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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
T. A. Cavanaugh, Aristotle’s Voluntary / Deliberate Distinction, Double-Effect Reasoning, and Ethical Relevance
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In this essay I articulate Aristotle’s account of the voluntary with a view to weighing in on a contemporary ethical debate concerning the moral relevance of the intended / foreseen distinction. Natural lawyers employ this distinction to contrast consequentially comparable acts with different intentional structures. They propose, for example, that consequentially comparable acts of terror and tactical bombing morally differ, based on their diverse structures of intention. Opponents of double-effect reasoning hold that one best captures the widely acknowledged intuitive appeal of the distinction by contrasting agents, not acts. These thinkers hold that the terror bomber differs from the tactical bomber while terror bombing does not differ ethically from tactical bombing. Aristotle’s accounts of the voluntary and the deliberately decided upon provide grounds for the ethical relevance of the intended / foreseen distinction as applied to both acts and agents.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
Lawrence J. Hatab, Dasein, The Early Years: Heideggerian Reflections on Childhood
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Like most philosophers, Heidegger gave little attention to childhood, but his philosophical emphasis on pre-reflective practice and understanding seems uniquely qualified to help make sense of a child’s experience and development. Moreover, it seems to me that many central Heideggerian concepts are best defended, exemplified, and articulated by bringing child development into the discussion. A Heideggerain emphasis on pre-theoretical world-involvement opens up a rich array of phenomena for studying child development, which can improve upon standard theories that have over-emphasized exclusive conditions or criteria. I begin by laying out some basic features of Heidegger’s conception of being-in-the-world as a preparation for understanding the world of the child. Then I will briefly discuss some of Heidegger’s remarks on childhood, followed by some reflections on language acquisition and the correlation of anxiety and meaning.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
Michael Oliver Wiitala, The Forms in the Euthyphro and the Statesman: A Case against the Developmental Reading of Plato’s Dialogues
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The Euthyphro is generally considered one of Plato’s early dialogues. According to the developmental approach to reading the dialogues, when writing the Euthyphro Plato had not yet developed the sort of elaborate “theory of forms” that we see presented in the middle dialogues and further refined in the late dialogues. This essay calls the developmental account into question by showing how key elements from the theory of forms that appear in the late dialogues, particularly in the Statesman, are already operative in the Euthyphro. When one identifies the way in which each of Euthyphro’s definitions of piety fails in light of Socrates’s arguments, one already finds the conception of form that Plato presents in the middle and late dialogues.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
Shane Drefcinski, What Does It Mean, To Become Like God?: Theaetetus 176a–177b
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In the Theaetetus Socrates states that we should become like God. Recent commentators disagree over the meaning of his directive. David Sedley argues that it urges us to assimilate to God in our present lifespan by a life of philosophical contemplation. Julia Annas thinks that it is just another way of stating that virtue (including moral virtue) is sufficient for happiness. Sandra Peterson denies that Socrates’s directive should be taken seriously. I argue that his directive is serious and includes both moral virtue and philosophical contemplation. Furthermore, I argue that this goal does not fall within the confines of our present lifespan. By this directive Socrates means that to become like God we should live virtuously in order to escape the cycle of reincarnation and achieve a specific, fulfilling kind of immortality.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
A. S. Kleinherenbrink, Freedom within Understanding
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Current debates on freedom of will disregard that understanding is a necessary presupposition to experience the will as free. Theories of freedom such as those by Frankfurt, Watson, and Wolf are demonstrably incapable of explaining (the absence of) freedom in several quotidian situations because of a lack of a concept of understanding. In explicating why understanding is a necessary (and sufficient) condition for freedom, I present an alternative theory that I call the Understanding View. It proposes that the experience of freedom depends on the degree to which we understand the inner context of our identity and the outer context of a given situation. The Understanding View succeeds in accounting for freedom in those areas where its main rivals fail as well as in those situations to which they can successfully be applied. This makes the Understanding View more useful in addressing the question of the freedom of will.
contemporary currents
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
Francis J. Beckwith, Does Judith Jarvis Thomson Really Grant the Pro-Life View of Fetal Personhood in Her Defense of Abortion?: A Rawlsian Assessment
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In her ground-breaking 1971 article, “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that even if one grants to the prolifer her most important premise—that the fetus is a person—the prolifer’s conclusion, the intrinsic wrongness of abortion, does not follow. However, in her 1995 article, “Abortion: Whose Right?,” Thomson employs Rawlsian liberalism to argue that even though the prolifer’s view of fetal personhood is not unreasonable, the prochoice advocate is not unreasonable in rejecting it. Thus, because we should err on the side of liberty, the right to abortion is vindicated. In this article, I argue that Thomson’s latter reliance on Rawlsian thinking suggests a way of re-reading her earlier essay that casts doubt on whether she really grants the dominant prolife account of unborn human life.
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
Amihud Gilead, We Are Not Replicable: A Challenge to Parfit’s View
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Challenging the idea of personal identity, Derek Parfit has argued that persons are replicable and that personal identity does not really matter. In a recent paper Parfit again defends the idea of personal replicability. Challenging this idea in turn, I explain why persons are absolutely not replicable. To prove this I rely on two arguments—the Author Argument and the Love Argument. The irreplicability of persons relies upon the singularity of each person and thus entails that personal identity is irreducible and that it really does matter.
book reviews and notices
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
Mark J. Burke, S.J., Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait. By Donatella DiCesare, translated by Niall Keane
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 4
Xingming Hu, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies. By Steve Coutinho
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