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Displaying: 1-10 of 14 documents


1. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Theodore George, Letter from the Editor
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2. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Tanja Staehler, The Refuge of the Good in the Beautiful
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In the Platonic dialogues, the enigmatic concept of the good tends to retreat at those very moments when it is supposed to show itself. This paper examines the relation between the beautiful and the good as the good takes refuge in the beautiful. Hans-Georg Gadamer holds a particular interest in these retreats since they show that there is actually an emphasis on appearances and the human good in Plato. In contrast, Emmanuel Levinas is critical of the primacy of vision and the beautiful from an ethical perspective. The relevant passages in the dialogues will be interpreted with respect to this divergence.
3. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Daniel L. Tate, Renewing the Question of Beauty: Gadamer on Plato’s Idea of the Beautiful
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Posing the question of beauty anew, Gadamer pursues a hermeneutic remembrance of the original relation of beauty and truth forgotten by modern aesthetics. For Gadamer, the essential relation of kalos and aletheia is preserved, above all, in Plato. This essay elaborates his retrieval of Plato, re-thinking the splendor of beauty and the illumination of truth from being as an event of coming-to-presence. After discussing his engagement with Heidegger the essay reconstructs Gadamer’s interpretative argument, showing how he interprets the transcendence, radiance, and measure that characterize Plato’s idea of the beautiful as structural features of being as an event of truth.
4. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich, The Approach to the Problem of Comprehension in Roman Stoicism
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Throughout the sources that have come down to us from the Roman period of the Stoic school, we find an important number of therapeutical practices that can be clearly linked to other schools (such as Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Cynicism or Epicureanism) and can be consequently seen to constitute (part of) the common ground that enables the idea that there is a general Hellenistic approach to the problem of philosophy as therapy. I will argue that a subset of those strategies, which I will refer to as repetition, ascetic and visualization practices, can be better understood as part of an approach to the problem of comprehension, a new approach which, contrary to what may seem at first glance, is fully consistent with the intellectualist conception of human agency defended by both Early and Roman Stoics. I will further suggest that this new approach to the notion of comprehension may be interpreted as an expression of dissatisfaction with the Early Stoic excessively abstract approach to the problem of knowledge.
5. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Henk Keizer, Is There a "Pancreas Problem" in Spinoza’s Theory of the Human Mind?
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This article explores a new reading of an important section of Part II of Spinoza’s Ethics. It recognizes that Spinoza actually differentiates between the human mind conceived from the viewpoint of its cause and the human mind conceived from the viewpoint of its nature. It shows, most importantly, that Spinoza assigns different objects to those ‘minds’. Consequently they represent different knowledge of the body. It will appear that the human mind in respect of its cause represents non-conscious knowledge of the human body and that the human mind in respect of its nature represents conscious knowledge of the human body. It will be shown that knowledge of the inner processes of the human body and of the body per se belongs to the domain of non-conscious knowledge. The same conclusion will be obtained in an analysis that starts from the distinction between the formal and the objective being of the human mind.
6. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Sean Erwin, The Metabolism of the State: Instrumental and Aleatory Aspects of Auxiliaries in Machiavelli
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At Discorsi II.20, Machiavelli defines auxiliary arms as those, “whom a prince or a republic send captained and already paid for, for your aid.” My contention is that Machiavelli’s treatment of auxiliary arms is much more nuanced than it may seem at first glance. Throughout his works, Machiavelli articulates this type of force from the standpoint of the prince but also, surprisingly, from the standpoint of the people. In their princely employment, auxiliary arms act instrumentally as means for the projection of power. However, analyzed from the standpoint of the people, auxiliary force exposes the projects of the state to the radically aleatory. Acknowledging the aspectival function played by the definition of auxiliaries in Machiavelli’s texts offers a new vantage point for re-reading Machiavelli on the nature of authority, power and the conflict of the umori.
7. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Gordon Hull, Building Better Citizens: Hobbes Against the Ontological Illusion
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Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian political animal, a move that enables a malleable psychology in which we are driven by our passions and responses to external objects. Our psychology is accordingly overdetermined by our socio-cultural environment, and managing that environment becomes a central task of the state. A particular problem is what I call the “ontological illusion,” the constitutive human tendency to ontologize products of the imagination. I argue that Hobbes’s strategies for managing the ontological illusion govern part four of Leviathan. Those chapters are intended to convince elites that crediting ontological illusions in policy is disastrous, as his discussion of demonology and its thinly veiled references to witchcraft persecutions readily illustrates.
8. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
James Luchte, Of Freedom: Heidegger on Spinoza
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In this essay, I will explore the much neglected relationship between Heidegger and Spinoza—and thus of Heidegger and the modern sense of freedom. The free man, for Spinoza, is one who has not only cultivated the stronger active emotion of acquiescence to the univocal chorus of necessity, but has also learned to disengage external factors which are coincident with such passive emotions—to organise an ‘order of encounters’ as Deleuze describes in his Expressionism. Heidegger, on the contrary, who undertakes a meditation upon ‘Spinozism’ in the context of his 1936 lecture course, Schelling’s Treatise on Freedom, would seem to take issue with Spinoza in his own contention that the one who faces his or her ownmost possibility of death without evasion, is the one who is most free—or, who will have found him or herself in a moment that discloses the necessity of one’s own singular freedom. It will be in the context of this divergence between substance and event that I will argue that Spinoza’s notion of freedom as it consists in the acquiescence to substance is a falsification of human existence for the sake of a hedonistic escapism.
9. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Dennis Vanden Auweele, Schopenhauer and the Paradox of Genius
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Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy proved more palpable to artists of the nineteenth century than to philosophers as such (with the exception of Nietzsche, Freud and Wittgenstein). Ironically, Schopenhauer’s aesthetical theory is particularly paradoxical on a variety of fronts. One troubling paradox is how Schopenhauer subscribes both to the elitist nature of the genius artist and a naturalist metaphysics. How can a singular being have radically distinct abilities if s/he cannot principally differ from the rest of existence? I address this paradox in this essay and provide a solution by focusing on a certain evolution in Schopenhauer’s philosophical development.
10. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Beau Shaw, Semele’s Ashes: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Hölderlin’s "As when on a holiday . . ."
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This paper is an elaboration of Paul de Man’s critique, in “Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin,” of Martin Heidegger’s commentary on Friedrich Hölderlin’s poem, “As when on a holiday…” I show that de Man’s critique can be expanded into a critique of a type of testimony that Heidegger ascribes to Hölderlin’s poem. Heidegger ascribes to Hölderlin’s poem what I call “infinite testimony,” but, thereby, suppresses in the poem another type of testimony—what I call “finite testimony. This suppression is most in evidence in Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s reference to the myth of Semele, as well as in Heidegger’s excision, in the version of the poem that he printed in the commentary, of the concluding lines of the poem. Additionally, I discuss the political implications of Heidegger’s suppression of the finite testimony depicted in “As when on a holiday . . .”