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Displaying: 71-80 of 1496 documents


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71. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Timothy Pawl, Kevin Timpe, Heavenly Freedom: A Reply to Cowan
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In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Steven Cowan calls into question our success in responding to what we called the “Problem of Heavenly Freedom” in our earlier “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven.” In this reply, we defend our view against Cowan’s criticisms.
72. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Joshua Rasmussen, Andrew Cullison, Daniel Howard-Snyder, On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument for Atheism
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Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on is false. Second, the argument equivocates between two kinds of grounding: instance-grounding and quasi-mereological grounding. Happily, the equivocation can be avoided; unhappily, avoidance comes at the price of a false premise.
73. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Chris Tweedt, Splitting the Horns of Euthyphro's Modal Relative
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There is a modal relative of Euthyphro’s dilemma that goes like this: are necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them because they’re true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as contingent as God’s free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you try to split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in God’s nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I will argue that Leftow’s argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature.
reviews
74. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Paul Weithman, Justice in Love, by Nicholas Wolterstorff
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75. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Joshua C. Thurow, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments, by C. Stephen Evans
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76. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
David O'Hara, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality, by David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls
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77. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
David Brown, The Poetics of Evil: Towards an Aesthetic Theodicy, by Philip Tallon
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78. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Jeff Snapper, Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition, by Kevin W. Hector
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79. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
T. J. Mawson, On What Matters: Volume One and On What Matters: Volume Two, by Derek Parfit
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80. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Matthew Barrett, In Adam’s Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin, by Ian A. McFarland. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010
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