Social Theory and Practice

Observation by nonstandard observers (such as cats) has different implications for privacy than observation by ordinary human beings. This seemingly trivial point yields important insights about privacy. Searching for the characteristic that explains this difference reveals that privacy is importantly related to our interest in how others see us, and the derivative interest in controlling the information upon which others’ perceptions are based. This also casts light on the important relationships between privacy, autonomy, and the development of public personae.

Constructivism often expresses a commitment to discursive respect. The paper explores interdependencies between three dimensions of discursive respect, namely, its depth, scope, and purchase. It identifies challenges for constructivist attempts to locate discursive respect in the normative space defined by these dimensions, and considers whether there can be a coherent conception of discursive respect that is plausibly deep, inclusive in scope, and meaningfully rich in purchase. I suggest that locating discursive respect within the matrix of discursive inclusion is a task partly beyond constructivism, especially if discursive respect, or the constitutive discursive standing that it accords, is an important good.

The republican case for workplace democracy (WD) is presented and defended from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firm—namely, (a) the right to freely exit the firm and (b) workplace regulation. This paper shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then shows that WD is necessary, from a republican standpoint, if workers’ interests are to be adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are finally addressed—(i) that WD is redundant, (ii) that it is unnecessary provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and (iii) that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-employment.

Mass atrocities are commonly explained in terms of changes in legal or moral norms. This paper examines the role that changes in social norms can play in precipitating or prolonging mass atrocities. I focus specifically on manipulative transformations of social norms. I first distinguish between the manipulative introduction and the manipulative activation of social norms. I then explain how both forms of manipulation can contribute to mass atrocities. Finally, extending a line of thought first suggested by Hannah Arendt, I present a case study of the manipulative introduction and activation of language rules amongst the Nazis during World War Two.

Many suggest that we should look backward and measure the differences among various parties’ past emissions of greenhouse gases to allocate moral responsibility to remedy climate change. Such backward-looking approaches face two key objections: that previous emitters were unaware of the consequences of their actions, and that the emitters who should be held responsible have disappeared. I assess several arguments that try to counter these objections: the argument from strict liability, arguments that the beneficiary of harmful or unjust emissions should pay, and arguments from distributive justice. I argue that none of these successfully justify a backward-looking approach to the temporally remote portion of the climate burden.

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it presents the urgent case of civil war, relatively undertheorized by just war theorists, along with the normative issues that pertain to this type of conflict and its participants specifically. Second, it suggests that this civil war perspective offers fresh support for the traditional “independence thesis”— separating just cause for war from the rules of its conduct—which is often criticized by contemporary moral philosophers.