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Philo

Volume 13, Issue 1, Spring/Summer 2010

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Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents


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1. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
James Baillie, New Problems for Religious Pluralism
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John Hick’s theory of religious pluralism posits the same ineffable spiritual reality, ‘the Real,’ as the source of all major religious traditions. He offers pluralism as the best explanation of salvific parity, the thesis that these religions are equally effective vehicles for salvation. Most criticisms of Hick have focused on the explanans, arguing that the Real cannot play any explanatory role due to its ineffability. I raise two difficulties for the explanandum, the thesis of salvific parity. I call these the problems of bad religion and good secularism.
2. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Kai Draper, Evidence without Priors
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I argue that it is possible to acquire evidence that has no probability, not even zero, prior to its acquisition. If I am right then, contrary to certain Bayesian models of confirmation, conditionalization is not the only possible basis upon which a rational agent will alter her credence in some hypothesis in response to new evidence. My conclusion follows from certain analyses of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Because those analyses are controversial, however, I alter the Sleeping Beauty scenario to generate an obvious example of evidence that has no prior probability.
3. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Yehuda Gellman, A Problem for the Christian Mystical Doxastic Practice
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William Alston has identified what he calls a “Christian Mystical Practice” as one of the many doxastic practices in which humans engage. He defends CMP as being as rational as other doxastic practices, including the sense perceptual practice, having its own input and output rules, and its own background overrider system. I argue that there seems to be a serious problem with Alston’s characterization of the overrider system for CMP. The presence of this problem threatens to damage Alston’s argument for the rationality of engaging in the Christian Mystical Practice.
4. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
M. Andrew Holowchak, The ‘Soft Dictatorship’ of Reason: Freud on Religion, Science, and Utopia
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5. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Joseph P. Li Vecchi, Analogical Deduction via a Calculus of Predicables
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This article identifies and formalizes the logical features of analogous terms that justify their use in deduction. After a survey of doctrines in Aristotle, Aquinas, and Cajetan, the criteria of “analogy of proper proportionality” are symbolized in first-order predicate logic. A common genus justifies use of a common term, but does not provide the inferential link required for deduction. Rather, the respective differentiae foster this link through their identical proportion. A natural-language argument by analogy is formalized so as to exhibit these criteria, thereby showing the validity of analogical deduction.
6. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Christopher H. Pearson, Methodological Naturalism, Intelligent Design, and Lessons from the History of Embryology
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Intelligent Design proponents consistently deny that science is rightfully governed by the norm of methodological naturalism—that independent of one’s actual metaphysical commitments regarding the natural/supernatural, a scientist, qua scientist, must behave as if the world is constituted by the natural, material world. This essay works to develop more fully a pragmatic justification for methodological naturalism, one that focuses on a number of key elements found in 17th and 18th century embryology.
7. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Eric Reitan, Moving the Goalposts? The Challenge of Philosophical Engagement with the Public God Debates
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When philosophers contribute to public debates as polarized as contemporary ones about theistic belief, it is common to encounter responses that, philosophically, are woefully misguided. While it is tempting to simply dismiss them, a closer examination of recurring responses can offer insight of philosophical significance. In this paper I exemplify the value of engaging with recurring but misguided popular objections by looking carefully at one such objection to my recent book, Is God a Delusion?
book review
8. Philo: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Mark Bernstein, Challenges and Defense
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