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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Stephen R. Munzer

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There are at least five types of innocence. Innocence of various, but not all, types can be possessed, then lost, and later still regained or even surpassed. The most important of these I call “mature innocence,” which is a confirmed state of character, attained reflectively and by an individual’s exercise of effort and agency, that is highly resistant to sin and moral wrongdoing. Mature innocence can be either a secular or a specifically Christian ideal. To surpass mature innocence is to attain a related ideal of purity of heart.

symposium: kant’s philosophy of religion

2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Andrew Chignell

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I briefly describe the unusually contentious author-meets-critics session that was the origin of the book symposium below. I then try to situate the presentsymposium within broader contemporary scholarship on Kant.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Pamela Sue Anderson

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In my response-paper, I dispute the claim of Firestone and Jacobs that “Kant’s turn to transcendental analysis of the moral disposition via pure cognition is perhaps the most important new element of his philosophy of religion” (In Defense of Kant’s Religion, 233). In particular, I reject the role given—in the latter—to “pure cognition.” Instead I propose a Kantian variation on cognition which remains consistent with Kant’s moral postulate for the existence of God. I urge that we treat this postulate as regulative. So, in place of pure cognition, “belief in” God grounds our hope for perfect goodness.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
George di Giovanni

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In this comment on Firestone and Jacobs’s book, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, I take issue with (1) the authors’ strategy in demonstrating that it is possibleto positively incorporate religion and theology into Kant’s critical corpus, and (2) their intention to focus on the coherence of Kant’s theory without necessarily recommending it for Christianity. Regarding (1), I argue that in pursuing their strategy the authors ignore the fact that Kant has transposed what appear to be traditional religious doctrines to a completely different level of reflection, in effect turning them into imaginary tropes intended to mask otherwise irreducible contradictions in his view of human agency. As for (2), I claim that the authors’ intention runs the risk of being disingenuous, since Kant presented his religion as the true religion, opposing it to historical Christianity (unless the latter, of course, is re-interpreted according to his own precepts).
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Stephen R. Palmquist

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This article extends the metaphorical trial posed by the authors of In Defense of Kant’s Religion by cross-examining them with two challenges. The firstchallenge is for the authors to clarify their claim that they are the first interpreters to present “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that portrays it as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts, given that several of the past interpreters whose works they survey in Part 1 conduct a similar type of analysis. The second is to compare the assumption pervading Part 2 of their book, that Kant conducts his first “experiment” in the first three Pieces and the second experiment in the Fourth Piece of Religion, with the previously defended view that the two experiments are weaved throughout all four Pieces. After observing several dangers this assumption poses for affirmative interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion, I conclude by showing how the authors’ problem-driven hermeneutic led them to downplay various portions of Kant’s text.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Gordon E. Michalson, Jr.

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This essay underscores the significant contribution Firestone and Jacobs make through the very thorough way their book surveys the wide range of recent scholarship bearing on Kant’s Religion. The essay then argues, however, that the complex scaffolding designed to summarize and categorize the varied responses to Kant has the effect of muting the authors’ own very bold interpretive stance. This point is particularly true with respect to their account of the compatibility of Kant’s Religion with the Christian tradition. In addition, the essay suggests that the judicial metaphor of “defense” is overplayed, forcing certain interpretations of Kant into potentially misleading positions for the sake of the interpretive scheme.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Chris L. Firestone

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This essay replies to four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In reply to Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., I argue that the best pathway for understandingKant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Religion) is to conduct close textual analysis rather than giving up the art of interpretation or allowing meta-considerations surrounding Kant’s personal and political circumstances to govern one’s interpretation. In response to George di Giovanni, I contend that his critique is dismissive of theologically robust readings of Kant for reasons that have very little to do with what Religion actually asserts. Pamela Sue Anderson’s essay, I argue, reads Kant on God according to an empirically-biased stream of British interpretation which makes Kant’s transcendental philosophy appear foreign to its rationalist heritage. Lastly, in response to Stephen R. Palmquist, I suggest that his reading of Kant’s two experiments is done not only in a vacuum, but also according to a perspectival interpretation of Kant that goes beyond what Kant’s writings actually maintain.
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Nathan A. Jacobs

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In this essay, I reply to the above four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In reply to George di Giovanni, I highlight the interpretive differencesthat divide the authors of IDKR and di Giovanni, and argue that di Giovanni’s atheist reading of Kant does not follow, even granting his premises. In reply to Pamela Sue Anderson, I show that if her reading of Kant is accurate, Kant’s own talk of God becomes empty and contemptible by his own lights, and I then show how her empirical bias prompts a significant misreading of IDKR. In reply to Stephen Palmquist, I expose four fallacious maneuvers in his paper, which comprise the bulk of his essay. And in reply to Michalson, I address a series of minor concerns raised in his essay, and then set the record straight on the motives behind IDKR in general and my own take on Kant’s compatibility (or lack thereof) with Christianity in specific.

book reviews

9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Michael Almeida

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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Dale Tuggy

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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Paul C. Anders

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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
C. Stephen Evans

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13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
E. J. Lowe

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14. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
William J. Abraham

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