the name of the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, the patron of the Congress, who because of illness was unable to attend. Dr. Beneš, Minister for Foreign Affairs, then greeted the delegates, and expressed the hope that the Congress would have an abiding message for a strife-torn world. He underscored the social bearings of philosophy, and declared himself to be opposed to every form of social mysticism and opportunism which aimed simply at the exercise of power. The crisis of democracy he believed to be really a crisis of men, not of the institution, and gracefully ex-

¹ Prague, September 2-7, 1934. This report is based on my attendance at all the five plenary sessions and as many special sessions, information from friends who attended sections at which I was unable to be present, and the reading of the papers I was unable to hear in person.

pressed his regret that practical tasks prevented him from assuming his rightful seat in the Congress as a professor of philosophy. Additional addresses of welcome by officers of the city and university were succeeded by the delivery of greetings from the various countries represented. The absence of any delegation from Russia was very conspicuous. And after the many smooth words of universal good-will expressed by representatives from countries where tolerance is not a virtue, the appearance of Professor Reichenbach, formerly of Berlin, as a spokesman for Turkey was ironical as well as dramatic. This formal session was brought to a close after Professor Rádl read two letters he had received as organizer of the Congress: one from Samuel Alexander, who offered age, deafness, and the long distance as the reasons for his absence; and one from Edmund Husserl, who sketched the mission of philosophy as the search for apodictic certitude.

I

The first plenary session was devoted to a discussion of the limits of the natural sciences, and the two contrasting views offered by the principal speakers were representative of fundamental differences which divided the delegates throughout the many sessions. Professor Bachelard argued clearly and well that there are no theoretical limits to natural knowledge, that so-called insoluble problems are badly formulated issues, and that science is most active at the points where it is pushing back the momentary boundaries of our knowledge. Professor Driesch, on the other hand, insisted that philosophy, as the study of "primary meanings," lays bare the unalterable axioms for every science. He thus claimed that the sciences can not ultimately dispense with the causal principle, Euclidean space, and some kind of "soul-principle" to explain the difference between the inorganic and the organic.

In the discussion that followed, those who hold that knowledge of the type found in the natural sciences need not be supplemented by something else, seem to me to have had the better of the argument. Reichenbach effectively criticized Driesch's views on geometry and physics, and Carnap easily disposed of the doctrine of entelechies as fatuous.

Indeed, to my mind those whose special domain is logic and scientific method had consistently the best of the argument, and in the special sessions devoted to logical analysis conducted themselves with the minimum of emotional by-play. The bitter consequences of loose speculation were apparent on the face of European events to all who cared to see, and many of those attending the Congress found the only road of intellectual salvation in the painstaking, if

sometimes myopic, dissection of logical problems. The prolonged applause which greeted the closing words of Professor Lukasiewicz's technical paper on modern logic, that he was a foe of all "verschwommenen 'wahren' Begriffe," was expressive of the fears and hopes of all those who realized the social bearings of the positions the speaker was attacking.

Adherents of the position of the *Wiener Kreis*, together with similar-minded thinkers from France, Germany, and Poland, dominated the meetings devoted to logic, and both as individuals and as a group they were to me the most interesting and vital philosophers present. There was ample opportunity to judge them, for two days before the Congress they had held a *Verkonferenz* in preparation for an International Congress for the Unity of Science, to be held at Paris in 1935; they were therefore present in full force. Most of the papers read at these meetings were technical, but they were received by large and indefatigable audiences. The perhaps disproportionate amount of space and enthusiasm that this report devotes to the logical papers is thus a consequence both of my own interests and my evaluation of the sessions I attended.

The position of the *Wiener Kreis* was expounded by Professor Carnap and Dr. Neurath. Carnap developed his views in opposition both to psychologism and phenomenology, and maintained that all propositions of science are capable of being expressed in the language of physics. In the brief time at his disposal, the import of this doctrine was not developed, and the delicate problem of the autonomy of the several sciences was not touched upon. The programmatic character which the positivistic theses possess at present was felt by many to be an obstacle to their adequate discussion. But interestingly enough, the Dominican Father Bochenski hailed the movement as a continuation of the Aristotelian tradition and as compatible with neo-Thomist doctrines. On the other hand, Professor Ingarden, speaking as a phenomenologist of long standing, admitted that the existence of a distinctive "Wesensschau" was problematic, but urged that the positivists have been too ready to assume that there is no such thing. Incidentally, he took pains to make clear that the *Existenzphilosophie* which has recently been associated with phenomenology is not a legitimate offspring.

In his discussion of the nature of "wholes" Professor Schlick illustrated the technique of operational definitions. He argued that whether something is to be regarded as a "whole" or as a "sum," is not a question of fact, but of the appropriateness of definition; it is convenience and the selection of properties studied which determines whether the behavior of a "whole" is to be described in terms of its "parts" or not. I do not think Schlick defined clearly

enough the issues he was discussing, and in dismissing Drieschian entelechies he seemed to me to have also thrown out the baby with the bath. He contributed very little to understanding what scientific need the concept of "whole" aims to meet—a need which often is a genuine one as the discussion helped to indicate. In his paper, Professor Morris developed a more inclusive form of pragmatism which would give an important place to the analyses of the positivists, but which would supplement their purely formal studies on the nature of symbols by considering the social and biological contexts in which the latter function. It was refreshing to find an American pragmatist accepting the results of modern logical techniques and offering a program for employing them in the interests of an adequate theory of meaning.

In a long address, Professor Reichenbach sketched the contents of his forthcoming book on the theory of probability, a theory which he has developed independently and in great technical detail, but which in essentials is familiar to all students of Peirce. The application of the theory to solve the problem of induction was also indicated by him, and this too is along familiar lines. But Reichenbach's views apparently took his hearers by surprise, judging by the nature of the discussion that followed; and this may testify either to the inaccessibility of Peirce to European students, or to the provincialism of their reading habits. However that may be, Reichenbach's book will, in my opinion, prove to be of first-rate importance and value to all students of scientific method.

Serious obstacles in the way of logical positivism were discussed by Professor Ingarden in a challenging paper. He urged that the metalogical propositions of the *Wiener Kreis* are either meaningless, if meaning consists in verifiability by physical processes, or contradictory. And he insisted on the need for distinguishing meaning from verifiability. In his reply, Carnap agreed that some of the criticisms advanced were fatal, but declared that the formulation of positivism which Ingarden took as the basis for his analysis no longer was representative. The bearings of logical analyses on the social sciences were expounded in an authoritative manner by Dr. Kaufmann, who combines in a fascinating way remarkable competence in the diverse fields of economics, jurisprudence, and the foundations of mathematics. He showed how pseudo-problems in the social sciences can be eliminated by applying a rigorous logical technique, but cautioned his hearers against using Occam's Razor so as to cut the jugular vein of philosophic inquiry. The warning seems to me to have been a timely one, and the tendency against which it is directed one of the dangerous enemies with which the *Wiener Kreis* has to fight. For the price of a precipitate dismissal of genuine difficulties as meaningless is only too often sterility.

I can mention only in passing several other papers classified as belonging to this group: Professor Schiller's familiar thesis, which he supported by numerous questionable illustrations, that no absolute exactness can be found either in philosophy or science, and which called forth from the gentle and courteous Carnap the remark that it was about time philosophers stopped repeating errors which had disappeared from the textbooks a hundred years ago; Professor Meyer's attempt to supplant mechanism by holism by viewing physical laws as limiting cases of biological laws, an attempt which had some points of interest, though it was unclear in import; Father Walker's timely raising of the question as to the ontological facts behind physical theories; Mr. Hemens' absurd claim that modern science is in consonance with Hegelian philosophy, and that its fundamental truths have been anticipated by the latter; and Professor Flewelling's version of absolutes and invariants as fictions of the understanding which are only pragmatically true, and his curious suggestion that in personalism was to be found the solution of the ancient problem of the universal and particular.

II

The rôle of the descriptive and normative points of view in the social sciences was the theme proposed for the second plenary session. If not much light was thrown on the subject, there can be no doubt that considerable heat was generated. Professor Hellpach of Heidelberg, a former Social Democrat and minister of education, pontifically laid down the thesis that *das Volk* is the central subject-matter of sociology, and that common descent and common purposes are constitutive marks of a *Volk*. From this norm for the social sciences he drew the interesting conclusion that every genuine culture is intolerant toward all others. The murmurs of protest from the audience at these words almost drowned out the speaker's voice. And after this performance, it was more than a relief to hear Professor Smith's eloquent condemnation of the intolerance and brutality which characterize the fascist states. He made a stirring call for harnessing the free imagination of man to the services of the norms of science and human welfare. He extolled the American social and philosophical scene for the large rôle which tolerance and informed imagination play in it, and generously interpreted the well-known fact-grubbing tendencies of so many American social scientists as an implicit commitment to scientific standards in their researches.

Professor Smith recognized that his paper was something less than a contribution to the explicit theme of the session, but declared that he was compelled to alter his original essay because of unusual

circumstances.² The procession of German exiles who rose to express their dissent from Hellpach's doctrines and their adherence to ideals of humanity now a heresy in Germany, was a poignant drama. Professor Warbeke's perhaps innocent remark that philosophy can not as such be democratic or marxist, and that even Plato had condemned democracy, was greeted with ear-deafening applause from the German delegates. But to me, at any rate, Professor Hellpach represented just that type of obscurantism which Dr. Beneš had condemned much earlier; and as the discussion showed, neither he nor his supporters were able to give any intelligible account of the concepts they bandied about so freely.

No less obscure were some of the other papers read at the special section devoted to the problem of norms. Professor Emge found that the central inquiry for every philosophy ought to be "what-is-one's proper-concern." But to understand the nature of man in his determinate situation in nature, one must possess a non-discursive grasp on the "whole" in which man is embedded. Professor Wenzl argued that the absence of spirituality in present-day society is due to the disappearance of absolute values. Professor Draghicesco found that the scientific methods of the natural sciences are inapplicable to the social ones, because the subject-matter of the latter is dominated by ends and purposes rather than by antecedent causes. Perhaps the least unsatisfactory paper was Dr. Šules' distinction between law and morals, wherein he attempted to mediate between the claims of extreme positivists and idealists. But my chief impression was that of very muddled waters indeed, which these discussions succeeded in muddling still further.

In the related section devoted to the theory of values, Professor Hartmann consumed two out of the three hours allotted to all the papers in expounding his familiar doctrine of absolute, eternal values. It was, as is usual with him, an impressive-sounding address, though I think none of the basic premisses upon which his entire argument rests were adequately considered, so that those who hold to a naturalistic, functional theory of values were surely left unconvinced. Professor Laird also defended a predicative theory of the good, according to which goodness is a predicate applying directly to objects and is not essentially related to appetites or consciousness. "I have to show that the affective theory is insufficient," he declared. "And I submit it is plainly so." But although he expanded this statement, it is, I submit, not much of an argument. Professor Krusé in his paper urged that a melioristic ethics has close affinities with ethical realism, on the ground that the former

² These circumstances were created by what appears to be the forced withdrawal of Professor Kelsen's paper.

implies a potential coöperativeness on the part of reality with human effort. I am not convinced, however, that such an argument could not easily be made to prove almost any thesis.

III

The relation between religion and philosophy was the theme of the third plenary and several special sessions. Professor Przywara expounded the Augustinian tradition of his Church with intense eloquence and noble zeal. He argued that with respect to subject-matter, method, and point of departure, a mystic religion is presupposed by every philosophy. The key to his address was St. Augustine's statement that if one *knows* the object of one's belief, it can not be God one knows. Every discursive philosophy has its roots in earthly things, and is inferior to, but dependent upon, a transcendental religion. By contrast, Professor Brunschvicg's learned paper was a highly sophisticated delineation of a unitary religion on a philosophical basis, whose corner stone is the knowledge and love of truth.

Impressive though Przywara was as a man, the discussion indicated that he carried little conviction to most of his hearers. He was criticized for converting the problem of the relation between religion and philosophy into the very different one of the relation between *his* religion and philosophy; and the suggestion was made that the question could be best treated by considering the relation between experience and knowledge. Dr. Neurath, as the chief propagandist for the *Wiener Kreis*, scandalized a part of his audience by agreeing boldly with Przywara that traditional philosophy was a secularized theology, and by offering the to him incompatible alternatives of theology and traditional philosophy on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the other. Judging from the protests he called forth, Neurath touched a tender spot on many a philosopher's skin: his bomb-shell utterance was roundly denounced, and the "scientific" character of traditional philosophy was vehemently defended.

In the special sessions, Professor Chevallier declared that the modern ills of man are due to his loss of faith in absolute values, to his following Protagoras rather than Plato. He recommended taking man's finite nature, not as a measure of all things, but as a clue to a transcendental reality. Professor Lossky undertook to show that the Christian world-view offers an admirable synthesis of opposite poles of thought in metaphysics, value theory, and the philosophy of social life. Professor Shebbeare found that popular religion as a constructive faith has a more vital appeal than Hegel's philosophy of religion, which finds God only retrospectively in achieved his-

tory. And Professor S. Frank discovered in the present collapse of religious belief a crisis of rationalism; he believed it was an opportune occasion for the rebirth of a negative theology in the form of a mystic knowledge of the inexpressible unity of being.

With some negligible exceptions, the outcome of the studies in the sociology of religion was worlds removed from the minds of those who participated in these sessions. Faith, belief, spirituality, are things which were conceived as growing in a social and economic vacuum; there was little recognition that religion too has a material basis or that the ills of mankind are the products of things other than spiritual conflicts. Is it too much to expect that philosophers should not discourse upon religion as if they were preachers, and that they should discuss the conditions of its growth, its characteristics and crises, in much the same spirit as a naturalist studies a plant? To me, at any rate, the evangelical tone of most of the papers was an intellectually depressing experience.

IV

The fourth plenary session was given over to the discussion of the crisis of democracy, and was supplemented by four additional afternoon sessions. This plenary session was the longest and the noisiest of all. Professor Bodrero naturally defended the fascist state. He analyzed the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, to show that the individualistic capitalism and the lust for private gain to which they gave birth are the sources of our contemporary evils. On the other hand, in the Italian fascist state he found the single alternative to the crass materialism of our civilization. But he admitted, very disarmingly, that the ideal of a corporate state will require many generations before it can be adequately embodied.

Defenders of democracy were not lacking, especially French ones. Thus Professor Basch and M. Barthélemy shouted their belief in a progressive humanity with roof-raising voices and to the accompaniment of passionate stamping of feet. They held it was possible for an individual to develop so as to live in harmony with, and not in fear of, the state; and the brutal egoism of the middle ages was prophesized as the consequence of a fascist organization of society. The abstention of the German delegates from this debate was very conspicuous; their behavior proved once more that discretion is the better part of valor.

In a more dispassionate mood, Professor Montague made a careful analysis of the weaknesses of contemporary democracy. He offered a plan to qualify present-day practises with desirable features taken from fascist and communist programs. His suggestion was to create within capitalistic society "island communities" run on

fascist-communist principles. Because of his choice of language, there was some risk that many in the audience would mistake Montague for an exponent of fascism, and Professor Smith attempted to make clear the fundamentally democratic nature of his countryman's views. While Professor Montague believed in the practicality of his plan, the time was much too brief for him to prove his point, and the general feeling was that the utopia he proposed was inadequate to meet modern problems.

The afternoon sessions devoted to the same theme contained a miscellany of papers. Professor Feldkeller of Berlin distinguished himself by offering a heroic philosophy of history, in agreement with the politics of the day at home. Every philosophy has a political tendency, he declared, and so-called pure philosophy is simply middle-class philosophy. (Shades of Stalin!) Professor Kozak saw the crisis of democracy as due to the resurgence of naturalism, which he identified with nineteenth-century amoralism, popular Darwinism, and fatalistic Marxism. M. Barthélemy argued that it is starvation which has created the mentality so fatal to democracy, and declared that the alternative to a democratic state is tyranny. Dr. J. Fischer of Prague in a well-reasoned paper argued that the democratic ideal requires the subordination of economics to social control, and thus is not incompatible with socialism. Professor Morrow discussed the state of contemporary liberalism, and found that though concessions must be made to its critics the heart of traditional liberalism is sound, i.e., that the individual is the chief source of value, the state is merely an instrument for securing his needs, and that the practice of reason is the strongest support of the social order. Professor Lavergne offered an interesting solution to the difficulties of present forms of parliamentary government in the form of a double universal suffrage: each individual would vote once as a consumer and once as a producer. But how such a scheme could be implemented within the present framework of industrial organization was not considered by him. And finally Professor Rougier offered the principle that the ruler is responsible to the ruled as the criterion for distinguishing authoritative from democratic states. He acknowledged some of the advantages of dictatorial government, but also pointed out the high price which must be paid for them: constant danger of panics, inflexibility of policy, and the disappearance of scientific objectivity. The authoritative state, he concluded, turns away from the Olympian deities in order to worship at the altar of the dark Chthonic gods.

V

“The mission of philosophy” was the theme for the final plenary session, and in the light of the papers and discussions of the preceding days it was perhaps not to be expected that a clear answer would be given. Professor Orestano, replacing Croce, who for unexplained reasons did not come, characterized the past century as having an abundance of grandiose philosophical theories, and the present one as a period of intense criticism. Italian philosophy, he believed, is critical in a sense far beyond Kant, for according to it the categories are transitory expressions of the spirit and need of the times. However, philosophy is to be neither fascist, Marxist, or liberal, but the pursuit of a single truth. The mission of philosophy is to fortify the soul, and by combining criticism with synthetic hypotheses to reveal new values.

As the second speaker, Professor Utitz affirmed philosophy to be a genuine science, though not a “mere” science—for it has a vital message for “life.” But the philosopher can not always embody his philosophy in his own person, for we are all sufferers from the limitations of finitude. Without having to subject its concepts to experimental control, the task of philosophy is to disclose the laws of the understanding. I must confess I was unable to get any clear idea from Professor Utitz what he believed the task of philosophy to be. I regret to say that in his case, as in so many others, the chief object of his address seemed to be edification, not understanding.

In the afternoon sections devoted to this topic, Professor Lalande suggested that the essential task of contemporary philosophy is to make clear to the masses that the evolutionism of the nineteenth century, in which he too found the seeds of barbarism in present-day politics, has no scientific basis. Professor Conger, fresh from a visit to Asia, believed that in the development of the age-old idea of man as a microcosm, a fruitful field can be found for coöperative effort between the east and the west. And according to Professor Salomaa, the task of contemporary philosophy is to formulate a new critique of reason. On a somewhat different theme, Dr. Zollschan argued that the philosophy one professes is not racially determined, although there are native tendencies in each man which lead him to adopt a definite outlook. In the discussion, Professor Meyer of Hamburg defended the racial theories of the Third Reich, and perhaps only the lateness of the hour and the fatigue of the audience saved the day for law and order. And this report would not be complete without mention of Professor Heyde’s surprising discovery that while there was such a thing as a national science, in the sense that each nation occupies itself with characteristic problems, all

national boundaries are wiped out when the issue of the truth of solutions is raised.

Some historical papers were included in this section. Dr. Löwith found in Nietzsche the philosopher most expressive of our times, and then turned a complete somersault by declaring that Nietzsche's writings were both opportune and inopportune. Professor Kraus traced the history of German philosophy in Bohemia from Bolzano through Brentano, and showed in an interesting manner that the tendency has been to base philosophy on psychology and an empirical method. Finally, Professor Fung briefly indicated the content of contemporary philosophy in China as an interpretation of its classical thinkers and institutions in terms of current problems.

VI

The session devoted explicitly to the theory of knowledge contained some papers of interest, and was refreshing if only for the variety of topics discussed and because the favorite horses of traditional epistemology ran only seldom. Professor Habermann made an ambitious and worthwhile attempt to interpret causal connections in chemistry in terms of probability relations, and incidentally developed the topology of chemical behavior. Professor Pollak discussed the ontological status of qualities and truth, and arrived at a watered-down version of objective relativism. Only a hair separates truth from error on these points, but Professor Pollak seemed to me to be often far removed from the side of the angels. Professor Michaltschew wrote what is to me a highly amusing piece, in which he compared Rehmke's philosophy with dialectical materialism. He discovered that they have twenty points in common, but also important differences. The points of difference happen to be fundamental, while the similarities are those which can be found between any two realistic views of the world. Professor Watson examined Whitehead's philosophy of nature as expounded in *Concept of Nature*, and defended it against some imaginary critics. And Professor Petronievics sketched his metaphysics, which is a monadology developed in the grand manner, and often reminiscent of the macroscopic atom so well known to readers of Professor Northrop's writings.

VII

A few papers on psychology, pedagogy, and esthetics remain to be reported. Without analyzing the claims of opposing schools of thought, or trying to mediate between them, the proper subject-matter of psychology was identified by Dr. Brunswik as the study of intensional activities of the mind. Professor Ramul made some

worthwhile points on the dependence of history upon psychology, although he did not state clearly the type of psychological investigation which is relevant to the historian's task. Professor Robin contributed some wise words on the teaching of philosophy and the contents of philosophical curricula, and saw in the translating and expounding of philosophical texts an important way to develop the philosophical spirit. Professor Givanovitch achieved the unbelievable by compressing into three pages a complete system of philosophy, including an elaborate system of education. And in a suggestive essay Dr. Mukařovský approached the analysis of art objects as semeological facts, as signs which are communicative as well as autonomous or non-transitive, differing in this last respect from the signs employed in the sciences.

VIII

A report of the Congress just closed is hardly possible without at the same time offering an estimate, and thus perhaps revealing more about the reporter than the reported. It is therefore advisable that I summarize my impressions scattered throughout these pages and state baldly my reactions. About the fructifying and inspirational value of the papers and discussions it is surely too early to speak. I believe that some of the essays submitted are significant contributions to philosophy. But as a whole, I do not think the intellectual level of the present Congress reached the standards set by the two preceding ones. Perhaps it is the selection of topics, perhaps the changed social situation throughout the world, which is to blame. But whatever the reason, a majority of the papers were simply occasions for despair to all those who do not view philosophy as a substitute for music and poetry as expressions of the emotions. There was a woeful lack of clarity, of analysis, of appeal to logic and empirical findings. There was an abundance of oratory without a compensating abundance of integrated vision. And without either a sound method or a reasonable objective, what claim has philosophy upon the attention of mankind?

The mechanism of the Congress was almost everything that could be asked for. The organizing committee, and especially Professor Rádl, state, city, and university officers, and even the gods who control the weather, went out of their way to make the week spent in Prague comfortable and interesting. The beautiful and historic city provided an admirable opportunity for all those who cared to, to enjoy the sights, smells, and sounds of a majestic past marvellously preserved in modern settings. There was an interesting publishers' exhibit of recent books on philosophy, although America was represented most inadequately; while antiquarians

could examine books and manuscripts from the libraries of Hus, Komensky, Bolzano, and Brentano. And there were a fortunate few who were conducted by Dr. Škrach through the intricacies of the Masaryk archives and the delights of the President's private library. Occasions were also created for the members of the Congress to meet one another in a more intimate way; at a tea at the Společenský Klub, at a garden party given by Dr. and Mrs. Beneš in the beautiful gardens and corridors of the Černín Palace, and at a reception given by Dr. Alice Masaryk in the Hradčany Castle.

Naturally, there were difficulties, remediable and irremediable. The lack of a universal language was a sad handicap to those whose linguistic upbringing was provincial. American and English delegates were at a special disadvantage, for English was rarely spoken and more seldom understood. For this reason papers read in English found few to discuss them. In the allotment of time to papers and discussions wise counsel did not always prevail. As already mentioned, one paper consumed at least two out of the three hours devoted to three addresses; and in another afternoon session, which began at four and for which six papers were scheduled, the fourth paper was not reached until eight o'clock. In general, the program was too crowded, many papers were too long for ordinary endurance, and the discussions frequently were independent addresses. It was not unusual for delegates to advertise beforehand their own lecture in commenting on someone else's paper. Speakers frequently overstayed their time, and the amusing play of the Oxford Congress, in which the impatient applause of the audience at the speaker's failure to heed the chairman's warning is mistaken for a grant of additional time, was staged with gusto several times.

At the closing session it was decided to hold the Ninth International Congress at Paris in 1937, three hundred years after the publication of Descartes' *Discourse*. Henri Bergson was invited to act as its honorary chairman.

One of the last resolutions to be proposed was introduced by Professor Montague. It reads: "The philosophers gathered from many lands in this Eighth International Congress do solemnly reaffirm the faith of their great predecessors in the liberty of thought and conscience, and the right of all men to express freely the opinions which they believe to be true." It was a gallant gesture made on behalf of all those persecuted in many lands, and was adopted by a large majority without discussion. Some silently voted against it, some did not vote at all, and the Italian delegation voted for it with enthusiasm.

ERNEST NAGEL.