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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 2
Justin Bledin

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Is modus ponens valid for the indicative conditional? McGee [1985] famously presents several alleged counterexamples to this inference rule. More recently, Kolodny and MacFarlane [2010] and Willer [2010] argue that modus ponens is unreliable in certain hypothetical contexts. However, none of these attacks undermines an informational conception of logic on which modus ponens is valid.

2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 2
Stephan Leuenberger

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Where does the line between the possible and the impossible fall? One influential answer to this question is succinctly expressed by the thesis that there are no brute necessities. Typically, that thesis is taken to be non-contingent by its proponents. In this paper, I shall argue that if it is necessary, it is so brutely. From this, it follows that there could be brute necessities. But this has no tendency to show that there are any. On the resulting view, the world is full of contingency—but only contingently so.