History of Philosophy as Freedom

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Perhaps I should begin with some words on myself. Nothing personal, however. I happen to have shifted from Ancient Philosophy to another field of research. Praising Athens in front of an audience of Athenians is an easy task.[1] On the other hand, we are not sure that the orator is totally sincere. She—Aspasia—may be flattering her audience. Now, I am sort of a former Athenian who migrated toward Jerusalem and Mecca. Therefore, as for the matter, I am certainly less competent and less equal to the honor that is bestowed upon me than I should be. On the other hand, I won't be too easily suspected of pleading for myself.

For the sake of brevity, I will take the liberty of proceeding in the literary genre of the thesis. Since I am meant only to open the floor for further discussion, I have given those theses an extreme formulation that needs qualification. You will have to blunt the edges.

Freedom as the Essence of Philosophy

Let me begin with a provisional definition of the concept "philosophy."

> *Philosophy consists in affirming freedom and upholding it with all its consequences.*

This may sound typically modern: one thinks of Schelling's clarion call in the letter that, at twenty, he wrote to Hegel, who was only five years older, "The Alpha and Omega of all philosophy is freedom."[2] The freedom he is thinking of is Fichte's version of the Kantian primacy of practical reason, hardly a Greek idea. But still, this idea is to be found in ancient thought, too. Let me remind you of the obvious: we already read in Plato a characterization of dialectics, that is, of the highest discipline in philosophy, as the authentic liberal art, as the science of free men (*he ton eleutherôn episteme*).[3] Aristotle defines wisdom as the kind of knowledge that exists for its own sake, which is the privilege

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of free men.[4] Later on, we read in Syrianus, a Neoplatonist commentator on Aristotle, "doing away with freedom makes philosophy a superfluous enterprise" (*le in nobis interemptum superfluam pronuntiat philosophiam*).[5] Whatever endangers freedom must endanger philosophy, too.

We can sum up the main features of the philosophical discipline under the heading of freedom. I have chosen three such features: origin, method, and goal of philosophy.

1. As for its concrete, that is, social origin, philosophy is rooted in the ideal situation of an open dialogue in which whoever wants to take part can, and in which, furthermore, the arguments are judged for what they are worth, regardless of their origin, that is, the speakers.

As a matter of course, such a situation is an ideal. It constitutes the transposition of philosophical freedom into social *parrhesia*. This concept brings about the requirement of a social control. The first consequence of such social control is that philosophical statements should be understandable. For sure, the vocabulary and style of philosophy is most peculiar, so that it cannot help sounding uncanny. In principle, however, philosophy must speak the same language as man in general.

2. As for philosophical method, freedom is its principle, too. Let me call this method by the name of "phenomenology." I don't mean thereby any particular school, to be distinguished from rival trends or styles, but phenomenology such as it understands itself, i.e., to quote Husserl in person, the "hidden nostalgia of the whole modern philosophy."[6] Now, it endeavours to set our gaze free from prejudices and preconceptions of all ilk, thereby enabling us to receive the given as such, that is, such as it freely gives itself as what it is and with the properties that make it what it is.

3. Finally, the ultimate goal of philosophy is a universal claim, the claim to truths that hold good for everybody. This is one more consequence of thinking through the principle of freedom: the universal is the open space in which no fixed boundary is allowed to subsist, since it would limit freedom.

Servility

Now, what kind of things can endanger the philosophical enterprise? What are philosophy's enemies? Since philosophy is grounded in freedom, those dangers and enemies cannot possibly come from without. To be sure, free people in general, and philosophers in particular, can be deprived of their freedom. But freedom *as such* cannot be conquered unless it surrenders. The enemies of philosophy must be inside freedom itself, they must be temptations. The worst temptation is bondage, and it comes to a head when it is voluntary bondage, i.e., servility. Why should we choose slavery? Because freedom must produce anxiety in front of the risk that any free being must run. If

philosophy is the affirmation and the defence of freedom, its nourishing soil is anxiety. Not just any anxiety, but a controlled anxiety, a fruitful anxiety. But still: freedom is unpleasant and we can try to shirk it.

Let me try to sketch the kind of servility that philosophy has to face. I distinguished three dimensions of philosophy. Each can yield to a specific temptation.

1. Over against the claim to open communication, we find servility toward formal languages. My quarrel is not with those languages as such. But applying a method can become a medication for us to alleviate anxiety. By so doing, we shirk the angst of questioning. Psychoanalysts describe ritual behaviours and interpret them as enabling some neurotics to thwart the coming up of an anxiety that they could not keep at bay. One of those psychoanalysts, George Devereux, has brought this idea to bear on behavioral sciences and explained that the excessive emphasis on a strict method may arise from the desire to avoid the anxiety that we can't help feeling when we are ourselves at stake as human beings. We thereby dodge the very problematic character of our own humanity.[7]

2. As for philosophical method, philosophy has had to accept that natural sciences claimed their independence. She had to accept not to be a science. Servility toward sciences can take several aspects. Let me single out two of them.

First, mimicry, aping science. From Galileo onward, natural sciences have been speaking another language than humans, i.e., the language of mathematics.[8] Symbolic language has an advantage: the reader knows right at the beginning that the work is esoteric. This is not the case for philosophy: it has no visible bulwarks. Hence the temptation, on the side of the layperson, to ask the philosopher for something that can be understood without further ado. And the parallel temptation in the philosopher to defend him/herself by retreating into a specific language, in order to pose as a specialist of a definite branch of scientific knowledge.

A more outspoken kind of servility toward science consists for the philosopher to become a historian of sciences. The latter has a far easier task than the historian of philosophy. As far as technicalities are concerned, both are more or less in the same predicament: the trouble the former takes in mastering the science whose history he/she wants to explore is matched, in the latter, by the painstaking endeavor to gain command of, say, ancient and/or foreign languages. But the historian of science walks on a firmer ground. Science progresses by confirming or infirming the hypotheses it makes. We clearly know who carried the day. There are winners and losers. In the history of science, you can cast a backward glance and say who was on the straight path and who walked astray. This is scarcely the case in philosophy. Who knows which of Plato and Aristotle, or Kant and Hegel, was right?

Let me here use a military image. Some historians of science can be compared with those soldiers in trench warfare, who had to "mop up" the enemy

positions. They would give the wounded the so-called finishing shot. They could do that after the trench had been stormed by a first wave of assault. The first wave had to bear the brunt and face its own death. I deeply respect scientists who conquer the unknown, who open up new truths, who vanquish darkness. I am less sanguine about the respectability of the claque of progress.

3. Over against the claim to universality, we find servility toward the dominant intellectual atmosphere of our time and age. In philosophy, too, a certain *political correctness* is rampant. *Doxa* is not a new phenomenon. But it takes exasperating features when it is given free rein in the very name of philosophy. The Parisian café-philosophers invoke Socrates, when they claim to be reviving the living atmosphere of philosophy, by emphasizing again the dimension of dialogue. But there is an aspect that they forget or, to be precise, that they carefully sweep under the carpet: Socrates wanted to put to the test the *doxa* of the *polis* and to scrutinize the credentials of its legitimacy. He gave it the lie with a patient stubbornness that led to his trial and condemnation. In our Western societies, the hemlock or the stake exist only—thank goodness!—in the *soft* version of refused tenures and lack of reviews.

The petty Socrates of the screen has become *soft* in the same way: he is a conformist. Some questions are sanctuaries. Let us cast a glance at a book written in collaboration by two would-be philosophers—let me call them, after Flaubert, Bouvard, and Pécuchet—and published a couple of years ago. Right at the outset, they are eager to underline that, as a matter of course, they are committed to the great tradition of the Enlightenment, they are modern, they are democrats, they stand for the autonomy of man, etc. We can sleep in peace: serious questions won't be asked.

Is History of Philosophy Servile?

I have been leveling criticism at some temptations that all philosophers meet. But shouldn't we listen to what other people say about our own discipline? More often than not, the importance ascribed to history of philosophy is under fire. The emphasis that it receives in the continental tradition is interpreted as a symptom of decadence. Philosophy degenerates and becomes philology. The theme is very old, even hackneyed, since it is already to be found under the pen of Seneca.[9] Philosophy, thus, does not study the things themselves, but what was earlier thought by other people. Aquinas expresses this tartly in a frequently quoted statement: "*studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum.*"[10] It is highly ironical, by the way, that this quotation should come from a commentary on Aristotle.

Now, this criticism is all the more acute in that it touches a sore place. Poking fun at servility is very nice, but shouldn't we sweep at our own door?

Is not history of philosophy servility *par excellence*? Philosophy has to cope courageously with the things themselves. When it fails to do so, it cowardly takes shelter in other people's thoughts. Furthermore, among all kinds of history, the study of ancient philosophy is the most servile, for it chooses as its subject matter a hoary and respectable tradition, an intellectual establishment of sorts.

Let me make a case for the contrary. First, I will show that history of philosophy could help philosophy to overcome servility. Then, I will show that the study of ancient philosophy is especially helpful in that field. Let me first make a preliminary observation on the very divide between historians and "pure philosophers," also known as "systematic" philosophers. It would be overhasty to draw too neat a line between those two groups, and it might be more fruitful to place the dividing line in another way.

Frequently, the real boundary runs inside history itself, that is, between people who do history of philosophy in general and students of contemporary philosophy. Many would-be "pure" philosophers—at least in my country—are in fact historians of contemporary philosophy. Some among them could even be described as importers of foreign philosophical wares—which is, by the way, one of the definitions of the sophist that Plato gives in the dialogue by this title.[11] The tendency to which they are committed, or the language from which they translate, is not relevant in the last analysis.

What deserves our attention is that those people sometimes are not even aware that they are historians. The proximity in time of the thoughts that are to be understood muffles the impression of strangeness. People who study the works of contemporary thinkers can more easily imagine that they are doing the thinking themselves. The snag is that people who ignore that they are historians are seldom that finicky about a rigorous historical method.

I should like to add a second reason that could justify our blurring the dividing line. Once again, a bare fact: the very best people do both. People who do "pure" philosophy—what is called among us French people "*philosophie générale*"—barring exceptions, are seldom the best philosophers. Conversely, people who do only history are seldom the most interesting historians.

History of Philosophy as a Possible Antidote

Let me now try to show to what extent history of philosophy can help us not to yield to the temptations that I have just sketched.

1. Against the degeneration of philosophical language into a technical jargon, history of philosophy enables us to understand the emergence of the philosophical enterprise in and from everyday experience. It reconstructs the shifts in meaning that led to the use of words as technical terms. By so doing, it can help us, indirectly, to find a way back to the original experiences for

which words of art were coined, and possibly to coin new words that are more in keeping with our actual parlance and more efficient for teaching purposes.

There is more to that. The dialogic dimension of philosophy gives us an argument in favor of history of philosophy. The latter is not the adversary of dialogue. We don't have to choose between historical erudition and living dialogue. By and large, "real" dialogues in the coffeehouses of our own cities produce the most boring kind of commonplace. To be sure, if the agora in Athens resounded of anything other than the cries of the fishmongers, the same kind of idle talk was to be heard. Little wonder, since we, for the most part, and barring exceptional circumstances, are rather silly people who say silly things. A successful dialogue situation is an extremely artificial phenomenon, and really interesting dialogue partners are exceedingly rare. Something far more interesting would arise if we were able to speak with Aristotle, Kant, etc. Now, this is precisely what history of philosophy makes possible: it furnishes the philosophical discussion with its most important ingredient, that is, worthy partners, partners who are much more interesting than us dwarves.

Against servility toward sciences, the philosopher must ask: do sciences help us better understand ourselves or better to answer our questions? Can they, as such, further our own humanity? Or is it rather the case that they clog the channels that lead to this understanding? A historical meditation may be helpful.

As for content, history of philosophy can show that the emergence of modern science and of technology in its wake is a consequence of, or at least a parallel to, philosophical decisions. History of philosophy has to lay bare other, pre-scientific, possibilities of being human, which enables it to point toward new ways.

2. As for method, history of philosophy can also offer another model than history of sciences, and a model, moreover, that could prove fruitful for the latter as well. To be sure, there are, in history of philosophy, features that resemble what we observe in history of science: the very fact that some philosophers are considered "great thinkers," as belonging to a canon of required reading, etc., happens for the most part *post festum*. Yet, in history of philosophy, there are no such things as radically overcome ideas or definitely assured results.

Very much to the contrary, history of philosophy has been functioning for more than one century as an endeavour to rediscover and rehabilitate thoughts that had been forgotten or looked down at. The very essence of historical work and its infinite task of self-correction is captured fairly adequately by the word "revisionism." It is a pity that the word was hijacked by people who are scarcely worthy of it. Let me mention here the rediscovery of some characters of the Latin Middle Ages who were too much in the shade of Aquinas, of the importance of al-Farabi, of the part played by the Arabs in the formation of Scholastic

thought, of the overcoming of the common view of German idealism as leading toward Hegel, etc.

3. Against servility toward the contemporary *doxa*, history of philosophy can give us some weapons. The universal that we want to access is not just the opposite of any particular whatsoever. It asserts itself in the teeth of a particular particularity, i.e., not the parochialism of our neighbour, but ours. Reaching upward toward the universal is possible for us if and only if we become conscious of our own particularity. This takes place through a historical reflection. Perhaps we could here borrow a phrase from the early Leo Strauss: the "second cave." Under the first cave, the "natural" one, Plato's cave, there is a second cave, which is historical in nature. And we have first of all, by doing history, to climb from this deeper cave into the higher one.[12]

The Key Role of Ancient Philosophy

Up to now, I have been supporting history of philosophy generally speaking. I would like to risk a step further by showing what kind of part can be played by a special field in the history of philosophy, namely history of ancient philosophy.

First some words on freedom as the nourishing soil of philosophy might be apposite. The ideal of philosophical dialogue is rooted in the experience of Greek democracy. We could indulge in oversimplification and contend that philosophy is nothing more than taking democracy seriously in an absolute, nay, maniac way. This is already to be found in Plato's *Protagoras*. There, Socrates points out that the Athenians are careful to distinguish between technical and political questions. When they discuss technical issues, the competence of professional people is decisive. But where political decisions are at stake, every technical competence is put into brackets, and even the look or origin of the speakers is discarded in favor of the intrinsic worth of the arguments that they put forward.[13] On this issue, Plato himself is utterly in the wake of his teacher Socrates. Many centuries later, Giambattista Vico could see this very clearly. According to a breathtaking paragraph in the Scienza Nuova, the assembly of the people in Athens is the place where the Platonic theory of ideas was found. Plato observed that every citizen, who in normal circumstances looks for his interest only, submits himself, in so far as he is a part of the *polis*, to an idea of common utility that keeps away from passions.[14]

1. For us to keep philosophical language sound, the study of ancient philosophy is especially fruitful. It is even the only one that can enable us to do so. Ancient philosophy is "first" philosophy in a chronological meaning, too. It had to create its own intellectual tools. For instance: the Platonic *eidos* is a common Greek word; but the meaning in which it is used is diametrically opposed to the common use—a Greek ear perceived *eidos* as what can be seen, Plato means with *eidos* what no eye can see. In the *Phaedo*, he underlines the

paradox that arises from such a new meaning by using the adjective *aeides* as an epithet of *eidos*, "an invisible visage."[15] Reconstructing the emergence of such words can help us to find new ones, for example, for *eidos*, the "look" of things, their "aspect," or their "family look."

2. History of philosophy does away with the dream of a "Socratic" revival of dialogical philosophy. It reminds us that the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues is a fiction. It makes no sense to try to reproduce the situation that they depict. Such a setting never existed.

Against servility toward science, ancient philosophy is again in a favorable position, for a paradoxical reason: the worldview that underlies it is irretrievably lost. Even the students of ancient science must confess that what they try to understand is false, period. They are not tempted to court success; they have to support the underdog.

We saw above that history of philosophy gives the vanquished a second chance. This is the more so for the student of ancient philosophy. He/she has to face specific difficulties, which make his/her task more delicate. Many ancient thoughts have sunk with almost all hands. What we call at present by the name of our field, that is, ancient thought, is in fact flotsam after so many shipwrecks. It is the result of a selection made at the end of the ancient world. We cannot ply our trade without a constant attempt at freeing ourselves from this canon. To begin with, we have to recover thoughts that were transmitted to us in fragments only; which is no accident: what exists so is what could not enter some canon. Hence the rehabilitations of the Presocratics, of Stoic logic, the rediscovery (alleged or real) of Plato's unwritten doctrines, etc.

3. Against contemporary doxa, the study of ancient philosophy can be all the more efficient because its object is so far from us. So far, as a matter of fact, that we are not even allowed to take the very existence of philosophy for granted. Ancient philosophy had not only to be born, it had to assert itself in a peculiar context. It had to cast its moorings from myth—a word that took up its present-day meaning on the basis of this very separation from philosophy. The study of ancient philosophy always has to take into account this non-philosophical, pre-philosophical foil on which the philosophical enterprise makes sense. It has to look at the limits of philosophy more closely, not to blur them, but to assess more exactly from what philosophy arose. Before *philosophia philosophata*, there is *philosophia philosophans*, philosophy in the making.

History of ancient philosophy has to look for philosophy even in texts in which there are no concepts. Things like that have been done for ancient epic, for example, Hesiod. More is to be done. I am not that sweet on "multiculturalist" rhetoric, but I think that philosophy should approach non-Greek texts and elicit from them as much philosophy as they can yield. Let me give you two examples from the Bible.

1. Deuteronomy 4:19: "And lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun, and the stars, even all the host of heaven, shouldest be driven to worship them, and serve them, which the Lord the God hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven. But the Lord hath taken you, and brought you forth out of the iron furnace, even out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheritance, as ye are this day." The characterization of the heavenly bodies, that is, that they are the same for every people, is very much the same as Aristotle's criterion for what takes place *physei*: fire burns in Athens in the same way as it does in Persia (EN, V, 10, 1134b19, 25–27). They are belittled over against the exodus. History is worth more than nature.

2. 1 Samuel 8:15: "he will take a tenth of your grain and of your vintage and give it to his officials and attendants." The Hebrew, and the Greek of the Septuagint, too, say more crudely: he will take your seed (the same word for semen) and give it to his eunuchs. Fruitfulness is made to support barrenness. Two models of temporality: biological cycle of sowing and reaping; the administrative line of files and chronicles.

Now, the presence of a philosophical background is not only a past that recedes as we progress; it is still surrounding us. It is not simply there for us to look backward at it, it still belongs to our present. We do not remember it as a past fact, but as what we cannot that easily remember, that is, our present context.

This problem is inbuilt in the very enterprise of studying ancient philosophy, because the very object of this study contains the problem. Among the benefits of the study of ancient philosophy is that its student cannot possibly take rationality for granted.

Freedom for the Thing Itself

I have been emphasizing freedom as the element of philosophy. Now, philosophical freedom does not imply that we can do anything, but that we are free for the thing itself. There is a give and take in freedom. Things too must be left free to be what they are.

This calls for some words on "deconstruction." What Heidegger called by the name of *Destruktion* or *Abbau* was meant to enable us to disencumber the original soil of experience, which was covered up by concretions that rendered the edification of new figures a sheer impossibility.[16] The ultimate goal was the arrival of what is new. According to contemporary supporters of "deconstruction" around Derrida, there is no such thing as the origin, and there should not be any.

Be that as it may, in both cases, a rule obtains: deconstruction is worth what the construction was. In any case, before we deconstruct, we must make sure that what we are deconstructing is the real thing, not a sham-building we have previously bungled up. Deconstructing Plato, deconstructing Aristotle, why not? But they must be Plato and Aristotle. Deconstruction is all the more interesting

when construction has provided it with a consistent object. And for us to construct such objects, philology and history are indispensable tools. A paradox follows: only through the painstaking enterprise of an appropriation of the past can we question what is our own. And again: only by criticizing what is our own can we build our identity. Destruction and construction—nay, edification, sapping, and bolstering—must go at the same pace.

As a consequence, we have first to set the ancient object against us in its right to an independent existence, in its freedom to be what it is, or what it was. We have to steer clear from two reefs. The first one is anachronism. It consists in interpreting ancient philosophical texts as forerunners of what came afterward, by foisting on them our present-day outlook.

Let me give you an example. Plato's *Timaeus* should not be understood as a step toward modern science, but in its own right. The *Timaeus* is first a literary work of art, a certain way for Plato to use language. And he does that by mobilizing a whole array of devices, including playful ones. Physical phenomena are explained not only as facts, but as words. Hence many etymologies—puns as a mater of fact. Some are obvious and were pointed out by ancient commentators. In 43c7, *aisthèsis* from *aïssô* was seen by Proclus (in *Timaeum*, ed. Diehl, t. III, p. 332, 3–16). There are other ones in 65e1, 67d2, 68a1, 76a1, and 77b3.

All this is plain sailing. Still, there is a passage that reaches farther than simple play, since it affects a concept that lies at the very core of Plato's teaching in the *Timaeus*, that is, *eikôs muthos or logos*. The phrase is too often understood in the light of modern epistemology, as likelihood, probable account. But there are passages in which it means "alike" in quite a naive, not to say crude, sense, as the likelihood of a portrait.

Timaeus, 56b4: *pur-puramis*; *kata ton orthon logon kai kata ton eikota*. Translators are compelled to translate the passage in a distorted way. Cornford has: "in accordance with genuine reasoning as well as probability . . . we may take the pyramid as the element or seed of fire" (p. 223).

For the last French translator, Brisson, who otherwise did a splendid job, the *Timaeus* is the earliest program of a mathematized physics. He translates: "*conformément à la droite raison et conformément à l'<explication> vraisemblable <que nous proposons>*" (p. 159), that is, "according to right reason and according to the likely explanation that we are putting forth." He has to translate the same word in two different ways: *logos* is rendered by "reason" and by "explanation." He has to add words. The last clause suggests that *eikôs* is sort of on the side of the subject, that it is not an intrinsic property of the *logos*.

Orthos logos is in fact etymology, the right naming. We could say that there is on the one hand the *orthos logos*, as a merely linguistic phenomenon, and on the other hand the *eikôs logos*, which points toward rationality. But this is

ruled out by another passage: *touto ho nun thermon legomen* ***eikotôs*** *to pathèma kai tounoma pareskhen* (62a4); seen by Cornford (p. 260), who refers to the Cratylus.

There is a second danger. It is symmetrical to anachronism, but I could not find a convenient name for it. It consists in anchoring texts to the epoch at which they were written, more precisely, to our own view of the horizon, of the farthest limits of thought at this period of time. By so doing, we preclude the possibility of an author anticipating later developments. But why should not an ancient author have seen the thing itself? In the *Categories*, Aristotle first divides quantity into discrete and continuous. A discrete quantum has parts that have no common limit. Such are number (4b25–31) and vocal speech (4b32–37). A continuous quantum has parts that have a common limit. Such are geometric realities like line, surface, and volume (5a1–6); such are, too, time and place (5a6–14).

A further division distinguishes quanta whose parts have a position (*thesis*) in relation to one another, like geometrical dimensions and space, and quanta whose parts have no position in relation to one another, but only an order (*taxis*), like time, number, and speech.

A difficulty arises for time, and for time alone. It is the only case of a quantum that is continuous *and* that possesses an order, and no position. Since none of its parts subsist (5a27), for it "flows," how can we say that it is continuous (4b24, 5a6)? With what is one of its parts continuous? What is continuous must hold together. By this token, time is pure continuity, or pure continuation, pure activity of establishing continuity, without anything to put into continuity with anything whatsoever. Time is containing more than continuous. It is a container without content, that is, something like a pure form. This is what Kant will say centuries later. To be sure, in a very different key, for Kantian time is a form of subjectivity, but a form all the same.

Conclusion

I began this article with some words on myself as an individual. As a conclusion, it should be apposite to reflect on who we are as a collective being, as some sort of guild of people who ply the same trade. The answer is in the question: we are the people who ask who we are. We are the people for whom identity is present as a question. We are people who try to practice some sort of historical *gnothi seauton*. We are people who want to question our own identity through a detour. The identity of the contemporary man is historically conditioned. What we are is what we became. To be sure, this has been the case since the beginning. But the difference consists in reflection. The *gnothi seauton*, and still more examination of conscience, nowadays presupposes a historical reflection. Dodging history makes us fall prey to *doxa*. *Doxa* must undergo a

historical treatment. Since our identity is mediated and conditioned through the past, we reach ourselves through history. Thus, history puts ourselves into question and becomes the most dangerous place. History of philosophy may have revolutionary consequences, as far as it destroys this or that *fable convenue*. History puts us to the test. Historians are not making "the leisurely stroll of the pampered owner in the garden of the past";[17] rather they are pathfinders. Today, Socrates would do history.

Notes

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1. Plato, *Menexenos*, 235d.
2. Schelling, Letter to Hegel, February 4, 1795, in *Briefe an und von Hegel*, ed. J. Hoffmiester (Hamburg: Meiner, 1969), 22.
3. Plato, *Sophistes*, 253c7f.
4. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A, 2, 98b24–28.
5. Syrianus quoted by Proclus, *De providential* [Latin], XII, §66; 83 Isaac.
6. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie* §62, 118.
7. G. Devereux, *From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioural Sciences* (Mouton, Paris, and Den Haag, 1967).
8. Galilei, *Il saggiatore*, chap. 6.
9. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, XVII, 108, 23.
10. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Treatise on the Heavens*, I, §229.
11. Plato, *Sophistes*, 224cd.
12. See the references in L. Strauss, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, *Philosophy und Gesetz, frühe Schriften*, ed. H. Meier (Metzler, Stuttgart, 1997), preface of the editor, XXIX, n. 40.
13. Plato, *Protagoras*, 319b–d.
14. Vico, *Scienza Nuova* (1744), IV, 14, 2, §1041; ed. F. Nicolini (Bari: Laterza, 1928), 125.
15. Plato, *Phaedo*, 79a, 80d, 81a, c, 83b; *Gorgias*, 493b4f.
16. See the first occurrence of the phrase in Heidegger: "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers '*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*'" (1919), quoted in the very valuable Heidegger-Index (1919–1927) by R. Petkovšek, (Ljubljana, 1998), 55f.
17. Nietzsche, Friedrich, "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben," Preface in Unzeitgamässe Betrachtungen, II, KSA vol. 1, 245.