Faith and Philosophy

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief.

The doctrine of reincarnation is usually associated with Buddhism, Hinduism and other Eastern religions. But it has also been developed in Druzism and Judaism. The doctrine has been used by these traditions to explain the existence of evil within a moral order. Traversing the boundaries between East and West, we explore how Jewish mysticism has employed the doctrine to help answer the problem of evil. We explore the doctrine particularly as we respond to objections against employing it in a theodicy. We show how it supplements traditional punishment, free will and soul-building theodicies, and helps these theodicies avoid various objections.

Theists typically think the freedom to choose between right and wrong is a great good (hence, the free will defense). Yet, they also typically think that the very best being—God—and inhabitants of the very best place—heaven—lack this kind of freedom. The question arises: if freedom to choose evil is so good, then why is it absent from the best being and the best place? I discuss articulations of this question in the literature and point out drawbacks of answers that have been proposed. I then propose a new answer by showing how freedom to do evil could result in certain good situations even if it does not contribute to the intrinsic greatness of a certain being or place.

In this note, I consider an argument advanced by William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair against the possibility of actual infinite collections based onHilbert’s Hotel and alleged problems with inverse operations in transfinite arithmetic. I aim to show that this argument is misguided, since it is based on a mistaken view that the impossibility of defining ℵ0 - ℵ0 entails the impossibility of removing an infinite subcollection from an infinite collection.

In this very short paper, I argue that it is possible to harmonize the doctrine of original sin, as western Christendom has traditionally understood it, with a polygenist account of human ancestry. To this end, particular attention is paid to the encyclical Humani Generis (1950), in which Pope Pius XII strongly cautions against polygenist ideas.

Dale Tuggy has criticized my proposal for the doctrine of the Trinity, claiming that social trinitarianism cannot be monotheistic. I present a counter-argument, and consider the ways in which Tuggy might respond to it.

Recently Jeff Jordan has argued against the view that divine perfection would require God to love every human with equal maximal intensity. He asserts that his argument depends on principles of perfect being theology which he develops and defends. In this paper I argue that Jordan’s case can be better understood as two conceptually distinct arguments, only one of which depends on his proffered principles of perfect being theology. I then critically evaluate each of these arguments, arguing that both are unsuccessful.