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articles

1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Kenneth Boyce

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Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to establish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. (2) There is evil in the world. Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing a positive case that (1) and (2) are consistent. A weakness in Plantinga’s free will defense, however, is that it does not show that theism is consistent with the proposition that there are non-moral evils in the world (i.e., that there obtain morally bad states of affairs for which no creature is morally responsible). But many of us firmly believe that there are evils of that sort. I show how Plantinga’s free will defense can be extended so as to redress this weakness.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Joseph Corabi

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Recently, there have been a number of responses to Ted Sider’s argument in “Hell and Vagueness,” which challenges the consistency of a popular view of hell with God’s justice. After presenting an interpretation of the original argument, I critically examine the reply to it by Trent Dougherty and Ted Poston. I conclude that we should be suspicious of the success of their overall approach, both because it requires the truth of controversial metaphysical theses and because it does not ultimately address the heart of the worry that Sider’s argument is built on. Ultimately, I present and offer a limited defense of a new response to Sider, built on a picture of consignment to hell based on having committed mortal sins that are unforgiven by God.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Katherin A. Rogers

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Hugh McCann argues that God wills human sin, that humans are nonetheless significantly free, and that his position provides a satisfying theodicy of sin. I defend an Anselmian view: Although God causes the existence of all that exists, He does not produce sin. Human beings are the ultimate sources of their sinning, which sinning should not happen. McCann rejoins that my position is incoherent and that my criticisms are not well taken. I respond, clarifying Anselm’s understanding of human freedom, revisiting and defending my previous criticisms, and arguing that in practice McCann’s position is a poor fit for the Christian life.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Steven B. Cowan

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In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe seek to respond to the so-called “Problem of Heavenly Freedom,” the problem ofexplaining how the redeemed in heaven can be free yet incapable of sinning. In the course of offering their solution, they argue that compatibilism is inadequateas a solution because it (1) undermines the free will defense against the logical problem of evil, and (2) exacerbates the problem of evil by making God the “author of sin.” In this paper, I respond to these charges and argue that compatibilism can offer a satisfactory explanation for the sinlessness of the redeemed in heaven. I also raise some problems for Pawl’s and Timpe’s incompatibilist solution.

review essay

5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
William Hasker Orcid-ID

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Eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering is a major contribution to the literature on the problem of evil. This reviewessay summarizes the overall argument of the book, pointing out both merits and difficulties with Stump’s approach. In particular, the essay urges objectionsto the solution she presents for the problem of suffering.

reviews

6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Greg Welty

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7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Hugh J. McCann

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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Paul J. Griffiths

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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Jacqueline Mariña

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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Dale Jacquette

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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Kai-Man Kwan

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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Eric Reitan

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13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Daniel N. Robinson

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14. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 4
Timothy Paul Erdel

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articles

15. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Wolterstorff

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In this article I review some of the more important developments in philosophy of the past fifty years with the aim of pointing out the contribution that the work of Alvin Plantinga has made to these developments. Along the way I also highlight the most important enduring themes in Plantinga’s work.
16. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 3
Alvin Plantinga

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17. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 3
Jeff Speaks

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Most arguments against God’s existence aim to show that it is incompatible with various apparent features of the world, such as the existence of evil or of human free will. In response, theists have sought to show that God’s existence is compatible with these features of the world. However, the fact that the proposition that God exists is necessary if possible introduces some underappreciated difficulties for these arguments.
18. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 3
Robert Audi

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The concept of faith is central in the philosophy of religion, and the concept of virtue is central in ethics. Both can be clarified by exploring their relationshipswith each other and their connection with conduct, reasons for action, and the good. One important question is whether faith is a virtue. Answering this requires at least a partial account of what constitutes faith and of what makes a characteristic a virtue. The answer also depends on whether we are speaking of religious faith or of faith in general, and on what “content” the faith in question has. This paper approaches the question by contrasting faith with faithfulness, connecting both with trust, and exploring conditions under which each may count as a virtue.
19. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 3
Brian Leftow

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One central claim of orthodox Christianity is that in Jesus of Nazareth, God became man. On Chalcedonian orthodoxy, this involves one person, God the Son, having two natures, divine and human. If He does, one person has two properties, deity and humanity. But the Incarnation also involves concrete objects, God the Son (GS), Jesus’s human body (B) and—I will assume—Jesus’s human soul (S). If God becomes human, GS, B and S somehow become one thing. It would be good to have a metaphysical account of their oneness. I have suggested one. Thomas Senor has criticized my suggestion. I now reply to his case.
20. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 3
Jonathan D. Matheson

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Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology—that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty’s argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.