Idealistic Studies

Volume 39, Issue 1/3, Spring/Summer/Fall 2009

Elena Ficara
Pages 87-97

Hegel’s Dialectic in Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy
Benedetto Croce and Gilles Deleuze

In this paper I consider Benedetto Croce’s interpretation and critique of Hegel’s dialectic in Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è morto della filosofia di Hegel (1906) and I compare it with a very similar critique elaborated by Gilles Deleuze around sixty years later (in Différence et répetition, 1968, Nietzsche et la philosophie, 1962 and Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? 1991). Even if they are two very different authors, belonging to very different traditions and contexts, both Croce and Deleuze criticise Hegel with a very similar argument, namely by saying that Hegel did not adequately take into account the concept of difference, and subordinated it to opposition (or negation). In addition, albeit by taking different roads, both Croce and Deleuze thought that philosophy has its own specific logic, and this logic is a logic of concept.