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Displaying: 1-20 of 29 documents


1. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
David Galloway

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This is a discussion of L. Jonathan Cohen’s argument against the possibility that empirical psychological research might show that lay deductive competence is inconsistent. I argue that, within the framework Cohen provides, the consistency of lay deductive practice is indeterminate.

2. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Weng Hong Tang

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According to success semantics, a belief’s content is that which guarantees the success of the actions that the belief, in combination with the relevant desires, would cause. One worry with the view is that it seems to apply only to full beliefs and fares poorly in dealing with partial beliefs. For example, if Ida’s partial belief that p is of strength 0.5, she may act in a way that would fulfill her desires if p were in fact false—assuming that she desires money, she may well accept a bet that pays her $500 if not-p and costs her nothing otherwise. In response to the worry, defenders of success semantics hold that the content of a partial belief is simply that which guarantees the success of the actions it would cause were it a full belief. But, as I’ll argue in this paper, such a response is unsatisfactory.

3. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Andrew J. Pierce

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In recent work, Joshua Glasgow has offered a definition of racism that is supposed to put to rest the debates between cognitive, behavioral, attitudinal, and institutionalist definitions. The key to such a definition, he argues, is the idea of disrespect. He claims: “φ is racist if and only if φ is disrespectful toward members of racialized group R as Rs.” While this definition may capture an important commonality among cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal accounts of racism, I argue that his attempt to expand the definition to cover institutional or “structural” racism is less persuasive. Alternatively, I argue that structural racism must be understood in terms of injustice rather than disrespect. This involves giving a fuller account of how institutions are related to the beliefs, actions, and intentions of individuals, and thus how they can come to embody a certain kind of agency.

4. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Micah Newman

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The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), according to which two objects are identical if they share all the same properties, has come in for much criticism. Michael Della Rocca has recently defended PII on the grounds that it is needed to forestall the possibility that where there appears to be only one object present, there is actually a multiplicity of exactly-overlapping such objects. Katherine Hawley has criticized this approach for violating a plausible “ground rule” in applying rules of indiscernibility to questions of identity: where there is putative duplication, it must be qualitatively significant. Hawley further suggests that with this rule in hand, one can tell the difference between the presence of one and two indiscernible objects without recourse to either PII or brute, nonqualitative individuation. In this paper, I critically examine Hawley’s contention and find that her appeal to “qualitatively significant duplication” fails since its application to distinct indiscernibles involves a difference that is primarily quantitative anyway. The upshot is a different proposed set of “ground rules” for applying the criterion of qualitative difference when seeking a grounding or explanation for distinctness and identity.

5. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Evan Butts

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Ability is a key notion in much contemporary externalist epistemology. Various authors have argued that there is (at least) an ability condition on knowledge (e.g., Ernest Sosa, John Greco, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard). Moreover, epistemic justification is also arguably tied to ability. Yet there is not total agreement amongst the interested parties about the conditions under which subjects possess abilities, nor the conditions under which a subject who possesses an ability exercises or manifests it. Here, I will address what conditions must obtain for a subject to possess an ability.

6. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Gary Bartlett

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In “New Troubles for the Qualia Freak,” Michael Tye argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic micro­physical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal to the unargued intuition that experience could not occur in something small enough to fit in a Petri dish.

7. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Brian Ball

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Frank Hindriks (2007) has attempted to derive a (restricted, moral) variant of Timothy Williamson’s (2000) knowledge rule for assertion on the basis of a more fundamental belief expression analysis of that speech act. I show that his attempted derivation involves a crucial equivocation between two senses of ‘must,’ and therefore fails. I suggest two possible repairs; but I argue that even if they are successful, we should prefer Williamson’s fully general knowledge rule to Hindriks’s restricted moral norm.

8. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Frank Hindriks, Barteld Kooi

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According to the expression account, assertion is the linguistic expression of belief. Given the knowledge rule of belief, this entails that knowledge is a normative requirement of sincere assertions. On this account, which is defended in Hindriks (2007), knowledge can be a normative requirement of sincere assertions even though there is no knowledge rule that is constitutive of assertion. Ball (2014) criticizes this claim arguing that the derivation of the knowledge rule equivocates between epistemic and moral senses of obligation. In response, we resist the charge of equivocation. Ball does not, after all, demonstrate that the distinction matters in the context at issue. In addition to this, we argue that it is a virtue of the account that the knowledge rule is restricted in application to sincere assertions. The case we present to illustrate this is that of the virtuous liar who knows what he believes, and is insincere because that is the right thing to do in the situation. It makes no sense, we suggest, to criticize the liar for not knowing that which he asserts. After all, it is his moral duty to assert what he knows to be false. Furthermore, his epistemic standing is impeccable, as he knows what he believes.

9. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Brian Ball

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10. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Pieranna Garavaso

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This paper addresses a question concerning psycho­logical continuity, i.e., which features preserve the same psychological subject over time; this is not the same question as the one concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. Marc Slors defends an account of psychological continuity that adds two features to Derek Parfit’s Relation R, namely narrativity and embodiment. Slors’s account is a significant improvement on Parfit’s, but still lacks an explicit acknowledgment of a third feature that I call relationality. Because they are usually regarded as cases of radical discontinuity, I start my discussion from the experiences of psychological disruption undergone by victims of severe violence and trauma. As it turns out, the challenges we encounter in granting continuity to the experiences of violence and trauma victims are germane to those we encounter in granting continuity to the experiences of subjects in non-traumatic contexts. What is missing in the most popular accounts of psychological continuity is an explicit acknowledgment of the links that tie our psychological lives to other subjects. A more persuasive notion of psychological continuity is not only embodied and narrative, as is Slors’s notion, but also explicitly relational.

11. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Jeffrey F. Sicha

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Wilfrid Sellars has been widely—though, I argue, largely mistakenly—criticized for his doctrine of picturing. I claim that a more thorough and accurate exposition of this doctrine shows that it does not suffer from alleged mistakes and, in addition, benefits Sellars’s general position by being the source for an “external” criterion of success for basic empirical truths, by providing a way to incorporate into his position the “mapping” processes of “animal representational systems,” and, finally, by being the philosophical piece in his “functional” account of meaning that allows it to deal with “names.”

12. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Robert K. Garcia

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I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. On the other hand, if we take principal attributes to be tropes, then IC introduces challenges that undermine the argument. This is partly because the assumption of tropes makes it possible to distinguish several versions of substance dualism, versions that differ with respect to their degree of generality. I argue that taking principal attributes to be tropes makes it challenging to establish any of these versions by way of an IC-based separability argument. I conclude the paper by suggesting a way forward for the proponent of the separability argument.

13. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Nicole Hassoun

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In “World Poverty and Individual Freedom” (WPIF), I argue that the global order—because it is coercive—is obligated to do what it can to ensure that its subjects are capable of autonomously agreeing to its rule. This requires helping them meet their basic needs. In “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough,” Jorn Sonderholm asserts that this argument is invalid and unsound, in part, because it is too demanding. This article explains why Sonderholm’s critique is mistaken and misses the main point of WPIF’s argument. It also explains why WPIF is important—it can address some of those most resistant to significant obligations of global justice—libertarians, actual consent theorists, and statists.

14. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Steve Matthews

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In what sense is a person addicted to drugs or alcohol incompetent, and so a legitimate object of coercive treatment? The standard tests for competence do not pick out the capacity that is lost in addiction: the capacity to properly regulate consumption. This paper is an attempt to sketch a justificatory framework for understanding the conditions under which addicted persons may be treated against their will. These conditions rarely obtain, for they apply only when addiction is extremely severe and great harm threatens. It will be argued also that to widen the measures currently in place in some jurisdictions, though philosophically well-motivated, would require very strong evidence of a set of conditions disposing a person to an addictive future. It is doubtful that any such currently available evidence is strong enough to justify coercive treatment. Nevertheless, coercive treatment of addiction is already a reality, with the potential for more, and so some discussion will be presented regarding the extraordinary safeguards necessary to prevent misapplication of such treatment policies.

15. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
James John

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The qualia theory (QT) says that experiences’ phenomenal properties can come apart from and completely outrun their representational properties and that phenomenal properties are to be accounted for in terms of “qualia,” intrinsic nonrepresentational mental properties of experience. In Consciousness and Cognition Michael Thau argues that QT is incoherent. Thau’s argument fails. It rests on an illegitimate assimilation of phenomenal differences to differences in “the way things seem.” It begs the question by assuming that representational content can suffice for phenomenal character. And it overlooks a crucial difference between two very different versions of QT. The upshot is that QT is much more plausible than representationalist critics like Thau have supposed.

16. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Roberto Colonna

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Leopoldo Zea, one of the most important and original thinkers in contemporary Latin-American thinking, analyzed through his very long and fruitful career, the problem of cultural identity, focusing in particular on the complex relationship that has arisen between Latin-American culture and Western culture. This article presents, after a brief analysis of the most characteristic aspects of Zea’s thought, an interview, which I did with Zea in 2001. In this interview, probably the last that the Mexican philosopher was to give (Zea died in June 2004), some of the fundamental passages of his philosophy are re-examined and explored in greater depth.

17. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Shawn Graves

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Richard Feldman and Ram Neta have recently noted that philosophers give relatively little attention to specifying the conditions under which S has something as evidence at a time. This issue is significant to evidentialists. Evidentialism states that which doxastic attitude S is epistemically justified in taking toward a proposition at a time depends upon what is supported by the total evidence S has at that time. What we regard as being necessary and sufficient for S’s having something as evidence partly determines evidentialism’s implications in all cases. Evidentialists need to offer a plausible account that, when conjoined with evidentialism, yields plausible results about epistemic justification in all cases. Here’s what I do in this paper. After considering and rejecting two attempts to identify when S has something as evidence, I present and explain Richard Feldman’s recent account. I argue that evidentialists ought to reject Feldman’s account, too.

18. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Masashi Kasaki

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Virtue epistemology has it that knowledge is a kind of success through ability, and explains the value of knowledge in terms of the general value of success through ability. However, Duncan Pritchard, in a series of recent writings, argues that knowledge is not merely a success through ability, and the virtue-theoretic explanation of the value of knowledge fails. He derives general claims about what he calls ‘environmental luck’ from certain examples, and uses them against virtue epistemology. First, I propose counterexamples to Pritchard’s general claims about environmental luck. Second, I offer a diagnosis of both Pritchard’s and my examples, according to which they differ as to how many abilities are responsible for the performance in question. Different structures of performance make for different conditions for success to be fully creditable to a subject. Once this is taken account of, virtue epistemology can deal with all the examples, while maintaining its main tenet that the value of knowledge is explained in terms of the value of success through ability. Third, I show that my response to Pritchard’s argument against virtue epistemology is more plausible then the ones offered by John Greco and Ernest Sosa.

19. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup

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Recently, the possibility of misrepresentation has resurfaced in the debate between higher-order thought theorists and their opponents. One new element in the debate has been the rare cases of Charles Bonnet syndrome (RCB cases), proposed as empirical evidence for misrepresentation as posited by the higher-order theories. In this article I will spell out the argument supposedly underlying the claim that the RCB cases are genuine empirical evidence of misrepresentation. I will then proceed to show that this argument relies on a hidden premise. With this premise exposed the argument cannot support the notion of misrepresentation posited by higher-order theories.

the american style in philosophy

20. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 39
Áine Mahon

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