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Philo

Volume 13, Issue 2, Fall/Winter 2010

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Displaying: 1-6 of 6 documents


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1. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Bradley Monton, Against Multiverse Theodicies
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In reply to the problem of evil, some suggest that God created an infinite number of universes—for example, that God created every universe that contains more good than evil. I offer two objections to these multiverse theodicies. First, I argue that, for any number of universes God creates, he could have created more, because he could have created duplicates of universes. Next, I argue that multiverse theodicies can’t adequately account for why God would create universes with pointless suffering, and hence they don’t solve the problem of evil.
2. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
David J. Anderson, Joshua L. Watson, The Mystery of Foreknowledge
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Many have attempted to respond to arguments for the incompatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge by claiming that God’s beliefs about the future are explained by what the world is like at that future time. We argue that this response adequately advances the discussion only if the theist is able to articulate a model of foreknowledge that is both clearly possible and compatible with freedom. We investigate various models the theist might articulate and argue that all of these models fail.
3. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Evan Fales, Divine Commands and Moral Obligation
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A popular proof for the existence of God assumes that there are objective moral duties, arguing that this can only be explained by there being a supreme law-giver, namely God. The upshot is either a Divine Command Theory (DCT)—or something similar—or a natural-law theory. I discuss two prominent theories, Robert Adams’ DCT and Stephen Evans’ hybrid DCT/natural-law theory. I argue that they suffer from fatal difficulties. Natural-law theories are plausible, if God exists, but can’t be used to prove His existence; and are less plausible, on the evidence, than a naturalistic natural-law theory, which has the best prospects for providing an objective foundation for morality.
4. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Michael W. Hickson, Conscientious Refusals without Conscience: Why Not?
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In this paper I uncover and critically analyze a methodological assumption in the literature on conscientious refusals in health care. The assumption is what I call the “Priority of Conscience Principle,” which says the following: to determine the moral status of any act of conscientious refusal, it is first necessary to determine the nature and value of conscience. I argue that it is not always necessary to discuss conscience in the debate on conscientious refusals, and that discussing conscience is even problematic, since it can lead authors to beg the question.
5. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Rob Lovering, The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers
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That theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make the evidential case for theism to atheistic evidentialist philosophers raises a problem—a question to be answered. I argue here that—of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem—each is either inadequate or, when adequate, in conflict with the theistic evidentialist philosophers’ defining beliefs. I conclude that the problem of the theistic evidentialist philosophers—the question of why theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make their case to atheistic evidentialist philosophers—is a problem for theistic evidentialist philosophers—an objection to their defining beliefs.
discussion
6. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Aaron Segal, Alvin Plantinga, Response to Churchland
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Paul Churchland argues that Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism is unsuccessful and so we need not accept its conclusion. In this paper, we respond to Churchland’s argument. After we briefly recapitulate Plantinga’s argument and state Churchland’s argument, we offer three objections to Churchland’s argument: (1) its first premise has little to recommend it, (2) its second premise is false, and (3) its conclusion is consistent with, and indeed entails, the conclusion of Plantinga’s argument.