

# WHAT DOES PROTENTION “PROTEND”?

## REMARKS ON HUSSERL’S ANALYSES OF PROTENTION IN THE BERNAU MANUSCRIPTS ON TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS

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In the version of the *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness* that was edited by Martin Heidegger in 1928, protention is only mentioned in a few places.<sup>1</sup> If we compare this with the analyses of retention, which are distinctly dominant both quantitatively and qualitatively, protention appears like a phenomenon that is mentioned only for reasons of symmetry and fairness. Husserl writes: “Every original constituting process is animated by protentions, which emptily constitute, gather, and bring to fulfillment that which is to come.”<sup>2</sup> Another thesis is: “In each primal phase [*Urphase*], which constitutes originally the immanent contents, we have retentions of the preceding phases and protention of the coming phases of the same contents. And these protentions are fulfilled, as long as the contents last.”<sup>3</sup> Retention and protention are presented to a large extent to be analogous phenomena. Occasionally retention is denoted as “primary recollection” and in analogy protention is denoted as “primary expectation,” protention is characterized as a kind of expectation of hyletic contents “which are going to come.”<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the fact of the minor treatment of protention is the further fact that nearly all passages of the *Lectures* dedicated to protention stem from the phase of Husserl’s reworking this material in Bernau in September 1917.

But what is to be found in the *Lectures* is not the only outcome of the new and deeper reflection on protention in the year 1917. In the research manuscripts written shortly after the reworking of the *Lectures*, now published as the *Bernaue Manuskripte zum*

*Zeitbewußtsein* (1917/18) the analysis has become more differentiated. In what follows I will present the details of this analysis and draw from them what I think to be useful and to the point. The very experimental character of the Husserlian research manuscripts often results in aporetic and seemingly contradictory concepts. Thus I do not see the Bernau Manuscripts as a kind of last and definite theory of protention, but in them there is some work done that has promise for further development.

First I will give a short overview over the character of Husserl’s analyses of time constitution in general. In the second part I will delineate the theory of protention in the *Lectures*. In the third part I will treat the theory of protention in the *Bernaue Manuscripts* as far as it is worked out. In the fourth part I will try to draw some conclusions that may go beyond the state of reflection in the *Bernaue Manuscripts*.

### The Project of the Time Analyses: Constituting Time Out of Hyletic Data

In the *Lectures* Husserl works out how sensual data and their duration can be constituted on the experiential ground of a hyletic flow. They constitute or we may say “show” themselves in the interplay of hyletic data (*Urhyle*) and the retentional contents. This kind of “showing themselves” is the basic kind of time constitution. The experiential ground of this constitution consists of a hyletic stream and of retentions sinking or descending in different levels.


Retention is the designation of an originary faculty of the human mind, one

that enables us to keep hyletic data for a short time alive and intuitive. Retentions keeps contents given to us, although gradually weakening in intensity. But even as the contents are sinking in intensity up to the point of vanishing entirely, they remain given, even though they have already lost any sensual character. We might interpret this weakening as a characteristic of a time perspective. Husserl himself uses the analogy between a spatial perspective and a perspective in time.<sup>5</sup> What is more important for further constitutive achievements is that there are synthesis of coincidence established between the different kinds of contents in inner time consciousness: between the primal presence (*Urpräsenz*) and the different levels of “sinking” retentional contents that are co-given in a certain phase. By this synthesis of coincidence sensual data together with their duration are constituted.<sup>6</sup>

The syntheses of coincidence that serve in this case as a basis for apperception come into being in the interplay of primal presentation and retentional contents. When analyzing the synthesis of coincidence we see that the direction of attention we take is crosswise (*quer*) to the axis of the newly streaming hyletic data, and we may denote this kind of intentionality therefore as “cross intentionality” (*Querintentionalität*). In this “crosswise” direction of attentiveness in each now-point our attention is directed to the different contents of consciousness that are now at the same time experienced intuitively but that lay somehow one on the top of the other (*übereinander*). What I notice with this and in this synthesis of coincidence is that the same sensual content that was present “just before” is also present in retention. And it is retentionally present not only in one level of submersion (*Versunkenheit*), it is present in different levels of depth. The retentional levels cover one another but at the same time they permit being looked through. We thus realize that it is “the same” hyletic datum, for example a small red spot that lights up on a dark background.

The manner of achieving this identity-i.e., that it remains the same sensual givenness-conceived as the same because the retentional contents are still present, is denoted by Husserl as synthesis of coincidence. But nevertheless we also are aware of the sinking and the weakening liveliness of this sensual givenness. We are aware that the sensual givenness was “for some time” the same.<sup>7</sup> The interpretation of the experienced synthesis of coincidence as a “duration” is based on the present sensual contents together with the retentional contents. It is possible because we do not only see the now present sensual contents (b), we also see “through” them. The present sensual contents are like a foil or film through which we can see the retentional phases which have already flowed off (b<sub>1</sub>, b<sub>2</sub>). This special feature of the synthesis of coincidence as occurring in a “seeing through” the medium of present and retentional contents of different sinking levels which remain hyletic-sensually equal is the core of Husserl’s concept of time constitution.

If we only regard the retention then we obtain the diagram:



But we have to pay attention to the fact that we are dealing with an idealized simple case. The streaming-coming hyletic data first have the quality a, then they change to b, and in the end change to c. Retentional sinking is indicated with the superscripts, so that the line under the line of primal presence (*Urpräsenzlinie*) has at each place the index 1, in the next line 2 and so on. But retentional presence is limited. At a certain point the retention fades away. It might be possible to stretch the realm of attentiveness so that the

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limit of retentional givenness may be extended. For example in languages with the verb at the end of a sentence we are able to retentionally hold together the words of a long sentence up to the point where the sense is revealed.

Sensations or sensual data with their duration are the product of the constitution in inner time consciousness. On this level of constitution there is founded a new step of passive synthesis, in which the so called “*Abgehobenheiten*” prominences, kinds of Gestalt figures or outlines, are constituted in synthesis of homogeneity and heterogeneity. They are the materials for the intentional apperception in perception.

Sensual data and their duration are constituted in the apperception of the synthesis of coincidence. This coincidence concerns the sensually identical hyletic elements and the retentional phases of the same hyletic givenness. The retentional elements are on different levels of sinking but in regard to their hyletic contents they are of the same kind. Thus as long as there is a coincidence between the primal presence and the retentional phases in regard to hyletic qualities, we constitute a sensual datum with its duration. Even if for example a red light flickers on a dark background, i.e., it vanishes for a short time and then returns, this sensual datum is continuously identifiable by its location and its hyletic quality.

### **Protention in the “Lectures” (August-September 1917)**

In the *Lectures* as they were edited by Husserl in late summer 1917 there are only few passages that treat protention. Most of these passages stem from the year 1917. This is the case for §24, §40 and the last part of §43.<sup>8</sup> We have written evidence from Edith Stein that Husserl edited the *Lectures* at the beginning of his stay in Bernau (30 July—1 October 1917), i.e., in September 1917. The now published Bernau Manuscripts on protention-I am thinking of the texts No. 1

and 2—differ from and go beyond the position of the *Lectures* and thus did not go into the editorial work on the *Lectures*.<sup>9</sup>

In the *Lectures* Husserl introduces protention quite in analogy to retention: “In every primal phase, which constitutes an immanent contents, we have retentions of the foregoing and protentions of the coming phases of the same contents, and this protentions are fulfilled, as long as this contents lasts.”<sup>10</sup> Retention and protention are precisely determined only for a short distance of the respective phase, after this they change into a “dark horizon” of “undetermined” protentions respectively retentions (ibid.). This sudden decrease from determined to undetermined justifies to speak of a “retentional and protentional fringe.”<sup>11</sup>

In the *Lectures* protentions intend something to come but in an empty and undetermined way: “Every originary constituting process has protentions, which constitute that what is to come emptily and catch it up and fulfill it.”<sup>12</sup> The fact that the contents of protention in normal perception remains undetermined becomes distinct in the demarcation and confrontation against recollection. In §24, which was also composed in 1917, we learn that protentions are not that undetermined in the context of recollections. Husserl writes: “while the originary protention in the framework of perceiving an event was undetermined and left open either that the coming event may differ from what was expected or even that nothing happens, in recollection we have an expectation which does not left open what is going to come.”<sup>13</sup> So we do not learn what protentions “protend” in the *Lectures*, they are left undetermined.

### **Protention in the Bernau Manuscripts (Text No. 1+2, p. 22)**

The analysis of protention is carried on in the Bernau Manuscripts that were most likely composed after Husserl edited the *Lectures* in September 1917. I refer espe-

cially to texts No. 1 and No. 2 of *Husserliana* XXXIII, which stem from September 1917. What I would like to make clear is that the developed theory of protention in the Bernau Manuscripts differs in some important points from the position of the *Lectures*. To make this clear I will first analyze the “completed” diagram in Text No. 2.<sup>14</sup> This diagram is developed out of the well known diagram in the *Lectures*.

It seems to be easy to answer the question: Which contents are retended by retention? Retentions keep alive and intuitive the streaming hyletic data, for example a tone or a color “for a time.” Retention is an intuitive consciousness, but it is always a modification of a preceding impression. The next and far more complicated question is: What does protention protend?

The designations “protend” and “retend” are chosen in analogy to “intend.” This analogy is based on the fact that retention and protention have a definite content, i.e., an idea of what they are intending and what they are keeping alive or expecting, which may be viewed as a kind of intentional content. Besides this definite “intentional” content there are manifolds of actually given hyletic contents which present and fulfill the intention. Here there is another parallel to intentionality in the full sense, which may intend, for example, perceived real objects that are presented to us in different perspectives.

In spite of all these similarities we should not forget that the sense of intentionality is quite different in perception, on the one side, and in retention and protention, on the other. There are at least two steps of constitution that divide these two kinds of intentionality: The first step in constitution is the constitution of sensual data and their duration in the inner time consciousness. The next step is the “passive synthesis” of the prominences (*Abgehobenheiten*) as kinds of Gestalt formations or Gestalt fragments in sensuality. This applies to all fields of sensuality, not only the visual field. The next step is the per-

ception of objects on the base of these Gestalt-fragments.

If we do not pay attention to this difference between intentionality in the full sense of objectifying acts and the intentionality of retention and protention we may draw wrong conclusions.

The first step of constitution happens in inner time consciousness and its result is the constitution of sensual data with their duration. This sensual data connect and unify at the level of passive synthesis in the mode of heterogeneity and homogeneity, so that the results are the sensual *Abgehobenheiten* or Gestalt-fragments, such as edges or surfaces with a determined Gestalt and shape that we can perceive in the visual field.<sup>15</sup> With these *Abgehobenheiten* as “raw materials” and the so-called type (*Typus*) as a kind of architect’s plan, the intentional apperception builds up a representation of the intended object.

Intentionality in the true sense of the word is only reached at this third level of constitution; for example, a perception of a real thing. At the top of this level we find prepredicative experience that consists in syntheses that arise as homogeneous perceptions. Loosely formulated, prepredicative experience consists of associative connections between things and their properties (or between events). These connections do not yet claim to be cognition; the experience of these connections is a result of homogeneous perceptions only “in me,” but not yet claiming to be valid for others. The predicative judgment and cognition in the full sense is founded on these perceptual and prepredicative levels. But in order to be intuitive predicative judgment requires a complex founded act in which the series of perceptions, which formerly led to the prepredicative form of the judgment, is run through again, but now with an explicit interest in cognition. In this process the prepredicative judgment serves as an important guideline.

I would now like to go back to the question what protention protends. For this I will

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no longer be fulfilled because the limit of the retentional function is reached.

So we find that in this diagram the retentions and the retentional continuum, designated as  $E_1^2E_2$ , as a whole can be interpreted as designating at the same time a continuum of protentions, i.e., of the expectation of further sinking. Thus the retentional continuum  $E_1^2E_2$  is “double-faced.” It designates retentions and it designates at the same time R-protentions.<sup>20</sup> Retentions are looked upon as protentions. We even might think that retentions “become” protentions in transition to the next phase but this seems me to be too speculative. What remains true is that the contents of these R-protentions remain strictly oriented by the present retentions. They look like a mirror-image of the present retentions.<sup>21</sup>

Husserl himself was not convinced of this concept and he poses it as a kind of hypothesis and as a question: “Could it be that in the primal process, may it concern old or new events, essentially every phase is at the same time retention and protention in relation to the following phase?”<sup>22</sup> But this hypothesis has as an inconvenient consequence a complication and a double sense in the denotation of the diagram: A line that denotes retentions also denotes protentions. And we cannot as is suggested on the first sight simply regard the lower branch as retention and the upper branch as protention.<sup>23</sup>

If we analyze the upper branch of the diagram, i.e., the H-protentions, we cannot find such a precise prelineation as in the case of the R-protentions. But as in the lower branch we may start with the supposition that also for this part of protention the primal hyle and the foregoing retentions determine the contents of the expectations (but we will not stay with this supposition). Husserl writes, “These anticipations are motivated by the continuum of the preceding retentions as progressive continuum.”<sup>24</sup> In the upper branch we expect that it goes on in the same style.<sup>25</sup> The determination of the contents and the differentiation of the H-Protentions,

which are directed towards coming hyletic data, depends on the flow of retentions. Husserl writes: “The further an event has proceeded, the further it presents material for differentiated protentions, which results in a projection of the past on the future.”<sup>26</sup> And in another passage: “Consciousness remains in its course anticipating what is going to come, a protention is directed on the continuation of the series in the same style.”<sup>27</sup> The protentions can be determined in regard to the kind of sensual data that is going to come: If a tone has been heard so it is going to be a tone in the coming phases of hyletic givenness.<sup>28</sup>

If we take as an example a red light flashing against a dark background, then we have no retentions of this hyletic givenness at this starting point.<sup>29</sup> Retention is just starting to function and only after the first phases of this process of retentional sinking do protentions directed toward the coming phases of hyletic givenness start to form. In this beginning phase protentions form with strict orientation to the just passed retentions and this process is continued in further phases.<sup>30</sup> So the contents of beginning protentions are oriented to the starting phases of retention in a just started hyletic event, and after some phases the protention which is motivated by the small red light continuing to stay on homogeneously gets firmer and firmer. We might say that in the case of a starting hyletic event a “medium phase” must be reached. Only in this medium phase can a firm protention on the persistence of this special hyletic data be motivated by some phases of homogeneous hyletic givenness.

### Beyond the Bernau Manuscripts

Now we have an answer to the question “What does protention protend?” but it is not a satisfying answer to our question. This dissatisfaction is due to the fact that we know a lot of situations in experience in which we expect hyletic elements, complex combinations thereof or even whole events which are

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not determined by hyletic givenness and retention alone. For example, we might think of the situation of waiting in our car in front of a red light knowing quite well that the yellow light is going to go on soon.<sup>31</sup> This class of protentions is directed to coming hyletic data but it is not dependant only on the present hyletic data and retention alone, rather it depends on our experience in the world. Thus we may denote them as H-protentions but they do not coincide with the kind of H-Protentions we have already analyzed. We need to denote a new class of H-protentions which I will denote for the present as “altering expectations” or “protentions based on intentional expectations.”

But before we make this next necessary step in our analysis, which goes beyond the Bernau Manuscripts, I will try to delineate some systematic alternatives in protention that may supply us with concepts to make the next distinctions in the field of protention. I will only presuppose the normal situation in the constitution of inner time consciousness: Some phases of hyletic presence of the hyletic data “red” accompanied with their retentions. There are the following principal possibilities:

1) Permanent protention. We expect: It goes on and on in the same way, i.e., the hyletic data remain the same as in the phases before. We see red, further red, and we pretend the same “red” hyletic data to appear on and on. But if we sense yellow this is no “big disappointment,” i.e., no form of disappointment that results in new forms of sense giving acts like negation; we merely change the protention to yellow.

2) Typological differentiated protention. We expect: It will appear red on and on, but the kind of presentation of this “red” can change within the limits of a typological style of “red”; for example, getting slightly darker or brighter. Husserl seems to prefer this kind of solution at some places in the Bernau Manuscripts: “Protention is oriented towards the coming, but the concrete con-

tents are only determined very generally (if a tone starts sounding then it will be a coming tone, even if intensity and quality remains relatively undetermined).”<sup>32</sup> This solution is a modification of the first that considers additionally the typological style of presentation, but it remains relatively within the narrow framework of the motivation by present hyle and present retentions.

3) Protention limited by the same sense field (*Sinnesfeld*). We expect: What is going to come is a color, but it does not have to be the same red color (or tone). This protention remains within the limits of the field of a determined sense, for example the visual (or acoustic) field, but it is not determined which color (or tone). This expectation is broader than the typological limits in the second type of protention, but the limits of the respective sensual field are not exceeded.

4) Unspecific protention. We might expect: “Something” is going to come, something in sensuality, either in the same or another field of sensuality. We might designate this problematic possibility an “empty protention.” Taking up this possibility reveals a problematic consequence: Even the “unexpected start” of a new hyletic givenness is somehow foretold, i.e., announced in advance, by protention. This might be a too strong interpretation of protentional expectation.

5) Altering protention. We expect: Something determined is going to come but it is not the same as what was given before: I see the red light and expect at the same time the yellow light to go on. This altering expectation might also cross the borders of sense fields: We see a stone flying toward the window, expecting the sound of breaking glass. But all these “altering protentions” are dependant on everyday experience. If someone has never seen a European traffic light before, he will not expect yellow. Thus we must concede that this—up to now hypothetical—form of protention is more adequately designated as a “intentional expectation” within





intentional expectation “sink down” into the level of constitution of inner time? Or is this simply a chimerical idea?

### **A Hypothesis on the Character of “Protentions of Expectation”**

My suggestion in regard to this open question is not yet well worked out. My hypothesis is based on the phenomenon of “phantasmatic self-affection” which shows that intentional apperception has an effect on the hyletic level.<sup>38</sup> We might best get an idea of phantasmatic self-affection with the example of a well known melody of which only the first tones are heard (think of Beethoven’s ninth symphony). What passively happens to us is that we already seem to “hear” the following passages of the score, we “hear” the coming melody with the help of musical phantasmata. If we change to the example of the traffic light, the model gets more complicated: While it is still red we watch the dark yellow light and we may have phantasmata of the coming lighted yellow at the same time.

One might object that phantasmatic self-affection is a function and a concept that does not occur in Husserl’s analyses of time-consciousness. Which is to say that it is an element foreign to these analyses that we should not insert without good reasons. I would like to argue in favor of this new element of theory in the following way.

Phantasmatic self-affection is not a function that is so foreign to Husserl’s own analyses as it might appear. In his Bernau analyses concerning the question which hyletic contents are used for the function of fulfillment in retention (and thus also in protention), Husserl often comes back to the concept of a “modification” of the hyle.<sup>39</sup> The concept of a modification of an act concerns the intention as well as the hyletic part that is performing the fulfillment. The concept is oriented to the paradigmatic relation of originary perception to recollection or phantasy. It is clear that the “modification”

that makes the hyle of the primal process to become retention or protention must be different than in these paradigmatic cases. But: In both forms of modification phantasmata perform a decisively important contribution in the fulfillment of the modified acts. Phantasy and the pictures of recollection are combined from phantasmata that cannot stem from the actual sensation. Thus in recollection and phantasy the subject is affecting itself with the help of phantasmata. In my view this is in line with Husserl’s own analyses that attempt to interpret retention and protention as phantasmatic self-affection.

Additionally it has become clear that in the arguments and in the concepts of the Bernau analyses there is no useful and appropriate solution for the problem of the “movable” intentional expectation sunken down on the level of protention.

If we ask what might be an appropriate solution for this question, this is to assume that the form of protention that stems from a preceding intentional expectation is still nothing more than protention, i.e., it is neither an expectation of an object and its qualities in the full sense nor an expectation of an coming event. Looking at the case of retention and rigid protention, we find only modified intentions that are directed to hyletic contents. Thus protention stemming from expectation can also only pretend hyletic contents (or modifications thereof). The hyletic contents protended—in the case they really appear—should be able to present the object or event expected intuitively. That means that the form in which the intentional expectation can “appear” on the level of inner time consciousness, as protention must be a protention of sensuality, i.e., of hyletic contents.

Now I want to make an argument that is strictly parallel to these cases of retention and rigid protention: Retention retends hyle that actually passed by, in the form of a modification of these hyletic contents that was al-

ready actually given. Rigid protention protends the coming hyle in the form of a modification of the actually passed by hyletic content, e.g., the light is red and I rigidly protend further red. Thus protentions of expectations must also protend coming hyle in the form of a modification of hyletic contents. But this protended hyletic content, which is in the position to present the object intentionally expected, was not given in this actual context of experience as in the case of retention and rigid protention. Thus it must be oriented to the hyletic elements that have presented the expected object in former experiences; for example, I remember in recollections that usually yellow follows red. Thus, as in recollection, it must be a phantasmata of yellow that bears the protention on the coming event.

On the one hand, the form in which the protention of intentional expectation appears must be something like hyletic contents; on the other hand, it cannot be a modification of the hyletic contents actually passed by (the red traffic light is still on) for it protends hyletic contents that were not present in the actually given experiential context. If phantasmata are the mode in which intentional expectation appears as protention on the level of inner time consciousness then we have to face the fact that sensuality and phantasmata are competing on the same field. This is a clear argument that the way in which protention of intentional expectations appears is not allowed to appear in a way more vivid than actual sensuality. Thus protentions of intentional expectation have to be distinctly weaker than actual sensuality, otherwise they would dazzle and deceive our perception. These demands are all fulfilled by phantasmata.

### **Conclusion**

Now I would like to leave my hypothesis on the character of protentions of intentional expectations and sum up the results of my analyses. My thesis concerning the problem

of the contents of the protentions directed towards coming hyletic data is divided in two.

There is a part of intentional expectation that has “sunken” to the level of protention with the help of phantasmata that are mixed in the hyletic contents. We can designate this share as “H-protentions of expectation.”

There is another part of H-protention that is only oriented to the present hyle and the retentional phases just passed by. We can designate them as “rigid H-protentions.”

Attending to these two types of H-protention, it becomes clear that there is a lively conflict between them. For example: Standing before the red traffic light, the rigid H-protentions are protending “red-on-and-on” while the protentions-of-expectations are protending “yellow-now-now-...”

To resume my investigation: Husserl brings forward the question of the contents of protention in the Bernau Manuscripts. The separate consideration of the “lower branch” of protention is especially helpful but the character of the “upper branch” of H-protention is still beset with open questions. I have tried to argue that there are at least two components in H-protentions: One is the rigid H-protention only dependant on present hyle and present retentions, the other is the protention-by-expectation, which is best understood as a “sunken” intentional expectation that nevertheless can draw attention to its contents with the help of phantasmatic self-affection.

### **A Remark on Some Problems in the Designation of the “Completed” Diagram in Husserliana XXXIII, p. 22**

I would like to take the opportunity to discuss some problems with the designation of the “completed” diagram in text No. 2 of the Bernau Manuscripts (above, p. 158).<sup>40</sup>

This drawing and the description in the context offers some difficulties. Most of the problems are due to the designations which seem not to be consistent and for this reason the descriptions in the text receive a double

meaning. What I have to offer for this problem is an interpretation that makes necessary eight corrections in the text. As this is obviously too extensive intervention for a critical edition it was decided to edit the text as it is in the Husserlian originals.

The source of the problem is the double use of the designations  $E_1$  and  $E_2$ . On the one hand they designate points in the line of primal presence (*Urpräsenzlinie*), i.e., the points  $E_1, E_2, E_3, E_4$  on the line of primal presence. But the designations  $E_1$  and  $E_2$  at the end of the diagonal lines designate the whole line. It is not possible to distinguish both designations from Husserl's typeface, but it seems very likely and it makes sense therefore to designate the complete diagonal lines in a different manner than the points on the primal phase. For this reason I have set these designations in italics (cf. the diagram on p. 158).

From this modification of the diagram's designation there arise the following changes: The description of the "slanting stripe" (*der schiefe Streifen*) on p. 22 (= lines 2-7) must now be: "so muß zunächst die Strecke  $E_2E_1^2$  (die Retention des Abgelaufenen) eine Protention tragen, die mittelbar durch den schiefen Streifen, der durch  $E_2E_2$  und  $E_1^2E_1$  begrenzt ist, zu bezeichnen wäre."<sup>41</sup> The description of the angle on p. 22, lines 17-19 should now be: "Es fehlt aber eine Signatur für die Protentionen, die im Winkelausschnitt  $E E_2 E_2$  liegen. Wir

ziehen nun eine Verlängerung von  $E_1^2 E_2$  nach oben ..."<sup>42</sup>

One might also discuss the sense of the designations  $E_2^3$  und  $E_2^4$ : if we judge the sense of the superscripted index according to the designations for the sinking of the point  $E_1$ , then it seems likely that it should designate the degree of the retentional sinking. If this is true, then the two designations  $E_2^3$  and  $E_2^4$  would be misplaced. The first point should then be designated  $E_2^1$  and the second as  $E_2^2$ . I think this reading is wrong. We might interpret the index in another sense and read the superscripted index as a kind of hyletically oriented index, thus interpreting  $E_2^3$  as "retention of  $E_2$  at the place or when  $E_3$  takes place." This would also harmonize with the designations on the lowest diagonal line, but it may on at first sight look like a change in the sense of the designations. It is tempting to interpret the designations  $E_1, E_2, E_3, E_4$  as designations of time-moments in the flow of time, but they are chosen to designate hyletic contents. Husserl's intention is to make clear how time is constituted in the streaming interweaving of hyletic contents and retentions of former hyletic contents. Thus we can not impute Husserl that he interprets the flow of hyletic contents already to have an order in time; this would be obviously circular. Thus also judging from the point of view of this systematic consideration it is convincing that the superscribed indexes have an hyletic sense and not yet a time-sense.<sup>43</sup>

## ENDNOTES

1. The *Lectures* were held first in Winter 1904/5, in 1928 they were published by Martin Heidegger in the reworked version from late Summer 1917; cf. Rudolf Boehm's "Einleitung des Herausgebers," in Hua X, pp. XIX–XXIII. I am citing the Husserliana Edition of Edmund Husserl's works as usual (Hua. Vol. Nr., page #).
2. Husserl writes: "Jeder ursprünglich konstituierende Prozeß ist beseelt von Protentionen, die das Kommende als solches leer konstituieren und auffangen, zur Erfüllung bringen" (Hua X, p. 52).
3. "In jeder Urphase, die den immanenten Inhalt ursprünglich konstituiert, haben wir Retentionen der vorangegangenen und Protentionen der kommenden Phasen eben dieses Inhaltes, und

- diese Protentionen erfüllen sich, solange eben dieser Inhalt dauert” (ibid., p. 89).
4. Cf. for the concepts “primäre Erinnerung” and “primäre Erwartung” (ibid., pp. 35–39). This is already corrected in §40 of the *Lectures* which stems from 1917: “Wir haben sodann von den Retentionen und Protentionen zu scheiden die Wiedererinnerungen und Erwartungen, die nicht auf die konstituierenden Phasen des immanenten Inhalts gehen, sondern vergangene bzw. künftige immanente Inhalte vergegenwärtigen” (ibid., p. 84). In the *Bernau manuscripts* the designation “primary expectation” is called misleading: “Die Retention (das Bewusstsein der Postpräsentation) ist genau besehen keine Erinnerung, sie soll also nicht primäre Erinnerung genannt werden. Sie ist keine Vergegenwärtigung” (Hua XXXIII, p. 55). Also expectation and protention, which are used quite synonymously in the *Lectures* (cf. Hua X, pp. 35, 39), should be distinguished. I will discuss below the difference between protention and intentional expectation that is directed to objects, their qualities and coming events.
  5. Retention is: “eine[r] Art zeitlicher Perspektive (innerhalb der originären zeitlichen Erscheinung) als Analogon zur räumlichen Perspektive” (ibid., p. 26).
  6. Cf. the characterization of the synthesis of coincidence in the *Lectures* §18: “In der Folge gleicher (inhaltsidentischer) Objekte, die nur in der Sukzession und nicht als Koexistenz gegeben sind, haben wir nun eine eigentümliche Deckung in der Einheit eines Bewußtseins: eine sukzessive Deckung. Natürlich uneigentlich gesprochen, denn sie sind ja auseinandergelegt, sind als Folge bewußt, getrennt durch eine Zeitstrecke”; and in §31: “Die Deckung betrifft die außerzeitliche Materie, die eben im Fluß Identität des gegenständlichen Sinnes sich erhält.” The important role of the synthesis of coincidence is also theme of an analysis of the diagram in §43, Hua X, pp. 93:9-94:4. This text and the diagram stem from the Ms. L I 10 / Bl. 1a which was also composed in Bernau.
  7. The figure of speech “for some time” is to be understood as a metaphor. On the level of the actually floating hyletic contents there is not yet any form of time neither subjective nor objective time because time is constituted on this basis in the first step as duration of sensual data. The figure of speech “for some time” has nevertheless a good sense in this context but the sense stems from a retrospective reflection.
  8. The text of §40 completely stems from Ms. L II 19 / Bl. 3a (starting around the middle of the page). §24 stems from Ms. FI 6 / Bl. 56a, a page written in 1917 and inserted later into the Manuscript of the *Lectures* of WS 1904/05. The last part of §43 (starting with “Man sieht . . .” = Hua X, p. 93:9) stems from Ms. L I 10 / Bl. 1. This page (Blatt 1) has the title “Bernau” and a hint “ad 187,” which refers to Edith Stein’s copy (her compilation) of the Lecture from WS 1904/05.
  9. In summer 1917, Stein worked on a manuscript “Zeitbewusstsein” compiled from Husserl’s manuscripts. In a letter to Roman Ingarden dated from 6.7.1917 she reports: “Ich habe in der letzten Zeit immer neue Stöße von Manuskripten geordnet und bin eben jetzt auf das Konvolut ‘Zeitbewusstsein’ gestoßen. Wie wichtig die Sachen sind, wissen Sie ja am besten: für die Lehre von der Konstitution und für die Auseinandersetzung mit Bergson und, wie mir scheint, auch mit anderen, z.B. Natorp. Der äußere Zustand ist ziemlich traurig: Notizenzettel von 1903 an. Ich habe aber große Lust zu versuchen, ob sich eine Ausarbeitung daraus machen lässt.” In July 1917 she brought this compilation more or less to a close and handed it over to Husserl. In a letter to Ingarden from 7.8.1917 she reports: “Ich habe im letzten Monat Husserls Zeitnotizen ausgearbeitet, schöne Sachen, aber noch nicht ganz ausgereift.” Early in September 1917 (8.9.1917) she reports proudly to Ingarden that Husserl is working intensively on the theme of time in Bernau: “Ich bin auf drei Tage hier beim Meister, es wird eifrig ‘Zeit’ gearbeitet.” These letters can all be found in E. Stein, *Briefe von E. Stein an Roman Ingarden (1917–1938)* (Freiburg: Herder 1991).

## ANALYSES OF PROTENTION

10. "In jeder Urphase, die den immanenten Inhalt ursprünglich konstituiert, haben wir Retentionen der vorangegangenen und Protentionen der kommenden Phasen eben dieses Inhaltes, und diese Protentionen erfüllen sich, solange eben dieser Inhalt dauert" (Hua X, p. 84 = L II 19/3a).
11. Cf. Hua X, p. 105. Husserl speaks of a "Hof."
12. "Jeder ursprünglich konstituierende Prozeß ist beseelt von Protentionen, die das Kommende als solches leer konstituieren und auffangen, zur Erfüllung bringen" (Hua X, 52).
13. "Und wenn die ursprüngliche Protention der Ereigniswahrnehmung unbestimmt war und das Anderssein oder Nichtsein offen ließ, so haben wir in der Wiedererinnerung eine vorgerichtete Erwartung, die all das nicht offen läßt" (ibid., §24).
14. Cf. Hua XXXIII, p. 22.
15. There are like processes in all other fields of sense experience, for example the beginning and end of tones.
16. "Der Verlauf der retentionalen Zweige bzw. der jeweilige intentionale Gehalt des eben auftretenden retentionalen Zweiges wirkt auf die Protention inhaltsbestimmend ein und zeichnet ihren Sinn mit vor" (Hua XXXIII, p. 38).
17. Cf. *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Hamburg 1974), pp. 122f.
18. Cf. Hua XXXIII, p. 22. The reasons for my modifications are discussed in the addendum to this essay.
19. Husserl writes that the protentional aspect is "eine Art Spiegelbild der Urseite" (ibid., p. 24).
20. Cf. Hua XXXIII, pp. 23f.
21. "Aus der Einseitigkeit wird Doppelseitigkeit, und die neue Seite <wird> eine Art Spiegelbild der Urseite" (ibid., p. 24). We might note that this might be the same for the upper branch of a vertical phase, but here protentions change into modified protentions, cf. ibid., p. 26.
22. "Im Urprozeß, möge er alte oder neue Ereignisse betreffen, sei wesensmäßig jede Phase in eins Retention einer vorangegangenen erfüllten Zeitstrecke . . . und Protention in Beziehung auf die folgende?" (ibid., p. 27:31-36).
23. Husserl writes, that we can "einen unteren Zweig nicht einfach als Retention, den oberen als Protention bezeichnen" (ibid., p. 28).
24. Husserl writes: "Diese Antizipation ist aber durch das Kontinuum vorangegangener Retentionen als fortschreitendes Kontinuum motiviert" (ibid., p. 24).
25. We expect "künftiges Fortgehen im gleichen Stil" (ibid.).
26. "Je weiter ein Ereignis fortschreitet, umso mehr bietet es in sich selbst für differenzierte Protentionen, 'der Stil der Vergangenheit wird in die Zukunft projiziert'" (ibid., p. 38).
27. "Das Bewußtsein bleibt in seinem Zuge und antizipiert das Weitere, nämlich eine Protention 'richtet' sich auf Fortsetzung der Reihe in demselben Stile" (ibid., p. 13).
28. "Protention richtet sich auf das Kommende, einem Allgemeinsten nach inhaltlich bestimmt (hat ein Ton zu erklingen begonnen, so ist es auch künftig <ein> Ton, wenn auch das nähere Wie der Intensitäts- oder Qualitätsverhältnisse unbestimmt bleibt im Sinne der Protention usw.)" (ibid., p. 14).
29. Cf. ibid., p. 37.
30. Husserl speaks not only of "Anspinnen," i.e., starting, but also of "Fortspinnen" (ibid., p. 13), which means continuing in the same way.
31. In the United States green follows immediately after red, but in Europe red is followed by a short period of yellow and then by green.
32. "Protention richtet sich auf das Kommende, einem Allgemeinsten nach inhaltlich bestimmt (hat ein Ton zu erklingen begonnen, so ist es auch künftig Ton, wenn auch das nähere Wie der Intensitäts- oder Qualitätsverhältnisse unbestimmt bleibt im Sinne der Protention usw.)" (Hua XXXIII, p. 14).
33. Cf. *Erfahrung und Urteil*, § 23b, pp. 120–23.
34. In §23b of *Erfahrung und Urteil* Husserl speaks of "absolut starre Gesetzmäßigkeit" (p. 122; "rein passiv," p. 123).
35. Cf. ibid., pp. 122f., §23b.
36. Cf. ibid.
37. "Protention ist nicht mehr wirkliche Aktivität im Modus des Vorgreifens" (ibid., p. 123). In the text of §18f. of the "Analyses of passive synthesis"

Husserl has not reached this level of discrimination, for he analyses here intentional expectation in the form of Association as a kind of protention. This leads to contradictory characterizations of retention and protention: On the one side retentions (and thus consequently also protentions) are characterized as being not intentional (Hua XI, p. 77) and at the same time the changing association is analyzed as being a kind of protention. The interpretation of association being protention does contradict its characterization as being rigid (“in starrer Weise,” Hua XI, p. 73).

38. On phantasmatic self-affection cf. D. Lohmar: “Vier Thesen zur Selbstaffektion,” in R. Bernet und A. Kapust, eds., *Sammelband der Konferenz “Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare,”* (Leuven 1998); “Selbstaffektion zwischen Anschauung und Begriff,” in V. Barale, ed., *Dimensioni di Soggettiva* (Pisa, 2002); and “Zum Projekt einer Phänomenologie der Selbstaffektion. Über einige Methodenprobleme und die Leistung der Selbstaffektion für die Analyse des Zeitbewußtseins,” in

W. Hogebe, ed., *Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen*. Sektionsbeiträge des XIX. Deutschen Kongresses für Philosophie, 23-27. Sept. 2002 Bonn (Bonn, 2002), pp. 1065–75.

39. Cf. Hua XXXIII, pp. 25, 172, 202, 212, 220, 238ff.  
 40. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 22.  
 41. The designation  $E_2E_2^3$  in line 6 of p. 22 stems from the Editors of *Husserliana* XXXIII, in the manuscript the designation is  $E_2E_2$  (cf. the text critical remark on this line on p. 298), in correspondence to my suggestion it is more fitting to read  $E_2E_2$ .  
 42. This correction is not dependant on my modification of the designations, it only changes a superscribed index into a subscribed one.  
 43. I would like to express my gratitude to the helpful criticism on former versions of this paper by Rudolf Bernet, Bill McKenna also for his kind help with the text, Henning Peucker and Siegfried Rombach. I would like to mention gratefully also the discussions with the participants in a seminar on protention held in the Winter semester 2001 at the Husserl Archive of the University of Cologne.

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