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Displaying: 71-80 of 1530 documents


articles
71. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Robert J. Hartman, How to Apply Molinism to the Theological Problem of Moral Luck
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The problem of moral luck is that a general fact about luck and an intuitive moral principle jointly imply the following skeptical conclusion: human beings are morally responsible for at most a tiny fraction of each action. This skeptical conclusion threatens to undermine the claim that human beings deserve their respective eternal reward and punishment. But even if this restriction on moral responsibility is compatible with the doctrine of the final judgment, the quality of one’s afterlife within heaven or hell still appears to be lucky. Utilizing recent responses to the problem of moral luck, I explore several Molinist accounts of the final judgment that resolve both theological problems of moral luck. Some of these accounts entirely eliminate moral luck while others ensure that the moral luck involved in the judgment is overall good luck.
72. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Joshua Johnson, In Defense of Emergent Individuals: A Reply to Moreland
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J. P. Moreland has recently raised a number of metaphysical objections to the theory of Emergent Individuals that is defended by Timothy O’Connor, Jonathan Jacobs, and others. Moreland argues that only theism can provide a sufficient explanation for human consciousness, and he considers the theory of Emergent Individuals to offer a competing naturalistic explanation that must be refuted in order for his argument to be successful. Moreland focuses his objections on the account of emergence advocated by the defenders of the theory, as well as what he considers to be the theory’s problematic commitment to panpsychism and the causal powers metaphysic. I respond to Moreland’s objections and argue that they are unsuccessful largely due to his misunderstanding of the theory of Emergent Individuals.
reviews
73. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
C. Stephen Evans, Mind, Brain, and Free Will, by Richard Swinburne
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74. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Raymond J. Vanarragon, God, Goodness, and Philosophy, ed. Harriet A. Harris
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75. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Mark C. Murphy, God and Moral Obligation, by C. Stephen Evans
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76. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Jason Decker, Honor For Us: A Philosophical Analysis, Interpretation and Defense, by William Lad Sessions
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articles
77. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Tomas Bogardus, The Problem of Contingency for Religious Belief
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In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief.
78. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Tyron Goldschmidt, Beth Seacord, Judaism, Reincarnation, and Theodicy
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The doctrine of reincarnation is usually associated with Buddhism, Hinduism and other Eastern religions. But it has also been developed in Druzism and Judaism. The doctrine has been used by these traditions to explain the existence of evil within a moral order. Traversing the boundaries between East and West, we explore how Jewish mysticism has employed the doctrine to help answer the problem of evil. We explore the doctrine particularly as we respond to objections against employing it in a theodicy. We show how it supplements traditional punishment, free will and soul-building theodicies, and helps these theodicies avoid various objections.
79. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Joshua Rasmussen, On the Value of Freedom To Do Evil
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Theists typically think the freedom to choose between right and wrong is a great good (hence, the free will defense). Yet, they also typically think that the very best being—God—and inhabitants of the very best place—heaven—lack this kind of freedom. The question arises: if freedom to choose evil is so good, then why is it absent from the best being and the best place? I discuss articulations of this question in the literature and point out drawbacks of answers that have been proposed. I then propose a new answer by showing how freedom to do evil could result in certain good situations even if it does not contribute to the intrinsic greatness of a certain being or place.
80. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
James East, Infinity Minus Infinity
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In this note, I consider an argument advanced by William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair against the possibility of actual infinite collections based onHilbert’s Hotel and alleged problems with inverse operations in transfinite arithmetic. I aim to show that this argument is misguided, since it is based on a mistaken view that the impossibility of defining ℵ0 - ℵ0 entails the impossibility of removing an infinite subcollection from an infinite collection.