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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3

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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Paul Symington

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This article considers the significance of Kant’s schematized categories in the Critique of Pure Reason for contemporary metaphysics. I present Kant’s understanding of the schematism and how it functions within his critique of the limits of pure reason. Then I argue that, although the true role of the schemata is a relatively late development in Kant’s thought, it is nevertheless a core notion, and the central task of the first Critique can be sufficiently articulated in the language of the schematism. A surprising result of Kant’s doctrine of the schematism is that a limited form of metaphysics is possible even within the parameters set out in the first Critique. To show this, I offer contrasting examples of legitimate and illegitimate forays into metaphysics in light of the condition of the schematized categories.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
William Lane Craig

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Graham Oppy has emerged as one of the kalam cosmological argument’s most formidable opponents. He rejects all four of the arguments drawn from metaphysics and physics for the second premiss that the universe began to exist. He also thinks that we have no good reason to accept the first premiss that everything that begins to exist has a cause. In this response, I hope to show that the kalam cosmological argument is, in fact, considerably stronger than Oppy claims, surviving even his trenchant critique.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Thomas W. Smythe, Michael Rectenwald

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In this paper we critically evaluate an argument put forward by William Lane Craig for the existence of God based on the assumption that if there were no God, there could be no objective morality. Contrary to Craig, we show that there are some necessary moral truths and objective moral reasoning that holds up whether there is a God or not. We go on to argue that religious faith, when taken alone and without reason or evidence, actually risks undermining morality and is an unreliable source of moral truths. We recommend a viewpoint on morality that is based on reason and public consensus, that is compatible with science, and that cuts across the range of religious and non-religious positions.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Angela McKay Knobel

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Although scholars agree that Aquinas believed the pagan could possess “true but imperfect” virtues, there is deep disagreement over the question of how these “true but imperfect” virtues should be understood. Some scholars argue that Aquinas believed the pagan’s imperfect virtues are nonetheless ordered to a genuinely good end (his natural good) and are connected by acquired prudence. Other scholars argue that Aquinas believed that any virtues that the pagan possesses are considerably more limited: they are more akin to dispositions than habits, and they are not connected. This paper argues that this latter position is incoherent. If one is willing to concede that the pagan can perform genuinely good actions, then one must concede that the pagan can possess genuine (albeit imperfect) virtues that are connected by acquired prudence.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
R.E. Houser

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Thomas of Aquino, from the time he wrote his commentary on the Sentences through writing the Summa of Theology, recognized how far beyond Aristotle’s as the rational theology of Avicenna. After perfecting his approach to proving the existence of God in the “five ways,” Aquinas further developed Avicenna’s organization for treating God’s nature by simplifying Avicenna’s often convoluted thought and added his own developments in content and order. In sum, Aquinas’s treatment of God’s nature depends closely upon Avicenna’s treatment of the subject in his Metaphysics 8.3–7, even more so than upon Aristotle. This conclusion can be seen by comparing the doctrines of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Aquinas on the divine nature.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Robert E. Wood

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The free spirit is central to Spinoza, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Each of them sees it as linked to the recognition of necessity. They also see freedom in relation to the Totality: God or nature for Spinoza, absolute spirit for Hegel, and for Nietzsche the will to power operating within the eternal recurrence of the same. For all three—especially for Nietzsche who might seem to hold the opposite—the free condition is won through strenuous self-discipline. Further, all three deal with the notion of Being. For Spinoza, the notion of Being as the starting-point is equivalent to substance; for Hegel, Being is empty reference to Totality that affords primordial distance for individual human beings; for Nietzsche, Being is irrelevant emptiness. But it is only Hegel who establishes a ground for individual self-determinationthrough the emptiness of the human reference toward Totality.

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8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Brendan Sweetman

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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Paul DeHart

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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Mark Piper

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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3
Thornton C. Lockwood, Jr.

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13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 51 > Issue: 3

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