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Displaying: 71-80 of 1504 documents


book reviews
71. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
William Hasker, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century, by Maria Rosa Antognazza. Trans. Gerald Parks.
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72. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Terence Cuneo, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn, by Paul Weithman
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73. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Paul Gould, Creation and the Sovereignty of God, by Hugh J. McCann
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74. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 3
Jeff Jordan, Rationality and Religious Commitment, by Robert Audi
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articles
75. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Jason Turner, Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense
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The free will defense is a theistic strategy for resisting the atheistic argument known as “the logical problem of evil.” It insists that God may have to allow some evil in order to get the greater good of creatures freely choosing to act rightly. Many philosophers have thought that the free will defense requires the truth of incompatibilism, according to which acts cannot be free if they are causally determined. For it seems that if compatibilism is true, God should be able to get the goods of free creatures acting rightly without any evil by simply creating a world where creatures are causally determined to always act rightly. I argue that this is not so. First I describe and motivate a compatibilist account of free will according to which, although God can create creatures which are both free and causally determined, the freedom of determined creatures depends on God’s not taking into account what they will be determined to do. I then show how, given such a form of compatibilism, God may be able to create free and determined creatures without being able to create creatures determined to always freely act rightly.
76. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
John Kronen, Sandra Menssen, The Argument from Wholes: A Classical Hindu Design Argument for the Existence of God
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All wholes are made by an intelligent agent; some wholes were not made by an embodied agent; so, some things made by an intelligent agent were not made by an embodied agent. Such was the basic argument for God’s existence defended by Udayana, the greatest of the Nyāya-Vaiśeika philosophers, in his Kiraṇāvalī. Our paper explicates this argument and highlights its merits.
77. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Matthey Carey Jordan, Divine Commands or Divine Attitudes?
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In this essay, I present three arguments for the claim that theists should reject divine command theory (DCT) in favor of divine attitude theory (DAT). First, DCT (but not DAT) implies that some cognitively normal human persons are exempt from the dictates of morality. Second, it is incumbent upon us to cultivate the skill of moral judgment, a skill that fits nicely with the claims of DAT but which is superfluous if DCT is true. Third, an attractive and widely shared conception of Jewish/Christian religious devotion leads us naturally to an attitude-based conception of morality rather than a command-based one.
78. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Dale Tuggy, Hasker's Quests for a Viable Social Theory
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In a series of papers, William Hasker, in conversation with important recent work in philosophical theology, has carefully articulated and argued for a version of “social” trinitarianism. I argue that this theory should be rejected because it is not consistently monotheistic.
79. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Timothy Pawl, Kevin Timpe, Heavenly Freedom: A Reply to Cowan
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In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Steven Cowan calls into question our success in responding to what we called the “Problem of Heavenly Freedom” in our earlier “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven.” In this reply, we defend our view against Cowan’s criticisms.
80. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 2
Joshua Rasmussen, Andrew Cullison, Daniel Howard-Snyder, On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument for Atheism
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Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on is false. Second, the argument equivocates between two kinds of grounding: instance-grounding and quasi-mereological grounding. Happily, the equivocation can be avoided; unhappily, avoidance comes at the price of a false premise.