"THE WOUNDER WILL HEAL"

COGNITION AND RECONCILIATION IN HEGEL AND ADORNO

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The Trojan Epic Cycle comprised many extraordinary stories, most of which were recounted in works other than those attributed to Homer. The following is one of the stranger extracts from the Cycle: Helen has been abducted by the Trojans and the Greeks have resolved to get her back. The problem is that they have no idea where Troy is. They set off for Asia Minor, hoping that along the way they'll be able to sort out exactly where they're supposed to be going. Finally, they arrive at what they think is Troy—but which is in fact Teuthrania, a city in Mysia. They mistakenly lay siege to the city and in the ensuing skirmishes, Achilles wounds the defending king and hero, Telephus. Eventually, the nimble-witted Achaeans realize their error and retreat to their home shores, a journey which apparently takes them eight years. (By this time, counting the two years it took them to decide to go after Helen, ten years had elapsed since her abduction.) Back in Teuthrania, however, all is not well: Telephus's wound refuses to close. His condition becomes rather serious, so he consults an oracle to see about getting back on his feet. The oracle, naturally, replies with a seemingly straightforward but in fact deeply cryptic answer to his query: "ὁ τρώσας ἰάσεται," the wounder will heal. Telephus, for one, thinks he knows exactly what the oracle has in mind and sets off for Agamemnon's court at Aulis, which he infiltrates, disguised as a beggar. His idea, presumably, is that the oracle must have meant that Achilles is the only one who can heal him; after all, Achilles was, in fact, "the wounder." Before he gets a chance to track down Achilles, though, he's found out, recognized, and dragged before Agamemnon. Now, in the meantime, the Greeks themselves have consulted a seer for directions to Troy, and received the answer that a Greek will show them the way. At first they're stymied, since clearly, none of them knows the way. However, upon interrogating Telephus, they discover that he is really an expatriate Greek living in Asia Minor, and of course he knows where Troy is. And so they make a deal with him: in exchange for leading them to Troy, the Greeks will get Achilles to take a look at the wound he inflicted on Telephus. Alas, sausage-fingered Achilles has no luck healing Telephus. At their wits' end, Odysseus at last realizes that by "wounder," the oracle must have meant the weapon rather than the person who wounded Telephus. Achilles fetches his spear and scrapes some rust off onto Telephus's wound. "The wounder will heal"—and indeed, the wound closes and is healed. Telephus, keeping his end of the bargain, then shows the Greeks the way to Ilium.

The epic source for the story, the *Cypria,* is unfortunately lost and we have no way of knowing exactly how the story was recounted by the poet, although various retellings, retellings of retellings, dramatic adaptations, vase paintings, and the like have helped us to piece it together.[1] Of course, it is of interest in its own right, but the story also has significance as the basis for an esoteric allusion made by both Hegel and Adorno, who on various occasions invoke the oracular "ὁ τρώσας ἰάσεται," as a way of saying something about the operations of thought (or more specifically, the concept) and the reconciliation of spirit and nature. Hegel, for example, in one of his lecture-hall additions to a passage from the *Encyclopaedia Logic,* says that thinking "both inflicts [a] wound and heals it again,"[2] while Adorno, on the other hand, in the Introduction to *Negative Dialectic,* says that "Cognition [*Erkenntnis*] is a τρώσας ἰάσεται."[3] Now, it may seem at first glance that Hegel and Adorno

have different things in mind. After all, Hegel says "thinking" is that which both wounds and heals while Adorno says it is rather "cognition." In point of fact, however, Adorno's allusion to the story of the *Cypria* is a direct reference to the Hegelian sentiment expressed in the passage from the shorter *Logic* and a subtle comment on its implications. This becomes clearer when we consider what Hegel understands by "thinking" and what Adorno means by "cognition."

In the immediate context of the allusion to the *Cypria,* Hegel himself defines the relationship between thinking and cognition: "The most perfect mode of cognition [*des Erkennens*] is that which takes place in the pure form of thinking.... That the form of thinking is the absolute one, and that the truth appears within it as it is in and for itself—this is what philosophy in general asserts."[4] Truth is the legitimate object of philosophy as the culmination of the self-development of spirit (*Geist*). As such, it is not something external towards which philosophy strives, a goal or end-point beyond what it already is; consciousness, on this view, would be nothing more than a sorcerer's apprentice, meddling in matters beyond its ken. Rather, consciousness is from the beginning in possession of the truth, even if its various self-misinterpretations lead it astray. It must gradually and painfully gain experience and learn how to execute the most patient and penetrating forms of self-critique. (By contrast, "impatience," as Hegel says, "demands the impossible, namely, the attainment of the end without the means.")[5] Thus consciousness does not learn the truth as something foreign to its own constitution; it rather sees the truth as something that is proper to consciousness in itself, that is, available to cognition as the very possibility of consciousness. In other words, the truth is already present in the most basic forms of cognition, although not as articulated and understood. At the end of the day, though, thinking cognizes the truth and the truth it cognizes is its own rational structure, which it shares with the world. This insight will lay the ground for an eventual reconciliation of spirit and nature.

Thus, the term "thinking" (*das Denken*) as Hegel understands it, is really about the cognition of the absolute, a pure cognition that both overcomes and underpins all finite and sensuous cognition. In this pure form of cognition, the truth is evident—the evident itself, we might say. Consequently, Adorno's statement about cognition simply being a τρώσας ἰάσεται seems to fit with Hegel's use of the term thinking. As Hegel says, thinking in the relevant philosophical sense simply *is* cognition. However, what Adorno says, in fact, is in subtle tension with Hegel's claims about thinking reaching the truth. This is perhaps just what one might expect from Adorno, who was as indebted to Hegel as he was committed to negating him—in the Hegelian sense of the term, naturally. Thus Adorno in no way wishes to disparage Hegel's thought. He attempts rather to convict it of a transgression and then rehabilitate it as the motor for critique and reconciliation. (Incidentally, it is in this attempt to rehabilitate we find the best explanation of what a "negative" dialectic really is.)

In order to make sense of Adorno's "corrective" gesture, we shall have to look a little more closely at the passage that brings Hegel to say that "It is thinking that both inflicts the wound and heals it again." In effect, Adorno's Hegelian gesture is an attempt to "rescue," as he says, Hegel from himself.[6] In this way, Adorno applies Hegel's "hair of the dog" logic to Hegel's own thought and thereby reactivates a truth moment that the rational teleology of his work obscures.

In the passage in question from the shorter *Logic,* then, Hegel sets reflective and philosophical cognition over against so-called "immediate" cognition—"so-called" because Hegel calls immediacy into question, dissecting what consciousness means by immediacy in order to bring out the internal contradictions that make a strong foundational account of it untenable. Nevertheless, we do have immediate cognition. Immediacy in the form of mere feeling or sensibility, for example, is some-

thing we necessarily engage in and share with animals, according to Hegel, because they, like us, have "drives, desires, and inclinations". But the animal "has no will and [so] must obey its drive if nothing external prevents it."[7] That is to say, immediacy implies a deficiency of reflection, the inability to determine an end that runs contrary to our drives and inclinations, or the general inability to relegate mere subjectivity to a position that serves a more patient and rational self-comprehending subjectivity.

The form that Hegel's critique of immediacy takes in the passage in question is made more interesting in that the argument is couched in an the interpretation of the myth of the Fall. Hegel's interpretation is subtle and complex, and brings in issues of evil and morality, which—despite their relevance—would lead us too far from the path we are on. However, what is at stake in Hegel's analysis should be made clear. Insofar as immediacy involves an unreflective unity of individual consciousness and nature, it seems almost paradisal, a sort of innocent trust in the world as we find it and move about in it. We act on nature as nature acts on us, and we follow a natural path towards fulfilment, taking all our actions and interactions for granted along the way. The model Hegel invokes, in keeping with his reading of Genesis, is the Garden of Eden. Philosophy disrupts the picture of innocence by positing thought, nature's counterpart, as the rational foundation and substance of nature, which is thereby revealed to be mediated and not "natural" in an independent sense at all. Nature is not what it seems; its immediacy is a false immediacy precisely because it rests on the prior work of reason, by which nature is deciphered, comprehended, and subjected to human ends. Natural objects thereby undergo a certain disenchantment once reason comes into its own: their immediate existence is shown to be false and they are stripped of their seeming self-subsistent tranquillity. In this movement, the standpoint of innocence sees only evil, claiming that our "true" nature is immediate and that any separation from the innocence of immediacy is an echo of "the original transgression," i.e., "the human conceit that wants to recognise the true by its own strength."[8]

Put briefly, thought separates itself from nature by positing itself as *for itself* and so spiritually distinct from animal life and nature, as well as spiritually superior to the false innocence of immediate consciousness. Reason finds itself to be reflected out of nature, rather than remaining inchoately fused with it. This first moment of philosophical thinking results in a schism between humankind and nature, which Hegel relates to the expulsion from Eden in his allegorical reading of Genesis. But we cannot rest easy with such a schism; for ultimately, we share our own rational structure with the natural world, which for its part can only be known through such a rational structure. Spirit sees itself in nature even as it separates itself from it. Consequently, as Hegel says, "this stage of schism must itself be sublated in turn, and spirit must return through its own agency to union with itself. This resulting union is a spiritual one [i.e., mediated as opposed to immediate], and the guiding principle of its return lies in thinking itself. It is thinking that both inflicts the wound and heals it again."[9] Thought, the true medium of spirit, can reconcile spirit and nature because they are both structured and articulable rationally and systematically. That is, they are both aspects of the movement of concepts in cognition. Hence this rational structure, insofar as it is the living essence of thought itself, is the subject matter of Hegelian logic, in which "thoughts are grasped in such a way that they have no content other than one that belongs to thinking itself, and is brought forth by thinking."[10] This content, of course, is none other than the concept in its purest form, in which all possible determinations have been reflected into a mediated but transparent union of universal and particular; it is, in other words, the absolute Idea. As the root of all natural and spiritual knowledge, the Idea thereby encompasses all experience and binds it together into one reconciled whole.

In the passage from *Negative Dialectic* that is the counterpart to the one we have been focussing on from the *Encyclopaedia Logic,* Adorno effectively rescues banal cognition from Hegel's overly logical interpretation of it; he does so by revealing a normativity embedded in the structure of the concept that disrupts the "fluid and transparent"[11] unity of concept and object that Hegel posits as the truth. Thought is perhaps not as sovereign as Hegel makes it seem.

Adorno does not, however, dispute the Hegelian account of the general structure of the concept. How could he? To dispute it would mean denying that knowledge is built up through the subsumption of particulars by universals, which informs everything from simple acts of naming or classifying to framing laws. The Hegelian system (or more specifically the way Hegel argues for a conceptual mastery of a world that merely is) is nevertheless the target, but not because our concepts are somehow unable to capture existence and experience adequately, which would amount to crass Romanticism. It is rather, as Adorno says, that conceptual "precision is a surrogate for the selfhood of the thing that does not quite let this selfhood become present; there is a gap between words and the things they conjure."[12] Adorno remains with the problem of attaining objectivity within a conceptual framework and to this end remains comfortably situated within the Hegelian tradition, which at least sees that thinking "inflicts [a] wound"—he will therefore claim, with Hegel, that "concepts alone can achieve what the concept prevents."[13] But for Adorno the "gap" between concept and thing, spirit and nature, can neither be overcome nor transcended in absolute cognition.

Thus without questioning the fact that concepts do grasp individuals, Adorno thinks that the "selfhood of the thing" (*Selbstheit der Sache*) is nevertheless necessarily underdetermined by concepts. Now Hegel, for his part, certainly admits that finite things "have a concept, [although] their existence is not adequate to it"[14]—in this sense, no conceptual subsumption can be perfect. But Hegel sees this as the "untruth"[15] of finitude, which ultimately authorizes him to surpass materiality for the sake of a purer ideality that can grasp the truth as it is in and for itself. By contrast, for Adorno, the thing's selfhood is precisely its truth moment qua the host of possibilities for cognition that it enfolds. This is the crux of his claim. Essentially, even the most precise concept or network of concepts (and Adorno is undoubtedly thinking of the classificatory concepts of the exact sciences) still misses the mark—not because the thing is ineffable or because it is finite and therefore untrue, but because no concept or chain of concepts can exhaust the simplest of objects that stands before us in empirical cognition, even if these concepts are utterly precise on their own terms. Our concepts "gather around" the thing, which expresses a normative reality for cognition to grasp. But because the object is inexhaustible from the point of view of the knowing subject, a regulative idea perhaps, the dream of essence or of a finite set of necessary and sufficient conditions falls apart: the object's determinate and material uniqueness and history allow for possibilities of description that outstrip the search for essence and conceptual comprehension. This feature of cognition, which Adorno calls non-identity, is then taken to be a principle for the structuring of knowledge itself. In cognition, concepts ought not to be applied according to a principle of classification that might make appeal to justness as a mere criterion; the principle of concept application itself ought simply to be that of justice in the face of non-identity. Rather than sublating empirical cognition in pure thought, the normativity inherent within cognition is rethought as a universal demand for justice.

The normativity at the heart of cognition is, admittedly, the driving force within both experience and consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Thus Adorno's claim must not be overstated. His critique is a simple, but far-reaching, correction to the Hegelian account, something like an insertion of modesty that resituates the concept in moral terms,

shedding only the overly logical claim to absolute cognition as the pinnacle of knowledge. If truth is really to be "present and actual, [and] not something over the hills and far away,"[16] as Hegel himself says, then thought cannot serve a teleological impulse towards purity, but must rather return to the contradiction-filled world that is its initial stimulus. As Adorno puts it: "It is [unreconciled matter], not the organizing drive of thought, that brings us to dialectics."[17] Thus in the first instance, Adorno *agrees* with the passage from the *Encyclopaedia Logic* about thought healing the wound it inflicts on nature: "Concepts alone can achieve what the concept prevents. Cognition is a "τρώσας ἰάσεται."[18] Like Hegel, Adorno believes that concepts, the only means at our disposal, do hold out the promise of truth. But by way of elaboration, Adorno adds that "the determinable flaw in every concept makes it necessary to cite others; this is what gives rise to the only constellations [of concepts] that have held onto something of the hope of the name [that is, that a name should truly and properly name a thing]."[19] It is at this point that their ways begin to part. While Hegel looks for reconciliation in the absolutized concept, Adorno stubbornly holds onto the hope of reconciliation within the sensuous world itself. Thus Hegel will explicitly say that "cognition... heals the ancient injury and is the source of infinite reconciliation. That is, cognition is just the annihilation [*vernichten*] of the outer, of what is alien to consciousness, and thus is the return of subjectivity into itself."[20] Adorno, on the other hand, seeks to convict sovereign subjectivity of conceptually exhausting and "annihilating" objectivity in the name of a reconciliation that sublates the real world.

Hegel's system grounds all empirical and spiritual determinations in an absolute Idea, the form of thought and reason that shapes all knowledge and experience. The Idea, the concept of the concept that he arrives at, is thoroughly logical, that is, "an object [of thought thinking its own ground,] in which all determinations have come together."[21] The Idea is thus the conceptual armature of knowledge and the principle of determinability itself. It may seem, then, that from a logical perspective it isn't a problem that actual concepts have "determinable flaws," as Adorno says, making it necessary to supplement concepts with yet other concepts. For Hegel, this proliferation is entirely underpinned by the logical structure of the concept itself, which guarantees determinability—not the adequacy of any given determination. But determinability is not what is at issue. The issue, for Adorno, is the moral and ethical dimension of actual concept application.

We must supplement concepts with other concepts because no one set of concepts, no one constellation, will be able to exhaust the "selfhood of the thing." If I say, for example, "book," "bound paper," "$19.99 at the bookshop," or "rubbish," I have tried to capture something in concepts. No one of these concepts, or even all of them together, will exhaust the selfhood of this something (its non-identity), or overcome the resistance of the thing to total identification by concepts. The thing is rich in possibility. And this possibility, this surplus meaning, is what prevents any determinate concept from absolutely encapsulating it: "A negative dialectic employs possibility in order to penetrate into its hardened objects [e.g., commodified and experientially reduced objects], the very possibility of which they were defrauded by actuality, flashes of which are yet visible in each and every one."[22]

On the side of the subject (of a subject who remains aware of possibility or surplus meaning), the objective non-identity of a thing is echoed in the "hope of the name," as Adorno puts it, that is, in the hope that a name truly and properly name a thing. To remain cognizant of non-identity is not to mock knowledge or truth; it is rather to see that concept application is not a merely logical procedure, although one cannot escape the logic that organizes it—the subsumption of particulars under universals. Logic, however, cannot account for the moral dimension of concept application, the fact that

when I name a thing, I must name it justly—I hope to bring about a fecund and appropriate (if still arbitrary and non-exhaustive) constellation of concepts. What Hegel overlooks, what he must overlook in a *Logic,* is that the concepts we use, actual concepts, invoke an ethical question: have I spoken justly, have I put it fittingly? That all of nature and spirit are knowable conceptually is one thing; whether they are known, here and now, in such a way as to retain a living sense of the possibility inherent in them is quite another. Language, of course, must approach the world with the aim of getting it right, but must do so in explicit acknowledgement of the conceptual non-exhaustibility of even the simplest of empirical objects. And although the specific normativity at work in Adorno's account is also present in Hegel's concept of experience, it loses its independent force when put to work in the service of the absolute.

The appeal to justice in actual concept application outlines a quasi-logical ethical normativity, the living moment of the logical structure of the concept; in this sense, it is the secret of the oracle's enigmatic utterance: "ὁ τρώσας ἰάσεται." The wounder will heal, but only if the concept that wounds can transform itself through a subjective impulse into a fragment of justice. Total justice, on the other hand—utopia, or a truly concrete total reconciliation of spirit and nature, which Hegel thinks he finds in the Idea—is of course implied by the normativity and teleology of actual concepts, but only if we extrapolate from the subjective moment of concept application and help ourselves to a universalized rule of *perfect* concept application. But it is just this sort of abstraction away from the matter at hand, from history, that Adorno struggles against and which, for Hegel, results in a logic. "Cognition that wants content, wants utopia,"[23] says Adorno. In other words, to want justice in empirical cognition is also to want to bring it about universally. But Adorno cautions us against this restoration of paradise on earth, even while he admits that cognition implies it: "Utopia," he says, "or the consciousness of possibility, clings to the concrete as it does to the undisfigured. But it is possibility, not immediate actuality, that obstructs utopia."[24] To want cognition to grasp its content in its truth is to want universal justice, but this is only a horizon that encompasses us and orients us within the world. The world itself, or rather the possibilities of cognition that help to prevent the utter commodification and etiolation of nature, also keep universal justice at a distance. Hegel thought he had solved the oracle's riddle but, as often happens when interpreting oracles, he was only partly right; he overlooked the fact that "the wounder will heal" is cast in the future tense. The healing moment of reconciliation is graspable and structures what is from within; but its structuring function leaves only a trace of reconciliation in the real. Reconciliation is rather the promise that cognition articulates and which builds our relation to the world, though qua promise it is horizonal and futural: "What would be different has not begun as yet,"[25] as Adorno puts it. In light of this promise, Adorno attempts to rescue from Hegel the thought that reconciliation is a normative structure and not the alleged concreteness of the Idea—which Marx, too, in his own way, unmasked as a frozen and lifeless caricature of the struggle for justice. Hegel tells us that cognition understood as spirit heals the schism between thought and being. Adorno corrects him by insisting on the element of possibility, or non-identity, contained within the formula, thereby demanding just cognition while at the same time holding utopia—fully actualized reconciliation—at a distance from us. Without this irreducible moment of non-identity, Hegel's reconciliation of spirit and nature is utterly vacuous.

It may be objected that Adorno sketches a model of reconciliation that is just as distant as Hegel's—a cognitive utopia that structures thought but cannot be realized. Reconciliation, however, is not a state of affairs; it is a procedure, a method that arises out of thought itself and provides a basis for justice in the particular—rather than justice writ large. It no more reaches its term in a real utopia than in the Idea.

Consequently, Adorno does not pursue an ethics separate from his critical project: the critique of thought *is* an ethics when understood as the elaboration of a principle of justice out of cognition itself.

ENDNOTES

1. There are too many sources to cite here. The reader is referred to the entry for "Telephos" in volume 5 of W. H. Roscher, *Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1916–1924 and 1965). The most relevant and accessible retellings of the story for the present purposes are (a) Proclus's synopsis of the *Cypria* in *Hesiod: The Homeric Hymns and Homerica,* trans. H. G. Evelyn-White (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), and (b) the epitome of Apollodorus's *Library* in Apollodorus, *The Library,* 2 vols., trans. J. G. Frazer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic,* trans. by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991), §24, Ad. 3, p. 62. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik,* in Hegel, *Werke* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), vol. 8, p. 88. The passage will be cited in full in a moment. Hegel alludes to the ancient proverb a few times in his works, often in the same general context of the 'original sin' of cognition separating itself from immediacy in reflection—as is the case in the passage cited from the *Encyclopaedia Logic.* Another example comes up in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy:* "Thinking always leads to difficulties because it splits up and holds separate the moments of an object which, in reality, are knotted together. Thinking provoked the Fall in the act of eating from the tree of the knowledge [*Erkenntnis:* cognition] of good and evil. But thinking also heals this injury. Thinking is the difficulty of overcoming thinking, and it is thinking alone that creates this difficulty" (*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie,* in *Werke,* vol. 18, p. 314).
3. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 53. *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), p. 62. In another work, "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," Adorno's social interest in the proverb is made explicit: "reified and rationalized society . . . could become a society worthy of human beings . . . but only by applying its rationality to itself, in other words, only through a healing awareness of the marks of unreason in its own reason. . . . In *Parsifal,* Richard Wagner . . . put Hegel's experience in terms of the ancient topos: only the spear that inflicted the wound can heal it." See Adorno, *Hegel: Three Studies,* trans. by S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 74. *Drei Studien zu Hegel* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 90. The essay in its entirety is very relevant in the present context.
4. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic,* §24, Ad. 3, p. 61/87. Whether Hegel knew the story of the *Cypria* through Proclus, Apollodorus, or some other source is unknown. He may well have had in mind a remark of Plutarch's from his "On Listening to Lectures" (*De recta ratione audiendi* or Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν): "For not only the wound of Telephus, as Euripides says, 'Is soothed by fine-rasped filings from the spear,' but the smart from philosophy which sinks deep in young men of good parts is healed by the very words which inflicted the hurt [αὐτος ὁ τρώσας λόγος ἰᾶται]." See "On Listening to Lectures," 46F–47A, in *Plutarch's Moralia,* 14 vols., trans. F. K. Babbitt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), vol. 1, pp. 250–51. In any case, Hegel certainly had a sizeable collection of Proclus and all of Plutarch in his personal library. But no matter Hegel's source (which may not have been unique), as a piece of folk wisdom, the homeopathic sentiment expressed by the proverb is quite commonplace (cf. "the hair of the dog that bit you"). Goethe's *Torquato Tasso* (IV:iv), which Hegel surely knew, also mentions the spear that both wounds and heals and relates it to the power of language. Finally, although not a source text, it would be remiss not to mention Jacques Derrida's extensive analysis of the ambiguous term φάρμακον (drug, poi-

son, remedy) in Plato; its concerns run parallel to those presented here. See "Plato's Pharmacy" in *Dissemination,* trans. B. Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). "La pharmacie de Platon," in *La dissémination* (Paris: Seuil, 1972). On a personal note, I would like to thank Nicholas Walker for information about Hegel's library and Stephen Menn for bringing the passage from Plutarch to my attention.

5. G. W. F. Hegel, Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 17, translation modified. *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* in *Werke,* vol. 3, p. 33.
6. See "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," p. 83/99.
7. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right,* trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §11, Ad., 45. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,* in *Werke,* vol. 7, p. 63. The contrast between immediacy and reflection, cast in terms of an animal–human divide, is frequent in Hegel. See, e.g., the *Phenomenology,* p. 65/91, and the *Encyclopaedia Logic,* §19, Ad. 2, p. 47/70.
8. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic,* §24, Ad. 3, p. 61/87.
9. Ibid, p. 62/88.
10. Ibid., §24, Ad. 2, p. 58/84.
11. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic,* §237, p. 303/388.
12. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* p. 53/62, translation modified.
13. Ibid., p. 53/62.
14. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic,* §24, Ad. 2, p. 60/86.
15. Ibid.
16. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic,* §24, Ad.3, p. 60/87.
17. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* p. 144/148.
18. Ibid., p. 53/62.
19. Ibid.
20. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* in *Werke,* vol. 12, p. 391.
21. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic,* §236, p. 303/388.
22. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* p. 52/62, translation modified.
23. Ibid., p. 57/66.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 145/148.

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