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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Carl N. Still, Aquinas on Self-Knowledge and the Individuation of Thought
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Thomas Aquinas’s theory of self-knowledge stands out among medieval theories for its conceptual sophistication, yet it remains less studied than many other areas of his thought. Here I consider a significant philosophical critique of Aquinas on self-knowledge and respond to it. Anthony Kenny alleges that Aquinas does not sufficiently account for the individuation of thought in the knower. But Kenny’s analysis of how Aquinas individuates thought ironically confuses Aquinas’s account with that of Averroes, whose explanation Aquinas rejected. A closer reading of Aquinas’s texts reveals that intelligible species, not phantasms, individuate thought. Kenny’s central objection to Aquinas’s account of self-knowledge is thus resolved, but I leave open whether Aquinas’s account could be usefully supplemented by modern treatments of self-knowledge.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Andrew Komasinski, Anti-Climacus’s Pre-emptive Critique of Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technology”
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In this article I argue that The Sickness unto Death, authored by Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes Anti-Climacus, has resources for an interesting critique of technology in some ways like that of Heidegger’s critiques in “Question Concerning Technology” and Being and Time. I suggest that Anti-Climacus’s account of “despair” resonates with much of what Heidegger says about inauthenticity and the self’s orientation toward death. But I also contend that in maintaining that the self can only be complete by understanding itself as essentially relating and related to God, Anti-Climacus has a critique of the sort of solution that Heidegger would provide. Finally, I trace the origin of this view to fundamental differences in ontology that must be settled outside of the problems posed by technology.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
P. A. McGavin, T. A. Hunter, The We Believe of Philosophers: Implicit Epistemologies and Unexamined Psychologies
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The ethical theory espoused by a philosopher is often dominated by certain implicit epistemological assumptions. These “ways of knowing” may in turn be dominated by personality preferences that give rise to certain preferred worldviews that undergird various philosophies. Such preferred worldviews are seen in We believe positions, stated or unstated. The meaning of these claims about the interconnections of unexamined assumptions and their philosophical implications may be seen through an example. This paper will examine certain crucial aspects of the thought of John Doris, who promotes a form of situationist ethics. This example is intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive. It points to the need for an openness to other epistemological assumptions that might permit a more comprehensive appreciation of what moral agency involves, beyond what arises from the restricted methods of analytical philosophy and a positivist worldview. There have been other efforts to meet the situationist challenge to classical Aristotelian ethics, yet surprisingly little attention has been given to the role of implicit epistemologies and unexamined psychologies. This paper offers a critical examination of these prior We believe positions.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Jesse Ciccotti, The Mengzi and Moral Uncertainty: A Ruist Philosophical Treatment of Moral Luck
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In this paper I will argue for a plausible account for moral luck in the Ruist tradition. In part one I will offer a preliminary framework for moral luck to establish an intersection between Ruist virtue ethics and its counterparts outside of Ruism. I will situate the term moral luck in a Ruist context. Although the term moral luck does not appear in The Mengzi (or any other Ruist document for that matter) the concept was known to Master Meng (Mengzi 孟子) and is useful for comparison with its foreign counterparts. In part two, guided by Thomas Nagle’s four categories for moral luck, I show where Ruist moral luck can be found in The Mengzi. I conclude by highlighting the contributions that Ruism offers to the broader moral luck discussion.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Stephen L. Brock, How Many Acts of Being Can a Substance Have?: An Aristotelian Approach to Aquinas’s Real Distinction
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Focusing mainly on two passages from the Summa theologiae, the article first argues that, on Aquinas’s view, an individual substance, which is the proper subject of being, can and normally does have a certain multiplicity of acts of being (actus essendi). It is only “a certain” multiplicity because the substance has only one unqualified act of being, its substantial being, which belongs to it through its substantial form. The others are qualified acts of being, added on to the substantial being through accidental forms. Having established this thesis, the rest of the article uses it as a basis for an approach to the so-called real distinction between act of being and essence or (more precisely) between act of being and substantial form. This approach is meant to be effective even in an Aristotelian setting where there may seem to be no place for a substantial act distinct from substantial form.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Justin M. Anderson, Aristotelian Groundings of the Social Principle of Subsidiarity
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The social principle of subsidiarity, both regarding the federalism debate in North America and the principle’s role in the formation of the European Union, has garnished increased attention in recent years. In this paper I will argue that if one looks for the historical seed of the principle of subsidiarity in Aristotle—as many authors do—then attention should fall more properly on his analysis of practical reasoning in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics than on Book I of the Politics. The treatment of practical reasoning more aptly explains the need for the principle of subsidiarity and, indeed, averring that it is based on an Aristotelian sense of autonomy is misplaced at best and dangerous at worst.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Jeffrey Bloechl, Review of Brian Gregor, "A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self"
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Brendan Sweetman, Review of Joseph J. Godfrey, S.J., "Trust of People, Words and God: A Route for Philosophy of Religion"
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 54 > Issue: 3
Joseph J. Godfrey, S.J., Review of Adriaan T. Peperzak, "Trust: Who or What Might Support Us?"
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