Journal of Business Ethics Education 2(1): 71-96.
© 2005 NeilsonJournals Publishing.

Teaching Ethics: A Classroom Model

Jim Wishloff
The University of Lethbridge

Abstract. An approach to ethical inquiry that overcomes the profound limitation emotivism places on honest moral discourse is developed. The method is introduced by first of all identifying the place which ethics properly assumes in a hierarchy of academic disciplines. Next, venerable traditions in normative ethics are summarized and a necessary order among them is posited. After reviewing what does not constitute sufficient warrant for our moral positions, it is proposed that the ultimate justification for our normative determinations be found in our worldviews. A classroom model is presented and its use demonstrated. The paper concludes by calling for a greater willingness on the part of all management educators to engage in the needed dialogue.

Keywords: ethical theory, decision-making model, metaphysics and worldview.

1. Introduction

"What Ever Happened to Ethics?" screams the *Time* magazine cover. But the issue is not referring to Enron, WorldCom, Tyco et al. The publication date is May 15, 1987 and rampant white collar crime (insider trading, money laundering, and green mail) is being bemoaned. The obvious question this raises is why has so little changed in the intervening years, particularly when one considers the effort that has been expended on business ethics education in this period? The thesis put forward here is that education in applied ethics, in this case business ethics, has not taken hold because it does not probe deeply enough. Our achievements in business ethics education are halting because we refuse to go to the conceptual foundations of matters. When we do, what serious flaws do we find and, more importantly, what can we do to repair them?[1]

The legacy of scientism (Adler, 1988), the metaphysical belief that the scientific method is the only way to know reality, includes emotivism in ethical thought (Adler, 1941). This is the belief that all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of attitude or feeling (preferences). MacIntyre (1984) claims that emotivism has become embodied in our culture so that even if people do not avow this moral relativism, they think talk and act as if it were true.

1. The depth of our intellectual failure is acknowledged by Ghoshal (2005) in a recent article. In the piece, published posthumously, Ghoshal not only offers a diagnosis that gets to the root of our problems but he courageously holds accountable both those responsible for purveying an ideology that denies that we are even moral beings and those who have seen fit to close shop around it.

Subscribers are granted a licence to make 1 copy of the paper for personal use only. Apart from this licenced copy, none of the material protected by the copyright notice can be reproduced or used in any form either electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any other information recording or retrieval system, without prior written permission from the owner(s) of the copyright. For multiple copy orders and reprint permissions contact the JBEE Publishing Editor, pneilson@neilsonjournals.com. All rights reserved. © 2005 NeilsonJournals Publishing.

This state of affairs raises two concerns. The first is what it means practically. If we seriously hold the position that right is whatever is preferred, then we will have to accept whatever the powerful will ushers in, for this is what its possessor prefers. This is nothing other than nihilism (from the Latin *nihil* "nothing"), a rejection of all moral principles. But this means the annihilation (from the Latin *annihilare*, "reduce to nothing") of everything. Of course, at any point such utter destruction may remain only a possibility as goodness and not evil is chosen. Without an adequate foundation (Brown, 1996; Rist, 1999) for such moral choices, however, the very existence of a stable social order is in question.

The second issue is the matter of what happens to moral discourse. If values are merely preferences, then any attempt at dialogue about moral matters can be cut off completely with the exclamation, "That's just your opinion". At least one eminent scholar (Etizioni, 1989) has written candidly about his confrontation in the classroom with just this attitude. "I clearly had not found a way to help classes of MBAs see that there is more to life than money, power, fame and self-interest."

How can the educator of management students proceed in the face of this reality? Is it possible to provide prospective managers with an education that equips them morally in an enduring way?

This paper, drawing on the author's two decades of experience teaching ethics to management students, argues that it is possible to have honest, open and fruitful dialogue in normative issues even in an age of extreme skepticism. This success is predicated on the development of an overarching framework for inquiry and its use in the classroom.

The paper sets out this approach to ethical inquiry in the following manner. First, drawing on the work of philosopher Larry Azar, ethics is situated in a renewed understanding of how the disciplines of higher education fit together. That is, the place of ethics in a sound ordering of intellectual studies is presented. The importance of developing an adequate and comprehensive metaphysics[2], as well as the ineluctability of making such intellectual commitments, is stressed. This metaphysical questioning culminates in a worldview. The characteristics of worldviews are discussed, as well as the criteria for their assessment. Ethical inquiry proper is then addressed. The point is made that ethical theorizing includes not only an explication of what we must do to be moral (normative ethics) but also requires that reasons be provided for those normative determinations (meta-ethics). Venerable traditions in normative ethics are summarized and a necessary order among them is posited. After reviewing what does not constitute sufficient warrant for our moral positions, the conclusion is reached that the ultimate justification for these positions can only be found in the

2. Metaphysics was the word assigned to books Aristotle wrote after his books on physics. What is beyond the physical or what can be learned about being after the physical properties of things in reality have been investigated. Metaphysics is the discipline that seeks to uncover these transphysical principles. It is the "science which takes as its subject being precisely as such, and those things which belong to being in virtue of its own nature, namely, being's essential attributes." (Anderson, 1953, p. 19).

metaphysical basis of our thought. A classroom model that translates these ideas for educational use is then presented and the approach is demonstrated using two brief examples. The paper concludes by summarizing the method and calling for a greater willingness on the part of all management educators to engage in the needed dialogue.

It should be evident from this outline that the paper will survey a very broad swath of the philosophical landscape. This breadth of coverage is necessary in order for the model of inquiry to be presented in its fullness. Given this aim of providing the complete structural framework of the approach to teaching business ethics, it is simply not possible to stop and flesh out every issue raised in its entire nuance. But depth of analysis is not being sacrificed so much as being postponed. Indeed, I would contend that the great benefit of having this framework is that it allows contentious issues in the discipline to be situated. Debate will be enhanced because it will be easier to see where viewpoints fit.

2. Renewed Model of the Academy[3]

There is a proper hierarchical structure to the disciplines that purport to be studying human beings. This structure, Platonic in its inspiration, has been revived by Azar (1983, 1990). Azar contends that Plato, shocked that as good a man as Socrates could be put to death by society, sought the foundations of political thinking. Politics, as the study of the common *weal* or common *good*, must be explicitly value-laden. Since the investigation of values is the task of ethics, politics presupposes ethics. But ethics discusses the notion of responsibility, and such a notion is meaningless apart from a free agent. Freedom, therefore, is presupposed in moral discourse and is studied in philosophical psychology. An adequate psychology—etymologically "the study of the soul"—is implied for an adequate ethics. But freedom is possible only if it is located in something that transcends matter. Therefore, freedom presupposes a spiritual (nonmaterial) base. The question of the origin of a spiritual soul in man is immediately raised. This is taken up in metaphysics or ontology, the most universal branch of philosophical inquiry investigating the nature of being or the kinds of things that exist.

The assumption behind the idea that metaphysics provides the foundation or matrix of all our thought is that there is a natural metaphysic to our mind, that our natural desire for knowing always seeks its culmination in metaphysics (Derrick, 1977; Owens, 1987). By our very nature we are concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being.

---

3. Teachers and scholars who work in institutes of higher education, or academia, are referred to as academics. The words come from the Greek *Akadēmos*, the name of the garden where Plato taught. Because Azar is drawing on Plato's thought, I thought it right to refer to the model of higher education being presented as a model of the Academy.

> ..the desire for truth is part of human nature itself. It is an innate property of human reason to ask why things are as they are … the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry.
>
> *Fides et Ratio, articles 3, 83*

In this model the primary questions dealt within the disciplines of philosophy and theology must be fought through first. What is real? Is there a Supreme Being responsible for the existence of the universe? What is the structure of the universe? What kind of being is a human being? To what extent can we have objective knowledge of our nature and our situation in the world? Indeed, the crisis of our civilization has arisen out of our denial of the first law of philosophical experience given by Gilson (1937, p. 306): "Philosophy always buries its undertakers."

Since tacit metaphysical assumptions will always be made (Walsh, 1936), responsible intellectual work demands that these questions be struggled with, that a careful search for first principles be undertaken. Any inquiry of a more proximate sort, including any discipline comprising the study of management, can be no more solid than the metaphysical base it is founded on (Whitehead, 1933). Furthermore, the theories in these disciplines are inherently normative. They are ethical through and through since they rest on an understanding of how we ought to act [ethics] which in turn is determined by presuppositions of what we are as human beings and what our lives are for [metaphysics]. In a word, metaphysics as the science of being *as* being provides the basis from which all subsequent knowledge can progressively be acquired. Figure 1 presents these relationships pictorially as the structure of a house.[4]

4. The analogy is deliberate for a number of reasons. One, it helps to remind us of the need for a sound metaphysical basis for our thinking—the structural integrity of a house depends on it having a solid foundation. Having said this, however, it must be noted that although there is a dependence of one area of study on another, one subject cannot be reduced to another. The roof rests on the walls and the foundation but is neither of them. The picture also alerts us to the profound significance of our metaphysical starting point and the need to get a good beginning. In house building it is absolutely critical to set out square and level. If you don't, then it will be really difficult to get the rafters up. Similarly, initial errors in metaphysics can result in positively devastating theories and conclusions in the proximate disciplines. "A slight initial error eventually grows to vast proportions." (Aquinas, 1968, p. 28, quoting Aristotle). Also, once the foundation is in place, we know that we have to accept that this is what we have to build on. We have to live with what we have done. So too we must live with the fruits of our metaphysical choice to the end—i.e. our thinking is constrained by the intellectual commitments we make at the outset. "Philosophers are free to lay down their own set of principles, but once this is done, they no longer think as they wish—they think as they can." (Gilson, 1937, p. 301, 302).

Figure 1: Ordering the Intellectual Disciplines



This project of metaphysical questioning, somewhat akin to what learning organization theorist Peter Senge (1990) refers to as the discipline of mental models only deeper, culminates for each of us in a worldview (Olthuis, 1985)[5]. It is difficult to pin down the meaning of this notion, but we can propose that it is our global set of beliefs about reality. It is our interpretive schemata of the broadest sort, a comprehensive and unified system of thought about the meaning of our lives, or even, our vision of life. Furthermore, every person has some such ultimate conception about his or her life, a point well made by Ashley (2000, p. 16). "… life without a world-view … either for the individual or for a community of cooperating individuals, is impossible …"

Some of the characteristics of worldviews are worth noting. i) Since metaphysics has primacy over epistemology,[6] our worldview will condition the way we see the world and will determine what we can know. The categories, perceptual and interpretive predispositions, and judgments about reality intrinsic to worldviews will be decisive in determining our knowledge claims. Our

5. Naugle's (2002) superb history of the concept of worldview traces its origin to Kant's use of *Weltanschauung* in his *Critique of Judgment* published in 1790.
6. This claim itself arises from or finds its validation from a particular worldview, namely philosophical realism. The basis for the point is that things must exist (be in being) before we can know them. Descartes' turn to epistemological idealism of course reversed all this but not without bringing into being intractable philosophical problems. The main problem with starting in one's mind with one's ideas and not with the things of reality is that the human mind is imprisoned "in its own subjective thinking" (Clarke, 2001, p. 39). I will say more about the distinction between realism and idealism (really idea-ism) at the end of the paper.

worldview constitutes the spectacles through which we experience the world. ii) Metaphysics deals with intuitable or self-evident first principles. Reason then deduces its conclusions from these sound premises previously established. It is in these unavoidable assumptions that worldviews both culminate and are justified. iii) This faith, what we believe in, entrust ourselves to, and make a commitment to, that is the ultimate grounding of our worldview, serves to give direction and meaning to our lives. Thus, worldviews function not only descriptively (this *is* a true picture of reality) but also normatively (this is what my life is for; this is what I *ought* to be). Because a worldview is the standard by which reality is pursued, it is a motivating force in life and a shaper of personal identity. The point is that the human mind thinks with ideas. Consequently, ideas must be understood to be the most powerful things on earth, for we act on our premises, values, beliefs, and images (in short, our ideas) about human nature and reality. iv) Because worldviews function to decide what is true and what matters in our experience, they are a determinant of community. A common worldview acts as a cohesive, pervasive "mind-set" that binds its adherents together. Without some minimal agreement on basic principles, it is not clear that a community of persons is possible. "Without a vision, the people perish" (Proverbs 29:18) v) Each of us claims that our worldview is ultimate. It is what we believe to be the truest for ourselves. Implicitly then we believe that it should compel the allegiance of others. If we didn't believe that our own worldview was worthy of the commitment of others, there would be no basis for ourselves believing in it. We would want to adopt the worldview of those others. Thus, worldviews can be, and indeed are, in conflict. Today, the basis of many of our disagreements is our differences in our ideas about the ultimate ground of existence; differences that must be resolved before meaningful dialogue on secondary issues can be undertaken. The clash of orthodoxies (George, 2001) or worldviews must be attended to. vi) While it is true that worldviews illuminate our experience and guide our conduct, our experience mediated by the language we use shapes our worldviews. The relationship is reciprocal. vii) Worldviews claim to be ultimate but they occur within particular traditions embedded in the historical process. To understand a worldview the specific historical, intellectual, and psychological contexts that it is formed out of and rooted in must be understood.

These characteristics, particularly the last two, raise the question of how we can test the veracity of our worldviews. Wolfe (1982) proposes four criteria to assess the adequacy of our general philosophical viewpoints. 1) Consistency: Is my interconnected web of beliefs free from contradictions? Am I forced to advocate a position I could not possibly live out? Is my metaphysics for others and not for myself? 2) Coherence: Do my beliefs cohere together as a whole? Are they internally related? 3) Comprehensiveness: Is my worldview applicable to the entire range of my experiences without arbitrarily ruling any of it out? Can it make sense out of not only physical objects and their movements but also

aesthetic, moral, historical, personal, interpersonal and religious facts? 4) Congruity: How adequate as an explanation is the worldview to the experience it covers? Is it a good interpretation? Does it really explain or help us to understand?

From this we can see that not all worldviews are of equal value. Clearly, worldviews will be more or less adequate to our experience, more or less faithful to reality. Thus, we need not succumb to the relativistic notion that any worldview is as good as any other. To assert this is to assert that in reality nothing is of value, that truth is an illusion. But this does not mean that we can canonize our worldview as unerring. One must allow reality to question and correct one's worldview. The difficulty, however, in using experience to assess our worldview is that experience itself is interpreted in light of the position that needs to be evaluated. To solve this dilemma, Wolfe (1982) proposes that we posit omniscience in metaphysical matters. Our worldview would then be completely consistent, fully coherent, all encompassing and its congruity would be omnipotent. Most significantly, it would be able to withstand all criticism and our belief in it would certainly be warranted.

Of course, we do not possess omniscience. Worldviews are human formations and are thus subject to all the weaknesses of human understanding. Our truth in ultimate matters will always be partial, "perspectival" (Clarke, 2001, p.8), so we should present our metaphysics humbly. We should also insist on tolerance, (Pinches, 1987). For in honoring other worldviews, we can gain understanding of our own experience. But this does not imply that our experience is infinitely malleable. Some worldviews plainly do not fit. *Tolerance in no way absolves us from seeking or attempting to resolve conflicting truth claims.*

Our only hope is to subject our worldviews to criticism. The discovery of error and the resultant revision represents genuine advancement. Viable worldviews need to be constantly tested and refined if better insight into reality is to be gained. Thus, the one compulsory requirement of worldviews is that they enter the arena of ideas openly, candidly, and honestly. Instead of hiding our assumptions hoping they will not be overturned, we should formulate them as explicitly, as extensively, and as clearly as possible so that those assumptions that do not stand up to critical examination can be improved upon. Nothing is more dangerous, more surely to lead to intellectual folly, than an unwillingness to be candid about presuppositional issues. Clarity of thought and genuine communication are only possible if our assumptive base is clear and thus dealing with assumptions forthrightly is the only responsible position to take.

Of course, in dialogue with others, we still need to be mindful of the enormity of the personal investment a worldview entails. Because worldviews are the bedrock of our existence, the scaffolding upon which our lives stand, the set of hinges on which our lives turn, there will be great resistance to changes in these our most profound beliefs.

The challenge, for all of us in this age of unparalleled lack of reflection (Berman, 2000), is to rediscover an orderly system of ideas about ourselves and about the world that is true to reality. We simply must uncover a concept of the universe and ourselves that does justice to our humanness. We must, in short, have worldviews that meet the criteria of consistency, coherency, comprehensiveness and congruity at least reasonably well. Assuming that some efficacy has been gained in metaphysical matters, how can ethical theory proper proceed?

3. Ethical Theorizing

Moral theories as systematic accounts of moral thought and practice which provide a general test for determining what is right and wrong must do two things:

1. They must explicate what we must do to *be* moral—i.e. answering the questions *how* should I live or *what* kind of person should I be. To be useable, the theory should provide guidance as to what to do in specific circumstances. (*Normative Ethics*—**This is how we should act.**)

2. They must provide reasons for being moral. Why is it reasonable that I should adopt the normative position developed in 1. above? What justification is there for the beliefs being held about how we should act? Are the moral assertions being proffered warranted? (*Meta-Ethics*—**Here's why**.)

Various modes of normative ethical theorizing have arisen to address our inherent ethical nature. The following statement[7] about the human condition will aid us in mapping these. *We are beings who act purposefully. Our actions have consequences over space and time.*

In the past, theories have been constructed that take only one element of the above statement to be exclusively the nature of moral reasoning. Thus, theories have been put forth that take each of the following as primary:

a) Moral Actors [Agent Morality]: The emphasis in these theories is that morality is a matter of *being* a certain kind of person, of having a certain kind of character. This character orientation is presumed to

7. Such a statement is clearly not true to someone like B.F. Skinner (1971) and those still following him (Yaman, 2002). But to move *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* is to move beyond the human person as a moral being. Ethical theory as it is presented here would be meaningless. Discussion is not closed off, however, just relocated to an assessment of Skinner's philosophical naturalism for its consistency, coherency, comprehensiveness and congruity.

give a certain direction to one's whole life—i.e. to dispose one to act in certain ways in certain situations. The archetypal theorist of human virtue is Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*).

b) Purposes: Teleological theories—from the Greek *telos* (ends or purposes)—are concerned with identifying the right and proper ends that ought to be pursued. Most important in this perspective is the question of the *summum bonum*, the greatest good or ultimate end that the human person has in virtue of his or her humanity. The great medieval churchman, St. Thomas Aquinas *(Summa Theologica)*, gives the definitive teleological account.

c) Moral Actions: Deontological theories—from the Greek *deon* (that which is binding)—attempt to determine the moral principles, rules, duties, obligations that indicate the right and wrong actions that all normal moral agents should adhere to. Since rights are correlated with duties, rights theorists may be considered in this group. Kant, with his Categorical Imperative, "act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never only as a means", is representative.

d) Consequences: These theories are often referred to as consequentialist since they use as a standard for right and wrong actions the comparative balance of good over bad that is brought into being by the actions. Note that there must be a theory of nonmoral value present to evaluate results in this manner. Utilitarian theorists, John Stuart Mill being the preeminent thinker in this regard, have typically chosen hedonism.

There is, however, a unity to the moral situation (Lucas, 1988). A full ethical theory must take into account all aspects of this situation. We can recognize that it is difficult to do this, difficult to consider all the dimensions of our moral condition, in *one* pass—i.e. it is hard to use all the theoretical perspectives at once. Still, there is the need to be aware that we must move quickly from whatever primary position we choose to the others.

- Commandments and duties can be given, but we still need to think about *whom* the human person is who will or ought to do this or that.

- Virtue is ultimately only virtue if it leads to action.

- Because it is impossible to anticipate all the effects of our actions, consequences must always be assessed.

Not all starting points are equally as valid, however. A metaphor (initially proposed by C. S. Lewis) can best serve to illustrate the point. If we liken our endeavors to the sailing of a fleet of ships, an order of primary positions becomes evident. First, each ship must be shipshape and seaworthy. There can be no substitute for this requirement. This is similar to individual ethics discussing virtues and vices. Being is thus primary as it precedes knowing and doing.

Granting organizations ontological standing (Greenfield, 1986) obscures the fact that social change can only come from the living system (Argyris, 1970). Our theorizing must start with human *beings*, for it is only unique, separate, significant persons that can *be* moral and can thus establish the morality of our organizations and our societies. In a word, *people make history*. Thus, the greatest need today in all our institutions is for people of character. The restoration of society must come from within (Schumacher, 1977). The qualities of moral character that have been regarded since ancient times as the fulfillment of our natural moral personhood, our perfected ability as spiritual persons, are the four cardinal virtues – prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance (Pieper, 1949). They represent the kind of being we ought to strive to become.

Rekindling the idea of virtue, rescuing its terminology from the semantic scrapheap, and reinterpreting the significance of the cardinal virtues in light of today's events is the great educational challenge of our time (Centore, 1997; 2000). With virtue central to our theorizing we ask, what does it mean to *be* prudent, just, courageous, and temperate? What is the application of these qualities of character that historically have been considered those enabling the human person to reach the furthest potentialities of his or her nature to the situation at hand?

Continuing with the analogy, the ships must sail together. They must cooperate with each other and at a minimum avoid getting in each other's way or running into each other. Better yet would be the situation where each ship was concerned about maintaining the seaworthiness of not only their own vessel but of the other vessels as well. This is like social ethics discussing justice, peace and charity. Such social goodness is dependent on individual goodness, for we cannot make a good society out of bad individuals.

Like the ships, we are caught up in a network of mutuality. Our actions, including doing nothing, invariably affect others. Our "private" acts have far-reaching public consequences. A minimalist ethic—one may morally act in any way one chooses so far as one does not do harm to others (Callahan, 1985)—is not only inadequate, it is deceitful. The myth of the "self-made" man needs interment because this person has never existed and will never exist. We are social beings by nature, not merely sociable.[8] Our life is always life in a community.

As a basic moral minimum we must at least meet our negative duties. Really existing moral laws such as those proffered in the Decalogue must be applied to the situation we are in to inform our actions. But this does not exhaust the

questioning arising from the deontological perspective. Positive duties, obligations to actively help others, must also be assumed. Since the bell tolls for all of us, what is my global responsibility? What would it mean to live on the moral frontier in exhibiting concern for others?

Finally, the ships must know their destination. To where are they sailing? Why are they at sea in the first place? This is the end for which seaworthiness and advancement of the entire flotilla are maintained, so it is a more basic concern than both of them. Analogously, for us as human beings it is to ask what our lives are for. Reflection on the purpose of our existence is basic for our individual and social ethical choices presuppose an answer to why we are here. This is illustrated quite well by this quote from Lewis Carroll's masterpiece of children's literature *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (p. 54).*

> Cheshire Puss … "would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
>
> "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
>
> "I don't much care where —," said Alice.
>
> "Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.
>
> "—so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.
>
> "Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough."
>
> Alice felt that this could not be denied…

We are purposeful creatures, and unless we want to entice nihilism by saying [like Alice] that it really does *not* matter what we do [which way we go], our next task is to take up the question of ends, to provide an explicitly teleological structure to our theories. That is, since we act in order to achieve ends (and thus, the ends we seek determine how we act), we must determine the ends that we ought to follow.

What is our highest or ultimate end? What is the transcendent ideal (Giacalone, 2004) in terms of which all our activities should be assessed? Are we guided by a sound vision of human flourishing (Camenisch, 1981)?

---

8. The position that human beings are inherently social and political beings is a conclusion arrived at by careful observation of human development. Human beings start in a state of utter dependence and must be fed, nurtured, clothed, educated over an extended period of time. A full human life requires material necessities and moral, social, intellectual and spiritual progress that cannot be achieved in isolation. In a word, social life is necessary for perfection. In this perspective, then, there is no need of a "veil of ignorance" since one is already aware of the communities one is a member of, including the whole human family, and the obligations they present.

What about the proximate ends and the means we have chosen? Are they the ultimate end-a-making—i.e. are the means morally consistent with a good end? Are our actions synthesized together? Have we organized a consistent array of possible means to achieve the ultimate end?

Even knowing their dock, the ships must continuously assess and adjust their course to ensure their arrival at the port. Similarly, the choices we make must be continuously assessed to ascertain their effects. Are our actions actually helping us to achieve our purposes?[9] Who is affected by what we are doing?

Deliberating upon these questions does not exhaust ethical reflection, however. Sufficient warrant for our decisions must still be provided. It will be helpful to first recount some of the more common rationalizations that we erroneously depend upon to ground our moral arguments.

a) Mere Assertions: To state that I think something is right or wrong does not make it so. Reasons need to be provided for taking this stance.

b) Personal Preferences: Disagreements over tastes do not need to be justified. That is, it is not necessary that everyone enjoy yogurt if I do. But I cannot establish that something is *morally* right for others and myself because I like it. I cannot, for example, give an F to a paper I am marking just because I don't like the color of the folder it is submitted in. There must be valid reasons to accept the judgment as correct.

c) Feelings: While our feelings can be an important barometer of morally repugnant behavior, *by themselves* they cannot justify our stance. We still must know why we regard the action as wrong. This is the meta-ethical aspect of our position.

d) Majority Rule and Statistics: Five, five thousand, or five million people doing a wrong thing does not make it right. What all or most people think does not settle moral questions. Opinion polls might reveal people's attitudes, but they do not determine moral truth.

e) Others are Doing It: Appeals based on the fact that a contemplated action is being done by others or will be done by others are insufficient. It is not right for me to hit someone *because* another person is doing it or will do it if I don't.

f) Legal Order and Other Rules: Saying something is against the rules (law) is not the same as saying it is wrong. Unjust laws need to be

9. In this framework consequences are still important but not all important as utilitarianism proposes. Our moral lives do not present themselves to us as a mathematical problem to be solved.

disobeyed. Our ideas of right and wrong are needed to evaluate the rules themselves. The law itself is an object of assessment.

g) Expert Authority: Claims by experts can still be rejected if we have weighty reasons for doing so. Indeed, since these people are human beings with all the consequent limitations and frailties associated with this position, their knowledge needs to be checked.

h) Power: Might, however efficacious, does not make right. He who has the gold may indeed rule. But the moral soundness of this rulership would still have to be evaluated.

i) Culture: That the society one lives in approves of an action does not justify its practice. The fact that a belief is widely held does not establish its validity. To propose that it does is to commit the Fallacy of Common Consensus (O'Connor and Godar, 1999). Cultures can be wrong about what is right just as individuals can be. The American South was wrong about slavery. The pogrom of the Nazis', even though it swept up an entire culture, was wrong. Gordon Gecko, the famous insider trader from the movie *Wall Street*, as a representative voice of our own culture, was wrong about greed. What is right (morality) cannot be established by what people do or think (sociology). The values we hold are subject to evaluation.

What then provides the justification of our moral beliefs? Since what we regard as morally imperative is determined by our worldview, the final elaboration and defense of our ethical systems rests in our metaphysical commitments. That is, our moral thoughts are inextricably linked to what we take to be metaphysically true. Many moral issues can only be resolved by scrutinizing first principles, and moral actions can be considered appropriate *if* they are developed from a *meritorious* worldview by solid methods of reasoning. Their feasibility vis a vis real world constraints would of course still have to be considered.

But what does this mean for educational practice? How does the argument developed here get translated into classroom use? The next section will take up these important pedagogical matters.

4. Ethical Decision-Making: A Classroom Model

The following model adapted from Brown (1990),[10] concisely captures the renewal of our knowledge system called for in this paper. Moreover, it summarizes the elements or steps of effective moral decision making. In

providing a common template it affords students and teachers alike the opportunity to meaningfully discuss the moral dimensions of management.

Figure 2: Making and Justifying Ethical Decisions



10. The idea of a baseball diagram comes from Brown's book. As a framework it keeps things concise but does not oversimplify. I more or less reverse the decision-making steps of home plate and first base from Brown. He begins with a proposal (homeplate) and then gathers observations (first base) that are needed. I start with a social reality that demands a moral decision (observations of what is happening: home plate) and then ask what could be done about it (possible proposals: first base). For Brown second base is where the ethical decision is made using normative ethical theory. I have adopted this in the diagram I am providing with a couple of important provisos. First of all, Brown collapses agent morality and the teleological perspective into one theory. I hold that given the centrality of purpose (Warren, 2002), they need to be kept distinct. As well, it is not clear that Brown insists on a full field application of the theories of normative ethics as I do. Brown clearly understands the role that assumptions play in the decision making process but his analysis does not probe them in their metaphysical depth. Thus, while we both list assumptions as third base in the model I am referring to something more than just one's taken for granted understandings of organizational life. The diagram shown is an aerial view of the diamond looking in at home base from above.

Home Base: The first step in making a good moral decision is to determine what is happening. This may seem too obvious to include as a step in the process but it is possible for a person to make a poor moral choice because he or she hasn't taken the time to clarify the facts of the situation he or she is in. In gaining a thorough knowledge of our present real life setting we seek information that is accurate (describes what is happening), inclusive (nothing of importance has been left out), and impartial (is free of biased or self-interested rationalizations). Interestingly, since what is observable to us is that in our perceptual world to which we have already attached significance, one of the major aids on home base is to gain input from all the important constituencies or stakeholders, *especially* those who may see things differently than us. It is crucial to note however that to decide not to decide is to decide. We can paralyze ourselves morally by trying to gather too much information. Timing is an integral element of prudence or practical wisdom – i.e. knowing when the decision must be made even though the information at hand is not complete.

First Base: On this base the task is to identify the possible actions we could take. The inestimable value of this step is to free up the moral imagination to go to work on the problem or dilemma we are facing, something gravely needed today (Werhane, 1998; Ciulla, 1998; La Forge, 2000). The idea is to circumvent the making of a poor moral decision because better moral alternatives were not considered.

Second Base: Once the alternatives that are available to us have been identified, then we must choose which one or ones we will pursue. This decision is made by applying the full range of normative ethical theory—moral agency, teleological, deontological, and consequentialist. The key here is to actually ask the questions demanded by the theories.[11] While real moral dilemmas exist, the only choice being the lesser of two evils for example, those alternatives lacking moral soundness will be exposed if scrutinized using the questions given.

Third Base: The ultimate warrant for the application of ethical theory to the decision at hand is to be found in our worldview. Inadequate or false assumptions about human nature and the nature of reality can only eventually be found wanting in terms of their results. Therefore, we must constantly assess our worldviews for their congruity, consistency, coherency, and comprehensiveness.

Over the course of several years of teaching ethics to management students I have found that the best approach is to present the model in its entirety and then immediately to introduce a simple example of a personal choice that had to be made. Student experience can be drawn from for this or it is easy to come up with

11. I have attached these to the paper as an Appendix.

numerous examples from the events of one's own life. Beginning in this way usually results in very little defensiveness since the issue at hand does not seem momentous. More importantly, students are able to see the model at work, to see how the full theory is put into practice.[12]

4.1. Case I: Paper Box Ethics

One morning I stopped my car across the street from a coin operated newspaper-dispensing box with the intention of buying a daily paper. I got out of the car and as I walked up to the box two ten year old boys who were waiting to catch a bus to school opened the door of the box for me saying something to the effect of, "the latch is broken." What should I have done?

Home Base: As a class, we review the facts of the situation. They seem straightforward but someone may ask at this point whether the boys themselves broke the latch. Surfacing even this additional detail helps immeasurably in later inquiry as it alerts everyone to the type of attention that must be paid to what is actually happening or to what has actually happened.

First Base: Even a class of moderate size will generate numerous possible actions that could be taken. These alternatives will generally come from a number of different students for the added pedagogical bonus of engaging more members of the class.

- Take a paper and leave no money
- Take a paper and deposit 50 cents
- Take two papers and pay for one

12. Jones' (1991) synthesis of ethical decision making models and other commentaries on ethical frameworks (Procario-Foley and McLaughlin, 2003) have the recognition of a moral issue or an ethical dilemma as the first step in the moral decision-making and behavior process. The model presented in this paper largely assumes that recognition into place and then proceeds with the analysis. There are a number of ways to handle this. One, a separate step could be added, an 'on deck' position wherein one would move to home plate upon the awareness that the issue in question was a moral matter. Or, the role of the batter's box itself could be expanded to include recognition *and* information gathering. Neither of these may be necessary however since the baseball diagram model of this paper differs in one fundamental and substantial way from the models that Jones surveys. The models that Jones goes over and attaches his moral intensity construct to are all *individual* decision-making models – i.e. they attempt to show how a single person would make a moral decision and act on it. The ethical decision making model here is designed for classroom use – i.e. it is designed to guide the inquiry of a community of learners. In this setting the recognition that the issue is a moral one can come from anyone. Once it does, once 'Play Ball!' has been uttered, then all the members of the learning community head to the diamond.

- Take all the papers and get the boys to sell them for you on commission
- Alert the newspaper company about the state of their equipment

Second Base: The assessment of the alternatives using normative ethical theory is the key step in the decision making process. We begin teleologically by asking what the highest or ultimate end of our lives is. Reflection together generally yields a good deal of consensus on this question, enough agreement at any rate to proceed with the inquiry. If I submit that my purpose in life is to develop moral character, then we can ask what would a good person do in this situation? What would it mean to act honestly and with integrity? What would the just person render to the newspaper company to give them their due? We then go on to a deontological line of questioning: What is the application of the Golden Rule? What would I want others to do if it was my paper box that had a broken latch? What binding moral laws must I respect, for example, the stricture against stealing? If I think beyond what I can get away with, what is the best I am capable of morally? Finally, consequentialism is used. What will result from each of the choices? What will be the effects or consequences of the actions being considered? The teaching challenge here is to slow down the inquiry to make sure students explicitly use the available normative ethical theory. The right thing to do in the situation is easy enough to come by but what students must realize is that their answer is not plucked out of thin air with no theoretical support but is arrived at or derived from a systematic application of venerable normative ethical perspectives. We are learning to walk together here even though the cases we will address later on demand a much brisker pace even a full striding out.

Third Base: But why be honest at all? Why is stealing wrong? To answer those questions we are driven to more ultimate ones. What is a human being? What is our understanding of our origin, our existence, and our destiny? One formulation that would seem to uphold virtue would be the suggestion that we are rational beings – i.e. as human persons we possess not just consciousness but the capacity to reflect upon our own thinking or awareness (Ward, 1992; Clarke, 1993; Kavanaugh, 2001; Machuga, 2002). We thus have powers of intellect and rational will. Life in community with other rational beings can only be sustained if we have security of our person and property and we know that others are telling us the truth.

A lot will have been accomplished in this seemingly inconsequential case. The framework will give students a place to hang their ideas, however unsure they are of them or however unfamiliar the concepts may be to them. Because it is a shared model, students can locate the thoughts of their classmates and have a meaningful dialogue. For example, if a student surfaces additional facts about the case, then everyone can repair to home base to deal with them. Or if a student

puts forward a substantially different worldview then a third base discussion about the veracity of the proffered metaphysical assumptions can ensue.

Additional examples of this sort can of course be discussed to solidify the student's grasp of the model. But really, the class is now prepared to analyze any managerial decision from an ethical perspective. Perhaps the greatest beauty of the approach is that it can accommodate all the functional areas of management—accounting, marketing, personnel, strategy, finance, *et cetera*.

4.2. Case 2: Accepting a Gift

Lori Peterson, C.A. (Chartered Accountant) works for the public accounting firm of Seymour & Doolittle. She audits the financial records of Richman Automotive, an automobile dealership consortium employing 200 people across the country. Last week, Barry Tees, the company's controller, invited her and her spouse to attend Richman's company Christmas party to be held at a nearby Canadian Pacific resort hotel. All employees would be flown into the resort and put up for the weekend at the company's expense. Lori and her husband would also be the company's guests for that weekend. The party's program would include a dinner and dance but its primary purpose would be to express gratitude (show honor) to everyone who contributed to Richman's success over the past year. Therefore, representatives of Richman's financial service providers (bankers), legal counsel (lawyers), and various significant product suppliers have also been invited and will most likely attend the weekend. <u>Should</u> Lori accept Barry Tees invitation and attend the Christmas party of Richman Automotive, a company she audits?

Home Base: As well as capturing the various details of the case, students will need to work at establishing an estimate of the value of the gift and making a determination as to whether this is nominal or substantial. [A figure in the range of $500 is usually arrived at and the thinking generally is that this is a significant amount.]

First Base: Obvious choices such as accept the invitation or decline it [go or stay home] are quickly identified. Creative alternatives are also listed as students realize that this is the purpose of this step. For example, a suggestion that Lori go but donate the value of the gift ($500) to a local charity in Richman Automotive's name is made.

Second Base: Teleologically, Lori might have as her end being a good member of the accounting profession while in the employ of Seymour & Doolittle. What then is good professional conduct in this situation? What does her professional code obligate her to do? What is the role of the auditor in our business system? Does acceptance of the invitation compromise this position in any way? How do

the moral virtues come into play? Is it prudent to take the gift? Could it result in Lori materially affecting future business decisions on behalf of Richman Automotive? Is justice done? What will be the public perception? Would an objective party reasonably suspect that the gift was aimed at blurring the recipient's independent judgment? As nice as the weekend would be, do courage and temperance require the moderation of one's desires here? What rules (deontological) or policies does Seymour & Doolittle have in place? How does consulting these affect the decision? Consequentially, what will happen if the gift is taken? What will happen if it is refused? Will the good will of the client be lost? What is the intention of Barry Tees anyway? The invitation is to a Christmas party and it has been made openly. Do these circumstances make a difference?

Third Base: Again, it is here that the ultimate warrant for the decision will be provided. For most cases substantial dialogue will not be required on the underlying metaphysical assumptions. That is, once you have considered whether prudence, justice, respect, loyalty, honesty, compassion, appreciation, persistence, patience, humility are nobler than their opposites by virtue of what we are as human beings, then you do not have to return to this question every time.

In the space available here it is possible to provide only a brief glimpse of the use of the model to guide ethical inquiry in the classroom. It has proven to be a most effective approach. Moral dialogue can be improved if a synthesis of all the perspectives on normative ethics [agency (virtue), teleological, deontological, consequentialist] is available to be used *and* if, at the same time, the profound role that worldview formation plays in the ultimate justification of our moral deliberations is acknowledged.

Management educators today work in an environment conditioned by the tenet that we invent our morality, any morality. Many, if not most, of the students entering a classroom discussion about a moral issue will do so assuming that morality is a matter of taste not truth. But the notion that everyone devises their own morality for themselves is not so much a carefully thought out position for them as it is one that they have adopted uncritically from a culture given over to the idea that science is univocal (Wishloff, 2003). The model provides a forum or vehicle to critically examine the worldview of positivism, its central tenets and ethical implications, and any other worldview in a way that deeper understanding is sought together in a respectful manner. It is my view that assisting students in clarifying the foundational premises of their thinking thereby helping them to become critical thinkers is a central task of an educator.

5. Summary and Conclusion

Reflection on the Socratic question, "how should one live?" is as inescapable today as it was when it was proposed so many centuries ago and as important to today's students of management as to the citizens of ancient Greece. The method presented here gives such persons the chance to form their consciences well in dialogue with others. The basic process is to use the full range of normative ethical questions grounded in a coherent sense of ultimate reality to decide what to do. Or stated somewhat differently: Given that this is happening (observations), we could do *a* or *b* or *c* (action possibilities), but normative ethical theory says we should do *a* (moral judgment). Our theory and our reflection using it is grounded in these [metaphysical] assumptions (ultimate warrant). A change in circumstances could require that we re-examine our moral choice.

The method is suited to what is being studied, ethical decision making by human beings in a management context, because it i) has a solid metaphysical base, ii) takes all the pertinent data of our experience, iii) analyzes these with a view to direct us to our ultimate ends, and iv) is logical, consistent, coherent, and pragmatic. It takes human beings into account as free, end-seeking beings and respects the anagogical character of reality. "Equal certainty should not be sought in all things but in each matter according to its proper mode" (*Nicomachean Ethics* i:3). Agreement does not need to be forced when dealing with the divergent problems (Schumacher, 1977) offered up by our moral lives. What we can be confident of is that if the process of philosophical midwifery has been properly carried out in moving from metaphysical facts to felt moral imperatives and thus to appropriate moral action, then we will have arrived at the best possible understanding we can have right now.

Thus, perhaps the greatest value of this method is that our ethical systems remain open to new truth or insight. The search for greater ethical understanding becomes eminently social as the facts and theories that are held can be compared and criticized.

- Does the metaphysical position that is held offer the most satisfactory explanation of the world as a whole?
- Have all the necessary facts been ascertained?
- Are there lacunae or errors in the reasoning process?
- Are alternative interpretations and explanations more plausible? Are there other possible actions that would be preferred?
- What is practically happening?

Out of this debate our ethical systems can be subtly transformed to face the increasing complexity and variety of moral problems that arise.

The classic ethical theorists and teachers, for instance those mentioned as exemplars for their approach—Aristotle, Aquinas—did not seek to be moral innovators. Instead they sought to have a morality that was justified by metaphysical facts. Which is to say that they discovered the morality that fits with what we are and where we are, with the actual nature and position of the human person in the order of things. They were, in short, metaphysical realists subscribing to the basic doctrines of philosophical realism:

1. There is a world or real existence which men have not made or constructed.

2. This real existence or reality can be known by the human mind.

3. Such knowledge is the only reliable guide to human conduct, individual and social.

I am fully aware that in resurrecting classical realism in a substantive way I am swimming against the cultural current. I know that this worldview, once commonly and common sensically held, has been thoroughly supplanted by philosophical idealism in its various forms, manifestations, and schools.[13] In contradistinction to philosophical realism, the basic doctrines here are:

1. There is no stable order of existence independent of the constructive processes of knowing and willing. [i.e. knowledge is a process of making rather than apprehending something already there].

2. The world that we produce in this way is the only world there is.

It is increasingly apparent, however, that the sustainability of the civilization ushered in by these new intellectual commitments is uncertain. We may have wished that we could dispatch the realist perspective in favor of one of our own choosing but it not clear that we live in a world where wishing will make it so, that we can with impunity choose our ideology as we "choose our clothes" (Lewis, 1967, p. 73). The relative merits of our various starting points must once again be discussed. The story about the drunk losing his keys at the door but looking for them under the street light some distance away "because the light is better over here" is an old saw but it fits our present condition. It is in our reluctance to return to where we dropped our keys, our unwillingness to engage in dialogue about the foundations of our ethical world (Arkes, 2002), that our fate is sealed, however.

---

13. The hope might be held that we are living in a postpositivist world (Clegg and Ross-Smith, 2003) but clearly this transition hasn't happened yet (Donaldson, 2005).

References:

Adler, Mortimer J. (1941), "God and the Professors". *In Science, Philosophy, and Religion: A Symposium* (pp. 120-138). New York: Kraus Reprint Co.

Adler Mortimer J. (1941), "This Pre-war Generation", *Reforming Education* (pp. 3-20). New York: Macmillan. (Originally published in Harper's Magazine, October 1940).

Anderson, James F. (1953). *An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas.* South Bend, IN: Regnery/Gateway.

Aquinas, St. Thomas. (1968). *On Being and Essence*. Translated by Armand Maurer, 2nd Revised Edition. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Argyris, Chris. (1970). *Intervention Theory and Method*. Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley.

Aristotle. (1985). *Nicomachean Ethics*. Indianapolis: Translated by Terence Irwin, Hackett.

Arkes, Hadley. (2002). *Natural Rights and The Right to Choose*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ashley, Benedict M. (2000). *Choosing a World-View and Value System*. Staten Island, NY: Alba House.

Azar, Larry. (1983.) *Philosophy and Ideology: An Adventure* (2nd ed.). Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall.

Azar, Larry. (1990). *Twentieth Century in Crisis: Foundations of Totalitarianism*. Dubuque, Iowa Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company.

Berman, Morris. (2000). *The Twilight of American Culture*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Brown, Marvin T. (1990). *Working Ethics: Strategies for Decision-Making and Organizational Responsibility.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Brown, Montague. (1996). *The Quest for Moral Foundation*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Callahan, Daniel. (1985), "Minimalist Ethics: On the Pacification of Morality", *Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life* (pp. 636-652). Christina Hoff Sommers (ed.). San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Camenisch, Paul F. (1981), "Business Ethics: On Getting to the Heart of the Matter", *Business and Professional Ethics Journal*. Fall, 59-69.

Carroll, Lewis. (1961). *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. London: Folio Society Edition.

Centore, F.F. (1997). *Confusions and Clarification*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America .

Centore, F.F. (2000). *Two Views of Virtue*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Ciulla, Joanne B. (1998), " Imagination, Fantasy, Wishful Thinking and Truth: Life is Translation and We are all Lost in It", *Business Ethics Quarterly*, Issue 1: The Ruffin Series, 99-107.

Clarke, Norris. (1993). *Person and Being*. Milwaukee, WI.: Marquette University Press.

Clarke, Norris. (2001). *The One and the Many*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Clegg, Stewart R. and Ross-Smith, Anne. (2003), "Revising the Boundaries: Management Education and Learning in a Postpositivist World", *Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2*(1), 85-98.

Derrick, Christopher. (1977). *Escape from Skepticism: Liberal Education as if Truth Mattered.* Peru, IL: Sherwood Sugden.

Donaldson, Lex. (2005), "For Positive Managmeent Theories While Retaining Science: Reply to Ghoshal", *Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4*(1), 109-113.

Etzioni, Amitai. (1989), "Money, Power and Fame", *Newsweek*, September 18, p.10.

George, Robert P. (2001). *The Clash of Orthodoxies*. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books.

Ghoshal, Sumantra. (2005), "Bad Management Theories are Destroying Good Management Practices", *Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4*(1), 75-91.

Giacalone, Robert, A. (2004), "A Transcendent Business Education for the 21st Century", *Academy of Management Learning and Education, 3*(4), 415-420.

Gilson, Etienne. (1937). *The Unity of Philosophical Experience.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Greenfield, Thomas B. (1986), "The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration", *Interchange, 17*(2), 57-80.

Jones, Thomas M. (1991), "Ethical decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model", *Academy of Management Review, 16*(2), 366-395.

Kavanaugh, John F. (2001). *Who Count as Persons?* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

LaForge, Paul G. (2000), "Four Steps to a Fundamental Ethical Vision through Meditation", *Journal of Business Ethics, 28*(1), 25-34.

Lewis, C.S. (1967), "The Poison of Subjectivism", In *Christian Reflections*, Walter Hooper (ed.), pp. 72-81. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.

Lucas, George. (1988), "Agency After Virtue"*, International Philosophical Quarterly, 28*(3), 293-311.

Machuga, Ric. (2002). *In Defense of the Soul*. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.

MacIntyre, Alisdair. (1984). *After Virtue* (second edition). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Naugle, David K. (2002). *Worldview*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.

O'Connor, Patricia J. and Godar, Susan H. (1999), "How Not to Make Ethical Decisions: Guidelines From Management Textbooks", *Teaching Business Ethics, 3*, 69-86.

Olthuis, James H. (1985). On World Views. *Christian Scholar's Review, 14*(2), 153-164.

Owens, Joseph C. (1987), "Metaphysics—The Fulfilment of a Natural Desire", *The Modern Schoolman, 65*(1), 1-13.

Pieper, Josef. (1949), "On the Christian Idea of Man", *Review of Politics, 2*(1), 3-16.

Pinches, Charles. (1987), "On Form and Content in Christian Ethics", *Sophia, 26*(1), 4-14.

Pope John Paul II. (1998). *Fides et Ratio* (Faith and Reason). Mediaspaul.

Procario-Foley, Elena G. and McLaughlin, Michael T. (2003), "A Propaedeutic for a Framework: Fostering Ethical Awareness in Undergraduate Business Students", *Teaching Business Ethics, 7*(3), 279-301.

Rist, John M. (1999). *On Inoculating Moral Philosophy Against God.* Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.

Schumacher, E.F. (1977). *A Guide for the Perplexed.* New York: Harper and Row.

Senge, Peter. (1990). *The Fifth Discipline*. New York: Doubleday.

Skinner, B.F. (1971). *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Walsh, Dorothy. (1936), "Ethics and Metaphysics", *International Journal of Ethics*, *No. 46*, 461-472.

Ward, Keith. (1992). *In Defense of the Soul*. Oxford, UK: OneWorld Publications.

Warren, Rick. (2002). *The Purpose Driven Life*. Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan.

Werhane, Patricia H. (1998), "Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethical Decision-Making in Management", *Business Ethics Quarterly*. *Issue 1*: The Ruffin Series, 75-98.

Whitehead, Alfred North. (1933). *Adventures of Ideas*. New York: Mentor.

Wishloff, Jim. (2003), "Responsible Free Enterprise: What It Is and Why We Don't Have It", *Teaching Business Ethics, 7* (3), 229-263.

Wolfe, David L. (1982). *Epistemology: The Justification of Belief.* Downer's Grove, IL: InterVarsity.

Yaman, H. Ruhi. (2003), "Skinner's Naturalism as a Paradigm for Teaching Business Ethics: A Discussion from Tourism", *Teaching Business Ethics, 7*, 107-122.

Appendix

Moral Actors or Agents [Virtue Theories]

i.e. Morality is a matter of being a certain kind of person, of having a certain character, that gives a direction to the whole of one's life.

Questions:

- Does this action contribute to the fulfillment of my being, help me to become the type of person I ought to become?
- What does it mean to prudent, just, courageous, temperate [in this situation]? What is the application of these qualities of character that historically have been considered those enabling the human person to reach the furthest potentialities of his or her nature to the situation at hand?
- What is the application of the infused virtues of faith, hope and love?
- What is the saintly response? How would those moral exemplars, those actual historical persons who lived out ideals worth having and who represent our own unlimited moral potential, act?
- What would it mean to rise toward the angels, to transcend my present moral condition?

Ends or Purposes [Teleological Theories]

i.e. Moral reflection seeks to identify the right or proper ends that ought to be pursued in virtue of our humanity.

Questions:

- What is the *summum bonum*, the greatest good or ultimate end, of our life's adventure [What is my life for, what is the purpose of my existence in an ultimate sense? Why am I here?] and our particular venture [what is the ideal in terms of which all our actions should be assessed? Are we guided by a sound vision of human flourishing?]

- Is what we are doing worth doing at all? Is there a noble purpose involved in this enterprise or undertaking?

- What about the proximate ends and the means we have chosen? Are they the ultimate end-a-making; i.e. are the means morally consistent with a good end?

- Are they synthesized together? Of the possible actions we could take, have we chosen a consistent array of means to achieve our end?

- Are we exhibiting practical wisdom in our actions? How prudent is our choice of means? Is there a better way?

Moral Actions [Deontological Theories]

i.e. Moral theories of this sort attempt to determine the moral principles, rules, duties, obligations that our actions ought to adhere to.

Questions:

- Am I doing as I would be done by? [Golden Rule] (e.g. Am I willing to volunteer for risks I am asking others to assume?)

- Are people treated as ends in themselves (as persons) and not as mere means (as things)? Is the dignity of others honoured and upheld?

- Do my actions conform to really existing moral laws [Decalogue's proscriptions against lying, stealing, murder, covetousness, adultery]? (e.g. What does it mean to tell the truth here?)

- Am I fulfilling my negative duties, the minimal constraints on my behaviour to not harm others?

But also:

- Am I fulfilling my positive duties, taking it upon myself to actively help others even though this might not be strictly my obligation? Am I acting as the Good Samaritan not passing by on the other side of the road but assisting as I am able to?

- What would it mean to live on the moral frontier in exhibiting concern for others? What is the top line? What is the best I am capable of morally?

Effects [Consequentialist Theories]

i.e. These moral theories use as a standard of right and wrong the comparative balance of good over bad (according to some non moral theory of value) that is brought about by an action.

Questions:

- Are our actions actually helping us to achieve our purposes? Are we actually getting to our destination? Where are we actually headed?

- What are the consequences or effect of our actions? Who is affected by what we are doing? What is the impact on the weakest and most vulnerable members of society? Is the benefit for some causing unacceptable harm to others?

- Do we need to fear publicity of our actions? Would I be comfortable if what I was contemplating doing was on the front page of tomorrow's newspaper? Am I acting as I would if the whole community knew exactly what I was doing? Do I need fear the exposure of my action to the light of day (John 3:19-21)?

- Do our actions continuously need justification or do they speak for themselves because of their moral soundness?

- Are our actions life-destroying or life-enhancing? Are we promoting injustice, violence, exploitation and unnecessary suffering or growth, fairness, freedom, dignity, hope, love, and wholeness? Are we tearing down or are we building up? Do our actions lead to destruction or equanimity?