

The First Children's Philosopher of Japan: Takeji Hayashi

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Introduction

In this essay I intend to introduce Takeji Hayashi as Japan's first children's philosopher. Based on his maeutic practice, I would argue that he deserves this title, although he never actually associated himself with either the European or American Philosophizing with Children movement. And above all I want to present his clinical pedagogy as a specifically Japanese tradition in philosophizing with children.

Hayashi is known in Japan as an extraordinary educator from the 1970s and 1980s¹. And yet, due to mannerist tendencies in the education profession, the pedagogical importance of his life work has been all too narrowly understood by teachers. As a result, he has not been appropriately recognized in the history of education except by a few educators from the older generation. In this way, he has been forgotten as a person, in spite of the undeniable fact that up to the present day, no other Japanese public school teacher has successfully developed a concept for teaching philosophy in elementary school. Unfortunately there is generally little interest in philosophizing with children at this level.

Especially today however, Japan ought to look back at its own attempt to help children develop their thinking processes, and at the contribution it made within the international trend toward philosophizing with children. And so I would like to illuminate Hayashi's clinical pedagogy and didactics as an academic discipline. Hayashi himself interpreted his instructional practice as a type of philosophizing with children oriented toward Socratic dialogue. Thus in his elementary school unit "On Humans", he took Socrates' original "What is that?" question² as his starting point.

I would like to call attention to Takeji Hayashi as

Japan's first children's philosopher and attempt a retrospective examination of his theory and practice from a new perspective.

In order to adequately assess the originality of Takeji Hayashi's philosophizing with archetypical school children and appreciate his achievements in Japan, some background information is required regarding the sociology of education and pedagogy in 1970s Japan, a situation that made Hayashi's program so radical and historically important.

1) The intellectual situation among Japanese educators in the 70s is significant; teachers in Japan suffered structurally under the great influence of ideological socialism and communism rising up against political conservatism. Teachers found themselves in the middle of a battle over political rights and education policy, which had already begun at the universities as fierce fights among the students and against the system.

Because of national education policy and in view of this contentious situation, Hayashi had to play the role of reformer in Japanese teacher-training at the Miyagi University of Education, and with his new idea - clinical pedagogy - he turned away from the methods of idealistic pedagogy. In his teaching, he developed innovative archetypal learning in which the child—in dialogue with the teacher—frees himself from spurious knowledge and begins to actually think. In contrast to the other pedagogical and didactic systems in which children are fed a standardized and predetermined curriculum, Hayashi always rejected mindless memorization, a strategy that was especially favored in the teaching of history. Hayashi, who also did research into Japanese history at the end of the Tokugawa era, devised, for example, a presentation in a history text of a deciding moment - the "Opening of the Country" (in which the Americans, with the help of the "Black Ship from the USA," forced the Japanese in 1853 to open their country to foreigners). He later philosophized with the children about it. The pupils were very happy to learn about the people of that time and their living conditions in such a lively way. For Hayashi this meant that he was giving the children "bread" instead of stones. In this way he criticized stereotypical instruction, in which the teacher, textbook in hand, conveys standard knowledge. It was his intention to promote "clinical skills" in the education of teachers. As in medical training, teachers were supposed to support their students' desires to learn as a group, to develop and evolve—in other words, they were supposed to give students what they needed to start solving problems cooperatively. For Hayashi,

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this was the signal that instruction “is beginning to happen.”

2) At this time a reorganization of teacher education was under way. The goal was to separate the MIYAGI Teachers College from Tohoku University (in the old system, the Imperial University Tohoku). At that time Professor Hayashi was rector of the Tohoku pedagogical faculty in the area of history of education. The professors were divided on this question and argued among themselves; in the end, the ministry's educational policy prevailed and the separation was carried out. Professor Hayashi and his allies among the professors of teacher education had raised their objections before the Tohoku professors and the ministry and had tried to keep the course in the larger Tohoku University for its own protection, but their efforts had been in vain.

After the teacher training course was moved, many of the professors elected Professor Hayashi as the first rector of the MIYAGI Teacher's College of Education. Rector Hayashi was given the task of reforming teacher education. He was asked to develop his own didactics, and together with colleagues designed a clinical pedagogy as an alternative to the idealistic pedagogy of the Tohoku faculty (the purely research-oriented academic pedagogy – a scholarly course in pedagogy). Rector Hayashi himself began to expand the teacher training reforms in accordance with his views on social justice, which at this time went hand-in-hand with a radically reformist or progressive view of pedagogy. In this he had the support of many of his colleagues in the field of didactics, most of whom were similarly progressive (“from a socialist and communist point of view.”) To this end he carried out instructional experiments in archetype schools throughout Japan using his unit “On Humans” - with its completely new methodology and content. Up to this time such an approach had never been tried, and certainly not with the intention of promoting reflection in order to elicit autonomous thinking from the children. Hayashi's first instructional experiment was carried out on February 19, 1971 (meaning that he began his practical work somewhat earlier than Matthew Lipman). Thus, as the representative of his “progressive” colleagues in didactics, he laid the foundation for a new didactics, a practical or clinical pedagogy which became the basis for reform in teacher education. I will try to reconstruct this clinical pedagogy in terms of “philosophizing with children” - seen as a “archetype science.”

3) Along with his tasks as rector at the MIYAGI Teacher's College of Education, Hayashi continued his research and teaching on the history of education at Tohoku University. There he did work both on the Greek philosophers Socrates and Plato (like the Hamburg professor Ekkehard Martens³) and on the history of Japanese education in the Meiji era. As part of the latter he studied Mori Arinori, a Meiji educational policy-maker. In the context of this research he spent some time in the USA. For his own personal development Hayashi oriented himself toward the life and person of the Christian thinker Shôzô Tanaka, who had also dedicated himself to the “social justice” theme.

Hayashi had already been associated with Christianity from his youth, when he had studied the theological curriculum of the private Christian school at TOHOKUGAKUIN University before entering the philosophy program of Tohoku University. In other words, Hayashi was a Christian scholar who had learned early in his studies about the concept of *Taishô*, i.e., democracy and education, and through his association with Japanese Christians in the USA had become acquainted with the European culture of philosophy and Christianity. His reverence for the life of the child is not Buddhist, but rather rests on his deep familiarity with Japanese Christian thinkers.

Takeji Hayashi's philosophy of *Bildung*: the Socratic idea of education

Like Socrates, Takeji Hayashi considered the active life to be the prototypical origin of philosophy⁴. As everyone knows, Socrates was not one to sit alone carrying on a monologue with himself and associating more with pen and paper than with society. Instead, Socrates was a *philo-sophos*, one who discussed dialogically in the *agora* with young men and reflected upon the truths of humanity, upon questions such as “What is *arete*, or human virtue?”, “Is it possible to teach human virtue?”, or “Who is the one to teach virtue?” Since Hayashi had studied Plato's “Apologia,” “Protagoras,” and “Menon,” the basic character of reflection in Socrates was clear to him. (GS I, 90ff.) Hayashi knew that for Socrates, a) *arete* was not something that could be taken for granted, that its definition was mired in *aporia*, at least in “Menon,” and, b) as political virtue (*politike arete*), it was identical with wisdom (*phronesis*). Following the Platonic dialogue “Gorgias,” Hayashi concluded that the problem of redemption through *arete* could be reduced to the problem of the soul's redemption⁵. Thus, concern for “improvement of the soul in wisdom and truth” (Apol. 29E) was at the center of Hayashi's calling. But wisdom for Socrates was essentially different from specialized knowledge such as *politike sophia* or *politike techne* (see “Protagoras”). Wisdom joins together with the human essence, the *agathos ta politike*, as, for example, in Pericles. But the human being is a *zoon politikon*, a social being. For this reason virtue typically makes itself felt in the public space. Human virtue (*arete*) per se is then the capacity to think conjointly with others (*symbouleuein têi polei*). Wisdom is indispensable for humans in search of the good life; it is the guarantor of human happiness. But since Socrates regarded the human being not only as *zoon politikon*, but also as *zoon logen echoen*, a creature of reason that follows the *logos*, Hayashi interprets *arete* as *phronesis*. The deed resulting from action in agreement with *logos* possesses morality. For Takeji Hayashi, the independence of the subject in its actions is the absolute prerequisite of *arete*. His moral doctrine can be regarded as a pure ethics of subjectivity (GS I, 106)⁶.

In Hayashi's view, the most important of life's duties, as outlined by Socrates in the “Apologia,” is the exami-

nation that leads to unmasking pseudo-knowledge, or *doxa*. Through this process of examination, humans should become as good and reasonable as possible (36c); it arises from the methodology of refutation, which makes ignorance manifest. An unexamined life is not worth living (38a)⁷. To make examination into an intentional method of education, Hayashi supplements his dialectics with the theory of *anamnesis* which finds its practical realization in *maeutics* (GS I, 111), or the art of midwifery, through which the soul is guided back to find its knowledge or true beliefs. To show how he puts his theory into practice, I would like to present some excerpts from his instructional unit “On Human Beings,” carried out in 1971 with 12-year-old sixth graders. Here he follows Socrates closely, who carries the bulk of the conversation; later Hayashi tries to draw the children into more intense participation. Due to this essay’s length limitations, what follows is a very abbreviated dialogue in the (German) translation of Kiichi Shimoyamada:

L (Hayashi): I’ve come so that I can think together with you about something very difficult. It is about the question “What is a human being?” What do you think about this question? It’s very difficult, but you can’t say it’s too difficult, because we are all human beings. So when I ask you what a human being is, what do you answer? Everyone can say what he or she thinks. It is really quite difficult. Kazunori Sakai?

S: I don’t know.

L: Is it all right to say that one doesn’t know this? Please think it over. You could say something.

What is a human being? The answer can be wrong. No one can come up with the right solution all at once. Through many errors we can approach the truth step by step. Miss Kuriyama, what do you think?

S: It is an animal that is developed in its head.

L: An animal, developed in its head. That’s a good answer. It makes two points: that the head develops and that a human is an animal. So now that is clear. What do you think about the head? If you call it the development of the head, then the question is, what does the head contain? Yes, you please!

S: It contains thinking.

L: Thinking. Does that mean the head is the place of thinking? That this capability exists here in the head? Then



let’s think a lot more: can you give more answers? Yes, go ahead.

S: Yes, compared to other animals, humans are patient.

L: Patient? Do you all think so? On the one hand, humans are patient compared with other animals. But are they patient when seen from all sides? What about when you compare them with oxen, for example? Then they aren’t patient any more. However, when they are sunk in silent thought one can say that they are patient. So according to your point of view, you might say that they are patient or not patient. So that could not always be right as answer to the question “What is a human being?” What else do you think?

S: The ability to invent, to create culture.

L: Yes, that’s an important point. Are there or aren’t there connections between invention, the creation of culture, and the development of the head?

S: (all) There is one! There is one!

L: There is one. That’s so. Now what do people call the ability to think, when they use a serious word? [...]

S: Wisdom.

S: Thoughtfulness.

L: Yes, the words wisdom or thoughtfulness may be used. That is true. Have you ever heard about the word “reason”? Have you heard the words “rational” or “feeling” or “will”? We are capable of thinking because we possess reason. “Reason” is what we call the power to reflect and make judgments. Is there something else? Miss Schuko Abe, please.

S: Their behavior is different.

L: What is the difference? Can you give an example? Schuko Abe, please tell us a little more.

S: Human beings stand and

walk on two legs.

L: That is an important difference between humans and animals. [...] Is there something else? It seems to me that some of you are purposely not raising your hands, even though you also know something. How about you, for example, Miss Misae Endô?

S: Right now I’m in the middle of thinking.

L: And what do you think, Sakai? Have you already thought about it? Not yet? Miss Mineko Kuriyama, then.

S: Humans can grasp things with their hands.⁸

Now Hayashi summarizes what the children have come up with, talks about the possibilities humans have because they

walk upright and can use their hands for other purposes. So that the children will be able to find out what the “essence” of being human is, he explains:

L: Now we are looking for the special quality that clarifies our statement: “That is a human being.” To use what might seem to be a difficult word, we are asking about the “essence” of the human. Have you ever heard the word? It refers to a thing’s most important distinguishing characteristic, its most basic individuality. Before you were imagining that humans were animals. It’s true that humans are animals. But there are very many animals in nature. Each animal has its own characteristics and its own way of life. Humans also have an individual character that is very different from other animals, and they also have a particular way of living. That is why we are thinking about what distinguishes humans from other animals. So far you have deduced that the human head has “thinking ability” or the capacity to invent or to make things. From that you concluded that humans create culture. That is a quality that separates humans from other animals [...] But aren’t there other living beings that can “make” things? Or aren’t there? What do you think? Or maybe the question is difficult? What do I mean? For example, a beaver can build a dam. It gnaws on the trees with its own teeth until they fall and drags them to the stream. To block the water it also makes use of stones and dirt. That is how it builds up a dam. This can be compared with “forming” something. Ants and bees are very skilled in building their “houses.” Would you be able to build a little six-sided room like the bees with no tools? Humans can’t cut down trees with their teeth or, like the bees, form a honeycomb from wax. In spite of that, humans put up buildings and dams. Now I’m asking you to think whether there is a difference between humans and beavers when they build dams. Is it the same thing or not? This is quite a difficult question, but please think about it. Yes, what do you think?

S: Yes there is a difference. Beavers or other animals are not capable of making things for the others because they need it. But humans do make something for others.

L: Making something for others could also be quality specific to human creations. Humans make dams for others who need them. But the really important difference in dam building is another one. Does the beaver think out a plan? Beavers don’t make plans. It’s true, though, that builders in the past also had no plans. Or if you wanted to make a pond in your garden, you might also try that without a plan. But is it the same thing when you make something without a plan as when a beaver does? Don’t you actually have a building plan, even if it isn’t written out with paper and pencil? When you made a pond, didn’t you have an invisible plan somewhere? Yes, Miss Kuriyama?

S: I had it in my head.

L: Yes, we have a plan in our heads. Even when we don’t have a blueprint we imagine a design. We have an intention about how we will make something. Because we then think about which materials we want to use and how much we have to have on hand, etc. Humans have the ability to think. It is the power they use to make an orderly plan and at the same time think about which actions one could choose to carry out the plan. Humans work according to a plan. This is a point where humans differentiate themselves from the other animals. To “think” something is a serious matter. Only humans have this ability. There is a variety of words one can use to express this special human quality. One example is the phrase “rational animal.” That signifies that among the many animals it is specifically humans that are rational.¹⁰

Then Hayashi and the children work through the peculiarities of tool usage. The saw, for example, is compared to the beaver’s teeth; the strength of the eagle with the development of airplanes. Together they discover that humans aren’t able like the other animals to survive with the help of inborn qualities, but that they have the ability to make tools and to improve them¹¹. For the class it was a very stimulating and novel experience to struggle with intellectually difficult, philosophical, perplexing questions and to devote all their energies to them, but they experienced deep concentration and joy in learning. As Megumi Kaimori said, “In class today I thought somewhat deeply about human beings. I reconsidered my own point of view and noticed my feelings in the process. I developed, at least slightly.”

According to Ekkehard Martens, Socrates is working toward *arete* or the good life.¹² Socratic philosophizing can be understood as the art of living.¹³ According to Hayashi, Socrates is the “teacher” who is responsible for the entire process of spiritual guidance (GS I, 122).

Ideas about Clinical Pedagogy in Takeji Hayashi Concept of Education and Image of the Child

Through educational research, Hayashi wanted to develop a foundation for Clinical Pedagogy¹⁴ in teacher training. In his opinion, it was a flaw in teacher education that there was no “clinical science of education” (N.276, KJ, 179, M.123). In what ways do the clinical ideas of Hayashi that start with the realities of children’s lives differ from previous idealistic pedagogy?

(1) Teaching as Development and Transformation

According to Hayashi, “Education is the work that furthers development” (O, 34). This corresponds to the Japanese terminology. What constitutes teaching and is the basis for education is not “Oshieru” (teaching), but rather “Sodateru”

(allowing to grow). “Sodatsu” means the ability of the individual to grow independently through an inner strength, thereby bringing body and soul into a harmonious relationship. In this sense teaching is nothing more than the activity that helps the child’s body and soul develop humanity (O.36). For this, nourishment is required, as with all living things. The prerequisite is a warm spirit of caring that comes from reverence for life (O. 34f.) or from pious respect for all living things (KS, 8). Teachers can only take on such an attitude if they have already transformed themselves and are able to enter into the perspective of the child. In this sense the only person who can teach children is the one who is able to learn from the child. In other words, the child transforms itself through the self-transformation of the teacher. Here Hayashi goes back to Goethe’s principle, “*Gestaltung und Umgestaltung*” (formation and transformation) (O. 37)¹⁵. For this reason Hayashi called for the self-reform of teachers on the practical level.

(2) The Hunger for Meaning

As was already mentioned, the child requires substantive nourishment. Like other children’s philosophers such as Lipman, for example, Hayashi also believes that the central characteristic of the child is a “hunger for meaning” and “wondering at the world.”¹⁶ Therefore Hayashi saw a “hunger for nourishment” in the depths of the child’s being.

Seen anthropologically, in Hayashi’s view the child is not just a fundamentally helpless creature¹⁷ (O.35, KJ6f., J.72), but possesses “a hunger for the nourishment that makes its development possible; that is, on the one hand, hunger for the body’s sustenance, but on the other hand, an equally great hunger for the soul’s nourishment (O. 195). Hayashi concluded from impressions received in his instructional practice that children “are hungry for instruction” (O. 195-201). Through this the child has endless capacities for self-transformation. The “Tatakiyô” of the teacher, meaning the taking up of the child’s reality and responsiveness to the child, should correlate with this basic anthropological constant. In summary, we can state that Hayashi discovered “that all children want to study” (O. 38ff.). He was even convinced that “all children are starving for learning that encounters resistance - or effective learning” (O. 40).

Instruction as archetype science (*Urwissenschaft*)

The original movement toward knowledge, the hunger for learning affects all children irresistibly. When this hunger is satisfied during instruction, an ineffable joy appears in the depths of the soul, resulting in a balanced harmony¹⁸. Hayashi reached this catharsis through his archetypal practice of “*Urwissenschaft*” (archetype science) (MK 90). Children’s archetypal “desire to know” was able to unfold in a living way in his teaching through the realization of elemental thinking in the form of philosophizing. Philosophy’s affair was for Hayashi a *pragma*, an activity, an achievement of understand-

ing that he valued highly in teaching. Epistemologically, his practice of dialogue aimed for a recognition of essences based on reason. Seen theoretically, his methodological paradigm in instruction was Socratic philosophy as the art of life¹⁹. He interpreted his philosophizing with children as “*Urwissenschaft*” with a “cathartic function.” For that reason, Hayashi strove ceaselessly in his elementary school teaching to follow the cultural, elemental learning²⁰ of the children. Basic to this were the following points:

(1) Instruction as cooperative exploration of the higher tasks with children

For Hayashi instruction is the work through which the teacher organizes the learning of the children. The subject, or the “master of learning”, however, is the child, for this is the basic precondition for instruction to take place. The teacher’s role in this is to help the child “reach the heights that could otherwise not be attained; that is the meaning of instruction”²¹ (O. 130). Teaching is thus high-level work and requires advanced knowledge in order to initiate the learning process, i.e., the children’s exploration process, and keep it moving forward. Thinking together with the children, the teacher tests their opinions.

(2) Testing what one knows and the “refutation” method

According to Hayashi, Socrates determined that *refutation*²² was the main business of education, since people should be freed through dialogue from preordained knowledge or *doxa* - for refutation is the method of liberation from the *doxa*. Thus the main task of the teacher is the struggle to demolish the *doxa* over and over again. And so *negation* has a purpose in teaching. Through uncompromising refutation the children experience liberation from their presumptions. When this happens, the eyes of the children shine and they come alive, because they have broken free of baser ideas. In this sense, the moment of refutation plays the greatest role. However, the quality of the negation is decisive. It is important that the children themselves, through their struggle with the teacher, negate their own assumptions, their current opinions or interpretations. An example of an unsuitable refutation would be the authoritarian attitude of a teacher saying things like “that won’t work.” That leads to a mechanical negation, not to the true effect of negation. Cathartic negation, the Socratic refutation, only arises when a person concludes for him or herself, from the soul’s deepest conviction, “that won’t work.” (O. 128) It is the new awareness of appearances and of ignorance that brings great joy to the children.

(3) The process of learning as catharsis – breaking out of ignorance

In his elementary school teaching, Hayashi experienced the Socratic concept of catharsis. For that reason he em-

phasized that instruction leads to catharsis. The children have purified themselves through an unrelenting search for answers (O. 174). According to Hayashi, there is a statement in Socrates' work in which he equates the process of acquiring knowledge with the process of purifying the soul. I recall that teacher Saitô used the word "cleanse" in this context. In the phrase "The children will be refreshed," one can find a connection to Socratic purification (*kalokagathia*) (N. 206). What is important for Saitô is the essential meaning of the word for Hayashi and the quality of experience in his teaching. In any case, Hayashi conceives of Socratic catharsis as purification from ignorance, in which the awareness of ignorance leads to a great inner joy, making redemption in life possible through knowledge. For children it is a joyous event. Metaphorically speaking, "ignorance" also meant for Socrates being stained with dirt and sin (see KD 42). When presumed knowledge is cast aside or overcome through learning, the faces of the children are transformed, according to Hayashi, and they become beautiful. This change in form he took for a change in personality.²³ The children also found the instruction a precious and useful experience that made them happy.



(4) Tenderness in teaching and its healing function

From October 1976 onward, the interpretation of education changed to an education for emancipation. Public school teachers who were disappointed by educational compulsions (KS 16), and who saw the significance of instructional practice as the emancipation of children constricted by the dictates of the schools, desired to distance themselves from this role and joined forces with Hayashi. Their goal was education for emancipation; they wanted "redemption for children through education" (KD 3f.)²⁴. This gave Hayashi new hope for education. He devoted his attention to those wounded or oppressed by society and dedicated himself to the education of these wounded, yet delicate souls of under-performing children. Here too he found the passionate hunger for learning (KS. iv, OM.83). But he also had to recognize that school compulsions had completely destroyed the tender souls of the children or had driven them into a corner.

(5) Daemonic magic – the fascination of philosophizing with children.

What was the primal motive that caused Hayashi to immerse himself 230 times in instructional experiments in the elementary grades? He called it "Yamitsuki," the fascination of philosophizing with children (O.11, 79), which leads to a profound encounter with the children's souls within these 45 minutes (O.80). At the beginning of his teaching experiments he was taken by surprise by the *thaumazein*, the archaic wondering of the children during instruction, and as a result he began his instructional research with Socratic philosophical conversations.

The mysterious communion of the soul with the child in this deep dimension filled Hayashi with a daemonic, magical power. At any rate, Hayashi already felt the magical power of "instruction through conversation" (O.61) in his first teaching experience in the Shiraiwa elementary school. Perhaps this primal experience could give teachers hope for a release from the hardships of the teaching profession.

Conclusion

Takeji Hayashi (1906-1985) was a theologian, Japanese philosopher, and educator. In his educational theory he unified western and eastern philosophy and culture: Hayashi brought Platonism, Socratic *maieutics*, and central ethical implications of Christianity together with the convictions of Japanese thinkers of the Meiji restoration. After he became Rector of the Miyagi Teachers College, he reevaluated his educational-philosophical theory in a practical way. In order to do that, he carried out instructional experiments in various Japanese schools. On the one hand he wanted to do basic research into the parameters of successful instruction, such as "instruction as strict organization of learning," for example. On the other hand he wanted to reconstruct an instructional theory for teacher education growing out of children's real-world situations. And so Hayashi rejected any methodology that was not tested in practice, such as the methodology of speculative pedagogy that remained on the theoretical level. In contrast, Hayashi wished to develop a clinical pedagogy based on the teaching practice of the researcher. Like Socrates, he tried to help the children through *maieutics*, or the art of midwifery, to develop their own structures and contents of knowledge. For this reason his teaching theory and practice rest exclusively on the principle of Socratic didactics. Thus Hayashi's teaching belongs to the type "philoso-

philizing with children,” for the following reasons:

1. In an instructional unit “On Human Beings” that is unusual in a Japanese context, he asks the famous “what is that?”-question.

2. He works through the question together with the children in an academic learning community (see Matthew Lipman) through cooperative inquiry in the form of a “dialogue.”

3. He encourages the children through his *maieutic* technique of “refutation” (and this is didactically significant) to overcome their ignorance and, on the basis of their experiences with ordinary dimensions of everyday life, break out of their rote understanding of things.

4. He interprets the transformation in the faces of the children while learning as “catharsis emerging from ignorance” and the physical manifestation of *kalogagathia*.”

Naturally this process does not mean for him that the children have acquired the *epistheme* or concept-formation. Rather it is important for Hayashi that the children’s hunger for fundamental learning (primal drive) is satisfied through their deep experience of primal knowledge in the phenomenon of therapeutic humanization during instruction. Seen from these angles, we can find in his teaching an instruction that does not require memorizing the answers to prescribed questions, but rather strives to develop capacity for thought and to solve the fundamentally difficult riddle of the human through “wondering” and the “What is that?”-question. In conclusion, we can see in Takeji Hayashi the first practical example in Japan of elemental thinking and philosophizing with children at the elementary school level.

Abbreviations

KD = Hayashi, Takeji (1978) /Kyôshitachi tonô Deai/ (Tôkyô: Kokudosh)

GS = Hayashi, T. (1986) Chosakushû, Vol. I- X. 1986-87. (Tôkyô: Chikuma)

N = Hayashi, Takeji (1973) /Jyugyô Ningen ni Tuite/ (Tôkyô: Kokudosh)

KJ = Kihaku Saitô & Hayashi, Takeji (1978) /Kodomo no Jijitsu/ (Tôkyô: Chikuma Shobô).

M = Hayashi, Takeji (1978) /Manabu to Iukoto/ (Tôkyô: Kokudosh)

O = Hayashi, Takeji (1978) /Oshieru to Iukoto/ (Tôkyô: Kokudosh)

KS = Hayashi, Takeji (1977) /Kyoiku no Saisei wo Motomete/ (Tôkyô: Chikuma Shobô)

OM = Haitani, Kenjirô & Hayashi, Takeji (1979) /Oshieru kototo Manabukoto/ (Tôkyô: Shôgakukan)

MK = Hayashi, Takeji (1978) /Manabukoto Kawarukoto, die Schrift der Fotografie/ (Conversation between Hayashi Takeji a. Takeuchi, Toshiharu) (Tôkyô: Chikuma Shobô)

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Endnotes

- ¹ Compare Terasaki, M., 1999, 447, 480f.
- ² See Martens, E., 1992, 65-79.
- ³ Martens, E. 1993, S. 403-409.
Martens, E. 1992.
Martens, E. 1999.
- ⁴ Ibid. 134.
- ⁵ Hayashi explained the further development of Plato's *arete*-concept (that is, *arete* as true *doxa* and its pedagogical significance) in his essay "Redemption through Knowledge" (GS I, 158-190).
- ⁶ The Greeks established reason, or *logos* - rational thinking and rational deliberation – as the guide for living and the mediator in the life of the state (*polis*). Thus the Greek citizen became history's first free individual within the state. The basic character of this citizen is thirst for knowledge, or the inclination to seek knowledge for its own sake ("On Greek Reason," GS I, 240f., 246).
- ⁷ As a side note, the critical examination of a way of life oriented towards worldly goods, mere income or fame is only the precondition but not the content of the happy life. (Martens, E. 1992, 124).
- ⁸ N, 14-17.
- ⁹ In order to answer this question one must have at least a basic knowledge of physical anthropology, for example, Darwin's theory of descent, the idea of man as a defective being (*Mangelwesen*) (Gehlen, A.), and as a learning being (Portmann, A.). This question also has a connection with the pedagogical view of man in Kant and Langefeld. Kant defines man in his pedagogical lecture as "the only creature that requires education" (Kant, 1803, Werke, XII, 697). According to Martius Jan Langefeld, man is an *animal educandum* (see Langefeld, M. J., 177).
- ¹⁰ N, 18-20.
- ¹¹ Compare Scheler, M., 1928. By not interpreting the human in comparison with God, but rather inquiring after the difference between humans and animals, Scheler's philosophical anthropology took an interesting turn. He said that what made humans human was, in comparison to the most intelligent of animals, neither intelligence nor imagination nor memory. The special human principle determining the essential difference was one that might even be considered opposed to life - which he called spirit (*Geist*). See Gehlen, A., 1961, 15.
- ¹² See Martens, E. 1992, 119. But it is true that Socrates, as opposed to Plato, emphasizes the necessity of critical examination and refers to *arete* (Ibid, 137).
- ¹³ Stenzel, J. 1961, 78. See also Martens, E. 1992, 134.
- ¹⁴ Hayashi developed a clinical pedagogy that stands in sharp contrast to idealistic pedagogy, which is carried out without any practical connection to educational practice. The occasion for this was the separation of the Miyagi Teachers College from Tôhoku University (N, 233; M, 44f.).
- ¹⁵ Compare Goethe, J. W. v. Faust, Vs. 6287 (Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden, Vol. III, 193). But in Goethe's poetry it signifies apprehending in phenomena the prototypes of life. (Ibid. 367). In Hayashi the logic of transfiguration is reinterpreted in practical dimensions. Possibly Hayashi makes reference here to the Christian

thinker Shôzô Tanaka's living model of transfiguration on the way to the *vita nuova* (T, 211). For the teachers, school is, according to Hayashi, "the training ground of humanity."

¹⁶ Compare Martens, E. 1999 and Engelhart, 1997, 56f.

¹⁷ See: J.G. Herder und Arnold Gehlen's view of humans as defective beings, and the *Biological Fragments* of Adolf Portmann.

¹⁸ Children take great pleasure in mental exercises, riddles, and thought puzzles that require intelligence, imagination and persistence (Freese, H.-L. 1996, 167). Instruction as primal knowledge begins with wondering at the riddle of the world (the riddle-question) and with the "What is that?" question about its origin (*arche*), as in the natural philosophy of the Greeks.

¹⁹ Compare Martens, E. 1992, 132ff.

²⁰ On "elemental thinking" see for example Goethe's "Anschauende Urteilskraft, HA XIII, 30f. One might say that in the pedagogical area Hayashi tried ceaselessly to penetrate into the primal, typical realm of learning and made of his instructional practice a proto-science. Compare also elemental philosophy as popular philosophy in Albert Schweitzer 1971, 28f, 233. Compare also Günzler, Claus, 1996 and Ekkehard Martens, 2003, 26f.

²¹ Hayashi sharply distinguished his instruction from a superficial, only briefly independent or active-seeming instruction, and criticized it as an abdication of responsibility on the teacher's part.

²² Hayashi thought he had found the moment of Socratic examination and refutation in the educational practice of his colleague K. Saitô. Of course Saitô, in his thoughts on education, was no Socrates expert, but rather a poet who interpreted the transformation of the children during instruction as an aesthetic refreshment. Both of them emphasized the real world experience of the children as methodological prerequisite of their pedagogy, and also the logic of teachers reforming themselves as a challenge to other public school teachers. But their interpretive apparatus and their preconceptions about education - seen from the standpoint of hermeneutics – reveal substantial differences.

²³ At the meeting of the Education Committee of the Upper House of Parliament on April 14, 1977, where the reform of university examinations was discussed, Hayashi made a short, 15-minute presentation using photos in which he showed the parliamentarians the beautiful transformation of previously suffering student faces (M, 244f., See also O, 266f.).

²⁴ See also Camhy, D. 1991, 15. According to Camhy, philosophizing can help children get along better with others and deal more easily with conflict situations, "since it can be a helpful means...to clarify thoughts, question ideas and opinions and identify possible solutions and various approaches to problem solving. [...] This capacity for reflection, for distance, can possibly lead to liberation, to salvation from restlessness." Camhy, D., 1984, 32.