Grazer Philosophische Studien

Volume 51, 1996

Predicates, Properties and the Goal of a Theory of Reference

An account of predicate reference is presented which attempts to steer a middle course between reductionism, which construes the notion in terms of speakers' inclinations, and {transcendent) realism, which construes the notion in terms of properties. It is first introduced in the context of a discussion of the accounts of length (distance) advanced by Hans Reichenbach, Adolf Grünbaum and Hilary Putnam. A general account of predicate reference is then developed that explains the notion in terms of speakers' inclinations, while rejecting the idea that this explanation should take the form of a reduction. The view is presented as a vindication of extreme nominalism, as it explains predicate reference solely in terms of the notion of qualia introduced by C.I. Lewis and developed by Nelson Goodman, which, it is argued, is definable in terms of speakers' classificatory propensities. Some connections are explored between the position that is presented and the views of Michael Dummett, John McDowell, Mark Johnston and Hilary Putnam, among others.