Displaying: 1-20 of 240265 documents

0.34 sec

1. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 26
L. Nathan Oaklander Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams’s thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is sympathetic with a B-theoretic ontology.
...Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time? ... there is no difference between A- and B-time, I shall explain what I take the ... between A- and B-time is that on the B-theory there are, whereas on some versions of ...
2. Philosophy Today: Volume > 65 > Issue: 3
Alina Achenbach The Ontic Gift: The Temporality of Technics between Heidegger and Derrida
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Much of modern technology critique inherits Heidegger’s ontico-ontological distinction. In this paper, following Stiegler’s linking of the ontic to the transgenerational, I argue that Heidegger leaves the materiality of technics as a potential site for difference in the wake. Put differently, Heidegger “declines the gift of the ontic,” instead constructing an order of an imagined Graeco-German inheritance—a culturally and linguistically specific “saving-power” against the ills of modern technology. Through Derrida’s inheritance of Heidegger’s work—marked by a different language and (postcolonial) positionality—I reconsider ontico-ontological difference as an opening to a co-constitutive productivity of world and thing, where the passing on of mnemonic inheritance features multiplicities of languages and cultural techniques that preempt Heidegger’s “Graeco-German monolingualism.” This calls for a central positioning of the politics of memory and inheritance within modern technology critique, thereby attending both to the material realities as well as the cultural differences of technics.
... with thinking (Denken) and speaking (Sprache). “The hand is not a prosthesis of ... , causality understood as the linear unfolding of cause and effect is a reductive ... “time” that is current throughout the metaphysics of the West ...
3. philoSOPHIA: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
MD Murtagh The Firstness of Sexual Difference: Charles Sanders Peirce, American Pragmatist and Incorporeal Feminist
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A metaphysical strand of C. S. Peirce’s American pragmatism resonates deeply in potential alliance with “incorporeal feminism”: a transcontinental philosophy with origins in Luce Irigaray’s ethics of sexual difference. A psychoanalyst trained by Lacan himself, Irigaray analyzes the unconscious of various philosophical systems, revealing dualism as an underlying phallic structure. In the dualism between idealism and materialism, she explains, the terms become sexually coded: idealism, paternal-masculine; materialism, maternal-feminine. Incorporeal feminism does not merely invert the roles, but radically reimagines the relation between them, postulating the ideal as a maternal condition of possibility for birthing the material into existence; not separate substances but the inseparable activity of materiality making itself. For Peirce, ideas act; and though he was by no means a feminist, his metaphysics lend at least three insights to incorporeal feminism: (1) an alternative to dualism in the trichotomic categories “firstness, secondness, and thirdness”; (2) an evolutionary cosmology where the material universe is a gestating embryo within a womb; and (3) an objective idealism: a model for addressing the dilemma of when sexual difference begins. Within “firstness,” sexual difference is ideal; an incorporeal activity pre-existing and latently imbuing materiality to varying degrees, ultimately expressing itself in certain life-forms as bodily differences.
... cosmology is a well-suited model for a space and time of sexual difference ... pragmatist feminism is to foreclose the possibility of a feminist metaphysics ... ) “a change in our perception and conception of space-time” (10) is necessary ...
4. The Review of Metaphysics: Volume > 49 > Issue: 2
Willem R. de Jong How Is Metaphysics as a Science Possible?: Kant on the Distinction Between Philosophical and Mathematical Method
..., for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of ... concept of metaphysics.On the one hand there is the distinction between clear and ... there is also a real difference between these two sorts of material "principles" in ...
5. Philosophy Today: Volume > 53 > Issue: Supplement
Michael Wittala The Metaphysics of Duns Scotus and Onto-Theology
... with forgetting that there is a difference between Being and ... there is a difference between Being and beings ... matter of thinking is the difference [between Being and beings ...
6. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Trish Glazebrook From φύσις to Nature, τέχνη to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo, and Newton
.... (Metaphysics 9.6.1048a31–b5)The first point to be noted is that the terms actuality and ... from nature.The difference between them is that in the case of φύσις, the ἀρχή and ... definitive of the theoretical attitude in §69 of Being and Time. The difference between ...
7. Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology: Year > 2012
Roberto Poli Modes and Boundaries
... first is the difference between the theory of being (the simple ... of the same kind between itself and that of which it is ... There is a difference, however, between substances we arrive at ...
8. Symposium: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Martina Ferrari An-Archic Past: Rethinking Negativity with Bergson
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Thanks to the revival in Bergson’s scholarship prompted by Gilles Deleuze’s Bergsonism, it is widely recognized that Bergsonism challenges the metaphysics of presence. Less attention, however, has been devoted to the status of negation or negativity in Bergson’s thought. Differently from Deleuze, I argue that Bergson’s claim that memory and perception, past and present, differ in kind does not call for the erasure of the negative but rather for the radical reconceptualization of negation in temporal terms. Thinking negation temporally allows Bergson to open the space for conceptualizing existence beyond presence, for developing an account of the paradoxical nature of the past. With an insight that anticipates Derrida’s thinking, Bergson tells us that the past is neither “there” nor “not-there,” neither a presence nor an absence. Grâce au regain d’intérêt pour Bergson qu’a suscité le livre de Gilles Deleuze, Le bergsonisme, il est maintenant largement reconnu que le bergsonisme met la métaphysique de la présence à l’épreuve. On a cependant moins porté attention au statut de la négation ou de la négativité dans la pensée de Bergson. Au contraire de Deleuze, je soutiens que l’affirmation de Bergson selon laquelle la mémoire et la perception, le passé et le présent, diffèrent en espèce n’amène pas un effacement du négatif mais plutôt une reconceptualisation radicale de la négation en termes temporels. En pensant la négation temporellement, Bergson peut ouvrir un espace pour conceptualiser l’existence au-delà de la présence et développer une explication de la nature paradoxale du passé. Anticipant la pensée de Derrida, Bergson nous montre que le passé est ni « présent » ni « non-présent », ni une présence ni une absence.
... 5 The mistake of both idealists and materialists is to posit a difference in ... a difference in kind between perception and memory, the present ... , or is of matter, there is no difference in kind between matter ...
9. Symposium: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Alistair Welchman Deleuze’s Post-Critical Metaphysics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Badiou claims Deleuze’s thinking is pre-critical metaphysics that can-not be understood in relation to Kant. I argue that Deleuze is indeed a metaphysical thinker, but precisely because he is a kind of Kantian. Badiou is right that Deleuze rejects the overwhelmingly epistemic problems of critical thought in its canonical sense, but he is wrong to claim that Deleuze completely rejects Kant. Instead, Deleuze is interested in developing a metaphysics that prolongs Kant’s conception of a productive synthesis irreducible to empirical causation. Where Badiou’s criticism might hold, however, is in the risk that Deleuze’s strategy runs of contaminating his new metaphysics with a new kind of transcendental idealism. This reading has recently been developed by Ray Brassier and I explore and evaluate it, concluding that in Difference and Repetition this accusation may be correct, but that by the time of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze (now with Guattari) has the intellectual re-sources to resist it.
... the boundaries of a possible experience, and it is this purported ... of phenomenology in the 20 th century and beyond. But there is ... Difference and Repetition, the critique of representation is, at least ...
10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Ryan J. Johnson Homesickness and Nomadism: Traveling with Kant and Maimon
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Solomon Maimon argues that while Kantianism does venture quite a way toward the establishment of an immanent critical project that more satisfyingly addresses real experience, it does not fulfill the aims of its own project. In order to negotiate Maimon’s claim, I utilize the primary metaphorics of the First Critique: homesickness. The Kantian longing for home is an insatiable yearning, a striving for the end of something that cannot end, namely, the end of the search for home (Zuhause). According to Maimon, although home is unattainable, there is a different sense of home: home is the path itself, a sort of nomadism, a roving life of the path that never leads home. The Kant of the first Critique did not fully realize that the project could not reach an actual final resting place; in fact, this realization, that home is a transcendental ideal, might be the very motivation for the third Critique. Thus, in order not merely to justify the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, but also to allow the application of such knowledge to reach the facts themselves, actuality as such, the “well-groundedness” of the critical project requires some re-direction from Maimon. To do this, Maimon renders Kantian transcendental conditions truly genetic.
... phenomena A and B occur in time, and that time is a priori, does not entail ... there is contingently a correspondence between the temporally successive ... is a problem of circularity in the Kantian method of conditioning, and the ...
11. Philosophy Today: Volume > 63 > Issue: 1
Catherine Homan The Play of Being and Nothing: World, Earth, and Cosmos in Eugen Fink
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The question permeating much of Eugen Fink’s work is whether a nonmetaphysical thinking of the world is possible. Fink views metaphysics as understanding the world merely from the side of beings and as a container of things. A nonmetaphysical thinking would be cosmological; it would think the world as a totality, as the origin of being, of beings, of time, and of space. This thinking requires a radical way of thinking that which cannot be thought: the nothing that allows being and beings to come to appearance at all. My analysis aims to articulate more clearly what Fink means by thinking cosmologically by tracing his understanding of world, earth, and cosmos and the interplay of being and nothing at stake in each. I clarify how Fink both inherits and goes beyond the philosophies of Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger to provide a way of thinking through that which resists articulation.
... the early Greeks recognized a difference between being and beings, a difference ... of the idea of being” (cited in Bruzina 1995: liii). Since space and time are a ... The question permeating much of Eugen Fink’s work is whether a nonmetaphysical ...
12. Semiotics: 1994
Benjamin E. Mayer Metaphysics: Permanently to be Exceeded, Permanently to Endure
... of the privilege of presence, so too there is a moment—and ... to the modes of time, the past and the future. Being is nontime ... . Thus, the question of the relation between 'metaphysics' and ...
13. The Philosophical Review: Volume > 113 > Issue: 2
Daniel Sutherland Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics and the Greek Mathematical Tradition
... as there is no sense that can be given to the ratio between an area and a volume ... distinguishes between two sorts of magnitude, quanta and quantitas; the former is a concrete ... regarded as a genus, then it is a lowest species [species infimae]and the difference of ...
14. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
David B. Cornay Kant and the Closure of the Epoch of the Metaphysics of Presence
... transition of a now which is between the nonbeing of a not yet and of a no more. It is ... " (see KdrV A. 598-B. 626). Given the difference of thought and intuition, that ... distinction between the concept of a thing in itself and that of appearance is not ...
15. Philosophy Today: Volume > 51 > Issue: Supplement
Emanuela Bianchi Aristotelian Dunamis and Sexual Difference: An Analysis of Adunamia and Dunamis Meta Logou in Metaphysics Theta
... sexual difference, the female is a sort of deformed or mutilated ... of privation—the first distinction he gives is between a simple ... says is that the contrary isthereand manifest in a peculiar ...
16. Heidegger Circle Proceedings: Volume > 15
Joseph J. Kockelmans On the Function of the Ontological Difference in Heidegger's Transcendental Ontology
... is taken in the context of investigations which have a transcendental and ... problematic as we find it in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics ... that Being is to be interpreted from the perspective of time and that this ...
17. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
George J. Seidel Orcid-ID Heidegger and the Overcoming of Metaphysics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Heidegger revisits German idealism after the “turn” in his thought in the mid-1930’s. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is philosophical, if not “theological” in his sense of that term. The other is personal. This later reason is emphasized by Otto Pöggeler, who suggests that after 1945 Heidegger sought to understand what had gone wrong in the tragic European debacle. Heidegger will lay the blame at the doorstep of what he terms onto-theology and the subjectivism he sees as endemic to the German idealist tradition, above all as exemplified in Hegel’s “onto-theo-ego-logy.” The article explores Heidegger’s reading of this tradi­tion of German philosophy as it begins with Leibniz and culminates in Nietzsche. It is the Event itself that makes possible the overcoming of metaphysics and its onto-theology. As Heidegger says in Contributions to Philosophy (From the Event), the ens realissimum (das Seiendste) “is” no more. It is the Event (Ereignis) that is the “most real,” since it is the Event that shows up and manifests itself as the revelation of the truth of Beinge in Da-sein, the being that is there in the Event.
... same time. There is The Metaphysics of German Idealism (1991), lectures ... metaphysics, announced in Being and Time, is really a return to the origin ... 2009b, 102–3). 17 The metaphysics of Hegel, according to Heidegger, is a mix ...
18. Process Studies: Volume > 6 > Issue: 4
Juliana Geran Pilon Becoming: A Problem for Determinists?
...'s metaphysics of time entaiIs (1). Now Iet us b,egin frorn the other end and examine the ... ,roperty and if the future is detenninate, there is no difference between a future ... sibilities. A detelminist oould agree here and still hold that there is a difference b'etween ...
19. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1/2
Anna Marmodoro Aristotle on Complex Perceptual Content. The Metaphysics of the Common Sense
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In his theory of perception Aristotle is committed to the principle that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a sensible quality, the modification of a sense organ by that quality, and the content of the perceptual experience of it. But on the basis of this principle, simultaneous perceptions of different sensible qualities give rise only to distinct perceptual contents. This generates the problem of how we become aware of complex perceptual content, e.g. in discerning red from cold. This paper examines the alternative (although not equally explanatorily powerful) models that Aristotle offers in the De Anima and in his biological works to account for complex perceptual content.
...: The object of sight is the visible, and what is visible is (a) colour and (b ... is a one-to-one correspondence between a sensible quality, the modification of a ... modification of the appropriate special sense organ by the form.^ There is a one ...
20. The Review of Metaphysics: Volume > 71 > Issue: 1
Sylvia Carli Energeia and Being-in-Time
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Aristotle defines time as “the number of movement (kinēsis) with respect to before and after” (Physics 4.11.219b2). The relation between sublunar substances, which have within themselves a principle of movement and rest, and time, therefore, appears unproblematic. Sensible substances, however, also perform perfect activities (energeiai) and, in the passages in which he most clearly outlines the nature of such activities, the philosopher leaves the issue of their temporality unresolved. As a result, scholars have speculated about different ways of understanding it. This paper argues that the Aristotelian corpus does offer precise indications on this issue. The Physics distinguishes between two modalities of being in time, namely, being-in-time in virtue of one’s nature and being-in-time accidentally. The case is made that energeiai belong to the class of things that are in time accidentally and that this way of understanding their relation to time fits their distinctive nature and is faithful to the phenomena.
... number, or (2b) that there is a number of it.” 42 The first sense ... that there is no difference between the two kinds of processes ... in virtue of one’s nature and being-in-time accidentally. The case is made that ...