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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
Tom Angier, Happiness: Overcoming the Skill Model
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I argue that the theory of happiness now dominant among philosophers embraces a flawed, technicizing model that represents happiness as a set of mental states produced by actions and events. This view contrasts with Aristotle’s conception, according to which happiness is not produced by (but is tantamount to) long-term activity and incorporates (but is not reducible to) a set of mental states. I then go on to criticize the skill model of happiness on three main grounds. First, unlike the Aristotelian model, it necessarily instrumentalizes activity while setting no principled limit to the manipulation of human action and experience. Second, and again contra Aristotle, it privileges an efficient (rather than formal) conception of causation while obscuring the way in which happiness is inextricably grounded in its conditions, which in turn has various deleterious upshots. Third and finally, the skill model yields a highly questionable notion of happiness as measurable.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
Gaven Kerr, O.P., Thomist Esse and Analytical Philosophy
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In this paper I seek to consider the project of analytical Thomism with particular regard to Aquinas’s metaphysics of esse. My overall conclusion is that Thomas’s thought on esse is part and parcel of a way of philosophizing that is alien to analytical philosophy and is such that analytical philosophy is constitutionally unable to come to terms with it. In order to argue for such a conclusion, I begin with a presentation of Aquinas’s metaphysics of esse. I then respond to the objection that arguably some analytical philosophers have already arrived at the same thought at which Aquinas arrived, thereby blocking the way to my denial of the possibility of an encounter between analytical philosophy and Thomist esse. Having removed that obstacle, I argue that analytical philosophy is constitutionally unable to come to terms with Thomist esse.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
Peter Seipel, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, Internal Reasons, and the Problem of Justification
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Recent years have seen a number of interpreters defend the claim that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is an epistemological doctrine. This interpretation of perspectivism leads to the worry that Nietzsche cannot offer any arguments for his view by means of which he may convince his opponents. To rescue Nietzsche from this justificatory problem, some interpreters have recently turned to the notion of “internal reasons,” or reasons that have force within multiple perspectives because they are based on shared standards. In this paper I show that the task for supporters of Nietzsche is considerably more complex than it may seem at first sight. I argue that there is no way to know in advance of empirical investigation on a case-by-case basis whether perspectivism can be saved from undermining any compelling reasons that Nietzsche might provide in its defense.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
Joseph Trullinger, Kant’s Neglected Account of the Virtuous Solitary
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In this paper I analyze the importance of Kant’s account of principled solitude at the end of § 29 of the Third Critique. The scant attention paid to this passage by the scholarship has mistaken it to mean that solitude is a misanthropic attitude, a misreading that serves a prevailing interpretation that Kant elevates communal interaction as the solution to moral turpitude. In reality, Kant holds that solitude can afford an individual liberation from the competitive obsession with others that characterizes vice. Whereas misanthropic recluses withdraw from society out of hatred, fear, or indifference toward people, the virtuous solitary withdraws from their company in order to acquire a morally principled attitude of self-possession. By carefully delineating the development of this view in Kant’s lectures and critical works, as well as by laying out the essence of Kant’s notions of philanthropy and misanthropy, I construct an account of how solitude can perform this philanthropic function.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
Daniel Bradley, Ligatio ex Nihilo: Original Sin and the Hope for Redemption: An Alternate Path through the Darkness of Kierkegaard’s Phenomenology of Anxiety
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In pointing out the strange phenomenological structure of anxiety, Kierkegaard re-opens the door to reflection on “nothingness.” This tradition has been fruitful, but it has remained wedded to interpreting this nothingness in light of the distinction between anxiety and fear. Thus, anxiety is understood exclusively as the transcendence of this or that possibility towards an encounter with the freedom of possibility itself. Kierkegaard’s original formulation, however, states that anxiety is “altogether different than fear and similar concepts.” In this article I take up Kierkegaard’s hint and argue that, interpreted in the light of guilt, his distinction is revelatory in ways that he himself did not anticipate. While we may be guilty for this or that sin, in anxiety we stand before our sinfulness itself. Anxiety ought to counsel us to be resolute in the face of possibility, but also to make a genealogical critique of our entanglement in the illusions of our past.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
Philip R. Shields, The Poverty of Patriarchal Power
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This paper argues that there is a counter-productive tendency for many feminist critiques of patriarchy to revert to the same impoverished conception of power that they are critiquing, and thus—despite a commitment to the idea of a social self—inadvertently to valorize the notions of independence, autonomy, and choice that are enshrined in the ideal of the patriarchal individual. An adequate account of power relations between men and women cannot be rendered if we employ a misplaced and reductive model of power, nor if we fail to acknowledge the intersubjective and interdependent nature of human self-consciousness—the deep and varied ways in which our identity and agency are intricately interwoven and wax or wane as a whole. Rightly understood, men are not (and historically have not been) as powerful and autonomous, nor women as powerless and oppressed, as they seem when viewed through the distorting lens provided by modern liberal individualism.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
M. Ross Romero, S.J., Plato’s Laws: Force and Truth in Politics. Edited by Gregory Recco and Eric Sanday
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
Timothy S. Quinn, Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s. Edited by Martin D. Yaffe and Richard Ruderman
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 1
David Kovacs, Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind. By James Madden
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