

ON SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF PERCEPTION

GEORGE S. PAPPAS
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT: Philosophical accounts of perception in the tradition of Kant and Reid have generally supposed that an event of making a judgment is a key element in every perceptual experience. An alternative very austere view regards perception as an event containing nothing judgmental, nor anything conceptual. This account of perception as non-conceptual is discussed first historically as found in the philosophies of Locke and (briefly) Berkeley, and then examined in the contemporary work of Chisholm and Alston.



One common theme in philosophical accounts of perception has been that each perceptual experience includes an element of judgment, or perhaps more exactly, an event of judging. Of course, a perceptual experience may also include additional elements beyond the judging; no doubt some sensory element is reckoned a part of the perceptual experience as well. Lacking something sensory, a theory of perception would court the charge that it makes perceptual experience of an object indistinguishable from merely thinking of that object. Nonetheless, the judging part is often taken as the key element in the perception, and even in some accounts identified with the perceptual experience, thereby relegating the sensory component to the status of a mere causal antecedent of the perceptual event. Engaging in an act of judging, it seems natural to suppose, involves applying one or more concepts, and so we can think of theories of this sort as holding that all perception has conceptual content.¹

An alternative, though perhaps a minority position, holds that perception is essentially *non*-conceptual. On such a view, perception may often be accompanied by a judging, or by an event of belief acquisition or some related cognitive and conceptual event. Still, according to this sort of theory, such events are not constitutive of the event of perceiving. Rather, the sensory

element is said to wholly compose the perceptual event. We could say, reasonably accurately, that on these non-conceptual accounts of perception, perceptual experiences are identified with events of sensing. To perceive some object *O* is just to sense in a certain manner with respect to object *O*.²

In this paper I will be mainly concerned with the theories that take perception to be non-conceptual. I will look at what I think are some historical antecedents of these theories in Locke and Berkeley, and then bring the story more up to date with a look at related theories in Chisholm and Alston.

I. LOCKE'S THEORY

Locke has traditionally been interpreted as having accepted an indirect realist account of perception. According to this theory, all perception of objects is mediated by and dependent on the immediate perception of one or more phenomenal entities, perhaps sense-data or *sensa*. In Locke's case, these phenomenal entities are ideas of sensation which, it is said, are objects that have determinate phenomenal features such as color and shape. Immediate perception of such ideas occurs in every perceptual experience, whether veridical or not. In a standard case of the veridical perception of a physical object, the event of immediately perceiving ideas stands in some causal relation to the object, and this same event of immediate perception is said to occasion the making of a judgment whose content in a typical case would be that some object is present.

Evidence that Locke accepted a theory of this sort derives from the fact that he distinguishes between immediate and mediate perception, and that he stresses that it is ideas that are the objects of immediate perception. He says:

Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call *Idea*. (*Essay*, II, VIII, 8)³

Here it is clear that Locke is talking about ideas as objects of a kind of perception. Elsewhere he sometimes calls such ideas *images* (II, I, 5), and at least in the visual case images are objects of visual apprehension. Further, Locke famously held that ideas of the primary qualities resemble real patterns or qualities in bodies. He claims that:

the *Ideas of primary Qualities* of Bodies, are *Resemblances* of them; and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves. (II, VIII, 15; emphasis Locke's)

Here two points are important. First, a resemblance thesis between ideas and qualities of bodies seems to require that the ideas have some determinate features approximating to those qualities in the bodies. Second, the phrase "their patterns" is clearly referring to features *of the ideas*—features which carry the resemblance, so to speak. This is positive evidence that Locke took ideas of sensation to be objects with determinate features.

There also seems to be evidence that Locke thinks an event of judging is always ingredient in perception, for he links perception and judgment explicitly:

We are farther to consider concerning Perception, that the *Ideas we receive by Sensation*, are often in grown People *alter'd by the Judgment*, without our Taking notice of it. When we set before our Eyes a round Globe, or any uniform Colour, v.g. Gold, Alabaster, or Jet, 'tis certain, that the *Idea* thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle variously shadow'd, with several degrees of Light and Brightness coming to our Eyes. But we having by use been accustomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of Light, by the difference of the sensible Figures of Bodies, the Judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their Causes: So that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or colour, collecting the Figure, it makes it pass for a mark of Figure, and frames to it self the perception of a convex Figure, and a uniform Colour; when the *Idea* we receive from thence, is only a Plain variously colour'd, as is evident in Painting. (II, X, 8; emphasis in original)

In this passage the thesis that ideas have determinate features is further reinforced, for Locke takes the original visual idea to be a plane figure with some color. Moreover, Locke seems to say also that the experience of the visual idea triggers a judgment that a body with a convex figure is present. As he is here just giving an example to illustrate a general case, we could fairly take this passage as evidence that Locke thinks an event of judgment is present in all perception, and that it is causally dependent on one's experience of some ideas.

Additional support for the traditional reading of Locke as an indirect realist derives from some comments he makes about real knowledge, i.e., knowledge of external bodies.

Where-ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our *Ideas* there is certain Knowledge; and where-ever we are sure those *Ideas* agree with the reality of Things, there is certain real Knowledge. (IV, IV, 18)

The point he seems to be making is that one has perceptual knowledge of external bodies only if there is a conformity between one's ideas and bodies, and one is sure that this conformity obtains. It is not sufficient, in other words, that there is a conformity; one must also be sure that it is present. It is this latter point that seems to call for judgment, specifically the judgment that there is the relevant conformity. Hence, all perceptual knowledge of bodies would depend upon and contain within it a judgment concerning the conformity obtaining between currently experienced ideas and external bodies.

Despite this important evidence supporting the traditional indirect realist reading of Locke, I think Locke's official theory of perception is actually something quite different. Partly this is because the evidence so far adduced

is overdrawn. We can begin to see this when we notice that in the passage concerning how judgment alters the appearance Locke is merely claiming that the unconscious judgment alters the original idea. Locke does not say that the judgment issues in or constitutes a belief to the effect that the object *has* the qualities correspondent to the altered ideas. Judgment operates to create new ideas, either wholly new ones or modified versions of the originals. This seems to be the only role claimed for judgment in the passage quoted earlier. In other words, judgment is not claimed to be productive of belief at all, but rather to be a process that changes the nature of one's ideas. While this role of judgment may compromise some of what Locke says about the passivity of all immediate perception of ideas, it does not establish that judgment is present in all perception.

The issue of perceptual knowledge as Locke envisions it raises a different problem. Suppose it is assumed that for Locke, one has perceptual knowledge of objects only if one is sure that there is a conformity between one's current ideas and some features of the object. This will require, as noted earlier, that perceptual knowledge implicates judgment in just the right way. However, the point that perception in Locke always includes an element of judgment will then follow only if we assume that Locke equates perception and perceptual knowledge, or at least that perception entails having perceptual knowledge. However, this is an assumption that Locke does not accept, as we can see from this passage:

Perception then being the *first step* and *degree towards Knowledge*, and the inlet of all the Materials of it, the fewer Senses any Man, as well as any other Creature hath; and the fewer and duller the Impressions are, that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties are, that are employed about them, the more remote are they from that Knowledge, which is to be found in some Men. (II, X, 15; emphasis Locke's)

I take this passage to indicate that Locke regards perception as an activity distinct from knowing. To perceive a thing is not in and of itself to gain knowledge of the thing, even if perception may typically be necessary for knowledge. Coming to have knowledge of a thing in perception is thus something posterior to and a different cognitive act from simply perceiving that thing. To use Locke's term, perception is just the "first step" towards knowledge. So, even if it is true that in acquiring perceptual knowledge of objects some judging is necessary, this is no reason to suppose that the event of perceiving includes or is an event of judging.

In another passage Locke ties perception and knowledge together in a way that may be read as the claim that perception just is perceptual knowing. The passage contains Locke's official definition of knowledge:

Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but *the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas*. (IV, I, 2; emphasis Locke's)

Further, if perception is just perceptually knowing something to be the case, then it is plausible to include some element of judging in perception, thus bolstering the traditional indirect realist account of Locke.

That perception of an agreement or disagreement between ideas includes some judging seems clear. However, this is not perception in the usual sense, the sense relevant to cases of perception of objects. We need to distinguish between (a) perceiving two or more ideas that agree or disagree, and (b) perceiving an agreement or disagreement between two or more ideas. Perceiving two ideas of triangular shape is the event of perceiving two ideas that agree on the shape dimension. That is distinct from noticing that these ideas agree on the shape dimension, and it is this sort of noticing that Locke is referring to as the perception of agreement or disagreement. It is this noticing of this perceptual sort, or perceiving that something is the case, that Locke is calling knowledge. Perceiving that the two ideas agree in shape presupposes that one perceives the ideas. But perceiving that the two items agree should not be confused with perceiving two items that happen to agree. So, the official definition of knowledge Locke provides gives no support either for the view that perception is just perceptual knowing, or for the claim that perception contains judgmental, conceptual content.

A final reason for not accepting the traditional interpretation of Locke on perception is that it makes no provision for something that he stresses. Locke notes that for him, perception is nothing more than the having of ideas. He says that:

To ask, *at what time a man has first any Ideas*, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having *Ideas*, and Perception being the same thing. (II, I, 9; emphasis Locke's)

Locke's point here, it seems to me, rules out the traditional indirect realist interpretation of his account of perception. The sensory event, which is the event of immediately perceiving one or more ideas, just is the event of perceiving an object. There is no additional event of judging, or of some other cognitive act, over and above the experience of the ideas which helps to make up or constitute perception.⁴

Locke returns to the point in the context of making another concerning pain and ideas. He says:

Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect, than it does a Billet, unless that motion be continued to the Brain, and there the sence of Heat, or *idea* of Pain, be produced in the Mind, wherein consists *actual Perception*. (II, IX, 3; emphasis Locke's)

Here Locke makes two points: namely, that one has perception only if one has ideas and, more importantly for present purposes, that the actual perception of the pain caused by the exposure to the fire is the same thing as the having of the relevant ideas.

I will call this way of thinking about perception an *identity theory*, because it identifies the event of experiencing ideas with the event of perceiving an object. The theory is still an *indirect realist* account, because perception of objects is still dependent on and mediated by the immediate perception of ideas. The theory is what we can call a *single tier* theory of perception, in the sense that it explicates perception in terms of a single event, namely the sensory event. This contrasts with a *two tier* account of perception, a paradigm of which was sketched above in the traditional indirect realist interpretation of Locke. Two tier theories, as I use the term here, explicate perception by means of two linked but separate events, one sensory and the other conceptual.⁵

An important asymmetry is worth noticing. Every event of perceiving an object, according to this indirect realist identity theory, consists in and is identical to an event of experiencing some ideas, but the converse does not hold. One can experience some ideas without perceiving an object, as when one hallucinates, thereby experiencing ideas with no attendant object. It must be assumed, as well, that only experience of the right sorts of ideas will make up the event of perceiving an object. The right sorts of ideas, naturally, will be those that are causally related to the object in question. And even here we have to say that the causal relation itself has to be of the right sort, though Locke does not supply the details. The basic point is that causal chains can be “deviant” in any number of ways, and full specification of this identity theory would have to isolate those types in the causal chains that need to be excluded.

If Locke’s notion of perception includes no judgmental element, it hardly follows that it is also non-conceptual, for there may well be modes of conceptual deployment outside of judgment. Nonetheless, there is evidence that perception lacks conceptual content for Locke, for he acknowledges perception far down in the animal chain:

Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, *in all sorts of Animals*; though in some, possibly, the Avenues, provided by Nature for the reception of Sensations are so few, and the Perception, they are received with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of Sensations, which is in other Animals. (II, IX, 12; emphasis Locke’s)

He gives an example of an oyster which has far fewer sensations than higher animals, but nonetheless has those sensations suitable to its physical condition and so has some degree of perception. Presumably lower level animals lack concepts that might be deployed in perception, so for these creatures perception lacks conceptual content. The case might be different for higher mammals and persons, of course; Locke does say that perception comes in degrees. However, his account of the difference in degree of perception between the lower and higher animals, persons included, cites merely less obscurity and dullness in the ideas experienced by the higher animals, along with a greater variety of ideas had by them compared to their lower cousins. This suggests, I think, that Locke takes perception in all cases to be a non-conceptual event, a

purely factual relation holding between an agent and some object. Moreover, the point Locke makes about the lower animals also supports the claim that experiencing ideas is an event without either judgment or conceptual content. Such animals, as he says, experience ideas or sensations, though they lack any conceptual repertoire. And Locke's explanation of the difference in degree of perception in higher versus lower animals will apply here as well. Experiencing ideas even for the higher animals, which I take to include persons, will also be an event with no conceptual content.

The non-judgmental and non-conceptual character of perception in Locke is fully general, applying to immediate as well as mediate perception. Immediate perception is merely perception not dependent on perceived intermediaries, while mediate perception is so dependent on intermediaries. The common element in each is perception proper, so if the interpretation given here is correct, neither immediate perception of ideas nor mediate perception of objects is anything more than a purely factual relation, containing nothing conceptual or judgmental.

To sum up thus far: I have said that it is plausible to take Locke as having endorsed an indirect realist causal theory of perception, though not of the traditional sort. The theory takes ideas of sensation to be experienced in every perceptual act, and to themselves be objects that have determinate features and that are immediately perceived. Perception of external objects is dependent on the immediate perception of ideas in the sense that the former would not occur if the latter were to fail to occur. In that sense, perception of objects is indirect. Nonetheless, the event of perceiving an object is constituted by the event of immediately perceiving some ideas; the one event is nothing more than the other. The concept of perception in Locke is further non-conceptual and thus is non-judgmental as well.⁶

II. SOME MORE RECENT ACCOUNTS

Accounts of the concept of perception articulated in more recent times by Chisholm and Alston are interestingly similar to that found in Locke as here construed. To be sure, there are important differences. Both Chisholm and Alston defend direct realism, while Locke does not. Further, neither Chisholm nor Alston accepts the theory of ideas we find in Locke. Still, despite these differences, there are important similarities worth noticing.

In his 1957 book, *Perceiving*, and then in various editions of *Theory of Knowledge*, Chisholm developed and defended an alternative to the theory of ideas. For him the term "idea" was replaced by "sense-datum" or "appearance," but this is a mere terminological variation. The basic point is that Chisholm was rejecting phenomenal entities with determinate phenomenal features, and rejecting as well the view that such entities are objects of immediate perception. He notes that a statement like:

(1) x appears . . . to S

where the blank can be filled in with various descriptive predicates, should not be understood to carry commitment to an appearance. He says, rather,

We should be on our guard . . . when locution (1) . . . is transformed as:

(2) x presents a . . . appearance to S .

For statements of the form of (2) are deceptively like such statements as "John presents an expensive gift to Mary," where the adjective attributes a property to the thing designated by the noun following it. The locutions " x takes on an . . . appearance for S ," " S senses a . . . appearance of x ," and " S is acquainted with a . . . sense-datum belonging to x ," which may be thought of as variants of (2) are equally misleading. Whatever else appearances may be, then, they are not "objects to a subject."⁷

In place of appearances or sense-data, Chisholm speaks of *sensing* or being appeared to. The notion of sensing, in turn, is used to define the concept of appearing.

When we say that " x appears so-and-so to S " we may mean that S is inclined to believe something about x . Thus, if we say " x appears blue to S ," we often mean that S is inclined to believe that x is blue. Chisholm counts this as an epistemic concept of appearing. But not all such concepts are epistemic; there is also a comparative sense of appearing. In this sense, " x appears blue to S " would mean that x appears to S in the way in which things that are blue appear under conditions which are . . ."⁸

Here the phrase "under conditions which are" would most commonly give way to something like "normal conditions," or perhaps "under optimum conditions." The idea Chisholm has is that in this comparative sense of "appears," the subject S need not be at all inclined to believe that x is blue. One is giving just a description, in comparative terms, of the appearing. What is of importance to Chisholm, however, is really a third notion of appearing, viz., a *non-comparative descriptive* concept. Using such a concept, when one says " x appears blue to S ," one is describing the appearing but without comparing it to other cases of something appearing, or to anything else. Neither is one expressing that S is inclined to believe that x is blue. This non-comparative concept of appearing is supposed to be purely descriptive.⁹

Non-comparative appearing is then defined in terms of sensing, or being appeared to:

x appears . . . to S means that S senses . . . with respect to x .¹⁰

Here the term "appears" will be followed by some descriptive adjective such as "blue" and "senses" will be followed by an adverbial form of the same term, viz., "blue-ly." The phrase "with respect to" is to be understood in causal terms. The event of sensing and its very nature or content are defined in terms of the causal stimulus, what Chisholm calls the *proper stimulus*. In brief, where Locke

will speak of immediately perceiving visual ideas of blue, Chisholm will speak instead of sensing blue-ly, where “blue-ly” is an adverb modifying “sensing.”

When it comes to perceiving in what Chisholm calls the “non-propositional sense,” what we find is an identity theory structurally very close to that discussed above for Locke. The non-propositional sense of “perceives” is reflected in expressions like “*S* perceives *O*,” or “*S* sees *X*,” where the perception-verb takes a grammatical direct object as complement. This is what Chisholm calls the “simplest” sense of perception, a sort of perception typically directed at physical objects. He writes:

We may now define the simplest of the non-propositional senses of “perceive”: “*S* perceives *x*” means: *x* appears in some way to *S*.¹¹

When we recall that the notion of appearing is itself defined in terms of sensing, as above, then the sort of identity we find in Chisholm for non-propositional perceiving is this:

“*S* perceives *x*” means: *S* senses . . . with respect to *x*.¹²

Is there nothing more to perception than sensing in a particular way with respect to the object? On Chisholm’s view there need not be any knowledge of one sort involved. He says that:

Using perception in the way defined here, we must say that there are people who perceive things, who see, hear, feel, or touch them, without *knowing* that they are perceiving anything, without knowing that they are seeing, hearing, feeling, or touching anything. For there are people who perceive things without knowing anything about the physical processes in terms of which I have defined the non-prepositional senses of perception words. Thus, we could say with Leibniz, that *apperception* is not given to all who have *perception*.¹³

This is just one sort of knowledge, namely, knowledge that one is then perceiving. One could lack that but still gain knowledge of the perceived object. However, we should also note that Chisholm says that:

there is no paradox involved in saying that a man *sees* a dog, without taking what he sees to be a dog.¹⁴

I take this to mean that Chisholm endorses the idea that one may perceive *x* but gain no beliefs about *x*, and thus that he accepts the further result that one may perceive *x* without gaining knowledge of *x*.

Still, Chisholm hesitates to say that perception is wholly non-epistemic, implying no belief-acquisition. He allows, that is, that in perceiving *x* the agent might engage in some *taking or other*, though he does not go on to reckon it an instance of knowledge. His point is that when *S* sees a dog, he may not take it to be a dog, but maybe he will still take it to be something. If that were right, there would always be some taking involved in the perception of objects, though it need not be focused in a specific way.

This line of thought is only allowed by Chisholm as possible. It is not something he endorses outright. So, I think we can safely say that for him, perception is non-epistemic in that it involves no acquisition of knowledge or beliefs about the perceived object. Further, as already noted, he takes non-propositional perception to be just the event of sensing in a certain way. There is thus no element of judging or taking involved in the perception of objects. Perception of objects, we might say, contains just the sensory component being caused in the right way. The similarity to the earlier portrayal of Locke is quite close.¹⁵

There is an important difference, of course, because Chisholm's theory is a version of direct realism, not a version of indirect realism as we find in Locke. Events of sensing are not perceived intermediaries, even though every event of perception includes one or more events of sensing. It is this fact that allows Chisholm to maintain that physical objects, and not sense-data or appearances, are the objects of direct perception.

With Chisholm's view before us, Alston's similar account is easy to formulate briefly and understand. Like Chisholm, Alston rejects sense-data and appearances, though he does not settle on adverbial states of sensing as making up the sensory element in perception. Instead, Alston favors what Chisholm had earlier called the "non-comparative concept of appearing." Linking this up to perception, Alston says that:

the analysis of the concept of object perception given by the Theory of Appearing is of breathtaking simplicity. For *S* to perceive *x* is simply for *x* to appear to *S* as so-and-so. That is all there is to it. At least that is all there is to the *concept* of perception. Thus the Theory of Appearing is a form of "direct" realism, even "naïve" realism, in that it endorses our spontaneous, naïve way of taking sense experience as involving direct awareness of an object that is presented to consciousness, usually an external physical object.¹⁶

This passage expresses a strict analog to the identity version of indirect realism earlier attributed to Locke. It is a single tier version of direct realism, just as we find in Chisholm, despite the different characterization of the sensory component. The event of *S*'s perceiving an object *x* just is, for Alston, the event of *x* appearing so-and-so to *S*. The parallel to Locke, as earlier construed, and to Chisholm, is straightforward on this point. So also is the parallel with regard to the non-epistemic character of perception. As Alston notes:

According to the Theory of Appearing, the notion of *x*'s appearing to *S* as so-and-so is fundamental and unanalyzable. And since this relationship, being unanalyzable, is not analyzable in terms of conceptualizations, beliefs, takings, or anything else of the sort, it really does have the non- or pre-conceptual character we saw earlier that perceptual appearing seems phenomenologically to have.¹⁷

Thus, on both points Chisholm and Alston follow Locke. Each accepts an identity theory of perception, one which identifies perception with the sensory element. And each accepts, too, the thesis that perception is fundamentally non-epistemic in nature, or a purely factual relationship between percipient and object. These facts are invariant across the differences, even though the differences are quite significant. Locke as here construed is an indirect realist, while both Chisholm and Alston are direct realists. Further, Locke accepts the theory of ideas, a theory scorned by both Chisholm and Alston, though Chisholm and Alston further differ from each other on the nature of the sensory. These differences, important though they are, do not affect the fundamental similarities in the three theories of perception. All are single tier theories that take perception of objects to be non-conceptual and non-epistemic.¹⁸

I suspect that this way of thinking about perception may be found in other authors, both in the distant past and more recently. This basically non-Kantian way of thinking about perception, I think, has every right to be thought of as something of a traditional view, along side of well-known alternatives found historically in Reid and Kant, and more recently in Sellars and Clark, among others.¹⁹ The full tracing of this tradition is yet to be done.²⁰

ENDNOTES

1. Kant and Thomas Reid are two important philosophers who held that perception includes a judging component, and who held that perception always has conceptual content. Reid is also a philosopher who has been interpreted as identifying the perceptual experience with the judging event, thereby robbing perception of sensory content. See William Alston, "Reid on Perception and Cognition," in *The Philosophy of Thomas Reid*, ed. M. Dalgarno and E. Matthews (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1989).
2. Beyond the authors to be discussed below, we also find this sort of theory defended in James Cornman, *Perception, Common Sense, and Science*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975).
3. John Locke, *Essay On Human Understanding*, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). References in the text are to the relevant book, chapter, and section of this edition of the *Essay*.
4. One could hold the view that judging is built into the experience of ideas, and in that way it is an ingredient in perception of objects even for the theory that takes perception to just be the sensory element. But this is not Locke's view. For he allows that small children, fetuses, and lower animals all experience ideas, but surely none of these creatures engage in acts of judging.
5. I discuss single-tier and two-tier theories of perception in more detail in "Sensation and Perception in Reid," *Nous* 23 (1989).

6. Berkeley's account of perception, it seems to me, is also a single-tier theory that identifies the event of perceiving an object with the event of immediately perceiving one or more ideas; and, as in Locke as here interpreted, Berkeley's notion of immediate perception is non-conceptual and non-epistemic. Of course, Berkeley is not an indirect realist, but rather a phenomenalist who identifies bodies with "collections" of ideas. I discuss these points in *Berkeley's Thought*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), chap. 6.
7. Roderick Chisholm, *Perceiving* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), 116–117.
8. *Ibid.*, 45.
9. It is contentious whether there really is a non-comparative, descriptive sense of appear-words; here I just fall in with Chisholm. For criticism of such a view see Hans Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
10. *Perceiving*, 125.
11. *Ibid.*, 149.
12. Chisholm speaks of an equivalence of meaning here rather than an identity of events; I assume that the event identity follows from the meaning equivalence.
13. *Perceiving*, 150, emphasis in original.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Chisholm has not been entirely consistent on this point. As Alston has noted, in Chisholm's 1982 paper, "A Version of Foundationalism," the notion of perception is defined in terms of taking, which is a form of judging. In the third edition of his *Theory of Knowledge*, however, published in 1989, Chisholm drops talk of taking, and again notes that perception has no implications with respect to belief. Instructive here is Chisholm's reply to Alston's essay, where he again defines perception more along the lines of that given in *Perceiving*. What he says is " S perceives $x =_{df}$ S is appeared to by x ." See Chisholm's "Reply to William P. Alston," in *The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm*, ed. Lewis Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 127. Alston's paper, "Chisholm on the Epistemology of Perception," appears in this volume; see especially 108–109. Interestingly, in his latest work on this topic, Chisholm gave up the adverbial theory and replaced it with some version of the sense-datum theory, the very theory he had criticized for many decades. See his "Intellectual Autobiography," in Hahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–38. I will not pursue this matter further, as Chisholm does not develop the position but only states that he has changed his mind.
16. William Alston, *Perceiving God* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 55.
17. *Ibid.* Alston notes that the theory of appearing does not require mention of a causal relation to an object in a way that the adverbial account adopted by Chisholm does. Here I pass over this difference.
18. Note too that one can have a phenomenalist version of a single-tier theory, structurally quite similar to the indirect realist and direct realist accounts found, respectively, in Locke, Chisholm, and Alston. See note 6.
19. See Wilfrid Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception," *Philosophical Studies* 41 (1982); and Romane Clark, "Sensuous Judgments," *Nous* 7 (1973).
20. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Central Division of the APA, 2001. The commentary given then by Margaret Atherton has been instructive.