Already a subscriber? Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 71-80 of 1472 documents


articles
71. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Michael Rota, Freedom and the Necessity of the Present: A Reply to William Hasker
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In a recent paper, William Hasker has responded to a paper of mine criticizing his argument for theological incompatibilism. In his response, Hasker makes a small but important amendment to his account of freedom. Here I argue that Hasker’s amended account of freedom is false, that there is a plausible alternative account of freedom, and that the plausibility of this alternative account shows that Hasker’s argument for theological incompatibilism relies on a dubious premise.
72. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
William Hasker, The Present Is Necessary! Rejoinder to Rota
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
My account of free will entails that events of the present moment are “necessary” in the same way that the past is necessary. I argue that Michael Rota’s main objection to this account is unsuccessful. I also argue that Rota’s synchronous account of contingency is inferior to the diachronic account which I favor.
reviews
73. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Tyron Goldschmidt, The Rainbow of Experiences, Critical Trust and God: A Defense of Holistic Empiricism. By Kai-man Kwan
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
74. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
R. T. Mullins, Inquiring About God: Selected Essays, Volume, 1 by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited by Terence Cuneo; and Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited by Terence Cuneo
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
75. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Joseph J. Lynch, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by Michael Murray
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
76. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Richard E. Creel, Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility, by Anastasia Philippa Scrutton
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
77. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
R. Douglas Geivett, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, by Brian Davies
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
78. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Thomas P. Flint, From the Editor
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
79. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
W. Matthews Grant, Divine Simplicity, Contingent Truths, and Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A well-known objection to divine simplicity holds that the doctrine is incompatible with God’s contingent knowledge. I set out the objection and reject two problematic solutions. I then argue that the objection is best answered by adopting an “extrinsic model of divine knowing” according to which God’s contingent knowledge, which varies across worlds, does not involve any intrinsic variation in God. Solutions along these lines have been suggested by others. This paper advances the discussion by developing and offering partial defenses of three such models.
80. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Katherin A. Rogers, The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Incompatibilists hold that, in order for you to be responsible, your choices must come from yourself; thus, determinism is incompatible with responsibility. One way of defending this claim is the Controller Argument: You are not responsible if your choices are caused by a controller, and natural determinism is relevantly similar to such control, therefore . . . Q.E.D. Compatibilists dispute both of these premises, insisting upon a relevant dissimilarity, or allowing, in a tollens move, that since we can be determined and responsible, we can be controlled and responsible. Positing a divine controller strengthens the argument against these two responses.