suggesting human free agency as a partial model for interpreting divine causality as it affects human life and religious consciousness. (Chapter 17) In this way, we end up with three kinds of remarks to be made about the attributes traditionally ascribed to God: Speaking metaphysically, we can say about divine goodness, for example, that the uncaused cause is good insofar as it necessarily meets the platonic norms of its own (unique) order (p. 254). Theologically, we can say that God is not good in any sense that would connect with human standards of goodness, although he (it?) is also neither evil nor amoral (pp. 296-297). And religiously, we can say that God is good insofar as a rational faith licenses belief in the value of the effects of creation (pp. 318-321). This last type of remark is partially supported by a theodicy based on the hoary notion of evil as privation (Chapter 19), a theory likely to appear naïve or cavalier to readers of other recent discussions of the subject.

After a very careful reading of Grisez's book, the connections among the three kinds of remarks about divine attributes remain somewhat opaque to me. The three are evidently consistent with each other, but more is needed to show that the uncaused cause is everyman's God. As far as I can see, the more is not supplied. Perhaps the point is just that metaphysics and theology prove that there is an uncaused cause which faith is entitled to call God. And perhaps the establishment of this point would be quite enough. The author suggests *Beyond The New Theism* as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate classes in philosophy, rightly pointing out that proponents of theism often receive less than a fair hearing in such courses (pp. xi-xii). On the other hand, potential users of the book should be warned that a thorough critical analysis of Grisez's argument is not likely to be accomplished within the limits of an ordinary course.

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JOHN M. COOPER. *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1975, 192 pp. $11.00, hardbound.

ARISTOTLE. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Synthese Historical Library, Vol. 13. Translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle. Dordrecht, Holland and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975, 372 pp. $50.00, hardbound.

Cooper's strategy is both bold and direct, to break through the dense underbrush of recent scholarship that surrounds Aristotle's *Ethics* by concentrating "on the two chief aspects of its theoretical backbone: his theories of practical reasoning and human flourishing" (p. *ix*). The latter phrase is his helpful rendering of the Greek expression *eudaimonia*, usually translated into English by 'happiness.' As he rightly stresses, the mushrooming commentary of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (chiefly in English, French, and German) does not provide, for the most part, "any clear, comprehensive, and consistent account at all of Aristotle's views on these topics." This defect he hopes to remedy by undertaking the "essential task" of working out "in adequate detail the overall theory lying behind Aristotle's analyses" of the particular components of his moral theory (p. *x*). Comfortably propped up against the rich background provided by W.F.R. Hardie's *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford, 1968), a comprehensive exposition and examination of the bulk of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Cooper's experiment is promising but risky. For, if his chiropractice on *phronesis* and *eudaimonia* fails, there is little to do but reluctantly return to those practitioners whose "predilection for scholarly safety prevents them from following out far enough the implications of what [Aristotle] does say" (p. *x*).

The book is divided into three progressively shorter and, to this reader, slighter sections: The first reveals a complex relation between deliberation,

the practical syllogism, and moral intuition; the second stresses the integrated character of a life combining moral and intellectual virtue in the *Eudemian Ethics;* finally, he attempts to solve the classical problem posed by Book X where Aristotle apparently argues for an exclusively intellectualist conception of *eudaimonia*. Along the way he clearly and forcefully presents some of the most important puzzles for contemporary students of these topics in the *Ethics* and is generally convincing in his criticism of the major solutions proposed by W. D. Ross, D. J. Allan, R.-A. Gauthier, W. Jaeger, and J. Burnet, to mention only the most influential of his opponents. To take but one example illustrative of the novelty and freshness of Cooper's reading of the *Ethics*, his account of the perplexing doctrine of the practical syllogism is certainly one of the most deflationary on record. Whereas others have sought unsuccessfully to bring practical syllogisms into alignment with the strictures intended for deliberation, especially the restriction to narrowly construed means-end reasoning, Cooper sharply separates the processes of deliberation and practical syllogism. The latter lies "outside the process of deliberation proper: it enters only with the exercise of the perceptual capacity that Aristotle says agents must have with regard to the specific types of things ultimately decided on by deliberation as the appropriate means to their ends" (p. 44). In other words, he assigns to practical syllogisms a *merely concretizing* role in the particular perceptual circumstances; they implement decisions to perform actions of certain sorts, decisions which are the products of the *specifying* function of deliberation. To use the terminology of contemporary action-theory, given certain ends, deliberation selects certain *act-types* or *generic acts* to be chosen by the agent, while practical syllogisms result in the actual production of *act-tokens* or *specific acts*. This suggestion is an attractive proposal. As Cooper notes, we need no longer worry about when a process of deliberation is completed: "The final outcome . . . is the

selection of a specific action and not of an explicitly individual action to perform . . ." (p. 39). Also, there is less mystery on this view in Aristotle's puzzling remark that the conclusion of a practical syllogism *is* an action. Additionally, Cooper reminds us that neither *to eschaton* (to which a crisp appendix is devoted) nor *to kath hekaston* (crucial technical terms for Aristotle) need be taken to refer to specific individuals. This is salutary for the general study of Aristotle and well deployed in behalf of his interpretation of their use in the *Ethics*. (A similar point about *todi* (p. 29) is, perhaps, more debatable than he will grant.) It can be fairly said that in developing his account of the relation between deliberation and the practical syllogism Cooper is careful to continually take us back to the text and the detailed treatment of specific passages.

Unfortunately Cooper's textual references are not always as supportive as one might wish. Taking for granted a rather elevated conception of deliberation, he offers *NE* 1112b2 and *EE* 1226a33–b2 as proof that "deliberation is called for principally or only in difficult or delicate cases, where the facts are complicated, or their bearings on the interests or principles in question is not easy to assess, or where a very great deal hangs on the decision's being correct, and so on. Certainly, cases of routine action do not call for deliberation" (p. 6). In both passages, Aristotle stresses the non-deliberative character of actions such as forming the letters of the alphabet and this may appear to be a mere dismissal of trivial cases. But, the surrounding context in both instances makes it clear that he is citing additional examples of what is not "up to us" to do one way or another; i.e., we do not deliberate about what cannot be changed by our own efforts, such as that which is eternal or necessary or by nature or due to chance (cf. *NE* 1112a3–b2). In his provisional specification of the scope of deliberation, Cooper has overlooked a natural reading of the parallel texts that would not support the characterization quoted above. Such a zealous misinterpretation, if isolated and not really crucial to his overall argument would, of course, be no more than a blemish on a serious study such as this. However, there are other signs of "special pleading" that might make one uneasy about recommending this book to students unfamiliar with the details of the *Ethics* and a fair sample of the best recent comment. Consider, for example, his rather brusque dismissal in a footnote of the painstaking analyses presented by B.A.O. Williams and C. Kirwan of Aristotle's apparent attempt to prove in Book I that there must be an ultimate end of action for everyone: "I do not think these reconstructions, ingenious as they are, do anything to bring out the reasons Aristotle may be supposed to have had for accepting, in whatever way he did accept, the existence of an ultimate end." (p. 93) This is especially puzzling in view of the fact that Kirwan's precise capturing of the distinction drawn in Book I, chapter 7 between *more final ends,* such as honor, pleasure, intelligence and virtue, and the notion of a *most final end,* such as *eudaimonia* alone appears to be, would have blunted the force of Cooper's curious criticism (on p. 92) of Aristotle's conception of an ultimate end. Due deference to this distinction would have also helped to prevent similar difficulties on pp. 16–18 and 100. This is not to say that Cooper is clearly wrong in his overlooking the approaches of Williams and Kirwan, but that one would feel more comfortable in accepting his own skepticism about Aristotle's argument if he had examined their interpretations more thoroughly. And, since he later devotes a relatively generous portion of the discussion to L. Ollé-Loprune and G. Rodier, scholars whose philosophical as opposed to philological sophistication is no match for that of the aforementioned, this slighting is a pity.

There are more serious qualms that one might have about Cooper's failure to avail himself of familiar philosophical distinctions that would have helped to clarify his argument. For example, he fails to distinguish sharply enough be-

tween the contexts of *rational justification* and *causal explanation* in his account of practical thinking. There are shifts from one context to the other, made with disarming ease, which lead to the conclusion on p. 10 that "what is presented as a theory of how decisions are reached also serves as a theory of how decisions, however reached, can be explained and justified." Even the attempt to defend this rather muddled conclusion by treating one's reasons for a course of action as merely hypothetical, "*as if* one had deliberated and decided accordingly (even if one actually did no deliberating at all)" (p. 10), will not clear the philosophical fog. Another instance in the same vein occurs on pp. 87–8 where Cooper concludes that Aristotle's ethical theory, "while decidedly not teleological in the modern sense, is also not deontological either," on the strength of rather sketchy accounts of either persuasion in meta-ethics. These deficiencies on the philosophical side make the book as a whole far less helpful to the general philosophical community than it might have been.

The last two sections are devoted to a search for a solution to a (since Hardie) familiar problem in interpreting Aristotle's account of the end of human flourishing. Does Aristotle think of *eudaimonia* as a *dominant* end, one to which other final ends must be subordinated when they conflict, or as a second-order, *inclusive* end developed along Rawlsian lines, where "to aim at having a flourishing life is . . . to attempt to put into effect an orderly scheme for the attainment of . . . first-order ends" (pp. 96–7)? In section II Cooper argues rather persuasively that at least the *Eudemian Ethics*, which he plausibly treats as an earlier version of Aristotle's ethical lectures, definitely favors the inclusive end conception of *eudaimonia* and furthermore does not place undue and unqualified emphasis on the unrestrained pursuit of the intellectual life to the slighting of the moral one. Indeed, his conclusion about the *Eudemian* theory's approach to the question of the superiority of intellectual goods to all others is quite sensible: "such goods are to be pursued single-mindedly, and preferred to any amount of other goods, once the requirements of the moral virtues are met" (p. 142). And the same general picture emerges from Cooper's portrayal of the central books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with their elaboration of the moral and intellectual virtues of the *phronimos* or practically wise man. But we are brought up short by the conflicting picture in Books I and X emphasizing what appears to be a dominant end of intellectualism. Cooper devotes his final section to a full airing of this rather jarring theme in Aristotle's later ethical teaching.

He first examines "three inadequate interpretations" of Aristotle's argument in Book X, all of which are attempts to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between the middle and last books (pp. 149–154). Having quoted a long and crucial passage (*NE* 1177b26–78a22), Cooper skillfully marshalls a few "simple facts about the Greek word *bios*" which block Gauthier's attempt to soften the ring of intellectualism: "When Aristotle contrasts an 'intellectual life *(bios)*' with a 'moral life *(bios)*', he cannot mean, as Gauthier's interpretation requires, the intellectual life and the moral life of a single person. The Greek expressions can only mean two different lives led by two different kinds of persons." (pp. 159–60) With a clearer choice before us now, Cooper goes on to argue that Aristotle's subsequent identification of the self with "one's pure intellect *(nous)*" (p. 162) makes it inevitable that the intellectual life discussed in Book X does "not involve the possession of any of the moral virtues" since such virtuous acts as one "may perform are not *his own* acts" but a mere "concession to the human being—the living physical body—with which he refuses to identify himself" (p. 165). As unwelcome as this interpretation appears even to Cooper, he stoutly defends it, citing "the late and technical psychological theory of the *De Anima*" as the source of this identification of a human being with his (theoretical) *nous* (p. 176) since in

that work "the highest intellectual function is not connected . . . with the other functions nor with any body" with the result that "the soul which exercises this function is not defined as the actuality of a body" (p. 175). This provocative version of an intellectualist reading of Book X will, no doubt, prove controversial. One has the feeling that Cooper should really have pushed harder here to work out the details of the late psychology and the implications as he sees them. One is tempted to observe that in the end he, too, succumbs to the temptation that he so consistently deplores throughout the book: a desire "to attribute to [an] author just what his texts clearly show him to have held, and nothing more," with the danger that one will "do little else than report his actual assertions" (p. *x*).

The criticisms offered above should not be taken as a condemnation of the book as a whole. It is a genuine contribution to our appreciation of Aristotle's masterpiece and will, no doubt, prove stimulating to other scholars. It is best seen, I think, as a useful supplement to the text itself and to other materials, such as Hardie's book and the sizeable literature addressed therein. One hopes that Harvard will see fit to bring out a paperback version that might assure it a wider distribution than at present. As matters stand, instructors would have to be rather heedless of their students' financial straits to require its purchase on top of other essential materials.

Hippocrates G. Apostle's new translation of the *Ethics* would, on the other hand, have to be masterful and his commentary absolutely indispensable to justify the outrageous price of $50 that Reidel is charging for it. Regrettably, neither conclusion will likely be drawn by those in a position to examine it. As in his previous translations of the *Metaphysics* (1966) and the *Physics* (1969), both brought out by Indiana University Press, his aim is "to help the reader get Aristotle's meaning as accurately as possible" by rigid adherence to "principles of terminology and thought" (p. *ix*), stressing consistency, adequacy, familiarity and clarity. On the whole, his effort may be characterized as literal in the extreme, perhaps more so than any of the many other fine English translations of the *Ethics* (such as those of Ross and Ostwald) that we have. One pays a price for this faithfulness, however, viz. the danger of unintelligibility when Aristotle displays that "dry conciseness that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents rather than a book," that flavor that "tastes for all the world like chopped hay." Thomas Gray, who complained of this stylistic aridity, warned readers that Aristotle suffers "vastly by his transcribers, as all authors of great brevity must" and at times Apostle's prose offers contemporary illustrations of this phenomenon. To remedy this however he offers voluminous "commentaries" (footnotes, really) at points where he feels an expansion or explanation of the text is called for. These are often helpful on biographical or literary allusions and obscure examples, especially those drawn from mathematics, but those hoping for philosophical illumination will be sadly disappointed. He appears to be almost blissfully unaware of the secondary literature that Cooper, for instance, appreciates and explores in his book. In all of the 148 pages devoted to "commentary" there is one reference (count 'em!) to a genuine commentary on the *Ethics,* a point made by Joachim which is mentioned on p. 217. There is no bibliography and, for purists, not even a note on which modern version of the Greek text he favors. After checking those of Bywater and Susemihl in two places where they differ I think it is safe to say he follows the former, but one really ought not have to do such detective work. As for the general quality of the notes, one should be wary. Twice on the first page (devoted to Book I, Chapter 1) he betrays a shallow appreciation of Aristotle's use of dialectical statements. They are, for Apostle, *merely* those "generally accepted as true," to be given but a provisional status in the argument as "dialectically true only." (p. 205) Those convinced by G.E.L. Owen and most recent commentators on Aristotle's methodol-

ogy of the important role played by such propositions throughout his corpus will shudder at the effect on the innocent of Apostle's carelessness. On p. *x* of his preface we are put on notice that a future translation of the *Posterior Analytics* is in the offing. Now that Oxford has brought out Jonathan Barnes' excellent version in its Clarendon series of texts, which feature philosophically worthy commentaries, let us hope he is dissuaded. After all, with inflation as it is, who knows how much unsuspecting libraries and the idle rich will have to cough up to purchase it?

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PETER T. MANICAS. *The Death of the State*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (Capricorn Books), 1974, pp. xv, 268. Paperbound.

If being free is contingent upon the fullest possible development of our potential humanity, and if the material basis for that development depends upon a highly complex network of cooperative productive interaction, then what room is left for the liberal ideal of "minimal interference" with persons "living as they wish"? In his book, *The Death of the State*, Peter T. Manicas tries to come to grips with this problem, a problem inevitable to those who, like Manicas, wish to adopt the Marxist conceptions of freedom and of social production but who nevertheless have some sympathy with the bourgeois conception of freedom so well articulated by John Stuart Mill (and so easily adapted to right-wing anarchisms). Manicas does as well as can be done trying to speak from what are really irreconcilable worldviews, and in the process he has produced a very useful book, quite well suited to teaching social and political philosophy courses at virtually any level. In the first five chapters, Manicas does a remarkable job of setting forth a coherent argument, sketching in at least rudimentary form (and sometimes in more detail and depth than that) the important philosophical precedents for (or against) his position, placing those in the historical-philosophical context from which they derive their full meaning, relating present political realities to all of this, and responding where appropriate to contemporary political theorists. At every point his presentation is clear and coherent, easily understood by beginning students, and easily debated by more advanced students.

In the first chapter Manicas argues that the (actual) function of the state is to define the boundary between public and private and to regulate what is thereby defined as public. "*The state*, then, *is the public organized under an authority which, within a given territory, has the monopoly of legal coercive power.*" (p. 31, emphasis in the original) Although he points out that the distinctions between public and private have always been ideological in that they have served to maintain the existing power relationships in any given society, he raises, in Chapter 2, the problem of constructing such boundaries so as to morally justify the use of coercive power entailed by the distinction. He considers the three traditional answers: natural law, which while it has the value of asserting, correctly, that people do stand "naturally" in moral relation to one another and that obligations derive from their being human, does not give us adequate criteria for distinguishing what ought to be the case from what is the case; conventionalism (contract theory) which begins with a premise of natural rights and is forced therefore to postulate society as a voluntary association when there is overwhelming reason to suppose that no society is in fact voluntary; and utilitarianism, from which it follows only that while sometimes (perhaps) we ought to obey the law, we do not ever have a *duty* to do so. Thus Manicas, like Robert Paul Wolff before him, ends by denying the existence of any legitimate states. Manicas nevertheless rejects Wolff's defense of anarchism since he does not feel that the individual loses autonomy simply by taking on an obligation (Wolff's main argument). He points out merely