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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Conor McHugh, Exercising Doxastic Freedom
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This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention.Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, I argue, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions-reactivity and reasons-reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntarycontrol. I develop and defend an account of freedom of intention, arguing that constitutive features of intention ensure that freedom of intention cannot requirevoluntary control. Then I show that an analogous argument can be applied to doxastic states. I argue that if we had voluntary control of intentions or of doxasticstates, this would actually undermine our freedom.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Mohan Matthen, How to Be Sure: Sensory Exploration and Empirical Certainty
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Derek Ball, Bryan Pickel, One Dogma of Millianism
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Bradley Armour-Garb, James A. Woodbridge, From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth-Theoretic Fictionalism
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Stephen A. Butterfill, Corrado Sinigaglia, Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action
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Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of actions? Standard accounts of achon assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Sam Shpall, Moral and Rational Commitment
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Michael Rescorla, The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation
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Many philosophers worry that the classical computational theory of mind (CTM) engenders epiphenomenalism. Building on Block's (1990) discussion, I formulate a particularly troubling version of this worry. I then present a novel solution to CTM's epiphenomenalist conundrum. I develop my solution within an interventionist theory of causal relevance. My solution departs substantially from orthodox versions of CTM. In particular, I reject the widespread picture of digital computation as formal syntactic manipulation.'
book symposium
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Douglas W. Portmore, Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Joshua Gert, Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Paul Hurley, Comments on Douglas Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism
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